**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

August 10, 2006

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
The Black Vault Headquarters
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 31, 2004, to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), for a copy of the document AD B232504, entitled, "Classification of Secrecy has Been Removed: Losses Suffered by USSR Armed Forces in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts." The DTIC forwarded your request to the Department of the Army, Freedom of Informatin and Privacy Acts Office, and that agency forwarded your request to this office for appropriate action and direct response to you. This request was received in this office on December 7, 2004.

b. Our letter of December 9, 2004, informing you we were searching for the records at another element of our command and that we were unable to comply with the statutory 20-day time limit in processing your request.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), that the record is releasable to you.

Please be advised that this record is an edited English language translation of a foreign language record prepared for official U.S. Government use; dissemination may be in violation of the law. The NGIC no longer possesses the original foreign language monograph.

We are forwarding a copy of this letter to the Department of the Army, FOIA (FOIA 05-0188).

Fees for processing this request are waived.

If you have any questions regarding this action, please feel free to contact this office at (301) 677-4060. Please refer to case #223F-05.

Sincerely,

Susan J. Butterfield
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CENTER
220 SEVENTH STREET, NE
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22902-5396

NGIC-HT-0288-95 DATE: January 3, 1996

**ENGLISH TITLE:** Classification of secrecy has been removed: losses suffered by USSR Armed Forces in wars, combat operations, and military conflicts.

**TRANSLATION OF:** *Grif sekretnosti snyat: poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voynakh, boyevykh deystviyakh i voyennykh konfliktakh.* ISBN 5-203-01400-0. 1993. Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo [Military Publishing House.] 416 p.

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**AUTHOR (AFFILIATION):** G.F. KRIVOSHEYEV, V.M. ANDRONIKOV, P.D. BURIKOV, V.V. GURKIN, et al.

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NGIC-HT-0288-95

# THE STAMP OF SECRECY IS REMOVED

# SOVIET ARMED FORCES LOSSES IN WARS, COMBAT OPERATIONS AND MILITARY CONFLICTS

## A STATISTICAL STUDY

Under the overall editorship of
Candidate of Military Sciences, General-Lieutenant
G.F. KRIVOSHEYEV

MOSCOW
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**The Stamp** of Secrecy Is Removed: Losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts: A Statistical Study/V.M. Andronikov, P.D. Burikov, V.V. Gurkin et.al.; Under the overall editorship of G.F. Krivosheyev. - Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1993. 415 p.

ISBN 5-203-01400-0

Up until recently this information was kept under the "Secret" stamp. This book for the first time will present summarized information about the losses of the army and navy during the whole history of their existence, starting with the civil war and ending with the war in Afghanistan. Quantitative information is published regarding the arms of service, strategic operations, battles, fronts, and individual armies, and losses of officers are described. An analysis is made of the numerical composition of the missing in action and the prisoners of war.

This book is intended for a broad range of readers.

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**Chapter IV**
**Losses among Soviet servicemen who participated in providing international, military and technical assistance to other countries, and also in eliminating military border conflicts**

# FORWARD

This book is a statistical study of the losses of personnel and combat equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, combat operations and military conflicts during the period from 1918 through 1989.

During this time our country was repeatedly subjected to aggression. The greatest of these was the attack by fascist Germany in 1941. Millions of Soviet people had to take up arms in order to defend the Fatherland. Many losses were suffered in the name of freedom and independence for our Homeland.

The courage and heroism of the sons and daughters of the Fatherland, who in the battles for freedom for their native land gave up the most precious thing - their lives, are seen behind these bitter numbers. Those who defended the country against numerous interventionists, who courageously opposed the Nazis and who died in battles around Minsk and Kiev, around Moscow and Leningrad, who went from the Volga to Berlin and who fell at the walls of the Reichstag, who died from wounds in a hospital, who up to their last hour maintained their fidelity to the Homeland in the hellish conditions of fascist imprisonment, and who perished as internationalist soldiers clearly stand out.

Up until recently statistical information about the military losses was classified as "Secret". The practice of the temporary classifying of this information was common in many countries of the world. However the process of removing the cover has "dragged out" for us. Therefore among some historians and publicists the desire arose to determine independently the scale of the military losses. During this their calculations were based on fragmentary information, on subjective arguments that were not supported by documentation. In some parts of the mass media calculations about losses which were taken from foreign sources that were also far from the historical truth appeared. All of this leads to the distortion of the real state of affairs and sometimes to attempts to devalue the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and to depreciate the high moral spirit of our soldiers, the fighting and organizational qualities of the command personnel of the army and navy, and their loyalty to the Homeland.

In connection with the removal of the stamp of secrecy from documents about the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, the collective of authors of this book for the first time conducted a statistical study of all types of personnel (and equipment for 1941-1945) losses by the army and navy during the years of Soviet power.

The main task of this work is to give to historians, publicists, military cadres and a broad range of readers generalized, objectively presented factual quantitative material.

The information about the military losses presented in this book, as it seems, can be objectively understood in the mass of those great difficulties by which various stages of the civil and Great Patriotic wars are characterized, in the strong and weak sides of the combat and mobilizational readiness of the army to repel an aggressor, in the state of the defense capability of the country, and in the strength of the spirit of the Soviet people. These studies give the opportunity to evaluate more realistically the role of the Soviet art of war in battles and

operations as well. The authors hope that the material of the statistical study, taking into account all of the brevity of the presentation, will turn out to be useful for those who are studying the military history of our Homeland.

In the course of the research work, which took several years, thousands of separate report and statistical documents that are stored in various archives were summarized, and analyses and comparisons were made. The search that was undertaken showed that the statistics for the war years, unfortunately, are far from complete. The years of the civil war and the first period of the Great Patriotic War are distinguished by their meagerness. This is explained by the difficult conditions in which the Red Army conducted combat operations. Often information about losses was lost, and sometimes it was, generally speaking, not reported to anyone (such a shortcoming is inherent to materials concerning the losses of fascist Germany in 1945, when its concise system of reports and accounting for the losses had completely disintegrated). In individual cases, when it was not possible to find the missing documents, the authors of the book determined the number of losses by means of calculations.

The main contents of the book are an analysis of the losses of personnel of the active army and fleet, and also the strategic formations, formations and units which directly participated in individual armed conflicts. Also, it presents the losses of border and interior troops which are taken into account during stages of the medical evacuation. In 1988 at the request of the General Staff, workers of the KGB and the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs did the necessary calculations of the irrecoverable losses of personnel for the Soviet Armed forces in the Great Patriotic War.

To compare and evaluate the scale of the losses information about the size of the Red Army and the Navy in various stages of their combat activity is presented in a series of tables. Information about the losses is presented in standard tables and diagrams. They show the types of losses, the categories of the killed servicemen and those who died by years (quarters) of the war, by fronts, by operations, and by the branches of the Armed Forces and the arms of service, with the exception of those cases when because of the absence of information it was not possible to do this.

The make-up of the killed and wounded servicemen, regardless of how they are termed, is basically given in contemporary terminology. The officers include the middle, senior and higher command personnel, students of military educational establishments, generals and admirals; the sergeants include the junior command personnel, ranking NCO's and warrant officers; and the soldiers include the Red Army soldiers, Red Fleet sailors, seamen, and also cadets of military educational establishments.

The personnel losses of the active army (fleet) are subdivided in the book into:

a) **irrecoverable**- they include those killed on the battlefield, those who died from wounds during stages of medical evacuation, those who were missing in action and who ended up as prisoners (the number of those who died from wounds and diseases in hospitals is shown only in the overall losses of the Armed Forces). The

number of the irrecoverable losses for the active army includes also the noncombat losses not connected with the direct conduct of military actions - those who died as a result of accidents,those sentenced by military tribunals to the highest degree of punishment for various sorts of crimes, those who ended their lives by suicide, and those who died from disease in hospitals.

b) **sick, injured and wounded** - they consist of wounded, injured, burned, sick and frost bitten servicemen who were evacuated from regions of combat actions in army, front and rear area hospitals. During the estimating of the overall number of the sick, injured and wounded it is necessary to bear in mind that many soldiers during the course of the war received two or more wounds and were more than once under treatment for disease, and therefore they are taken into account in the information about the losses two or more times accordingly.

It is also necessary to direct attention to the fact that double counting is possible not only among the wounded, but also in general during the calculating of the combat losses. For example, if a serviceman, who returned to duty after being wounded, was killed, then he is counted twice in the combat losses: once among the wounded and a second time among the killed. Unfortunately, it is impossible to specify exactly the number of such cases.

Each type of loss is shown in the tables in absolute figures and in a percentage relationship to the total number of losses. Also, the correlation of the total and the average monthly losses for fronts, fleets and the entire active army for a quarter, year and war to the average monthly recorded number of their personnel is given.

The losses of combat equipment and weapons are considered as irrecoverable, that is, as not subject to repair and recovery for reuse, although such actions by restored equipment did occur. But because of the difficulty in accounting for them and the small number of them, they were not analyzed.

There are in the book four chapters of information from the statistical research.

**In the first chapter** information about the losses of the Red Army in the years of the civil war and the foreign military intervention is concentrated. This information (by years, fronts, and arms of service is linked with the dividing up into periods of the armed defense of Soviet power. Losses incurred by the army while suppressing anti-Soviet actions are also accounted for here.

The chapter ends with the concluding events of the war in the Far East.

Data about the losses were determined, as a rule, on the basis of archive documents. In individual cases in view of the absence of exact information they were defined more precisely by the calculation method.

**In the second chapter** the losses of Red Army personnel in combat actions and military conflicts in the period between the wars are studied. They include information about the losses

in the Sino-Soviet miliary conflict on the Chinese-Eastern Railroad (1929), among the Soviet military volunteers in Spain (1936-1939) and China (1937-1939), in combat actions around Lake Khasan (1938) and on the Khalkhin-Gol River (1939), during the campaign into Western Ukraine and into Western Belorussia (1939), and in the Soviet-Finnish War (November 1939 to March 1940).

**The third chapter**, the largest, is dedicated to an analysis of the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Cumulative data from the State Committee of the USSR for Statistics about the human losses of the country are presented here. The losses of the servicemen of all categories are calculated here. Data about the irrecoverable losses (killed, died from wounds, missing in action, captured, killed as a result of unfortunate incidents and for other reasons) for the entire period of the war are summarized. An analysis is made of the military-medical statistics - sick, wounded and injured, outcomes of treatment, the number of people who returned to duty and who were discharged from the army due to the condition of their health.

Combat losses of the active army and fleet for the years and periods of the war, for the basic arms of service, strategic operations and battles, and for fronts and fleets are given. The total number is calculated and a description is given for losses for officers according to rank and main duties. One of the sections of the chapter is devoted to Soviet soldiers who were captured and missing in action. Another section reveals the losses of weapons and military equipment in the years of the Great Patriotic War. They are shown in numbers and percentages, with an analysis by years, periods of the war and operations.

There are several pages about irrecoverable human losses for the armed forces of fascist Germany and its allies in the war against the USSR. Information about those killed, those who died from wounds, the missing in action and the captured is given. The irrecoverable losses of Germany's allies and foreign formations of the Wehrmacht (Vlasov's troops, Moslems, Baltic and other subunits) are shown. The losses by Japan (August-September 1945) are shown.

**The fourth chapter** considers the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel who participated in several local wars and other events abroad. Included in particular here are the war in Korea (1950-1953), events in Hungary in 1956, the sending of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968), and the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989).

Documentary information of the military department and a number of archive institutions of the former Soviet Union were used during the preparation of this book. They include the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (CPAIML) under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central State Archives of the October Revolution (CSAOR) the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense (CAMD), the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (CSASA), the Central State Archives of the Navy (CSAN), and the Central Naval Archives (CNA).

## LIST OF MAIN ABBREVIATIONS

A - army
brmp - marine brigade
vdbr - airborne brigade
vdd - airborne division
gsd - mountain infantry division
id - anti-tank gun partisan division
kbr - cavalry brigade
kd - cavalry division
kk - cavalry corps
ltbr - light tank brigade
md - mechanized division
mk - mechanized corps
mekhbr - mechanized brigade
msbr - motorized rifle brigade
msd - motorized rifle division
o - independent
pbr - infantry brigade
pd - infantry division
sabr - self-propelled artillery brigade
sbr - rifle brigade
sd - rifle division
sk - rifle corps
tbr - tank brigade
td - tank division
tk - tank corps
UR - fortified region

# Chapter I

## PERSONNEL LOSSES FOR THE RED ARMY DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND THE FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION

The civil war in our country started shortly after the victory of the October socialist revolution and was an armed fight by the defenders of the new power against the anti-Soviet forces. It actually lasted five years (from October 1917 to October 1922).

The lengthy and intensive nature of the civil war, which inflicted enormous disasters on millions of people, was worsened by the foreign military interference which took the form of an intervention.

It should, however, be noted that military questions were the main thing and occupied the primary place in the life of the republic in the period from May 1918 (the start of the mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps) up to November 1920 (the defeat of Vrangel's army in the Crimea).

In this segment of time with a length of two and a half years the fate of the country was resolved exclusively on the fronts of the civil war. During these same years the regular Soviet Armed Forces, which consisted of the Red Army and the Red Fleet, were created, their maximum size was achieved (5,427,273 men on 1 November, 1920)[1], the most important operations to defeat the interventionists and the White Guard were carried out, and the largest part of the territory of the country was liberated.

The victories of the young Red Army over the united forces of the interventionists and the White Guard made it possible for the Soviet Republic at the end of 1920 to start the transition from war to peace. By this time the majority of the fronts of the civil war had been eliminated. And although in a number of places there were still individual focal points for military opposition (in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Far East), they no longer determined the main directions in the policy of the Soviet state. The resolution of the military tasks had withdrawn to the backstage.

The features of the dividing up of the civil war into periods that are examined are reflected in this book, where all of the statistical material about the losses[2] of the Red Army is divided basically into two parts: losses for the period from 1918 through 1920, in which the main burden of the armed fight took place, and losses for the period of 1921-1922, when the Red Army waged military actions basically against individual bandit formations, infiltrators from

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[1] See: Directives of the Command of the Red Army Fronts (1917-1922). (Direktivy komandovaniya frontov Krasnoy Armii (1917-1922)). Moscow, 1978. Volume 4. Page 227. (Henceforth references to this publication are denoted as Directives of the Command of the Fronts.)

[2] Here and henceforth the term "losses" means only losses in personnel.

abroad, and also against anti-Soviet uprisings and Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement actions.

## Red Army Losses for 1918-1920

The civil war and the military intervention inflicted enormous destruction and losses on our country. The harm that was caused to its economy cost about 50 billion gold rubles. The industrial production fell as a result of the war by 4-20% of the level for pre-revolution Russia (for 1913). The size of the working class was reduced by approximately half, and agricultural production dropped by the same amount. The total demographic losses for the population on the fronts and in the rear of the warring sides (in battles, from starvation, epidemics and terror) reached 8 million people[1]. This number also includes losses in personnel of the Red Army who were killed and who died from wounds and disease during 1918-1922.

There are great divergences in various sources in the literature about the question of the size of the losses among the combatants and the commanders of the Workers and Peasants Red Army (RKKA) in the civil war. In modern encyclopedic publications (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya), The Soviet Historical Encyclopedia (Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya), and The Civil War and the Military Intervention in the Soviet Union (Grazhdanskaya voyna i voyennaya interventsiya v SSSR)) the same number of killed servicemen is given - about one million men[2].

The famous Soviet researcher B.Ts. Urlanis, in the book Wars and the Population of Europe (Voyny i narodonaseleniye Yevropy), lists different figures: approximately 125,000 people killed on the front, and approximately 300,000 people who died in the active army and in military districts[3]. The total number of the killed and those who died all together was 425,000 men. This is approximately half of that figure for losses which is cited in the aforementioned encyclopedias.

There are also large contradictions in the statistical materials of the central organs of the RKKA which summarized information about the combat losses of personnel in the civil war. For example, according to accounts of the Mobilization Directorate of the Field Staff of the

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[1] See: The Civil War in the USSR (Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSSR): In 2 volumes. Moscow, 1986, Vol. 2. P. 406.

[2] See: The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya). Moscow, 1972. Vol. 7, p. 234; The Soviet Historical Encyclopedia (Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya) Moscow, 1965. Vol. 6, p. 79, and The Civil War and the Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Encyclopedia (Grazhdanskaya voyna i voyennaya interventsiya v SSSR: Entsiklopediya). Moscow, 1983. P. 14.

[3] See Urlanis, B.Ts. Wars and the Population of Europe (Voyny i narodonaseleniye Yevropy). Moscow, 1960. P. 183 and 305.

Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic the number of killed fighters and commanders for December 1920 was 85,343 and the number of wounded was 502,016[1].

Different data about the losses of Red Army personnel for 1918-1920 are given in information of the report and statistical section of the Main Directorate of the RKKA from 26 July 1924. They are:

**Irrecoverable losses**

| | |
|---|---|
| Killed and died | 40,000 men |
| Missing in action | 96,000 men |
| Captured | 24,000 men |
| Deserted | 20,000 men |

**Sick, wounded and injured**

| | |
|---|---|
| Wounded and injured | 360,000 men |
| Sick | 1,040,000 men |
| Total | 1,580,000 men[2] |

Here the total number of the irrecoverable losses according to the presented calculations were 180,000 men, and the sick, injured and wounded numbered 1,400,000 men.

The following year the same Main Directorate of the RKKA in its letter to the Budget Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Finances for the RSFSR dated 11 June, 1925 information about the total personnel losses for the same years was presented in a somewhat changed form:

**Irrecoverable losses**

| | |
|---|---|
| Killed and died | 60,000 men |
| Missing in action | 150,000 men |

**Sick, injured and wounded**

| | |
|---|---|
| Wounded and injured | 260,000 men |
| Sick | 1,000,000 men |
| Total | 1,470,000 men[3] |

[1] CSASA, file 7, catalog 7, d. 1159, p. 14.

[2] CSASA, file 54/36, cat. 5, d. 8, p. 13.

[3] CSASA, file 54, cat. 6, d. 493, p. 3-4.

The irrecoverable losses here are 210,000 men and the sick, injured and wounded numbered 1,260,000 men.

When comparing the data that has been presented it is clear that the total losses of personnel in 1925 in terms of the killed and dead is 20,000 men more, and the losses for the wounded and injured are 100,000 men less.

Then information about losses of the Red Army for 1918-1922 has been published in the book The National Economy of the USSR in Figures (Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v tsifrakh) (according to data of the statistical section of the Main Directorate of the RKKA). They are presented in table 1[1], which is shown below.

Table 1

| Types of losses | Years of the civil war | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1918 | 1919 | 1920 | 1921 | 1922 | |
| Combat | 8292 | 131,396 | 300,059 | 171,185 | 20,826 | 631,758 |
| Sick, injured and wounded (with evacuation) | 5127 | 150,324 | 212,580 | 194,758 | 18,277 | 581,066 |
| Total ....... | 13,419 | 281,720 | 512,639 | 365,943 | 39,103 | 1,212,824 |

This table is a very important military statistical document which deserves special attention when examining the question of the human losses in the civil war. But in connection with the fact that the compilers of this table did not explain what they meant by combat and sick, injured and wounded losses, contradictory interpretations of this document appeared in the press. In the previously cited book by B.Ts. Urlanis, Wars and the Population of Europe, for some reason only figures for combat losses are taken from this table and analyzed. It says here that the "comparison and the absolute value of the figures give grounds to suppose that the combat losses include the **killed and wounded**"[2] (our emphasis - *the authors*).

In Yu.A. Polyakov's book, The Soviet Country After the End of the Civil War: Territory and Population (Sovetskaya strana posle okonchaniya grazhdanskoj voyny: territoriya i naseleniye), a disagreement with B.Ts. Urlanis's version is stated and a different interpretation of the combat losses and the sick, injured and wounded losses of the Red Army in the table that we are looking at is given[3]. "It is logical to assume," we read in Yu.A. Polyakov, "that in both cases we are talking about the fatal outcomes, for it talks about the sick, injured and wounded,

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[1] See: The National Economy of the USSR in Figures (Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v tsifrakh). Moscow, 1925, p. 110.

[2] Urlanis, B.Ts. Cited work. P. 181.

[3] See: Polyakov, Yu.A. The Soviet Country After the End of the Civil War: Territory and Population (Sovetskaya strana posle okonchaniya grazhdanskoj voyny: territoriya i naseleniye). Moscow, 1986.

and not about the number of those who were sick[1] (that is, in the author's opinion, combat losses and sick, injured and wounded indicated in the table should mean the number of servicemen who were killed and died). Later it is proposed to accept these table data as the base and to consider the sum of them of 1,212,824 men as the total number of all of the servicemen of the RKKA who perished in 1918-1922[2].

The disparity and disagreement of the published data in terms of the same types of losses for the civil war is explained by the inadequate completeness or even absence of information on these matters in many report documents which went from the troops to the higher and central military organs. There were also frequent cases when the troop staffs did not give due significance to accounting and statistics for personnel losses or did not have the opportunity to work on this important matter by virtue of unforeseen acute complications of the operational situation. As a result, the archive stocks for the civil war suffer from a shortage of many primary documents which are necessary for developing statistical data, including for losses. Such problems are especially frequently encountered in the archive files for 1918-1919.

The situation in this area started to improve only after the Accounting-Statistical Information Department, which is part of the All-Russian Main Staff, was created in September 1919[3]. The work done by it helped organize the accounting and the reporting for all types of losses in the subsequent period of the civil war, starting from 1920. On the basis of the information about the combat losses for 1918-1920 that was collected by the department, in 1926 the Directorate for Organization and Services for the troops of the Main Directorate of the RKKA made the "List of Names of the Losses on the Fronts in the Workers and Peasants Red Army during the Time of the Civil War" (Imennoy spisok poter' na frontakh v Roboche-Krest'yanskoy Krasnoy Armiyi za vremya grazhdanskoy voyny) (Moscow, 1926). About 51,000 last names of servicemen who died at the fronts (killed and died in stages of the medical evacuation), and also a small number of those who died from diseases, appear on it.

In spite of the fact that this list is far from complete and contains only a small part of the last names of the deceased servicemen, even today it is of great importance as a historical document and as a unique memorial which immortalizes the memory of our soldiers.

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[1] Polyakov, Yu.A. Cited work. P. 102.

[2] Ibid, p. 103.

[3] The Accounting-Statistical Information Department was created as part of the Directorate for Command Personnel of the All-Russian Main Staff by order No 1488 of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic dated September 19 1919 with the task of carrying out the accounting and recording of all types of losses of the Red Army on the civil war fronts, and also of carrying out an accounting of the losses of the Russian Army for the period of the first world war. This department was also given the task of the scientific-statistical processing of materials about the combat losses and the satisfying of the requests that came in.

The collective of the authors of this book, when taking into account the experience of their predecessors in finding the losses in the civil war and when carrying out this same task in new conditions, relied primarily on archive documents in its work. For example, **the number of those killed, missing in action and captured** was determined on the basis of the documentary information of the Operational Directorate of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic which in accordance with the Table of Normal-Priority Messages about losses was received from the front and army staffs[1]. **The number of the wounded and sick** was produced according to data from the Main Military-Medical Directorate, to which information about the wounded, injured, sick and frost-bitten was sent from the medical units of the armies and fronts. Documents of other military departments were also used.

Unfortunately, even in these archive stores there is a shortage of many reports from the troops about the number of the losses for large intervals of time, which undoubtedly affected the completeness of the statistical information that is being presented. All of these cases are discussed specifically in the notes to the tables on losses.

The statistical material about the average monthly number of personnel of both the active troops and the Red Army on the whole for each year of the war has an important significance for estimating the losses in the period under examination. These data, presented in two tables (2 and 3), were used to calculate the relative values of the losses (in %).

Table 2

**Number of personnel of the active army troops for 1918-1920 using the average monthly number[2]**

| Years | For which months the number is used | Number of personnel |
|---|---|---|
| 1918 | July | 225,000 |
| 1919 | July | 1,307,376 |
| 1920 | On 1 July | 1,539,667 |
| Average monthly number | | 1,024,014 |

When comparing the data of the tables that are given, we see that the total size of the Red Army, taken for the average of each year of the war, significantly exceeded (by 1.6 to 2.3 times) the size of the active troops for the same time. This is explained by the fact the total size of the army and the navy included a large number of rear services, reserve and auxiliary formations, military installations and establishments (replacement reserve, reserve and training units, district and local military administrations, military educational establishments, railroad guard troops and

[1] The reporting is done by the Table of Normal-Priority Messages in May 1919 (order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic No 909 from 5 May, 1919).

[2] In connection with the impossibility of calculating the average monthly number of personnel of the active army (because of the absence of complete data), its total size for July 1918 and 1919, and for 1 June, 1920 is given.

other auxiliary troops, district military hospitals with a large number of wounded and sick servicemen, and others). In 1919-1920 the troops at the disposal of the rear services of the Workers and Peasants Red Army was further supplemented by such large troop strategic formations as the replacement reserve army of the republic and the replacement reserve armies of a number of fronts, and also the labor armies subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

Table 3

**Number of personnel of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic in 1918-1920[1]**

| For each time the number is given | | Total number of personnel of the Armed Forces | Breakdown according to the Branches of Service and the arms of service | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Number and month | | Ground Troops | Navy | Rear services units | Construction units |
| 1918 | 1 June | 374,551 | 326,335 | 48,216 | — | — |
| 1919 | 1 July | 2,320,542[2] | 2,212,047[3] | 33,520[4] | 60,808[5] | 14,167[6] |
| 1920 | 1 June | 4,424,317[7] | 3,875,257[8] | 46,405 | 261,415 | 241,240[9] |
| Average annual number | | 2,373,137 | 2,137,880 | 42,714 | 161,112 | 127,704 |

[1] In connection with the impossibility of calculating the average monthly size of the Armed Forces in 1918-1920, the total number of personnel on 1 July of each year of the war is given.

[2] Also, there were 112,000 workers of defense factories on pay in the Red Army.

[3] The given number for the Armed Forces includes 187,000 men who were sick, wounded and located in transit camps.

[4] The reduction in the number of Navy personnel in comparison with 1918 by 14,696 men occurred as a result of the departure of almost a third of the commanders and Red Fleet sailors to the ground troop fronts of the civil war.

[5] The column "Rear services units" includes information about the size of the following establishments of the Ground Troops: supply, military communications service, medical installations (evacuation) and veterinary installations, and also the animal-drawn transportation service units subordinate directly to the fronts, military districts and the center.

[6] The size of units of the military field construction with a central subordination is given.

[7] Also, on the pay of the Red Army at that time were 189,801 workers of defense factors and 12,090 peasants involved in shipping military freights, and also a certain number of artists and other people who received army food rations.

[8] This includes 201,282 people of the temporary duty personnel of treatment installations, 343,365 servicemen located at stations (at evacuation, staged, distribution, and feeding stations), and 222,328 men of the internal guard troops personnel.

[9] The composition of the construction units includes labor armies, military field construction units and various construction and logging detachments. The forming of the labor armies was done in accordance with the 15 January 1920 decree of the Council of People's Commissars, "In Connection with the Severe Economic Situation of the Country and the Impossibility of Demobilizing the Red Army in View of the Unceasing Military Threats on the Part of the Imperialist Powers". According to the decree the labor armies could at any time be joined into the regular active army.

It should be said that structural elements of the Red Army rear services during the course of the war and the military construction continuously developed and grew. Nevertheless, for the length of almost the entire period of the civil war being examined an acute shortage of soldiers and commanders was experienced at the front. For instance, at the start of 1919 the active troops of the Red Army were short, at a minimum, 280,000 infantrymen and cavalrymen[1] It was proposed to fill this shortage in 2-3 months. In actuality, the All-Russian Main Staff during this indicated time could allocate from the existing reserves no more than 157,000 men. In fact, the front received only 111,900 men, that is, 71% of the envisioned number.

As a result, the situation became even worse. The replacements that were allocated to the armies, as was noted in the 9 May 1919 Report of the Main Command, "could not even replace the natural loss of people on the fronts and the loss from the developing extreme desertion rate,

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[1] See: Directives of the Main Command of the Red Army (1917-1920) (Direktivy Glavnogo komandovaniya Krasnoy Armii (1917-1920). Moscow, 1969. P. 164. (Henceforth referred to as: Directives of the Main Command).

and at the present time the number of infantrymen and cavalrymen both in the active army and in the units of the internal districts decreased by 85,000, that is, by about 20%".[1]

In the report of the Main Command from 26 May 1919 it said the following about the shortage of people in the active troops: "In the armies and on the fronts they are about 400,000 infantrymen below the prescribed strength level. The Southern Front, which consists of up to 10,000 infantrymen in several armies, is especially weak in the constant battles. The replacements are arriving extremely slowly and in greatly too small numbers in comparison with the number of detailed replacements for the front"[2].

The main reasons for the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the manning levels of the combat troops for the fronts were the incomplete organization of the drafting of the people subject to a military obligation, their training and being dispatched according to their assignments, the deserting of the conscripts which took on a mass character, the shortage of weapons, first of all rifles, with which those formations being sent to the front should have been equipped, the poor working of the railroad transportation, and also the separating of many state and military organs from the needs and demands of the active troops. All of this was talked about many times in the reports from the commander-in-chief to the Defense Council concerning the condition at the fronts. Here are several excerpts from them.

"So far we do not yet have the right to state that our Republic has devoted the proper attention to the armed forces. So far it has gone like in the old ways, when the war department fought, but the other departments went on in their own ways"[3]. As a result, "there were frequent cases... when those citizens being drafted for military service rebelled and went home only because there were no barracks quarters allocated for them or for the lack of such things. Such cases occurred almost everywhere, and there turned out to be no places because the quarters and even the barracks of the old army, the quarters of the cadet corps, and the quarters of the religious seminaries turned out to be occupied by other commissariats. It was often necessary to stop the drafting of citizens because there were no boots, there was no clothing. It was often necessary to witness mutinies and dissatisfaction among the Red Army units because the interests of the citizens who are fighting for the good of the revolution and the socialist Republic were ignored by the local authorities"[4].

One of the reports of the commander-in-chief in May 1919 spoke with great alarm about the catastrophic shortage of rifles and cartridges in the active army and about the degree of separation of the state-wide and military rear services from the needs of the front: "Questions of

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[1] Directives of the Main Command. P. 319.

[2] Directives of the Main Command. P. 423.

[3] Directives of the Main Command. P. 171.

[4] Ibid.

supply are very acute regarding rifles and cartridges... after 2-3 months during decisive actions on the fronts there will not be a single cartridge at our disposal in the rear or at the fronts"[1].

And later: "... the failure to carry out the orders of the Main Command in the last two and a half months (to replenish the troops with personnel - *Author*) occurred not only because of the general conditions which have developed in the Republic, but also partly also from the fact that our system suffers from a separation of the rear from the front not only on a state-wide scale, but also ... in the framework of the war department"[2].

The problem of the recruiting and manning for the active troops and the replacing of their losses in personnel remained unresolved almost for the entire length of the civil war, and therefore the direct combat personnel from the troops of the front strategic formations of the Red Army in the majority of cases were inferior to the enemy in terms of the number of infantry and cavalry. Only by the middle of 1920 did the situation start to change for the better, which is shown by the data about the ratio and the size of the combat personnel of the active troops of the sides for 1918-1920 (see table 4)[3].

The number only of the combat troops of the Red Army who were active at the fronts of the civil war is given in the table, and therefore its summary data is less than the total number of the active troops shown in table 2.

From a comparison of the numerical data of tables 2 and 3 it is seen that during the war the ratio of the number of active and nonactive (rear services, internal, auxiliary, reserve, replacement and others) troops changed in the direction of a quantitative growth of the latter. This testified, on the one hand, about the natural growth of the role of the rear services support of the fronts, and on the other hand about the extreme expanding and growth of the number of rear services structures to the detriment of the fronts since the former "swallowed up" a large amount of the drafted and mobilized personnel.

In its turn, in the active army itself there were also both combat troops who were located directly in the forward line and headquarters, installations and rear services units as well as reserve and replacement troops. The numerical ratio between them can be seen in the example of the roll number of personnel of troops of the fronts and the active army on the whole, taken on 15 October, 1920 (see table 5).

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[1] Ibid. P. 322.

[2] Ibid. P. 323.

[3] The number of the combat personnel of the active troops is the actual number of infantry and cavalry of units, formations and strategic formations intended for the direct carrying out of a combat mission.

Table 4

## Number of combat troops of the Red Army and opposing troops active on the fronts in 1918-1920 [1]

| Years | Date for which the number of troops is given | Fronts (independent armies) | Number | | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Red Army | enemy | |
| 1918 | 1-10 December [2] | Northern Front | 20,020 | 34,053 | 1:1.7 |
| | | Independent Western Army (16th Army) | 7,840 | 93,350 | 1:11.9 |
| | | Southern Front | | | |
| | | Eastern Front | 105,910 | 220,000 | 1:2.1 |
| | | | 86,850 | 118,662 | 1:1.4 |
| | | Total ....... | 220,610 | 466,065 | 1:2.1 |
| 1919 | Second half of June [3] | 6th Independent Army (former Northern Front) | 13,820 | 39,500 | 1:2.9 |
| | | Western Front | 139,595 | 378,600 | 1:2.7 |
| | | Southern Front | 76,194 | 109,500 | 1:1.4 |
| | | Eastern Front | 125,240 | 129,000 | 1:1 |
| | | Total ....... | 354,849 | 656,600 | 1:1.8 |
| 1920 | First half of May [4] | 7th Independent Army | 21,986 | 114,090 | 1:5.2 |
| | | Western Front | 88,952 | 74,850 | 1.2:1 |
| | | South-Western Front | 42,877 | 97,360 | 1:2.3 |
| | | Caucasus Front | | | |
| | | Turkestan Front | 66,448 | 63,800 | 1:1 |
| | | | 30,685 | 10,900 | 2.8:1 |
| | | Total ....... | 250,948 | 361,000 | 1:1.4 |
| 1920 | 1 November [5] | 7th Independent Army | 33,934 | 102,900 | 1:3 |
| | | Western Front | 86,726 | 87,000 | 1:1 |
| | | South-Western Front | 72,192 | 45,500 | 1.6:1 |
| | | Southern Front (against Vrangel) | 186,068 | up to 41,000 | 4.5:1 |
| | | Caucasus Front | | | |
| | | Turkestan Front | 85,902 | 28,400 | 3:1 |
| | | | 34,069 | up to 13,000 | 2.6:1 |
| | | Total ....... | 498,891 | 317,800 | 1.6:1 |

[1] The data about the number of troops of the Red Army and the enemy that are presented in the table include only the number of infantry and cavalry of the combat troops (without taking into account the size of the headquarters, rear services and reserve units of fronts and armies). They are taken from collections of documents on the civil war: "Directives of the Main Command" and "Directives of the Command of the Fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922)".

[2] See: Directives of the Main Command. P. 132; Directives of the Command of the Fronts. Vol. 4. P. 51, 468-473.

[3] See: Directives of the Command of the Fronts.Vol.4. P. 70-71, 480-482.

[4] See: Directives of the Main Command. P. 327; Directives of the Command of the Fronts. Vol. 4. P. 220-227.

[5] See: Directives of the Command of the Fronts.Vol.4. P.220-227,525-526.

From the summer of 1918 higher operational-strategic formations (fronts), which were formed by the decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government and by the decree of the Defense Council, and which were formed by the order of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic started to be created in the

composition of the active army. These fronts were considered to be the main ones[1]. The chronological sequence of the creation of them and the time of their existence are shown in table 6.

Table 7 presents statistical information about the average monthly number of troops of each front (independent army) during 1920, and table 8 presents data about their losses in personnel for the same year. It was not possible to find analogous information about the losses of the fronts (independent armies) for 1918 and 1919.

Table 5

**Composition of the troops of the Active army and the number of them on 15 October 1920** [1]

| Operational-strategic and operational strategic formations | Total number of active troops | Breakdown | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | combat troops | | reserve and replacement units | | headquarters, rear services installations and units | |
| | | Number, men | % of total number | Number, men | % of total number | Number, men | % of total number |
| 7th Independent Army | 117,282 | 72,432 | 61.8 | — | — | 44,850 | 38.2 |
| Western Front | 431,591 | 151,399 | 35.1 | 146,864 | 34.0 | 133,328 | 30.9 |
| South-Western Front | 296,713 | 110,429 | 37.2 | 18,513 | 6.3 | 167,771 | 56.5 |
| Southern Front | 468,472 | 290,738 | 62.1 | 43,601 | 9.3 | 134,133 | 28.6 |
| 1st Cavalry Army | 49,822 | 33,898 | 68.0 | — | — | 15,924 | 32.0 |
| Caucasus Front | 304,437 | 158,961 | 52.2 | 43,393 | 14.3 | 102,083 | 33.5 |
| Turkestan Front | 73,470 | 46,511 | 63.3 | — | — | 26,959 | 36.7 |
| Troops of assistant commander-in-chief for Siberia | 124,526 | 55,158 | 44.3 | — | — | 69,368 | 55.7 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1,866,313 | 919,526 | 49.3 | 252,371 | 13.5 | 694,416 | 37.2 |

[1] The table has been prepared according to statistical materials about the combat and numerical composition of the troops of the active army on 15 October, 1920 (Directives of the Command of the Fronts. Vol. 4, P. 200-217).

The summary information about the total number of irrecoverable and the sick, injured and wounded losses of personnel for the Red Army for 1918-1920 (see table 9), which was made up from the number of losses of the active army and the losses of the military districts, is of special interest. The latter include basically data about the number of sick who were undergoing hospital treatment and the number of those who died from wounds and disease in district hospitals.

[1] Besides the main fronts there were local fronts which were created at the decision of the local party, soviet and military organs. They were also manned from local population resources. We are speaking specifically about the Semirechech'ye, Caspian, Fergana, Aktyubinsk and other local fronts. The fronts were sometimes also officially called independent combat sectors and regions of combat operations of Soviet troops which were part of the composition of the main fronts or independent armies (for example, the Georgiyevsk, Kuban-Black Sea, Tsarytsin, Steppe, Kamyshin, Ural-Orenburg, North-Siberian, Archangel'sk, Petrograd, and so on).

The statistical material presented in the table testifies about the constant growth of all types of losses in the years of the war, which was one of the reasons for the shortage of personnel in the active troops. The large number of sick, wounded and injured losses, especially in 1919 and 1920, draws attention to itself. For comparison, we will note: whereas in 1918 they comprised (rounded off) 138,000 men, already in 1919 they grew to 1,275,000 and in 1920 to 2,908,000 men. This scale of sick, injured and wounded losses is explained by the wide spread nature of epidemic diseases (3-4 types of typhus, cholera, dysentery, smallpox and others) at the front and in the rear services troops. In 1918-1920 over half of all of the sick servicemen were stricken by them. Epidemics, especially of typhus, were a serious problem for the Red Army during the civil war.

Table 6

**PERIODS FOR THE EXISTENCE**
**of fronts (independent armies, defense regions) in the civil war (1918-1922)**

Notes for Table 6: 1 - Years and months of the war; 2 - Name of the fronts (independent armies, defense regions); 3 - Periods for the existence; 4 - Eastern Front; 5 - Northern Front; 6 - Southern Front; (against Denikin); 7 - Western defense region; 8 - Independent Western Army; 9 - Caspian-Caucasus Front; 10 - Ukrainian Front; 11 - Western Front; 12 - 6th Independent Army; 13 - 11th Independent Army; 14 - Turkestan Front; 15 - South-Eastern Front; 16 - South-Western Front; 17 - 5th Independent Army; 18 - Caucasus Front; 19 - 7th Independent Army; 20 - Southern Front (against Vrangel)

Table 7

**Average monthly number of personnel of the troops on the fronts (independent armies) for 1920**

| Name of the fronts (independent armies) | Number | | | For which months the number is taken |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Command personnel | Junior commanders and soldiers | Total | |
| 7th Independent Army | 13,583 | 141,070 | 154,653 | July-August |
| Western Front | 26,272 | 355,799 | 382,071 | July-August |
| South-Western Front | 17,231 | 265,276 | 282,507 | July-August |
| Southern Front (against Vrangel) | 26,576 | 395,731 | 422,307 | October |
| Caucasus Front | 32,336 | 307,862 | 340,198 | July-August |
| Turkestan Front | 10,688 | 150,167 | 160,855 | July-August |
| 5th Independent Army | 9,432 | 104,778 | 114,210 | July-August |

Note. The average monthly size of active formations of fronts (independent armies) together with their staffs, rear services and reserve units is shown in the table. However, there were significantly fewer soldiers and commanders who directly carried out combat missions in them. Data is given below about the number of combat personnel of the fronts and independent armies for 1 August, 1920:

7th Independent Army - 49,188
Western Front - 136,292;
Caucasus Front - 147,875;
Turkestan Front - 29,758;
Southern Front (on 15 October, 1920) - 114,787;
5th Independent Army - 42,187
(See: Directives of the Command of the Fronts. Vol. 4. P. 180-184, 210)

One of the main reasons for the mass illnesses of the personnel with typhus and other acutely contagious diseases was the difficult medical condition of the troops, when there were not enough medical personnel, drugs, medical equipment, etc. everywhere. If one takes into account that in a number of regions along which the fronts of the civil war extended even in the pre-revolution time there were centers for typhus, cholera, plague, natural small pox, malaria and other dangerous infections, then the main source for the spread of the epidemics, including the typhus-spotted fever epidemics, will become clear. Even in 1912 in Russia there were 13,000,000 patients with infectious diseases. The first world war, famine, devastation, civil war, and the intervention greatly worsened the medical condition of the country, and therefore in 1918-1923 over 7.5 cases of European typhus alone spotted fever were recorded. Over 700,000 people died from it. But these figures are not complete since it was impossible to count all of those who were sick.

Another source for epidemic diseases among the personnel of the Workers and Peasants Red Army was the enemy troops. It is known, for example, that in connection with the very poor state of the military medical affairs in the White Guard armies they were almost completely infected with typhus which through prisoners and refugees was spread to the Red Army as well. This was

especially characteristic for the fronts active against Deniken's and Kolchak's armies. Here is one of the testimonies of that time, taken from the records of the peoples commissar for public health, N.A. Semashko. "When our troops," wrote N.A. Semashko, "moved beyond the Urals and into Turkestan, an enormous avalanche of epidemic diseases (typhus of all three varieties) advanced on our army from Kolchak's and Dutov's troops. It is enough to recall that of the 60,000 man enemy army which came to our side in the first days after the defeat of Kolchak and Dutov, 80% turned out to be infected with typhus. European typhus on the Eastern Front and recurrent fever mainly on the South-Eastern Front were aimed at us with a rapid flow. Even typhoid, this true symptom of the absence of elementary sanitary measures, at least of inoculations, developed in a broad wave in Dutov's army and came over to us"[1].

The situation was worsened even more by the uninterrupted burdens of war time and by the acute shortage of food. All of this led to the weakening of the human body which became less resistent to infections.

The fight against epidemics which gripped the army and the civilian population was waged on the state-wide scale. For this, fully empowered commissions both in the center and in the regions of the spread of the epidemics, as well as at the fronts, including the Emergency Military Medical Commission, were created. The Council of People's Commissars issued a series of decrees directed at combating the epidemics: "About Measures for Combating Typhus" (28 January, 1919), "About Mandatory Typhus Inoculations" (10 April, 1919), "About Measures to Combat Epidemics" (10 April, 1919) and others.

Leadership of medical-sanitary affairs in the Red Army was carried out by the Military-Medical Department, created in the structure of the People's Commissariat for Public Health. On 29 June, 1919, at its initiative a decree was issued about the mobilization of medical personnel, the execution of which helped bring about a reduction of the shortage of medical personnel in the Red Army from 40-50% in 1919 to 20-22% in 1920.

Emergency anti-epidemic measures were conducted in the troops. A network of quarantines, isolation-pass stations, and front hospital installations for infectious patients was created there. At the initiative of the Military-Medical Department the mass vaccination of the army and navy personnel was begun. The following fact testifies about the scale of it: in 1918 out of 140 out of every 1000 servicemen were immunized, in 1920 700 were immunized, in 1921 847 were immunized, and in 1922 almost all of the personnel of the front and rear troops were covered by inoculations.

Information about the number of infectious patients among the personnel of the Red Army for 1918-1920 is shown in table 10, prepared on the basis of documents and analysis data of the Main Military-Medical Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces.[2]

[1] "News of the Peoples Commissariat for Public Health" (Izvestiya Narodnogo komissariata zdravovkhraneniya). 1920. No 1-2. P. 11.

[2] CSASA, file 4, cat. 5, d. 19, p. 140.

Table 8

## Personnel losses of civil war fronts for 1920

| Types of losses | | | Fronts (independent Armies) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 7th Independent Army (former Northern Front) | | Western Front | | South-Western Front | |
| | | | Total | Of them, comm-anders | Total | Of them, comm-anders | Total | Of them, comm-anders |
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 245 | 23 | 6989 | 763 | 10653 | 1292 |
| | | % of losses | 3.1 | 7 | 4.8 | 10.2 | 12.2 | 16.9 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 1155 | 43 | 53805 | 1864 | 41075 | 1905 |
| | | % of losses | 14.5 | 13.1 | 37.3 | 24.8 | 46.9 | 24.8 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 1065 | 31 | 11597 | 381 | 5949 | 135 |
| | | % of losses | 13.4 | 9.4 | 8 | 5.1 | 6.8 | 1.8 |
| | Total of irrecov-erable losses | Number | 2465 | 97 | 72391 | 3008 | 57677 | 3332 |
| | | % of losses | 31 | 29.5 | 50.1 | 40.1 | 65.9 | 43.5 |
| | | % of avg. monthly size | 1.6 | 0.7 | 18.9 | 11.5 | 20.4 | 19.3 |
| Sickness,injury and wounded losses (with evacu-ation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 608 | 52 | 38861 | 3203 | 6653 | 3237 |
| | | % of losses | 7.6 | 15.8 | 26.9 | 42.7 | 7.6 | 42.2 |
| | Sick | Number | 4878 | 180 | 33171 | 1296 | 23234 | 1100 |
| | | % of losses | 61.4 | 54.7 | 23 | 17.2 | 26.5 | 14.3 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 5486 | 232 | 72032 | 4499 | 29887 | 4337 |
| | | % of losses | 69 | 70.5 | 49.9 | 59.9 | 34.1 | 56.5 |
| | | % of avg monthly size | 3.6 | 1.7 | 18.9 | 17.1 | 10.6 | 25.2 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 7951 | 329 | 144423 | 7507 | 87564 | 7669 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of avg monthly size | 5.2 | 2.4 | 37.8 | 28.6 | 31 | 44.5 |

Table 8 continued

| Fronts (independent Armies) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Southern Front | | Caucasus Front | | Turkestan Front | | 5th Independent Army (former Eastern Front) | | Total number of losses | |
| Total | Of them, comm-anders | Total | Of them, comm-anders | Total | Of them, comm-anders | Total | Of them, comm-anders | Total | Of them, comm-anders |
| 811<br>3.4 | 115<br>9.2 | 3139<br>8.8 | 245<br>14.1 | 333<br>22.2 | 15<br>23.4 | 218<br>1.1 | 14<br>2.4 | 22388<br>7 | 2467<br>12.9 |
| 14819<br>62.3 | 562<br>44.8 | 9576<br>26.9 | 423<br>24.4 | 97<br>6.5 | -<br>- | 1588<br>7.8 | -<br>- | 122115<br>38 | 4797<br>25.1 |
| 599<br>2.5 | 32<br>2.6 | 657<br>1.9 | 12<br>0.7 | -<br>- | -<br>- | 151<br>0.7 | 3<br>0.5 | 20018<br>38 | 594<br>3.1 |
| 16229 | 709 | 13372 | 680 | 430 | 15 | 1957 | 17 | 164521 | 7858 |
| 68.2 | 56.6 | 37.6 | 39.2 | 28.7 | 23.4 | 9.6 | 2.9 | 51.2 | 41.1 |
| 3.8 | 2.7 | 3.9 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 8.9 | 5.8 |
| 3548<br>14.9 | 340<br>27.1 | 6846<br>19.3 | 642<br>37.0 | 292<br>19.5 | 5<br>7.8 | 667<br>3.3 | 65<br>11.3 | 57475<br>17.9 | 7544<br>39.4 |
| 4019<br>16.9 | 204<br>16.3 | 15318<br>43.1 | 413<br>23.8 | 777<br>51.8 | 44<br>68.8 | 17698<br>87.1 | 494<br>85.8 | 99095<br>30.9 | 3731<br>19.5 |
| 7567 | 544 | 22164 | 1055 | 1069 | 49 | 18365 | 559 | 156570 | 11275 |
| 31.8 | 43.4 | 62.4 | 60.8 | 71.3 | 76.6 | 90.4 | 97.1 | 48.8 | 58.9 |
| 1.8 | 2 | 6.5 | 3.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 16.1 | 5.9 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
| 23796 | 1253 | 35536 | 1735 | 1499 | 64 | 20322 | 576 | 321091 | 19133 |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 5.6 | 4.7 | 10.4 | 5.4 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 17.8 | 6.1 | 17.3 | 14.1 |

Note. Information about the losses of the fronts for 1920 is incomplete, and also there is no information in it about the losses for January. Therefore, the summary information about the irrecoverable and sick, injured and wounded losses of the fronts does not match analogous information about the losses of the Armed Forces for 1920 (CSASA, file, 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 86, 86a and 99). The losses of the independent fronts for January 1920 comprised: Western Front - 174 men killed, 1094 dies from wounds and diseases, 952 men were wounded and 19,772 were sick; South-Western Front - 15 men were killed, 1053 died from wounds and diseases, 1768 men were sounded and 37,022 were sick; 6th Independent Army - 3 men were killed, 278 men died from wounds and diseases, 40 men were wounded and 2860 were sick. It was not possible to find information about the losses for January for the other fronts (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 65, 66 and 84).

**Table 9**

## Total losses of personnel of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic for the Civil War (1918-1920) [1]

| Types of losses | Number of losses by years | | | | | | | | | Total number of losses for 1918-1920 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1918 | | | 1919 | | | 1920 | | | | | |
| | Number of losses for year | % | | Number of losses for year | % | | Number of losses for year | % | | Number of losses for three years | % | |
| | | of avg. monthly number of personnel | of losses | | of avg. monthly number of personnel | of losses | | of avg. monthly number of personnel | of losses | | of avg. annual number of personnel | of losses |
| Irrecoverable losses: of active troops (naval forces): killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 1662 [2] | 0.7 | 1.1 | 22569 [9] | 1.7 | 1.7 | 122257 [16] | 7.9 | 3.8 | 146488 [23] | 14.3 | 3.1 |
| missing in action captured | 2060 [3] | 0.9 | 1.5 | 37839 [10] | 2.9 | 2.8 | 122130 [17] | 7.9 | 3.8 | 162029 [24] | 15.8 | 3.4 |
| died as a result of accidents, sentences, deserted, committed suicide | 199 [4] | 0.1 | 0.1 | 7343 [11] | 0.6 | 0.4 | 20018 [18] | 1.3 | 0.6 | 27560 [25] | 2.7 | 0.6 |
| of military districts - died from wounds and diseases | 4258 [5] | — | 2.9 | 18395 [12] | — | 1.4 | 17539 [19] | — | 0.6 | 40192 [26] | — | 0.9 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 8179 | — | 5.6 | 86146 | — | 6.3 | 281944 | — | 8.8 | 376269 | — | 8 |
| Wounded, sick and injured losses: of active troops (naval forces): wounded, injured, frost-bitten, burned sick | 15335 [6] | 6.9 | 10.5 | 202293 [13] | 15.5 | 14.9 | 319097 [20] | 20.7 | 10 | 536725 | 52.4 | 11.4 |
| of military districts - sick | 45542 [7] | 20.2 | 31.1 | 819617 [14] | 62.7 | 60.2 | 2203078 [21] | 143.7 | 69.1 | 3068237 | 299.6 | 65.3 |
| | 77322 [8] | — | 52.8 | 253502 [15] | — | 18.6 | 386455 [22] | — | 12.1 | 717279 | — | 15.3 |
| Total of wounded, sick and injured losses | 138199 | — | 94.4 | 1275412 | — | 93.7 | 2908630 | — | 91.2 | 4322241 | — | 92 |
| Of all losses | 146378 | — | 100 | 1361558 | — | 100 | 3190574 | — | 100 | 4698510 | — | 100 |

[Key on following page]

[1] The losses of personnel are shown in the table without a breakdown according to categories of servicemen since it was not possible to find full and reliable information about this. During the calculating of the percentage indicators for the irrecoverable losses and sick, wounded and injured losses the average monthly of active troops was used (see table 2).

[2] Includes 962 men killed (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 369), 681 men who died from wounds and diseases (just for the 6th Army for August-December, 1918, and 8th and 9th Armies for November-December, 1918) (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 65, 66) and 19 men lost for the navy (CSAN, file R-715, cat. 1, d. 137, p. 229). The information is incomplete.

[3] Includes 1479 men missing in action, 181 men captured (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 369) and 400 men lost by the navy, captured on 25 December 1918 on the destroyers "Spartak" and "Avtroil" (CSAN, file R-55, cat. 1, d. 19, p. 63).

[4] CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 369.

[5] Here the number of those who died from wounds and diseases in the Moscow, Orlov, and Volga Military Districts for the period of May-December 1918 is given (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 57, 63, 73).

[6] Includes in the troops of the Eastern Front for September-November 1918 - 8470 men, of the South-Western Front for November-December 1918 - 5334 men, of the 6th Army for August-November 1918 - 1439 men (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 65, 66, 82), and 92 men lost for the navy (CSAN, file R-715, cat. 1, d. 137, p. 229). The information is incomplete.

[7] Includes in the troops of the Eastern Front for September 1918 - 3394 men, for the 6th Army - September 1918 - 1536 men (CSASA file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 57,82), in the troops of the fronts and independent armies for the second half of 1918 - 40,585 men (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 383) and 27 men lost for the navy (highly infectious patients of the Baltic Fleet (CSAN, file R-588, cat. 1, d. 263, p. 1).

[8] The given number includes the number of sick in the Moscow Military District for March-June 1918 (24,174 men) and in the Orlov Military District (5591 men for May-June), and also the sick for the second half of the year in all of the military districts (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 73; cat. 4, d. 739, p. 383).

[9] Includes 7311 men killed (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 369), 898 men who died from wounds and 13,387 men who died from diseases - the losses of the fronts (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 393), as well as 757 men killed and 216 men who died from diseases - the losses of the navy (for references to sources see paragraph 14).

[10] Includes 30,799 men missing in action and 6830 taken prisoner - losses of the fronts (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 367-369), 101 men missing in action and 109 men taken prisoner - losses of the navy (for references to sources see paragraph 14).

[11] CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 367-369.

[12] The number of personnel who died from wounds and diseases in the military districts (Moscow and Volga) from 1 January, 1919, to 1 January, 1920, and in the Orlov District from 1 January, 1919, to 1 July, 1919) is shown (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 308, p. 57, 63, 73).

[13] Includes 201,269 men - losses for the fronts (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 383) and 1024 men - losses for the navy (for references to the sources see paragraph 14).

[14] Includes 818,244 men - losses for the fronts (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 383) and 1373 men - losses for the navy (highly infectious patients, treated in the Kronshtadt and Petrograd Naval Hospitals of the Baltic Fleet and in the hospital of the Astrakhan-Caspian Flotilla).

According to the report of the head of the Main Naval Personnel Directorate the losses for the navy for 1919 were about 4000 men (CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 288, p. 18-19), however it was not possible to confirm them with documentary information. It was possible to confirm with documents losses of 3580 men (of them 757 men were killed, 216 men died from diseases, 1024 men were wounded, 210 men were missing in action, and 1373 men were sick with highly infectious diseases). This confirmed information is included in the book.

Document sources for the navy losses are:

for the **Baltic Fleet**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 604, p. 25-67; file R-55, cat. 1, d. 23; file R-187, cat. 1, d. 324, 343; file R-307, cat. 1, d. 10; d. 11, p. 12,13,26; d. 13; d. 16, p. 24; file R-588, cat. 1, d. 263, 271, 273, 283;

for the **Astrakhan-Caspian Naval Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d.203; file R-55, cat. 1, d. 26; file R-562, cat. 2, d. 316, p. 1-8; d. 345; file R-588, cat. 1, d. 273, p. 112-113;

for the **Dnepr Naval Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 208, p. 29,32; cat. 3, d. 396, p. 19,25; file R-139, cat. 1, d. 42, p. 41; file R-187, cat. 1, d. 343;

for the **Onega Military Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-55, cat. 1, d. 26, p. 95; file R-124, cat. 1, d. 141, p. 303; file R-342, cat. 1, d. 776, p. 9;

for the **North-Dvina Military Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 3, d. 55, p. 6-9.

for the **Chudskoye Military Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 3, d. 196, p. 81; file R-187, cat. 1, d. 138, p. 20.

[15] The total number of sick personnel in the military districts for 1919 is shown (CSAN, file 6, d. 739, p. 383).

[16] Includes 192 men killed in January 1920 - only in the troops of the Western and South-Western Fronts and the 6th Army (CSASA, file 6, d. 308, p. 65, 66, 84), 21,965 men (of whom 2334 were commanders) were killed in February-December 1920 (CSASA, file 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 99) and 99,522 men died from wounds and diseases (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 383; file 4, cat. 8, d. 177, 387) - losses of the fronts, 578 men killed and died from wounds and diseases - losses of the navy (for references to sources see paragraph 21).

[17] Includes 4797 men who were commanders (CSASA, file 8, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 99) and 15 men were losses of the navy (for references to sources see paragraph 21).

[18] The noncombat losses (number of deserters) are shown for the period from 15 February to 31 December, 1920 (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 159-162, 303, 354, 355, 377, 378; d. 824). The information is incomplete.

[19] The number of those who died from wounds and diseases for 1920 in all of the military districts is given (CSASA, file 4, cat. 8, d. 177, 387). The information is incomplete. For all of 1920 at the front and in the rear 174,000 men died just from diseases. (Great Medical Encyclopedia (Bol'shaya meditsinskaya entsiklopediya). 1st ed. Vol. 5. P. 450).

[20] Losses with wounds are shown according to data presented in the "Encyclopedia Dictionary of Military Medicine" (Entsiklopedicheskom slovare voyennoy meditsiny) (Moscow, 1947. Vol. 2. P. 228), with an addition to them of 290,000 men lost by the navy.

[21] Includes 1454 men lost by the navy with highly infectious diseases (data according to the Petrograd Naval Hospital of the Baltic Fleet for 1920 and the Volga-Caspian Naval Flotilla for January-March and November-December 1920) (CSAN, file 6, cat. 4, d. 739, p. 383).

The column for losses for 1920 includes the losses of the navy which were 2337 men, of whom 169 were killed, 409 died from diseases, 15 were missing in action, 290 were wounded and 1454 were sick.

The document sources for the naval losses are:

for the **Baltic Fleet**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 245; d. 604, p. 25-67; file R-641, cat. 1, d. 195, 212, 123;

for the **Amu-Dar'ya River Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 183, p. 12;

for the **Aral, Azov and Siberian Military Flotillas**: CSAN, file R-55, cat. 1, d. 69;

for the **Volga-Caspian Military Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 3, d. 574; file R-562, cat. 3, d. 139, p. 104; D. 380, p. 1-12; cat. 2, d. 604;

for the **Dnepr Military Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 137, p. 39; cat. 3, d. 704;

for the **Western-Dvina Military Flotilla**: CSAN, file R-187, cat. 1, d. 343;

for the **Northern-Dvina Military Flotilla:** CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 241, p. 35;

for the **Onega Military Flotilla:** CSAN, file R-1, cat. 1, d. 1141.

[22] The total number of sick personnel for the military districts for 1920 is shown (CSASA, file 4, cat. 8, d. 177, 387).

[23] The total number of those killed and who died in stages of the medical evacuation is given, including 31,375 men killed and 115,113 men who died in the active army from wounds and diseases. The data about the number of the killed for the three years of the war are not complete.

Even in the far from complete name record for the losses on the fronts in the personnel of the Workers and Peasants Red Army during the time of the civil war, which includes basically only those killed on the battlefield, there are 51,000 who perished during the three years of the war, that is, almost 20,000 more.

According to the information of the Mobilization Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army from 14 December 1920 the losses for the years of the civil war for the killed and those who died from wounds and diseases was approximately 159,858 men (or 13,370 men more than that shown in the table) and, also, in the military districts 48,896 men died from wounds and diseases (or 8704 men more that shown in the table). It was not possible to confirm the difference with documentary data (CSASA, file 7, cat. 7, d. 1158, p. 14).

[24] About half of the number of those Red Army soldiers and troop commanders of the Western Front missing in action and taken prisoner in the table ended up being captured in 1920 during the time of the war with Poland. During this the older servicemen because of the lack of desire to fight voluntarily were captured. On the South-Western Front in a number of formations the natives of the Don and Kuban' all without exception voluntarily went over to the enemy side". (CSASA, file 6, cat. 2, d. 17, p. 16).

According to information from the Mobilization Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army Staff, on 21 November 1921 75,699 servicemen were returned from Poland and 40,986 men who were interned were returned from Germany - in total 116,685 Workers and Peasants Red Army servicemen. They included the following categories of personnel:

command personnel - 3713 men;
administrative personnel - 412 men;
political personnel - 1296 men;
medical personnel - 712 men;
Red Army soldiers and junior commanders - 100,434 men;
servicemen, not broken down by category - 10,118 men.
(CSASA, file 7, cat. 7, d. 287, 288; d. 1158, p. 14).

Part of the troops of the Western Front ended up interned: formations and units of the 4th Army (together with the 3rd Cavalry Corps which was a part of it) and 2 divisions of the 15th Army. In August, 1920 during the withdrawal from the Vistula region they were not able to breakthrough to the east and were forced to withdraw on to the territory of East Prussia, where they were interned by the German authorities, and in 1921 they were returned to the Homeland.

According to information of the Mobilization Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army Staff, on 12 January 1920 there were 38,153 men missing in action and 107, 173 men prisoner, for a total of 145,326 men (or 16,703 men less than shown on the table). The difference was not confirmed by the documentary information.

Of the 162,029 men missing in action and taken prisoner indicated on the table, 45,344 men were considered to be dead (irrecoverable demographic losses).

[25] The noncombat losses presented in the table for 1918-1920 (27,560) men consisted only of deserters from the active troops who will not subsequently be included in the irrecoverable (demographic) losses.

[26] The total number of servicemen who died from wounds and diseases in the military districts for 1918-1920 is given.

The data is not complete since many reports, including from the troops, about the number of deceased servicemen in the military districts for 1918-1920 are missing in the archive files.

From the following table it is clear that the infectious diseases in the army and navy for 1918-1920 (2,253,405 men) comprised over half of all of the wounded, sick and injured losses for the Red Army for the same period (4,322,241 men, see table 9).

Table 10

**Number of infectious patients in the Red Army (1918-1920)[1]**

| Years | | 1918 [2] | 1919 | 1920 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Types of infections and number of sick | Typhus | 2,022 | 319,765 | 512,776 | 834,563 |
| | Recurrent fever | 225 | 182,391 | 787,083 | 969,699 |
| | Undetermined typhus | — | — | 92,910 | 92,910 |
| | Typhoid | 3,296 | 25,990 | 46,455 | 75,741 |
| | Cholera | 176 [3] | 1,392 | 4,336 | 5,904 |
| | Dysentery | 90 | 10,581 | 67,780 | 78,451 |
| | Malaria | — | 39,773 | 78,910 | 118,683 |
| | Scurvy | 49 [4] | 4,154 | 66,187 | 70,390 |
| | Small pox | 82 | 3,434 | 3,548 | 7,064 |
| Total infectious patients | | 5,940 | 587,480 | 1,659,985 | 2,253,405 |

[1] CSASA, file 4,cat. 5, d. 19, p. 140.
[2] Data about the number of infectious diseases (with the exception of cholera) is calculated from July, 1918.
[3] Cholera in 1918 is calculated from April.
[4] Scurvy in 1918 is calculated only for the fronts.

In table 11 data is given about the number of personnel of the Workers and Peasants Army who died from infectious diseases
1

[1] They are determined by the calculation method based on the existing partial information about the number of infectious patients who died for 1919-1922 using calculated lethal coefficients for typhus epidemics (13% is average), cholera (28%), dysentery (14%), and other infectious diseases (CSASA, file 6, cat. 6, d. 294; file 5, cat.1, d. 36; file 4, cat. 8, d. 177, 387; cat. 5, d. 19,77; cat. 8, d. 479,528).

Table 11

| Types of losses | By years of the war | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1918 | 1919 | 1920 | |
| Number of infectious patients | 5,940 | 587,480 | 1,659,985 | 2,253,405 |
| Those among them who died | 756 | 73,804 | 208,519 | 283,079 |

As a result of the large complex of measures the infectious diseases in the Red Army after 1922 started to decline appreciably. Whereas in 1920 there were 1,659,985 infectious patients, in 1921 there were 580,548, and in 1922 (from January to October) there were 164,973, that is, many times fewer. Infectious diseases were ultimately eliminated in 1926.

And now we will return to table 9, which is the basic statistical document about human losses of the Red Army for 1918-1920. From the data that is contained in it, it is clear that the greatest number of wounded, sick and injured losses are in 1920 (2,908,630 men). In comparison with 1919 the number of them grew by over two times, basically due to the growth of epidemic diseases. In connection with this, the bed stock of the military medical installations was increased in 1920 from 158,000 to 397,000 hospital beds[1].

The calculations that were done, which start from the hospital capacity, show that the average length of treatment for each hospitalized servicemen was from one to one and a half months. During this 407,209 men, or 9.4% of the total number of all of the wounded and sick died in hospitals[2]. There were 578,468 men, or 13.4%, discharged from the Red Army due to a disability and also on leave until their ultimate recovery[3]. Over three years of war a total of 3,336,564 men, or 77.2% returned to duty after treatment.

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[1] See: The Civil War and the Military Intervention in the USSR. (Grazhdanskaya voyna i voyennaya interventsiya v SSSR). P. 341.

[2] The total number of personnel who died is produced by the calculation method: added to the 283,079 who died with an infectious diseases (see table 11) are 124,310 from the remaining number of sick, injured and wounded losses (2,068,836) who died. Here the second number is produced by using the lethal coefficient (6%), calculated for the wounded and ordinary patients applicable for the civil war (see: Urlanis, B.Ts. Cited work. P. 170, 189, 305, 306).

[3] The given number of those discharged due to a disability and on leave was produced by the difference between the total loss of Red Army personnel for 1918-1920 (1,280,315 men) and the number of the irrecoverable losses for the same period (701,847) (see table 13).

Among all types of irrecoverable losses indicated in table 9, special attention should be given to the so-called noncombat losses of Red Army personnel. They include all cases of the death of servicemen as a result of noncombat injuries and accidents, suicide and murder, and also those executed resulting to the sentences of military tribunals and deserters. In our statistical data the number of noncombat losses for 1918-1920 includes only deserters. Information about the other types of noncombat losses was not found. It can be presumed that these losses are included among those killed and those who died from wounds.

Information about the number of deserters that is presented in the table does not reflect the complete picture in this matter since the report documents included only the willful cases of desertion directly from the combat units. The specific nature of the civil war, about which it is necessary to speak in more detail, had an effect.

Desertion[1] in the Red Army appeared soon after the Soviet government was forced in May-June 1918 to change from the voluntary principle of recruitment for the Armed Forces to a system of compulsory military service.

The main mass of the deserters at that time was due to political fluctuations and dissatisfaction with the policy of "war communism", especially the surplus appropriation system, prosperous peasants and the middle class. This was most characteristic for Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, the Tambov region, and several other regions.

A marked growth of the overall fatigue of the people from the war and its incalculable burdens also affected the expanding of the scale of desertion. This point was especially emphasized in April, 1919 by V.I.Lenin in a letter to the Petrograd organizations, in which he said that the "signs of the fatigue of the masses (100,000 deserters) were becoming more and more frequent"[2].

It should be added to this that the military conscriptions and mobilizations of the population in 1918-1919, as was already noted, were frequently poorly organized and conducted during the absence of any accurate data about the number of those with military obligations. There was not enough clear leadership in places. As a result, there was a lack of coordination and confusion in the draft stations, in the training, distributing and dispatching of march replacement, and in the monitoring of their arrival at their appointed destination. The poor informing of the population about forthcoming mobilization and drafts was a serious flaw.

Even the Red Army itself was not yet a unified, precisely working military organism, which had a negative impact on the activity of all of the military organs from the bottom to the

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[1] During the civil war the concept of "desertion" was interpreted broadly and encompassed all forms of service service in the Red Army: voluntary leaving of one's unit or place of service by a serviceman for the purpose of evading military service or participation in combat operations, evading attendance at draft stations or one's place service according to the mobilization or draft by those with a military obligation.

[2] Lenin, V.I. Complete Collected Works. (Pol. sobr. soch.). Vol 50. P. 296.

top. "Hundreds and thousands of detachments of the most diverse size, physiognomy, discipline and combat capability - this is the external appearance of our Red Army up to the fall of 1918," M.N. Tukhachevskiy wrote later in his memoirs. "Only from this time does the break start. Detachments were reformed into regiments, regiments start to combine into brigades and divisions..."[1]

In connection with the situation that had been created, organs of Soviet authority and military departments in 1918 started to take more decisive measures against desertion. So, in December, 1918, the Central Temporary Commission to Combat Desertion was created from representatives of the All-Russian Main Staff, the All-Russian Bureau of War Commissars, and the NKVD. Provincial commissions which on 29 March, 1919 were given the right to examine cases about desertion with the imposing of punishments, were formed in country. Measures were established to punish desertion (from suspended imprisonment to execution). Revolutionary tribunals and provincial commissions were given the right also to use as a measure of punishment the confiscation of property of the deserters and depriving them of their land allotment (fully or partially).

Everywhere the checking of all those with military obligations was strengthened, especially at rail centers and on communication routes. As a result, during the period from 1 January, 1919, to 1 December, 1920, 2,846,000 men were found and returned to service, 1,543,000 of which were voluntary and 837,000 of which were detained in round-ups[2].

The following data exists about the willful desertion directly from the combat troops of the active army:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1918 | 199 men |
| 1919 | 7,343 men |
| 1920 | 20,918 men (59 of them commanders). |

Desertion from the active army continued even after 1920. In 1921 231,000 men deserted[3], including 32,773 men (1,704 of them were command personnel) from units which were fighting anti-Soviet attacks. In 1922 112,224 men deserted (including 3763 command personnel)[4].

[1] Tukhachevskiy, M.N. Selected Works. (Izbrannyye proizvedeniye). Moscow, 1964. Vol. 1. P. 73.

[2] See: The Civil War 1918-1921. (Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921 gg): In 2 volumes. Moscow, 1928. Vol. 2. P. 83.

[3] The figure is produced by the calculation method. For 5 months of 1921 (August-December) 96,255 men or, on average, 19,251 men a month, deserted. This means that for the year we get approximately 231,000 men (CSASA, file 7, cat. 7, d. 285, p. 254-259).

[4] CSASA, file 7, cat. 7, d. 285, p. 246,248.

Since among the deserters the percentage of willful deserters was relatively small for that time (the flights after arriving for military service comprised 18-20% and the flights from the front line units numbered 5-7%), measures of criminal punishment did not play a major role in the fight against desertion. The fact that of the total number of those detained during seven months of 1919 (1,500,000 men) only 95,000 men were recognized as willful deserters testifies to this. Of these, 55,000 were sent to disciplinary units, 6000 were sentenced to imprisonment (suspended and not suspended) 4000 were sentenced to execution (in the overwhelming majority of cases - suspended), and in fact 600 men were executed[1].

The situation with desertion as one of the types of troop losses in the civil war developed in rather a difficult way. In our statistical tables the number of irrecoverable losses includes only that part of the counted deserters which was not returned to the ranks of the Red Army in either a voluntary or administrative fashion.

[1] See: The Civil War 1918-1921. (Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921 gg). Vol. 2. P. 84.

Table 12

**Counted total number of personnel losses of the Red Army for 1918-1920**

| Types of losses | Total number of losses | % of average annual number of personnel | % of losses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses: | | | |
| of active troops (naval forces): killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 249,294 [1] | 10.5 | 4.9 |
| missing in action, not returned from captivity | 45,344 [2] | 1.9 | 0.9 |
| noncombat losses [3] — | — | — | — |
| of active troops (naval forces and military districts - died from wounds and diseases | 407,209 [4] | — | 8.2 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 701,847 | — | 14 |
| Losses of wounded, sick and injured: | | | |
| of active troops (naval forces): wounded, injured, frost bitten, burned | 536,725 | 22.6 | 10.7 |
| sick | 3,068,237 | 129.3 | 61 |
| of military districts - sick | 717,279 | — | 14.3 |
| Total losses of wounded, sick and injured | 4,322,241 | — | 86 |
| Total losses | 5,024,088 | — | 100 |

[1] Produced by the following method: starting out from the total number of wounded indicated in the table (536,725 men), and the ratio between the number of the killed and wounded calculated for the civil war (one to four), the nubmer of the killed for 1918-1920 was determined (134,181 men). After adding it to the number of those who died in the active troops (115,113 men) taken from the archive sources, the end result, shown in the table (249,294) was produced.

[2] Of the total number of those missing in action and taken prisoner in 1918-1920,only those who did not return from captivity and who died (45,344 men), that is, purely demographic losses, are shown in the table.

[3] Among the noncombat losses for 1918-1920 according to the documents this means only 27,560 deserters (from the active troops, who are not included in the number of the irrecoverable demographic losses.

[4] Produced by the calculation method (see p. 32-33).

During the course of the presentation of the material it was already said that the documentary information about personnel losses of the Soviet troops for 1918-1920 used in the book is incomplete. Therefore, the authors made a clarification of the summary data about the losses by the calculation method. They are presented in a corrected form in table 12 which is accompanied by the necessary explanations.

It is seen from the table that only data on certain types of irrecoverable losses underwent the clarification: the number of the killed and those who died in stages of the medical evacuation was determined more precisely; of the total amount of the missing in action and prisoners of war (162,029 men) in the table only the number of those who died is given, that is, purely demographic losses are given; noncombat losses of servicemen (27,560) are excluded from the irrecoverable losses since in this case they consist only of deserters who do not belong to demographic losses. Losses from sickness, injury and wounds, in spite of the previously mentioned incomplete nature of them, were not subjected to correction. It is not even possible

to carry this out on the basis of the existing archive materials. Also, the missing number of sickness, injury and wound losses is practically compensated for due to excesses of the so-called "repeat counting" in the medical statistics, where a certain number of servicemen because of repeat woundings or diseases went for treatment to military medical installations two or more times and were counted as new cases each time. This makes it possible to accept the existing data about injury, wound and sickness losses without great errors.

The clarified totals for the losses for 1918-1920, and also the existing data about the overall size of the personnel contingent mobilized and drafted into the Red Army for these years give the possibility to calculate the "arrival" and "departure" of personnel of the Armed Forces for the indicated period of the civil war. The numerical data which characterize the arrival and loss of servicemen are presented in table 13.

The table shows that in the volunteer period of the building of the Soviet Armed Forces their size by the start of June, 1918, was 374,551 men. But this was not enough to repel the attack of the enemy troops which numbered about 700,000 men. The interventionists and the White Guards, which had almost a double superiority in forces, were able to surround the Republic of Soviets with a ring of fronts. In the situation that was created the government switched to manning the army and navy by means of a general mobilization of laborers, first of all workers and peasants. In connection with this, on 29 May, 1918 the Decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee about the mandatory conscription into the army, with which the new stage of military building was begun, was announced. The conscription into the Red Army was done by means of drafts of citizens of specific ages, and during this only the working masses received the right to defend the revolution with weapon in hand. The "nonworker elements" were involved in carrying out various auxiliary obligations (administrative works, construction of engineering installations, repairing equipment, etc.).

The V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was held in July, 1918, approved the measures for creating the regular Red Army. The congress established the compulsory military service for citizens ages 18 to 40, abolished the appointment by election for the command personnel, and also confirmed the necessity of involving military specialists from among the former generals and officers for service in the army and navy.

Table 13

**The balance of the number of personnel of the Red Army for 1918-1920**

| Types of replacements and losses of personnel | Number |
|---|---|
| On the rolls on 1 June, 1918 (end of the volunteer period and start of the compulsory military service) | 374,551 [1] |
| Mobilized into the Red Army: | |
| citizens born from 1879-1901 | 4,449,383 [2] |
| according to special orders (military specialists, party and other workers) | 1,883,654 [3] |
| Total entering into the Red Army over three years (together with those in the army on 1 June 1918) | 6,707,588 |
| Lost from the Red Army (total) | 1,280,315 [4] |
| Consisting of: | |
| irrecoverable losses | 701,847 [5] |
| discharged due to disability and on leave due to health condition | 578,468 [6] |
| On the rolls on 1 November, 1920 | 5,427,273 [7] |

[1] The total number of personnel of the Workers and Peasants Red Army on 1 June 1918 is taken from table 3.

[2] See: Directives of the Command of the Fronts (Direktivy komandovaniya frontov). Vol. 4. P. 275-276.

[3] The presented number of mobilized men according to special orders included the following categories of citizens accepted into the Red Army from 12 June 1918 to 15 June 1920:

former officers and generals - 35,502;
former military clerks - 3,441;
former non-commissioned officers and warrant officers - 178,139;
former doctors (medical and veterinary) - 3,494;
former lower medical and veterinary personnel - 13,481;
citizens of various ages called into service in the Workers and Peasants Red Army by front line and local mobilizations - 366,718;
specialists - 71,559;
volost workers - 10-20 men from a volost) - 24,364;
those previously recognized as unfit for front line (campaign) service - 63,334;
railroad workers - 47,287;
members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) - 26,780;
members of trade unions - 12,573;
members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and trade unions - 40,938;
postal workers - 2,355
workers and employees of business, industry and transportation - 40,024;
students - 5,528
those with re-certification - 32,671;
soldiers of the old army who had returned from captivity - 39,407;
former prisoners of war born from 1898-1899 - 37,530;
those from a muster (decree of the Defense Council from 27 August 1919) - 502,873;
those mobilized in Ukraine in 1919-1920 - 214,387;
refugees from Lithuania, Latvia, Belorussia and Ukraine - 2,648;
leftovers from concluded drafts - 101,831;
rear guard - 16,790;
Total - 1,883,654 men.

The presented statistical data are taken from document No 67, (The Number of Citizens Drafted into the Red Army from 12 June 1918 to 15 June 1920" (See: Directives of the Command of the Fronts (Direktivy kommandovaniya frontov). Vol. 4. P. 274). Here only data for 15 June 1920 is used, and when they are absent data for 1 September 1919 are used. Information about those drafted according to year of birth which exists in the indicated document is omitted since it has already been taken into account in the table (see the paragraph "Citizens born from 1879-1901 Mobilized into the Red Army").

[4] The loss of Red Army personnel for 1918-1920 is produced as the difference between the total size of the entire personnel contingent which entered into the Workers and Peasants Red Army by drafts, mobilizations and voluntarily during the indicated period (6,707,588 men), and the total recorded number of personnel at the end of 1920 (5,427,273 men).

[5] The number irrecoverable losses is taken from table 12.

[6] The number of those discharged from the Red Army over the three years of the war because of a disability and on leave due to a health condition comes from the difference between the total loss of personnel (1,280,315 men) and the number of the irrecoverable losses (701,847 men), indicated in the table.

[7] See: Directives of the Command of the Fronts (Direktivy komandovaniya frontov). Vol. 4. P. 227.

The decree of the Congress of Soviets emphasized that each soldier who received a weapon was obligated to obey his officers without question and commanders.

In August 1918, by a special decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars all of the troops formed by various peoples commissariats: communication routes (railroad security), commerce and industry (border security), and the Peoples Commissariat for Food (food requisition detachments) were put under the control of the Peoples Commissariat for Military Affairs. Somewhat later the action of the decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars was extended to the troops of the All-Russian Emergency Commission for the Fight Against Counter-Revolution and Sabotage as well. Then by decision of the government all of the active troops which consisted of independent detachments and units began to be merged into the armies and fronts. All of these measures were directed at the further centralization of the command of the Armed Forces and at giving order to the mobilization work as well as raising its effectiveness.

From table 13 it is clear that during the bringing to life of the Law About Compulsory Military Service 4,449,383 men (from the 22 age groups that were subject to mobilization) were drafted into the Red Army during the three years of the war. However, this number of draftees by age groups did not encompass all categories of citizens who were called into service in the Red Army. Therefore, the remainders from the named age groups were mobilized according to special orders, for instance, during the musters, the front line and local mobilizations, etc. Also, command, administrative-economic and medical personnel, and also a significant number of citizens who came from party, trade union, and komsomol mobilizations were additionally called into service in the Workers and Peasants Red Army. Volunteers, those who were re-certified, former prisoners of war, refugees and others went here.

The cited categories of citizens who were drafted in a administrative manner numbered in total 1,883,654 men.

All together during 1918-1920, as is shown in table 13, 6,707,588 men were mobilized and drafted into the Red Army, and the loss of servicemen due to irrecoverable losses and also due to those discharged from the army and navy because of disability and on leave because of a health condition numbered 1,280,315 men, or 19% of the mobilized personnel contingent. This is the main amount of the arrivals and losses of personnel for the period under examination.

## Losses of the Red Army while cleaning up the last centers of counter-revolution and intervention (1921-1922)

With the defeat of Vrangel's forces in the spring of 1920 the main period of the civil war ended. The majority of its fronts were eliminated. The military question ceased being the main

question in the policy and activity of the Soviet state. A gradual change to peaceful construction started. It was carried out in a difficult economic and political situation. In a number of places armed uprisings against the new order started up.

The governments of many countries supported the remaining centers of opposition of the White Guards, peasant revolts and rebellions of various sorts. Due to the dispatching of armed formations consisting mainly of white emigrants to the territory of the Soviet republic, the tension on its borders remained constant.

Then the Social Revolutionaries and Menshiviks activated their anti-Soviet activity. In 1921 a whole series of armed revolts broke out in the Tambov region, in Siberia, in the Northern Caucasus, in Ukraine, in Belorussia and in other places. This was aided by the most severe economic destruction, famine (in connection with the bad harvest of 1920) and the demobilization of the army which was beginning, as a result of which unemployment was created. The difficulties and deprivations that had been endured during the war time as something that was necessary now caused dissatisfaction not only among the peasants, but also among part of the working class. The new mass fluctuations of the peasants and the middle class that occurred at that time showed up in the attitude of the personnel of some units of the army and navy.

The sharpest expression of this was the Kronshtadt rebellion of March, 1921.

The fight with the rebels was difficult and long. Significant forces of the Red Army participated in it, as well as troops of the internal service[1] and the All-Russian Emergency Commission, special purpose units[2], and other formations which together broke the resistance of

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[1] Troops of the internal service were special military formations which carried out missions of protecting the rear of the Soviet state. They were also charged with guarding the state borders. They were created by a decree of the Council on Labor and Defense from 1 September, 1920. They included troops for internal security of the republic, guard units, troops for defending railroads of the front line zone, and transport militia (rail, water). They were subordinate to the NKVD and the commander-in-chief. By the end of 1920 they numbered 360,000 men (14 divisions and 18 brigades). By a decree of the Council on Labor and Defense from 19 January, 1921 the troops of the internal service, from whom the troops of the All-Russian Emergency Commission, the railroad and water militia and been removed, were transferred completely to the war department.

[2] Special purpose units were military-party detachments. They were created under factory party cells, rayon committees, city committees, uyezd committees, and provincial committees of the party on the basis of a decree of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) dated 17 April 1919 for rendering aid to the organs of Soviet authority in the fight against counter-revolution and for maintaining order and guarding state installations. The special purpose unit personnel underwent training in the General Compulsory Education system, and after July 1921 in the system of military education establishments and courses of the Workers and Peasants Red Army. In March 1921 detachments from special purpose units were transferred into the composition of the militia units of the Red Army. In December 1921, the personnel of the special purpose units consisted of 39,673 regular personnel and 323,373

the rebels. With the change to the new economic policy (NEP) the rebellion everywhere sharply subsided. It ended in Ukraine and in the central regions of the RSFSR basically by the spring of 1922. In Central Asia in connection with the special conditions (national, religious, living, political, and geographic) and with the presence of ties between the leaders of the opposition forces and foreign states the fight against the basmatch counter-revolutionary bandit bands lasted until 1925-1926. Individual basmatch bands operated until 1931.

It should be noted that simultaneously with the cleaning up of the counter-revolution centers and the final driving out of the interventionists there occurred a major reduction in the Red Army.Its changing average monthly and average annual size for 1921-1922 is shown in table 14.

The combat operations of the Red Army for defeating the counter-revolutionary forces and the suppressing of anti-Soviet uprisings involved significant personnel losses for Soviet troops. Information about this is presented in tables 15 and 16. They show the losses of the active troops of the fronts, military districts, and operational groups, and also information on all types of losses.

One should especially examine the fight against the interventionists and White Guards in the Far East in 1921-1922 since here by virtue of the military and political situation that had developed the Far Eastern Republic, a bourgeois-democratic state formation in terms of form, was formed (on the territory of the Transbaykal, Amur, and Primor'ye oblasts) in April 1920. The Far Eastern Republic possessed a Peoples Revolutionary Army (NRA)[1].

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temporary personnel.

[1] Here and henceforth the "Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic" will also mean the Peoples Revolutionary Navy (NRF) of the Far Eastern Republic.

Table 14

## Average monthly number of personnel in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic for 1921-1922[1]

| For which time the size is given | | Total number of Armed Forces personnel | Broken down by branches of the Armed Forces and arms of service | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Date and month | | Ground Troops | Navy | Air Force | Rear Services Units | Construction units | Units not part of the branches of the Armed Forces |
| 1921 | On 1 July | 2,009,321 | 1,571,856 | 67,273 | 24,251 | 272,507 [2] | 73,434 [3] | — |
| 1922 | On 1 Jan. | 1,354,516 | 1,195,945 | 47,238 | 12,904 [4] | 97,868 [5] | — | 561 [6] |
| Average annual size | | 1,681,918 | 1,383,400 | 57,255 | 18,577 | 185,187 | 73,434 | 561 |

[1] In connection with the lack of the necessary data for calculating the average monthly size of the Armed Forces for 1921-1922, in place of it the table gives the number of them on 1 July (for 1921) and on 1 January (for 1922).

[2] The composition of the rear services units includes railroad troops, the number of which together with the military communications organs was 57,870 men.

[3] Only the size of the construction units is shown. The labor armies, which earlier were part of the construction units, in accordance with the decree of the Council on Labor and Defense from 30 March 1921, (order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic from 18 April 1921 No 864) and in connection with the demobilization of the Red Army which had begun, were transferred to the control of the Peoples Commissariat for Labor, and by 1 February 1922 had been disbanded (decree of the Council on Labor and Defense from 12 February 1921).

[4] The size of the air force is given without including any military education establishments which were counted in the composition of the Ground Troops.

[5] Taking into account the size of the railroad troops, which together with the military communications organs comprised 23,753 men.

[6] The number of personnel of units and installations of the military topographic service is shown in the column "Units not part of the branches of the Armed Forces".

Table 15

**Personnel losses of the fronts and independent armies (operational groups)during the time of combat operations to defeat the counter-revolutionary forces and to suppress anti-Soviet uprisings in 1921-1922 [1]**

| Fronts and military districts | Number of losses | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Irrecoverable | Sick, wounded and injured | Total |
| Western Front [2] | 14,602 | 26,372 | 40,974 |
| Caucasus Front [3] | 9,338 | 29,617 | 38,955 |
| Turkestan Front (the fight with the basmatch counter-revolutionary bandit bands in the period from January 1921 to July 1922) [4] | | | |
| Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea [5] | 926 | 867 | 1,793 |
| Volga Military District [6] | 14,935 | 37,860 | 52,795 |
| Orlov Military District (suppressing of rebellion in Tambov province in 1921) [7] | 4,164 | 3,192 | 7,356 |
| Petrograd Military District (suppression of Kronshtadt rebellion in 1921) [8] | 6,096 | 4,142 | 10,238 |
| Troops subordinate to the assistant commander-in-chief for Siberia [9] | 1,912 | 1,208 | 3,120 |
| Ural Military District [10] | | | |
| Independent Red Banner Caucasus | 3,485 | 11,295 | 14,780 |
| Army [11] | 259 | 156 | 415 |
| Operational group of forces in Karelia (defeat of the White-Finnish forces which invaded Soviet Karelia in 1921-1922) [12] | 2,328 | 8,206 | 10,534 |
| | 352 | 1,042 | 1,394 |
| Total ............... | 58,397 * | 123,957 | 182,354 ** |

* Includes 32,773 deserters.

** Data about the losses are incomplete.

[1] During the calculating of the personnel losses presented in the table the following archive sources were used:

a) Combat Operations against Anti-Soviet Forces in Ukraine, Belorussia, the Volga, Siberia and Other Regions (Boyevyye deystviya protiv antisovetskikh sil na Ukraine, v Belorussii, Povolzh'ye, Sibiri i drugikh rayonakh) (CSASA, file 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 71 ,101, 120, 183, 256; d. 803, p. 60, 103, 194, 238, 266);

b) Cleaning up the Kronshtadt Rebellion (Likvidatsiya kronshtadskogo myatezha) (CSASA, file 263, cat. 1, d. 27, p. 49; d. 51, p. 56-60; file 264, cat. 1, d. 28, p. 31; d. 29, p. 48,66);

e) Cleaning up the Rebellion in the Tambov Province (Likvidatsiya myatezha v Tambovskoy Gubernii) (CSASA, file 5, cat. 1, d. 176; file 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 120; file 235, cat. 2, d. 254, p. 87, 182, 334, 523, 644, 695; d. 567, p. 15);

d) Battles in Georgia and Armenia (Boi v Gruzii i Armenii) (CSASA, file 6, cat. 4, d. 641; file 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 71, 101. 120. 183);

e) Combat Operations against White-Finnish Forces Who Invaded Soviet Kareliya (Boyevyye deystviya protiv belofinskikh voysk, vtorgshikhsya v Sovetskuyu Kareliyu) (CSASA, file 7, cat. 2, d. 837, p. 17);

f) Losses by the Troops of the Turkestan Front Who Participated in the Fight Against the Basmatch Counter-Revolutionary Bandit Bands in 1921-1922. (Poteri voysk Turkestanskogo fronta, uchastvovavshikh v bor'be s basmachami v 1921-1922 gg.) (CSASA, file 110, cat. 4, d. 605, p. 3-5).

[2] Troops of the Western Front in 1921-1922 took part (together with units of the All-Russian Emergency Commission, special purpose unit detachments, the militia, and others) in combat operations against numerous armed formations sent from Poland on to the territory of Belorussia and the western areas of Russia (Bulak-Bakakhovich, Pavlovskiy, Prudnikov, Pimenov and others).

[3] Troops of the 9th and 11th Armies of the Caucasus Front in February-March of 1921 at the request of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia participated in armed uprisings against the rule of the Menshikovs and their foreign sponsors. Simultaneously forces of the 1th Army together with Armenian revolutionary detachments in February-July 1921 defeated Dashnak's forces in the entire territory of Armenia.

[4] Rifle and cavalry units of the Turkestan Military District (the Bukhara Group of Forces of the Red Army in 1921-1922 fought against major basmatch counter-revolutionary bandit forces on the territory of the Bukhara Peoples Soviet Republic.

[5] A significant part of the Ukraine and Crimea armed forces waged combat operations against Petlyurov's large formations sent onto the territory of Ukraine from Poland. The largest of them (Nel'govskiy's, Palii-Chernyy's, and Tyutyunnik's) were defeated by the end of 1922. In 1921 a number of operations were concluded upon the final defeat Makhnovets' forces.

[6] Troops of the Volga Military District, located on the territory of the Samara, Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan, Orenburg, and Saratov provinces, the German Labor Commune of the Volga, and territories of the Ural and Turgay oblasts in 1921 waged combat operations against rebels headed by Sapozhnikov.

[7] Troops of the Volga Military District in January-July 1921 waged combat operations on the territory of the Tambov province and partially on the Voronezh province to suppress the rebellion headed by Antonov. From February 1921 these troops were subordinate directly to the commander-in-chief. In March 1922 the Orlov Military District was disbanded.

[8] In March 1921 troops of the 7th Army of the Petrograd Military District under the command of M.N. Tukhachevskiy carried out a suppressing of the Kronshtadt rebellion which had engulfed the Kronshtadt garrison and crews of a number of ships (all together about 27,000 sailors and soldiers took part in the rebellion).

[9] Troops subordinate to the assistant commander-in-chief for Siberia carried out the suppressing of an anti-Soviet western Siberia rebellion in February-June 1921.

[10] Troops of the Ural Military District, which included the territory of the Chelyabinsk, Vyatsk, Severo-Dvina, Tyumen' provinces and the Baskiri ASSR, participated in suppressing the western Siberia rebellion (February-June 1921).

[11] The Independent Red Banner Army was created in May 1921 as a result of the reforming of the 11th Army of the Caucasus Front, which was abolished on 29 May 1921. Troops of the Caucasus Army took part in cleaning up the banditry and anti-Soviet actions in the Northern Caucasus in 1921-1922.

[12] The Operational Group of Forces in Karelia was created in November 1921 in order to cut off the so-called "Karelian adventure" (the invasion of White-Finnish troops into Soviet Kareliya in October 1921 - February 1922). The Operational Group of Forces that defeated the anti-Soviet forces in Kareliya were commanded by the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic, S.S. Kamenev, and the commander of the group of forces, A.I. Sedyakin.

Table 16

**Personnel losses of the Red Army troops that participated in armed conflict with anti-Soviet uprisings in 1921-1922**

| Types of losses | Number of losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total | % of losses | Breakdown of command personnel 1 | % of losses |
| Irrecoverable losses | | | | |
| Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 9,454 | 6.3 | 926 | 9.1 |
| Missing in action, not returned from captivity | 14,481 | 9.7 | 473 | 4.6 |
| Noncombat losses (died as a result of accidents, convicted, committed suicide) | 1,689 [2] | 1.1 | 1,733 | 17.1 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 25,624 | 17.1 | 3,132 | 30.8 |
| Losses from injury, wounds and sickness | | | | |
| Wounded, injured, burned, frost bitten | 10,711 | 7.2 | 956 | 9.4 |
| Sick | 113,246 | 75.7 | 6,091 | 59.8 |
| Total of losses from injury, wounds and sickness | 123,957 | 82.9 | 7,047 | 69.2 |
| Total losses | 149,581 | 100 | 10,179 | 100 |

[1] In the column, Breakdown of command personnel, the number of the losses of the command personnel from a platoon commander (and his equivalent) on up is shown (CSASA, file 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 71, 101, 120, 183, 256; d. 803, p. 60, 103, 238, 266).

[2] The number of the noncombat losses does not include 32,773 deserters (from active units) who do not belong to the irrecoverable noncombat losses.

Table 17

## Losses of the Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic in battles with the White Guards and Japanese Occupiers (from 1 January to 15 June 1922)

| Types of Losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Died and killed in stages of the medical evacuation | Number | | | 74 | | 391 | 465 |
| | | % of losses | | | 13.6 | | 5.4 | 6 |
| | Missing in action | Number | | | 3 | | 230 | 233 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.6 | | 5.4 | 3 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.1 | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 43 | | 2146 | 2189 |
| | | % of losses | | | 7.9 | | 29.6 | 28.1 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 121 | | 2767 | 2888 |
| | | % | of losses | | 22.2 | | 38.2 | 37.1 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.8 | | 7.1 | 6.3 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.27 | | 1.10 | 0.97 |
| Injury, wound and sickness losses (with evacuation to a hospital) | Wounded, injured, burned | Number | | | 145 | | 1276 | 1421 |
| | | % of losses | | | 26.7 | | 17.6 | 18.2 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 278 | | 3204 | 3482 |
| | | % of losses | | | 51.1 | | 44.2 | 44.7 |
| | Frost-bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total injury, wound and sickness losses | Number | | | 423 | | 4480 | 4903 |
| | | % | of losses | | 77.8 | | 61.8 | 62.9 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 6.20 | | 11.6 | 10.8 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.95 | | 1.78 | 1.66 |
| All losses | | Number | | | 544 | | 7247 | 7791 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 8 | | 18.7 | 17.1 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.22 | | 2.88 | 2.63 |

Table 18

## Total losses of personnel for the Red Army and the Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic in the concluding period of the civil war (1921-1922)

| Types of losses | Number of human losses | | | | | | Total number of losses for 1921-1922 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | in Workers and Peasants Red Army | | | in Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic | | | | | |
| | Number of personnel losses | % | | Number of personnel losses | % | | Number of personnel losses | % | |
| | | of average annual number of troops | of losses | | of average annual number of troops | of losses | | of average annual number of troops[4] | of losses |
| **Irrecoverable losses:** | | | | | | | | | |
| of active troops: | | | | | | | | | |
| killed and died in stages of the medical evacuation | 954 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 465 | 1 | 6 | 9,919 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| missing in action, not returned from captivity | 14,481 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 234 | 0.5 | 3 | 14,715 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| died as a result of accidents sentenced by military tribunals, committed suicide | 1,689[1] | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2,189 | 4.8 | 28.1 | 3,878 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| of active and nonactive troops (died form wounds and diseases in hospitals) | 209,396[2] | 12.5 | 7.8 | — | — | — | 209,396 | 12.1 | 7.8 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 235,020 | 14 | 8.7 | 2,888 | 6.3 | 37.1 | 237,908 | 13.7 | 8.8 |
| **Injured, sick and wounded losses:** | | | | | | | | | |
| Wounded, injured, burned frost bitten | 107,11 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1,421 | 3.1 | 18.2 | 12,132 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Sick in active troops | -113,246 | 6.7 | 4.2 | 3482 | 7.6 | 44.7 | 116,728 | 6.8 | 4.3 |
| Sick in nonactive troops | 2340682[3] | 139.2 | 86.7 | — | — | — | 2,340,682 | 135.5 | 86.5 |
| Total injured, sick and wounded losses | 2,464,639 | 146.5 | 91.3 | 4,903 | 10.7 | 62.9 | 2,469,542 | 143 | 91.2 |
| Total losses | 2,699,659 | 160.5 | 100 | 7,791 | 17 | 100 | 2,707,450 | 156.7 | 100 |

[1] The number of the noncombat losses does not include 230,000 deserters for 1921 (including 32,773 deserters from the active troops), or 112,224 deserters for 1922 since they do not belong to the category of irrecoverable losses.

[2] The number of those who died in hospitals from wounds and diseases is determined by the calculation method, starting from the following: for 1921 there were 580,548 infectious patients, of whom 77,901 died (CSASA, file 4, cat. 5, d. 19, p. 122; d. 63, p. 105; cat. 8, d. 528, p. 18; d. 479, p. 81). During 1922 (from 1 January to 1 October) there were 164,973 infectious patients, of whom 28,368 died (CSASA, file 4, cat. 5, d. 77, p. 33). By subtracting the number of infectious patients for 1921-1922 (745,521 men) from the total number of wounded, sick and injured losses for the same years (2,464,639 men), we will get the number of wounded and sick with infectious diseases (1,719,118 men). Using the lethal coefficient (6%) and the above indicated number of losses we get the calculated quantity of dead from the number of wounded and non-infectious patients (103,147). Totalling this figure with the previously cited quantity of deceased infectious patient (106,249 men), we will get the calculated number of those who died in hospitals from wounds and diseases (209,396 men), which is shown in the table.

[3] The number of the sick personnel of the nonactive troops of the Red Army for 1921-1922 (2,340,682) includes those hospitalized in 1921 (1,822,832 men)(CSASA,file 4,cat.5,d.19,p.122) and for 1922 (517,850 men, produced by the calculation method).

[4] The average number of personnel for determining the percentage ratio of personnel losses for 1921-1922 is made from the average annual size of the Workers and Peasants Red Army (1,681,918 men, see table 14) and the average monthly (average annual) size of the Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic (45,594) and consists of 1,727,512 men.

Table 19

**Total number of personnel losses of the Red Army for the entire period of the civil war (1918-1922)**

| Types of losses | Total number of losses during the civil war | Broken down by period | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1918-1920 | 1921-1922 |
| Irrecoverable losses | | | |
| Killed and died in stages of the medical evacuation | 259,213 | 249,294 | 9,919 |
| Missing in action, did not return from captivity | 60,059 | 45,344 [1] | 14,715 [2] |
| Died as a result of accidents, sentenced, committed suicide | 3,878 | — | 3,878 |
| Died from wounds and diseases in treatment installations | 616,605 | 407,209 | 209,396 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 939,755 | 701,847 | 237,908 |
| Injured, sick and wounded losses | | | |
| Wounded, injured, burned, frost bitten | 548,857 | 536,725 | 12,132 |
| Sick | 6,242,926 | 3,785,516 | 2,457,410 |
| Total of injured, sick and wounded losses | 6,791,783 | 4,322,241 | 2,469,542 |

[1] CSASA, file 7, cat. 7, d. 89, p. 287,288.
[2] CSASA, file 7, cat. 6, d. 802, p. 71, 101, 120, 183, 256; d. 805, p. 60, 103, 194, 238,266; cat. 2, d. 527, p. 6; file 235, cat. 2, d. 564, p. 87, 182, 334, 523, 644, 695; file 263, cat. 1, d. 51, p. 55-60; file 264, cat. 1, d. 29, p. 48, 66.

The Peoples Revolutionary Army was created in March-October 1920 on the basis of the partisan formations and the rebel detachments. The Peoples Revolutionary Army, in essence, from the very beginning was an integral part of the Red Army and was directed by directives from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the commander-in-chief, and the assistant commander-in-chief for Siberia.

There were 45,594 men[1] in the ranks of the Peoples Revolutionary Army in July, 1922:
commanders - 6,832
soldiers - 38,762.

[1] This figure is taken as the average monthly and average annual number of personnel for the Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic for 1921-1922.

The combat operations of the Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic began with the driving of the Semenov White Guards and the Japanese occupiers from Chita and the Transbaykal in April-November 1922. All of this made it possible to unite the Transbaykal and Amur regions into one whole. By the summer of 1921 the Primor'ye area, where power was seized by the Stavlennik White Guards on 26 May, remained occupied. There Ehite rebel army tried to move onto the offensive against the Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic, but was stopped, and then thrown back in February, 1922.

In September, 1922 the forces of the Peoples Revolutionary Army stopped the movement of the White Guard "zemstvo host" from Primor'ye in the direction of Khabarovsk, and then in October 1922 carried out the Primor'ye offensive operation which ended with the liberation of the Far East. With the inclusion of the Far Eastern Republic into the RSFSR on 15 November 1922 the Peoples Revolutionary Army was renamed the 5th Army of the Workers and Peasant Red Army.

Information about the personnel losses of the Peoples Revolutionary Army was found only for the period from 1 January to 15 June 1922[1] (see table 17). They consisted of 7,791 men, of whom 2,888 men were irrecoverable losses and 4,903 were standard losses.

The battles during the course of the conduct of the Chita operations (1-13 April, 25 April-5 May and 1-31 October 1920), the Volochayevka operation (1-12 February 1922) and the Primor'ye operation (4-25 October 1922) were the bloodiest. In the framework of the Primor'ye operation usually the Spasskaya operation (8-9 October 1922), which was distinguished by the special persistence of the opposing forces, is separated out from it. In it, the enemy lost over 1000 men killed and wounded, and about 280 men captured[2]. The losses of the Peoples Revolutionary Army forces also, by all appearances, were significant. However no information was found about them in the documents. The same can be said about the losses of the Peoples Revolutionary Army in other operations.

The summary data about the personnel losses for 1921-1922 are presented in table 18, where the number of losses is given broken down for the Workers and Peasants Red Army and the Peoples Revolutionary Army, and then in a summary form with the breakdown of them by their type.

The total number of personnel losses for the Red Army for the whole period of the civil war (1918-1922) is given in table 19. It is clear from it that the irrecoverable demographic losses for the entire period were 939,755 men (killed, died from wounds and diseases, missing in action, died in captivity, and during other circumstances).

When evaluating the number of wounded, sick and injured losses during the war (6,791,783 men), one should take into account that the total number given here for the wounded,

[1] CSASA, file 7, cat. 6, d. 991, p. 15, 38.

[2] See: The Civil War and the Military Intervention in the USSR. (Grazhdanskaya voyna i voyennaya interventsiya v SSSR). P. 565.

injured, and sick inevitably includes a so-called double counting (a significant part of the servicemen went to hospitals and other medical facilities for treatment two or more times and were counted anew each time). Also, a large number of the wounded and sick that are accounted for in the wounded, sick, and injured losses then ended up in the number of those who died and also were counted in the irrecoverable losses.

* *
*

In the first chapter results are given for the comprehensive study of the personnel losses of the Red Army in the civil war and, the total size of them, broken down by the years of the war (1918, 1919, 1920) and by its main periods (1918-1920 and 1921-1922), is given. Because of the inadequacy or absence of the necessary information it was not possible to show the losses of Soviet troops in the defense and offensive operations that they conducted. Data about the personnel losses of the Red Guard, which after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution was the main weapon for defending the Soviet Republic, are also missing. It is known that detachments of the Red Guard played a deciding role during the cleaning up of the counter-revolutionary uprisings along the Don, in the Southern Urals, Ukraine, and the Far East in the end of 1917. Together with the first units of the Red Army the Red Guard detachments offered a decisive battle to the German invaders around Pskov and Narva and successfully fought against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces in Ukraine.

The size of the Red Guard in the post-October period (before the creation of the Red Army) reached 253,000 men.

Also the question about the losses of partisans, who in 1918-1922 with weapons in hand operated in the rear of the White Guards and the interventionists, also remains open.

The partisan movement achieved the greatest scope in Siberia, Transbaykal, along the Amur, and in the Far East. According to incomplete data, there were 140,000-150,000 men just in the partisan detachments of Siberia, and the partisan detachments of the Amur region "grew into a real partisan army which by the spring of 1919 had over 100,000 active soldiers and a unified command. The partisans inflicted serious losses on the interventionists and the White Guards, having killed up to 17,600 men"[1].

There is only scanty information about the partisan losses. It is known, for example, that about 4300 men from among the Amur partisans died in battles, skirmishes, ambushes and raids[2].

We did not research the enemy (White Guards, interventionists and other forces) losses because of the lack of necessary information. An idea about the size of these losses can be gathered only according to the approximate information which is contained in a number of works on the history of the civil war and in individual publications on problems of demography and

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[1] Shishkin, S.N. The Civil War in the Far East. (Grazhdanskaya voyna na Dal'nem Vostoke). Moscow, 1957. P. 66.

[2] See: Kurguzov S. The Amur Partisans. (Amurskiye partizany). Khabarovsk, 1929. P. 55.

population. In the previously cited book by B.Ts. Urlanis, Wars and the Population of Europe, the front line losses of the Whites in the civil war (killed and died from wounds in stages of the medical evacuation) were set at 175,000 men[1], and their losses in terms of deaths from disease were set at 150,000 men[2].

In Yu.A. Polyakov's work, The Soviet Country after the End of the Civil War: Territory and Population (Sovetskaya strana posle okonchaniya grazhdanskoy voyny: territoriya i naseleniye), it is noted that the losses of the warring sides in 1918-1922 were approximately identical and all together comprised about 2.5 million men[3].

However, it must be said that the above presented information has in both cases a presumptive nature since it does ont have a strict documentary basis. One can agree only with the fact that the personnel losses for the enemy during the time of the civil war were not less than those for the Red Army.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the statistical material about the personnel losses of the Soviet troops that is contained in the first chapter will help in the future to avoid mistakes and inaccuracies in this area and will help bring about a more complete understanding of many events of the civil war.

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[1] See: Urlanis, B.Ts. Indicated work. P. 188.

[2] See: Ibid. P. 307.

[3] See: Polyakov, Yu.A. Indicated work. P. 104.

# Chapter II

## PERSONNEL LOSSES FOR THE RED ARMY IN COMBAT OPERATIONS AND MILITARY CONFLICTS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE WARS

Soviet troops in the period between the wars more than once had to resolutely repel various sorts of provocateurs and aggressors and with weapon in hand to defend the interests of their country. The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union suffered significant personnel losses in military operations at that time. The types of these losses and their total size in each military conflict are given on the basis of the existing documentary information.

In this chapter the personnel losses for Soviet troops during their marches into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia in 1939 and the losses among the Soviet military volunteers in Spain (1936-1939) and China (1937-1939) are also given.

### The participation of troops of the Turkestan Front (Turkestan Military District) in the fight against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary bands in 1923-1931.]

As a result of the active combat operations of the troops of the Turkestan Front against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement in 1921-1922 the majority of the armed Basmatch counter-revolutionary groupings were destroyed. By October 1922 there only 63 bands with a total size of 6,707 men there (from 26,061 men in the middle of May, 1922)
[1]. In the following years the combat activity and the size of the Basmatch counter-revolutionary sometimes grew, sometimes shrank, depending on the military and political situation that was developing in the Turkestan Republic (republics of Central Asia)[2].

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[1] CSASA, file 7, cat. 2, d. 466. p. 58.

[2] The Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was formed as part of the RSFSR in April, 1918 at the V Kray Congress of Soviets of Turkestan. Between its western and eastern parts were the territories of two feudal despotic Moslem states - the Khiva khanate and the Bukhara empire. After the victory in their peoples democratic revolutions in 1920 the Khorezm (June, 1920) and Bukhara (October, 1920) Peoples Soviet Republics, which became part of the TASSR, were formed.

During the national-state demarcation between the main peoples who

(continued...)

In 1923 specially allocated parts of the Turkestan Front continued the search for and pursuit of the remaining odd Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement detachments, inflicting perceptible losses on them during the combat confrontations.

In the period from October 1922 through February 1923 the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement lost 1749 men killed and wounded, of which 21 were kurbashis[1], 127 men were captured, 14 of them kurbashis. Six hundred twenty-eight men voluntarily surrendered their weapons, 56 of them kurbashis[2]. The losses in personnel of the Turkestan Front for the same period were 327 men killed and wounded and 43 men captured[3].

In 1924-1925 in connection with a severe draught and dissatisfaction by the population with the actions of certain organs of Soviet authority who allowed the harming of the interests of the poorest part of the Dexhna residents in matters of state insurance and who did not organize the timely delivery of cotton seed to the farmers, due to which many fields ended up unplanted, the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement again was activated in many regions of Central Asia. This was the most characteristic for Tadzhikistan, where the overall leadership of the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement was carried out by a descendent of the former emir of Bukhara, Ibrahim-Bek. Foreign intelligence agencies, especially the English, actively supported him, and supplied him with weapons, ammunition and supplies.

When preparing for a decisive attack, Ibrahim-Bek reorganized his forces, created a special group for anti-Soviet propaganda and diversion attacks, and even tried to regulate the collecting of taxes and assessments from the population. However, in the spring of 1925 his grouping suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Red Army. As a result, about 30 small formations with a total size of a little over 400 men remained on the territory of Tadzhikistan (former Eastern Bukhara).

From 1 May 1924 to 1 December 1925 the Basmatch losses were 2,104 men killed and 638 men captured. Also, 2,279 men voluntarily surrendered.

Units of the Red Army during that same time lost 719 men killed and wounded.

In 1926 troops of the Turkestan Front involved in the fight with the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement numbered 18,477 soldiers and commanders. During the year they had 190 combat encounters with the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement bands which just

(...continued)
inhabited the territory of the TASSR, in October, 1924 the Uzbek SSR, the Turkmen SSR, the Tadzhik ASSR (part of the Uzbek SSR), and also the Karakirgiz and Karakalpak autonomous oblasts (part of the RSFSR) were formed there.

[1] A kurbashi is a commander.

[2] CSASA, file 7, cat. 2, d. 466. p. 65.

[3] Ibid, p. 66.

from 1 April to 10 July lost 140 men killed, including 14 kurbashi, and 70 men captured, including 14 kurbashi. One hundred forty-two men voluntarily surrendered, including 16 kurbashi. During this period the aid to the units of the Red Army from the local population was wider than before. Therefore, by the end of the summer of 1926 an end was put to the major centers for the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement. During this the armed bands were practically wiped out in the Uzbek SSR, and in the Turkmen and Tadzhik Republics there remained nine Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement groups with a total size of about 100 men[1]. The elimination of them was entrusted to the militia and local self-defense detachments and the military units that were involved in the fight against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement were returned to their permanent deployment sites. In connection with this the Turkestan Front was reorganized into the Central Asian Military District[2].

However, the revolutionary reforms and the development of Soviet power in Turkestan proceeded in a contradictory way, with great difficulties. The overall cultural backwardness of the entire Central Asian area, and the rather strong influence of rich land-owning bais, the fanaticism of the Moslem clergy, and also the bureaucratism and unreliability of the apparatus of the central and local organs of power in the republics, which were 60-80% former bureaucrats of the old feudal administration, showed up here. The small size and insufficient activity of the republic party organizations were considered a weak point.

One can add to this, that in the period of the often forced collectivization of agriculture the internal political situation in the country, and in particular in Central Asia, became sharply exacerbated.

In August to September, 1929 the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement renewed activities in the eastern part of the Uzbek SSR (the Fergana oblast) and in the south of Kirgiziya (the Osh oblast). At this same time several Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement bands which came from Afghanistan appeared on the territory of the Tadzhik SSR[3]. The leaders of these bands skillfully played on the mistakes of the local organs of power and also on the dissatisfaction of the population with the methods of State grain purchases and collectivization of peasant farms, as well as other things.

The hierarchy of the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement this time made a special emphasis on the igniting of religious fanaticism among the Moslem population. The Basmatch

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[1] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 3, p. 112-120.

[2] Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR No 304 from 6 April 1926.

[3] The revival of the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement in 1929-1931, like in several previous years, was aided by the presence of large Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement groupings on the territory of neighboring Afghanistan which retreated there periodically from the Central Asian republics, their connection with their relatives and supporters in the indicated republics, and also the possibility of making almost unprecedented bloody raids on Soviet territory through the then weakly guarded state border.

counter-revolutionary movement bands killed party and soviet workers and collective farm activists, and looted and burned state and cooperative property.

Starting in September, 1929, in order to fight the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement at the request of the leaders of the republics units of the 2nd Turkestan Division in full force were called in. By the end of 1929 they had cleaned up the majority of active Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement formations. Those that escaped managed to hide abroad.

The losses of the Soviet troops during the period from September through December, 1929 were 11 men killed, 6 men captured, and 2 men missing in action[1].

The eoncluding stage of the combat operations for the troops of the Turkestan Military District against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement bands was their participation in the defeat in 1931 of a large Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement grouping headed by Ibrahim-Bek which in March-April, 1931 with small subunits had broken through from Afghanistan and dispersed in the territory of the Uzbek SSR. In the first half of May of the same year its numbers had reached 2,823 men[2].

The Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement tried to raise rebellions in a number of regions of Uzbekistan and to seize power, however they were not able to do this. Not only units of the Red Army, but also the local population, including volunteer detachments for fighting the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement (they consisted mainly of rural dwellers), the size of which by the end of May, 1931 was 7,213 men[3], took part in the fight against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement.

As a result of the measures of a political and military nature that were taken the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement bands of Ibrahim-Bek by the middle of 1931 were eliminated.

During the battles with the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement from 20 March through 2 June, 1931 the personnel losses of the active troops of the Turkestan Front were 106 men killed, 90 men wounded, and 3 men missing in action[4]. During this same time the enemy lost 1,224 men killed and 75 men captured. Three hundred fourteen voluntarily surrendered.

Table 20

**Personnel losses for troops of the Turkestan Front (Central Asian Military District) in the fight against**

[1] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 53.

[2] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 178, p. 144.

[3] CSASA, file 25835, cat. 15, d. 12.

[4] CSASA, file 25835, cat. 15, d. 11, p. 37; cat. 12, d. 230, p. 201-204; cat. 14, d. 178, p. 78.

**the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement during the period from October, 1922 through June, 1931**

| Periods for which the losses are calculated | Total losses | Broken down by types of losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Irrecoverable losses | | | | Losses from injury, wounds and sickness | | | |
| | | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Missing in action | Taken prisoner | Total irrecoverable losses | Wounded, injured, burned, etc. | Sick[8] | Frost bitten | Total of losses from injury, wounds and sickness |
| October 1922 - February 1923 | 370[1] | 109 | — | 43 | 152 | 218 | — | — | 218 |
| May 1923 | 56[2] | 28 | 7 | — | 35 | 21 | — | — | 21 |
| May 1924 - December 1925 | 719[3] | 239 | — | — | 239 | 480 | — | — | 480 |
| April - August, November - December 1926 | 12[4] | 4 | — | — | 4 | 8 | — | — | 8 |
| January - December 1927 | 66[5] | 19 | 2 | 1 | 22 | 44 | — | — | 44 |
| September - December 1929 | 19[6] | 11 | 2 | — | 13 | 6 | — | — | 6 |
| March - June 1931 | 199[7] | 106 | 3 | — | 109 | 90 | — | — | 90 |
| Total .......... | 1,441 | 516 | 14 | 44 | 574 | 867 | — | — | 867 |

[1] From the report of the commander of the Turkestan Front (CSASA, file 7, cat. 2, d. 466, p. 66). The document gives the total number of those killed and wounded - 327 men. The broken down number of these two types of losses, shown in the table (109 and 218), is determined by the calculation method. They come from the ratio of the number of the killed and wounded among the personnel of the Turkestan Front (1:2) during the period of combat operations against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement in 1921-1922.

[2] CSASA, file 5, cat. 1, d. 144, p. 14-18. Data about the losses for 1923 are incomplete.

[3] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 170, p. 239. The document gives the total number of the killed and wounded for the indicated time segment (719 men). The broken down number of these two types of losses is determined by the calculation method (see first note).

[4] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 3, p. 112-120. The document gives the total number of the killed and wounded (12 men). The broken down number of these two types of losses is determined by the calculation method (see first note). Data about the losses for 1926 are incomplete.

[5] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 19, p. 59.

[6] CSASA, file 25895, cat. 14, d. 53.

[7] CSASA, file 25835, cat. 15, d. 11, p. 37; cat. 12, d. 230, p. 201-204; cat. 14, d. 178, p. 78.

[8] Data about the sick, injured and wounded losses for the sick personnel of the units which participated in combat operations against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement bands either were not counted as losses or were included in the total number of the wounded and injured.

The final elimination of the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement (a few formations operated until 1933) was carried out without the participation of regular Red Army units.

Table 20 presents archive information about the losses of Soviet troops in the fight against the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement in Central Asia for the period from October 1922 through June 1931. It should be noted here that information about the total number of personnel losses for the period of combat operations under examination are not complete. It was not possible to find complete data about the losses of individual categories of servicemen either. The table does not show the ratio between losses and the average monthly number of personnel by virtue of the inability to determine the composition and the number of the troops which were involved in 1922-1931 in the fight with the Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement.

## The Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929

On 10 July, 1929 detachments of Manchurian troops and White Guards, having violated the existing Sino-Soviet agreements about the joint control of the Chinese-Eastern railroad, seized

it, defeated the trade unions and arrested over 200 Soviet citizens. Simultaneously, Manchurian troops started to concentrate along the Soviet border and to shoot at our border posts and population centers. Numerous protests by the Soviet government against provocative actions of the Manchurian authorities did not lead to the expected results. Additional measures were taken to defend the border and to repel the invaders.

By the start of October, 1929 the Manchurian government of Chzhan-Syuelyan had at its disposal the so-called Mukden Army with a size of about 300,000 men, detachments of White Guards (up to 70,000 men) and the Sungari naval flotilla consisting of 11 warships. They were concentrated basically in four areas: in the Transbaykal region (stations of Manchuria, Khaylar and Tsitsikar) - about 59,000 men, 107 machine guns, 70 guns, 100 mortars, 2 armored trains, and 3 aircraft; in the Blagoveshchensk region - up to 5000 men; in the Sungari region - over 5500 men, 26 machine guns, 20 guns and 16 mortars; and in the Primor'ye region - 63,000 men, 200 machine guns, 120 guns, and 110 mortars.

The grouping of Soviet forces in the Far East consisted of two rifle corps which had been hastily transferred there from the Siberian Military District (one to the Transbaykal region and the other to Primor'ye), and also a number of other units and formations. By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR from 7 August, 1920 the Special Far Eastern Army, under the command of V.K. Blyukher and including the Far Eastern Flotilla, was created from them[1].

It should be noted that the Soviet active forces (18,521 men) in terms of their size were 3-5 times smaller than the active enemy forces in each of the regions, but surpassed them in military equipment and morale-political regards.

The defeat of the grouping of Manchurian forces was carried out by the Special Far Eastern Army in the period from 12 October through 20 November, 1929 in three successive offensive operations: the Sungari operation (12 October to 2 November), the Mishan'fu operation (17-18 November), and the Manchurian-Chzhalaynor operation (17-20 November). During the combat operations the enemy suffered great losses in killed, wounded and captured. For example, in the region of the Manchuria and Chzhalaynor stations the Soviet troops captured over 8000 soldiers and 300 officers of the Mukden army. Just the personnel of the 35th Rifle Division during the period of battles from 17 to 19 November 1929 buried 1035 killed soldiers and officers from the Manchurian forces[2].

On 1 December 1929, the Manchurian government of Chzhan-Syuelyan was forced to start peace negotiations, and on 22 December the signing of the Sino-Soviet agreements about restoring the former situation on the Chinese-Eastern railroad took place in Khabarovsk. After this the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Manchurian territory.

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[1] The Amur Flotilla was called the Far Eastern Flotilla from September, 1926 to January 1931.

[2] CSASA, file 33879, cat. 6, d. 1, p. 15.

Taking part in combat operations against the Manchurian forces on the Soviet side were: in October - the 2nd Amur Division, the Far Eastern Flotilla, and two air squadrons of the Primor'ye group; in November - the 21st, 35th and 36th Rifle Divisions, the 5th Cavalry Brigade, the Buryaday Cavalry Brigade, and the 6th and 25th Aviation Detachments of the Transbaykal group.

The average monthly number of Soviet troops that participated in combat operations during the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1920 is characterized by the following information:

Table 21

| For which months the size is taken | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Illegible)-November | 1334 | 3097 | 14,090 | 18,521 |

During the battles the Soviet troops suffered the following losses:

Table 22

| Types of losses | Total | Commanders | | Junior commanders | | Soldiers | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Number of losses | % of total number of losses of the given type | Number of losses | % of total number of losses of the given type | Number of losses | % of total number of losses of the given type |
| Killed | 143 | 10 | 7 | 15 | 10.5 | 118 | 82.5 |
| Missing in action | 4 | — | — | 1 | 25 | 3 | 75 |
| Wounded and injured | 665 | 59 | 8.9 | 124 | 18.7 | 482 | 72.4 |
| Total .... | 812 | 69 | 8.5 | 140 | 17.2 | 603 | 74.3 |

The maximum number of losses, as the archive data shows, fell on the rifle troops. The losses of the other arms of service were insignificant. Thus, from the total number of personnel losses for the cavalry brigade there were only 11 men killed and 7 men wounded, for the Far Eastern Flotilla there were 4 men wounded (of whom 3 received wounds as a result of the explosion of their own gun on a ship during firing), for the aviation detachments which participated in the combat operations there was only 1 wounded.

The existing data about the nature of the wounds for personnel of the Special Far Eastern Army during combat operations deserve attention as well. From this data it follows that wounds and injuries from artillery rounds were predominant.

For example, in the 36th Rifle Division for 250 (100%) wounded during battles:

16 men, or 6.4%, were wounded from shrapnel shells;

118 men, or 47.2% were wounded from high explosive shells;

10 men, or 4%, were injured, and 106 men, or 42.4%, were wounded by gunshots.

Next comes a table for personnel losses of the Special Far Eastern Army both in an absolute and in a relative (percentage) form (see table 23).

Table 23

## Personnel losses for the Special Far Eastern Army in the Sino-Soviet Military Conflict (12 October - 20 November 1929) [1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 10 | 15 | 118 | 143 |
| | | % of losses | | | 14.5 | 10.7 | 19.5 | 17.6 |
| | Missing in action | Number | | | | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 10 | 16 | 121 | 147 |
| | | % | of losses | | 14.5 | 11.4 | 20 | 18.1 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.54 | 0.38 | 0.62 | 0.62 |
| Standard | Wounded, injured, burned | Number | | | 59 | 124 | 482 | 665 |
| | | % of losses | | | 85.5 | 88.6 | 80 | 81.9 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injured and wounded losses | Number | | | 59 | 124 | 482 | 665 |
| | | % | of losses | | 85.5 | 88.6 | 80 | 81.9 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 4.4 | 4 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.38 | 3.08 | 2.61 | 2.76 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 69 | 140 | 603 | 812 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 5.1 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.4 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.92 | 3.46 | 3.23 | 3.38 |

[1] CSASA, file 35083, cat. 1, d. 60, p. 6, 10; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 1, p. 75; CAMD, file 5, cat. 176703, d. 27, p. 48, 49.

## The rendering of military assistance to the Spanish Republic (1936-1939)

In July of 1936 the reactionary forces of Spain, headed by General Franco and relying on Hitler and Mussolini for support, raised a fascist rebellion against the Spanish republic and the republican government. During this the rebels were able to get a large part of the army on their side (up to 100,000 men).

A large role in the supporting of the resistance of the Spanish people against fascism was played by the international solidarity movement and aid on the part of the democratic forces of the world. The Soviet Union, having responded to the request of the Spanish government, gave concurrence to ship weapons and military hardware to the Spanish republic. In total from October,1936 through January 1939, it was supplied with 648 planes, 347 tanks, 60 armored cars, 1186 artillery guns, 20,486 machine guns, and 497,813 rifles[1].

Also, in accordance with the request of the republic government the Soviet Union sent to Spain about 3000 volunteers - military advisers, pilots, tank soldiers, sailors, various specialists who fought and worked on the side of the republic. One hundred fifty-eight volunteers were killed during this[2].

Table 23a presents the irrecoverable losses of Soviet military volunteers in Spain, taking into account their basic types and categories of personnel.

Table 23a

| Types of losses | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Died | Number<br>% of losses | 95<br>82.6 | 37<br>86 | 132<br>83.5 |
| Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | 20<br>17.4 | 6<br>14 | 26<br>16.5 |
| Total ... | Number<br>% of losses | 115<br>100 | 43<br>100 | 158<br>100 |

## The rendering of military aid to China (1937-1939)

[1] See: History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945).Moscow, 1974. Vol. 2. P. 54.

[2] Information of the GRU, source 24/243 from 30 July, 1991.

In July of 1937 the national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressors who had invaded the northeastern and central regions of China began. At the initiative of the Chinese communist party, which acted in cooperation with the Kuomintang[1], a unified anti-Japanese front was created. Several liberated regions, where significant forces of the Chinese Red Army were concentrated, were formed in the territory occupied by the Japanese.

The Soviet Union, which was acting on the basis of Sino-Soviet treaties on nonaggression (1937), trade (1939) and extending of credits (1939), provided much assistance to China in its national liberation fight. Just from October 1937, through September 1939 the Soviet Union supplied China with 985 planes, 82 tanks, over 1300 pieces of artillery, over 14,000 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 1550 trucks and tractors, and also ammunition, equipment and supplies[2].

At the request of the Nanking government, starting in the fall of 1937, Soviet military specialists and military advisers were sent to China on a volunteer basis. Already by the middle of February 1939 3665 Soviet military volunteers were working there and participating in the war with the Japanese[3]. Of them, 195 men were killed in battles for the liberation of the Chinese people[4].

In table 23b the irrecoverable losses of Soviet military volunteers in China are given taking into account their basic types and the categories of the personnel.

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[1] The Kuomintang is a political party in China that was created in 1912. It was the ruling party since 1927. The authority of the kuomintang was overthrown in 1949.

[2] See: History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945). Vol. 2. P. 72.

[3] See: History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945). Vol. 2. P. 73.

[4] Information of the GRU, source 24/243 from 30 July, 1991.

Table 23b

| Types of losses | | Commander s | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Died | Number<br>% of losses | 146<br>95.4 | 33<br>94.3 | 7<br>100. | 186<br>95.4 |
| Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | 7<br>4.6 | 2<br>5.7 | —<br>— | 9<br>4.6 |
| Total ... | Number<br>% of losses | 153<br>100 | 35<br>100 | 7<br>100 | 195<br>100 |

## The Soviet-Japanese conflict in the region of Lake Khasan in 1938

After the seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese in 1931-1932 and the converting of it to the puppet state of Manchugo, a jumping off spot for an attack on the Soviet Union started to be created and preparations were being intensively conducted by the Japanese Kwantung army for a future war. In the second half of the 1930's Japan, encouraged by the governments of the United states, England and France and supported by fascist German, moved to direct acts of aggression against the Soviet Union.

Having concentrated three infantry divisions, a mechanized brigade, a cavalry regiment, three machine gun battalions and 70 planes in the middle of July 1938 close to the Pos'yeta region of the Soviet border, the Japanese on 29 July 1938 with two companies attacked our border post on Bezymyannaya hill which was defended by eleven border guards and penetrated onto Soviet territory. However, subunits of regular Worker and Peasants Red Army troops which had rushed to aid the border guards faced the invading Japanese soldiers and officers over the border.

On 31 July the enemy again invaded Soviet territory and, having advanced up to 4 kilometers, seized tactically important hills Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya in the region of lake Khasan.

The assignment of defeating the invading Japanese forces was given by the command authorities of the Far Eastern Front[1] to the only recently created 39th Rifle Corps consisting of

[1] The Far Eastern Front for Soviet troops was formed in June 1938 on the basis of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army to repel Japanese aggression. In August 1938 after the completion of combat operations in the region of lake Khasan the administration over the Far Eastern Front was disbanded. The second existence of the Far Eastern Front belongs to the (continued...)

the 40th and 32nd Rifle Divisions, the 2nd Mechanized Brigade and reinforcement units with a size of 22,950 men[1]. The command authorities of the corps on the 2nd and 3rd of August made an attempt to drive out the enemy from heights that had been seized with forces of only the 40th Rifle Division which had not yet even completed its assembly. Its actions turned out to be without results since the Japanese at that time had been able to fortify and receive significant reinforcements.

The Soviet command authorities hurriedly sent to the region of the battles additional forces which on 6 August moved to the attack and over the course of three days fully cleared Japanese invaders from Soviet territory. The new attacks undertaken by the enemy were repelled with great losses for him. In connection with this, on 10 August the Japanese government proposed to the Soviet government to start negotiations, and on 11 August combat operations between the Soviet and Japanese troops were halted.

The personnel losses during the battles around lake Khasan, according to the testimony of Japanese sources, were 500 men killed and 900 men wounded[2].

Data about the losses for Soviet troops in personnel during the two-week battles with the Japanese in the Khasan region are shown in table 24.

The data about the losses, presented in table 24, make it possible to determine the ratio between the killed and wounded in Soviet troops, which is calculated as approximately one to four, that is, for each killed person there were almost four wounded. Also, the high percentage of losses among the command personnel, especially for the killed (18%) draws attention.

Here it should be noted that of the total number of wounded soldiers and commanders (2752 men), 66 men, that is, 2.4%, died in hospitals (during the period of from 30 July to 12 August 1938)[3].

(...continued)
period from July 1940 to August 1945.

[1] CSASA, file 35083, cat. 1, d. 60, p. 60.

[2] See: 1939: Lessons of History. (1939 god: Uroki istorii). Moscow, 1990. P. 291.

[3] CSASA, file 37299, cat. 176703, d. 27, p. 56.

Table 24

| Types of losses | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | | | | |
| Killed and died in stages of the medical evacuation | 129 | 191 | 397 | 717 |
| Missing in action | 5 | 8 | 62 | 75 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 134 | 199 | 459 | 792 |
| Sick, injured and wounded losses | | | | |
| Wounded, injured, burned | 290 | 406 | 2056 | 2752 |
| Sick | 37 | 79 | 411 | 527 |
| Total of sick, injured and wounded losses | 327 | 485 | 2467 | 3279 |

Table 25

**Types of wounds received by the personnel in the Khasan battles**[1]

| Types of wounds | Number of wounded | % of total number of wounded |
|---|---|---|
| Gunshot | 869 | 31.6 |
| Fragment | 1498 | 54.4 |
| Nonfirearms | 110 | 4 |
| Mixed | 275 | 10 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2752 | 100 |

[1] CAMD, file 5, cat. 176703, d. 27,p. 56.

Information about the nature of the wounded is presented below in table 26[1].

[1] CSASA, file 37299, cat. 2, d. 559, p. 134.

Table 26

| In the head | In the face | In the neck | In the chest | In the abdomen | In the arms | In the legs | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 86<br>3.1% | 78<br>2.8% | 53<br>1.9% | 252<br>9% | 72<br>2.6% | 1122<br>39.8% | 1146<br>40.8% | 2809<br>100% |

The statistical data about the types and nature of the wounds that is shown in tables 25 and 26 make it possible to conclude that the fragment wounds (54.4%) in the upper and lower extremities (80.6%) predominate among them.

If one takes the personnel losses due to diseases, then 56.1% of the total number of them were gastrointestinal connected with the failure to supply the active troops with potable water, 18.9% were catarrhal diseases, 13.3% were malaria illnesses, and 11.7% were other[1].

The data about the treatment outcome for the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who received wounds and were sick during the battles with the Japanese invaders in the region of Lake Khasan are of certain interest (see table 27).

Table 27

| Sickness, injured and wounded losses | Indicators for sickness, injured and wounded losses | Total who went to medical facilities | Of them | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | returned to duty | discharged and removed from accounting, given leave for treatment | died |
| Wounded, injured and burned [1] | Number | 2752 | 1973 | 470 | 93 |
| | % | 100 | 71.7 | 17 | 3.4 |
| Sick [2] | Number | 527 | 271 | 115 | 1 |
| | % | 100 | 51.4 | 21.8 | 0.2 |
| Total .......... | Number | 3279 | 2244 | 585 | 94 |
| | % | 100 | 68.4 | 17.9 | 2.9 |

[1] Data only about those who sent to hospitals for treatment are presented in the table. There is no information about the number of wounded, injured, burned and sick or about those who returned to duty by regimental and divisional medical stations.

[2] In columns 4, 5, and 6 (because of the absence of data) the outcome of the treatment for 216 wounded, injured and burned (7.9%) and for 140 sick (26.6%) is not indicated.

Here we should also talk about several special features in the rendering of first aid to the wounded and injured during the combat operations around Lake Khasan. First of all it was assumed that this aid would be rendered in battalion aid stations since at that time there were doctors on the rolls in the battalions. However, the first days of the battles showed that the battalion aid stations that were deployed on open terrain became a good target for enemy artillery. Therefore in the majority of battalions there were not deployed and the battalion doctors together with the medical corpsmen worked (directly in the combat formations) on rendering first aid, dressing the wounded, and evacuating them to the rear.

[1] CSASA, file 37299, cat. 5, d. 560, p. 19-21.

In conclusion, data about the average monthly number of troops (table 28) and also about the number of personnel losses with a breakdown by arms of service (table 29) and categories of personnel (table 30) are given.

Table 28

**Average monthly number of Soviet troops who took part in combat operations at Khasan**

| Total personnel in active troops | Breakdown | | | For which months the number is taken |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | commanders | junior commanders | soldiers | |
| 22,950 | 1636 | 3442 | 17,872 | August 1938 |

Table 29

**Personnel losses by arms of service**

| Arms of service | Categories of servicemen | Types of losses | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Killed [1] | Wounded | Missing in action |
| Rifle troops | Commanders | 55 | 268 | 5 |
| | Junior commanders | 68 | 391 | 1 |
| | Soldiers | 243 | 2056 | 7 |
| | Total ......... | 366 | 2715 | 13 |
| | % | 91.1 | 98.7 | 72.2 |
| Tank troops | Commanders | 10 | 22 | — |
| | Junior commanders | 23 | 15 | 5 |
| | Soldiers | — | — | — |
| | Total ......... | 33 | 37 | 5 |
| | % | 8.2 | 1.3 | 27.8 |
| Artillery (corps) | Commanders | — | — | — |
| | Junior commanders | 1 | — | — |
| | Soldiers | 1 | — | — |
| | Total ......... | 2 | — | — |
| | % | 0.5 | — | — |
| Signal | Commanders | 1 | — | — |
| | Junior commanders | — | — | — |
| | Soldiers | — | — | — |
| | Total ......... | 1 | — | — |
| | % | 0.2 | — | — |
| | Total | 402 | 2752 | 18 |
| | % | 100 | 100 | 100 |

[1] Data about the killed is incomplete.

Table 30

## Personnel losses for Soviet troops during combat operations in Lake Khasan region (29 July - 11 August 1938)

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 129 | 191 | 397 | 717 |
| | | % of losses | | | 28 | 27.9 | 13.6 | 17.6 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 5 | 8 | 62 | 75 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.1 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 134 | 199 | 459 | 792 |
| | | % | of losses | | 29.1 | 29.1 | 15.7 | 19.4 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 8.2 | 5.8 | 2.6 | 3.4 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 290 | 406 | 2056 | 2752 |
| | | % of losses | | | 62.9 | 59.4 | 70.3 | 67.7 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 37 | 79 | 411 | 527 |
| | | % of losses | | | 8 | 11.5 | 14 | 12.9 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 327 | 485 | 2467 | 3279 |
| | | % | of losses | | 70.9 | 70.9 | 84.3 | 80.6 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 20 | 14.1 | 13.8 | 14.3 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 461 | 684 | 2926 | 4071 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 28.2 | 19.9 | 16.4 | 17.7 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |

[1] CSASA file 35083, cat. 1, d. 60, p. 6,10; d. 105, p. 1-22; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 1, p. 75.

# Defeat of the Japanese invaders around the Khalkhin-Gol region in 1939

After having been convinced of the strength of the Soviet border and the lack of prospects for their military efforts in the coastal area during the time of the Khasan battles of 1938, the Japanese military in May 1939 organized a number of major provocations against the Mongolian Peoples Republic with the simultaneous incursion of Japanese troops into its territory in the Khalkhin-Gol River region. However, the joint operations of the Soviet troops located there in accordance with the Mutual Assistance Protocol (1936)[1] and troops of the Mongol Peoples Revolutionary Army[2] decisively repelled Japanese. After this the command authorities of the Kwantung Army concentrated a major grouping of troops on the Mongolian Peoples Republic border which by the end of June consisted of 38,000 soldiers and officers, 310 guns, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft. The Soviet-Mongolian forces, of which G.K.Zhukov (from 31 July a corps commander) took command, numbered 12,500 soldiers and commanders, 109 guns, 266 armored vehicles, 186 tanks and 82 aircraft.

The enemy, using his numerical superiority, on 2 July started to attack with the goal of surrounding and destroying the Soviet-Mongolian units and capturing an operational beachhead on the western shore of the Khalkhin-Gol River in order to set up future offensive operations in the direction of the Soviet Transbaykal. However, during three days of bloody battles all of the Japanese troops who managed to cross the river were destroyed or thrown back to the eastern shore. Subsequent attacks by the Japanese during almost all of July did not result in success since there were repelled everywhere.

However, the Japanese command authorities, in spite of the major failures and losses, stubbornly adhered to their aggressive plans. They started to prepare their so-called general

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[1] In January 1936 in the situation of an increased threat of attack on the Mongolian Peoples Republic on the part of Japan the government of Mongolia appealed to the government of the USSR with a request about offering military assistance. In February of the same year the Soviet government announced that the Soviet Union would help the Mongolian Peoples Republic to repel Japanese aggression. Right after this, on 12 March, the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol about

Mutual Assistance for a period of 10 years, which replaced the agreement of 1934, was signed in Ulan-Bator. In accordance with this protocol Soviet troops were deployed on Mongolian territory. By 29 May, 1930 the number of these troops, which were part of the 57th Independent Rifle Corps and which took part in the first battles on the Khalkhin-Gol river, was 5544 men, of which 523 were commanders and 996 were junior commanders (CSASA, file 37977, cat. 1, d. 101, p. 20). Subsequently the number of the Soviet troops grew in connection with the growth of the scale of the Japanese aggression.

[2] The Mongolian troops in the region of the combat operations had three cavalry divisions with a total size of 4860 men (of these, 1293 were commanders) (CSASA, file. 37933, cat. 1, d. 101).

offensive which was timed to coincide with the proposed start of a war in Europe by fascist Germany. With this goal, at the start of August the 6th Japanese Army under the command of General O. Rippo, with a size of 75,000 men, was greater. It had 500 guns and 182 tanks, and over 300 planes were allocated to it for air support.

The Soviet-Mongolian troops that at that time were combined in the 1st Army Group under the command of corps commander G.K.Zhukov numbered 57,000 soldiers and commanders. They had 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 aircraft. After having warned the enemy, on 20 August the Soviet-Mongolian troops after powerful airstrikes and an almost three hour artillery preparation moved to the attack with two groups - the northern and the southern. As a result of the bold and decisive actions of these groups on the enemy flanks, on 23 August the entire Japanese grouping was encircled. By the start of 31 August it was completely crushed. The combat operations were halted at Japan's request[1], and on 15 September a signing of the Soviet-Japanese agreement about ending the military conflict was held.

During the time of the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol the Japanese lost about 61,000 men killed, wounded and captured, including about 45,000 in July-August 1939. Their losses in killed alone during the entire period of the military operations were about 25,000 men.

On the Soviet side the 36th Motorized Rifle Division, the 57th and 82 Rifle Divisions, the 5th Rifle and Machine Gun Brigade, the 6th and 11th Tank Brigades, the 7th, 8th, and 9th Motorized Armored Brigades, the 56th Fighter Regiment, the 185 Artillery Regiment, the 85th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment, and combat support units took part[2].

Statistical data about the average monthly size of the Soviet troops who participated in battles on the Khalkhin-Gol (see table 31) and different information about the personnel losses will be presented.

Table 31

| For which months the number of troops is taken for calculating their average monthly size | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| June, July, August, September 1939 | 8457 | 12,583 | 48,061 | 69,101 |

[1] Battles in the air between the Soviet and Japanese air forces lasted until 15 September, 1939.

[2] CSASA, file 32113, cat. 2, d. 59, p. 37.

For the Mongolian Peoples Republic troops, the 6th and 8th Cavalry divisions with a total size of about 2260 men, of which 862 were commanders, took direct part in the defeat of the Japanese invaders on the Khalkhin-Gol[1].

The Soviet troops during the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol (until the middle of September 1939) suffered the following losses in personnel:

Table 32

| Types of losses | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | | | | |
| Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 1063 | 1313 | 4455 | 6831 |
| Missing in action | 71 | 120 | 952 | 1143 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 1134 | 1433 | 5407 | 7974 |
| Sick, injured and wounded losses | | | | |
| Wounded, injured, burned | 1335 | 2123 | 11,793 | 15,251 |
| Sick [1] | 85 | 127 | 489 | 701 |
| Total of sick, injured and wounded losses | 1420 | 2250 | 12,282 | 15,925 |

[1] Data about the number of sick, who were treated in hospitals of the Transbaykal Military District are presented in the table.

The wounded and sick were sent from hospitals located on the territory of the Mongolian Peoples Republic to military hospitals of the Transbaykal Military District, mainly to Chita. Approximately half of the wounded and sick were evacuated from the Tamtsag-Bulakskiy hospital by air[2].

There is some data about the combat losses among the command personnel according to positions during the time of the battles in August 1939. In the 57th and 82 Rifle Divisions and the 36th Motorized Rifle Division the indicated losses (not counting political workers and artillery soldiers) were 180 men[3], including:

[1] CSASA, file 37977, cat. 1, d. 101, p. 17.

[2] See: Smirnov, Ye.I. Frontline Mercy. (Frontovoye milocerdiye). Moscow, 1991. P. 24.

[3] CSASA, file 32113, d. 185, p. 179, 180.

division commanders - 1;
rifle regiment commanders - 4;
regiment chiefs of staff - 1;
regiment assistant chiefs of staff - 2;
battalion commanders - 4;
assistant battalion commanders for personnel and supply records - 2;
assistant battalion commanders for technical affairs - 1
battalion senior adjutants - 8;
rifle company commanders - 36;
assistant company commanders - 2
rifle and machine gun platoon commanders - 116;
battalion assistant adjutants - 1;
battalion chiefs of ammunition - 1;
transport platoon commanders -1.

In tank and motorized armored brigades during the same time (August) 130 command personnel were killed (not counting the political workers who were killed). The following losses were distributed in terms of position in the following way[1]:

tank brigade commanders - 1;
brigade chiefs of staff - 1;
brigade chiefs of staff for 1st section - 1;
battalion (armored) commanders - 1;
brigade assistant chiefs of staff for 1st section - 1;
rifle regiment and brigade commanders - 2;
battalion (tank) assistant commanders - 1;
battalion chiefs of staff - 4;
battalion assistant chiefs of staff - 7;
company commanders - 19;
battalion assistant commanders for technical affairs - 2;
assistant company commanders - 13;
platoon commanders - 66;
battalion chiefs of signal service - 3;
brigade chiefs of staff for 4th section - 1;
brigade chiefs of signal service - 1;
battalion chiefs of ammunition supply - 1;
artillery battery commanders - 1;
chemical platoon commanders - 1;
brigade chiefs of food and issue gear - 1;
brigade radio technician - 1;
anti-tank battery commanders - 1.

The data that have been presented testify about the fact that killed losses in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol were suffered by practically all categories of the command personnel.

[1] CSASA, file 32113, cat. 2, d. 56, p. 71.

The percentage of the commanders of rifle and tank units and subunits who died among the total number of the command personnel who died is presented below (table 33).

Table 33

| Categories of command personnel | In rifle and motorized rifle divisions, % | In tank brigades and motorized transport brigades, % |
|---|---|---|
| Platoon commanders | 65 | 58.8 |
| Company commanders | 20 | 14.6 |
| Battalion commanders | 2.2 | 0.8 |
| Regiment commanders | 2.2 | 1.5 |

Table 34

**Data about nature of wounds**

| Nature of wounds | Category of personnel | | | Total | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | | |
| Cranial | 56 | 80 | 344 | 480 | 3.1 |
| Eye | 14 | 28 | 94 | 136 | 0.9 |
| Maxillofacial | 50 | 78 | 438 | 566 | 3.7 |
| Cervical | 23 | 26 | 139 | 188 | 1.2 |
| In the chest | 91 | 122 | 613 | 826 | 5.4 |
| In the abdomen | 26 | 37 | 301 | 364 | 2.4 |
| genitourinary | 5 | 8 | 29 | 42 | 0.3 |
| Upper extremities | 272 | 530 | 3539 | 4341 | 28.5 |
| Lower extremities | 343 | 529 | 3125 | 3997 | 26.2 |
| Joints | 38 | 62 | 276 | 376 | 2.5 |
| Spinal-vertebral | 36 | 44 | 246 | 326 | 2.1 |
| Combined | 261 | 436 | 1970 | 2667 | 17.5 |
| Contusions | 90 | 104 | 476 | 670 | 4.4 |
| Burns | 14 | 17 | 24 | 55 | 0.4 |
| Not clarified | 16 | 22 | 179 | 217 | 1.4 |
| Total ...... | 1335 | 2123 | 11,793 | 15251 | 100 |

The total number of wounds for the personnel (15,251), shown in table 32, has the following distribution according to the types of them, %[1]:

gunshot - 44.2%;
fragmentation (shells, mines, grenades) - 48.4%;
fragmentation (air bombs) - 6.5%;
nonfirearms - 0.9%.

During a comparative analysis of the number of wounds in the upper and lower extremities one should keep in mind that in July 1939 among the soldiers and partially the junior commanders of the 603rd Rifle Regiment which consisted of drafted personnel there was a significant number of premeditated wounds (self-inflicted wounds) which were made basically in the upper extremities[2]. They ceased after the military council of the 1st Army Group took decisive measures to combat this disgraceful phenomenon.

[1] CSASA, file 32113, cat. 2, d. 56, p. 61.

[2] CSASA, file 32113, cat. 2. d. 56, p. 71.

Completing the discussion of the sick, injured and wounded losses among the personnel at the Khalkhin-Gol, we will present the existing (incomplete) data about the outcome of the treatment in hospitals (see table 35).

Table 35

| Sickness, injury and wounded losses | Total that went to military medical facilities | Breakdown [1] | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | returned to duty | discharged, removed from military accounting, given leaves | died |
| Wounded, injured, and burned | 15,251 | 3964 (data incomplete) | 355 [2] (data incomplete) | 720 |

It is especially necessary to speak about the losses among the personnel of the Soviet troops on the Khalkhin-Gol due to sick servicemen who during the entire period of the battles numbered 701 men[3]. The overwhelming majority of diseases were colds, gastrointestinal and eye diseases[4].

Table 36

[1] Data about the outcome of the treatment of the wounded, injured and burned are presented in the table according to their condition in November 1939. At this time the results of the treatment for 10,212 servicemen who were in military medical facilities had not yet been determined.

[2] This figure includes 534 men who died in field and evacuation hospitals and 104 who died in hospitals of the Transbaykal Military District (CSASA, file 32133, cat. 2, d. 59, p. 37; file 37462, cat. 2, d. 1, p. 147).

[3] The number of sick people who went through treatment in military district hospitals is shown here. There are no data about the number of sick servicemen who were treated in front line medical facilities (regimental and divisional medical stations).

[4] Colds were caused mainly by the unaccustomed changes between the day and night temperatures - from +35° to -15°. The main cause for the gastrointestinal diseases was the shortage of high quality water. Finally, the abundance of bright sunlight caused an irritation of the mucous membrane of the eyes, and during strong sand storms for many people this irritation was complicated by an inflammation of the mucous membrane.

## Personnel Losses by Arms of Service [1]

| Arms of Service | Categories of Servicemen | Types of Loss | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Killed | Missing in Action | Wounded |
| Rifle Troops | Commanders<br>Jr Commanders<br>Soldiers | 283<br>575<br>2533 | 6<br>48<br>405 | 857<br>1405<br>7807 |
| | Total .............<br>% | 3391<br>68.2 | 459<br>79.7 | 10069<br>82.9 |
| Tank Troops | Commanders<br>Jr Commanders<br>Soldiers | 120<br>195<br>344 | 3<br>15<br>18 | 165<br>225<br>474 |
| | Total .............<br>% | 659<br>13.2 | 36<br>6.3 | 864<br>7.1 |
| Artillery (Inclusing Divisional) | Commanders<br>Jr Commanders<br>Soldiers | 17<br>33<br>127 | —<br>—<br>14 | 65<br>91<br>310 |
| | Total .............<br>% | 177<br>3.6 | 14<br>2.4 | 466<br>3.8 |
| Air Forces | Commanders<br>Jr Commanders<br>Soldiers | 85<br>13<br>2 | 44<br>15<br>— | 88<br>14<br>— |
| | Total .............<br>% | 100<br>2 | 59<br>10.2 | 102<br>0.8 |
| Other | Commanders<br>Jr Commanders<br>Soldiers | 36<br>109<br>502 | 1<br>2<br>5 | 32<br>128<br>498 |
| | Total .............<br>% | 647<br>13 | 8<br>1.4 | 658<br>5.4 |
| | Total .............<br>% | 4974<br>100 | 576<br>100 | 12159<br>100 |

[1] Information about losses is incomplete.

**Personnel losses for Soviet troops during battles on the Khalkhin-Gol (11 May - 15 September 1939)[1]** **Table 37**

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 1063 | 1313 | 4455 | 6831 |
| | | % of losses | | | 41.6 | 35.6 | 25.2 | 28.6 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 71 | 120 | 952 | 1143 |
| | | % of losses | | | 2.8 | 3.3 | 5.4 | 4.8 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1134 | 1433 | 5407 | 7974 |
| | | % | of losses | | 44.4 | 38.9 | 30.6 | 33.3 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 13.4 | 11.4 | 11.2 | 11.5 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1335 | 2123 | 11,793 | 15,251 |
| | | % of losses | | | 52.3 | 57.7 | 66.7 | 63.7 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 85 | 127 | 489 | 701 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.3 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.9 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1420 | 2250 | 12,282 | 15,952 |
| | | % | of losses | | 55.6 | 61.1 | 69.4 | 66.7 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 16.8 | 17.9 | 25.6 | 23.1 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 2554 | 3683 | 17,689 | 23,926 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 30.2 | 29.3 | 36.8 | 34.6 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |

Judging by the analysis of the existing data about the sickness rate in the 36th Motorized Rifle Division the 57th Rifle Division, and military unit 9355 for the period from 1 April to 1 October 1939 the gastrointestinal and eye diseases on average comprised 56% (19.6 and 36.4% respectively)[2].

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[1] CSASA, file 32113, cat. 2, d. 56, p. 71; d. 59, p. 71-76; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 101, p. 17, 20,99; d. 1-4, p. 91-94; d. 589, p. 1-205.

[2] CSASA, file 32113, cat. 2, d. 386, p. 1032, 1085-1092.

It must be noted that in connection with the shortage of doctors in the regimental medical stations battalion doctors were transferred there and paramedics were sent to the battalions in their place.

Systematized data about all types of personnel losses for Soviet troops on the Khalkhin-Gol are presented in tables 36 and 37.

## The campaign into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia in 1939

On 1 September 1939 fascist Germany made a surprise attack on Poland, having advanced to there a powerful grouping of its troops which in terms of size greatly exceeded the Polish army (by 1.5 times in terms of infantry, by 2.8 times in terms of artillery and by 5.3 times in terms of tanks)[1]. The Polish government could not organize a defense of the country and fled on 17 September, having left the fate of their nation and demoralized army to the mercy of fate.

Soon after the start of the second world war Soviet troops at the decision of the Soviet state completed a march into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.

The troops of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Fronts on 17 September 1939 moved to the Soviet-Polish border and on 25 September reached the line designated for them along the Western Bug and San rivers. On the route of their movement the Soviet troops encountered individual centers of resistance which consisted of army formations and police forces. But they were quickly suppressed in the course of the armed clashes. The main forces of the Polish troops did not participate in the clashes. Whole units and formations were taken prisoner. On the Ukrainian Front in the period from 17 September to 2 August 1939 392,334 men were taken prisoner, including 16,723 officers [2], and on the Belorussian Front from 17 to 30 September 1939 60,202 men were taken prisoner, of which 2066 were officers[3].

The number of troops of the fronts and the total number of Soviet troops who participated in the march are shown in table 38.

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[1] See :<u>1939: Lessons of History</u>. (1939 god: Uroki istorii). P. 373.

[2] CSASA, file 35084, cat. 1, d. 22, p. 21; d. 24, p. 103; d. 25, p. 44; d. 28, p. 31.

[3] CSASA, file 37977, cat. 1, d. 217, p. 69.

In June, 1940, according to the Soviet-Rumanian agreement the state border between the USSR and Rumania was established along the Prut and Danube Rivers. Troops of the Southern Front, created on the base of the Kiev Special Military District, were sent to the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were taken from the Soviet state in 1918. There were no personnel losses here.

Table 38[1]

| Fronts | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total | For which months the number is taken |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ukrainian Front | 25,740 | 34,980 | 204,994 | 265,714 | Sep. 1939 |
| Belorussian Front | 36,243 | 45,169 | 119,390 | 200,802 | Sep. 1939 |
| Total for march | 61,983 | 80,149 | 324,384 | 466,516 | |

The losses in personnel for the troops of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Fronts during the march were:

[1] CSASA, file 37977, cat. 1, d. 187, p. 85-128; d. 193, p. 146; p. 215, p. 72, 82; d. 217, p. 26.

Table 39[1]

| Types of losses | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | | | | |
| Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 127 | 150 | 575 | 852 |
| Missing in action | 20 | 18 | 106 | 144 |
| Total of irrecoverable losses | 147 | 168 | 681 | 996 |
| Sick, wounded and injured losses | | | | |
| Wounded, injured, burned | 186 | 298 | 1518 | 2002 |
| Sick | 26 | 11 | 344 | 381 |
| Total of sick, wounded and injured losses | 212 | 309 | 1862 | 2383 |

Information about the losses of personnel broken down by arms of service is presented in table 40.

[1] CSASA, file 35084, cat. 1, d. 22, p. 22,23; d. 23, p. 21; d. 24, p. 108; d. 25, p. 45,46; file 37977, cat. 1. d. 193, p. 146, 188; file 35086, cat. 1, d. 213, p. 33; d. 244, p. 907; d. 396, p. 99, 100; d. 435, p. 31, 32; d. 447, p. 84; CAMD, file 16, cat. 204, d. 3, p. 7, 35, 54, 63, 64.

Table 40

| Arms of service* | Types of losses | Personnel categories | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | |
| Rifle troops ** | Killed and died from wounds in stages of military evacuation | 66 | 121 | 528 | 715 |
| | Missing in action | 20 | 18 | 106 | 144 |
| | Wounded | 164 | 270 | 1442 | 1876 |
| | Total .............. | 250 | 409 | 2076 | 2735 |
| Cavalry troops | Killed and died from wounds in stages of military evacuation | 2 | 10 | 16 | 28 |
| | Wounded | 4 | 4 | 14 | 22 |
| | Total .............. | 6 | 14 | 30 | 50 |
| Tank troops | Killed and died from wounds in stages of military evacuation | 9 | 17 | 26 | 52 |
| | Wounded | 18 | 22 | 41 | 81 |
| | Total .............. | 27 | 39 | 67 | 133 |
| Artillery | Killed and died from wounds in stages of military evacuation | 1 | 2 | 5 | 8 |
| | Wounded | - | 1 | 21 | 22 |
| | Total .............. | 1 | 3 | 26 | 30 |
| Aviation | Killed and died from wounds in stages of military evacuation | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| | Wounded | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| | Total .............. | 4 | 1 | - | 5 |
| Total for all arms of service | | 288 | 466 | 2199 | 2953 |

* CSASA, file 35084, cat. 1, d. 22, p. 22, 23; d. 23, p. 21; d. 24, p. 108; d, 25, p. 45,46; file 3508, cat. 1, d. 213, p. 33; d. 235, p. 40; d. 244, p. 907, d. 396, p. 98; d. 435, p. 31, 32; d. 447, p. 84; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 193, p. 188; d. 217, p. 58, 63, 86. Information about the personnel losses according to arms of service is incomplete.

** The number of losses of the rifle troops includes, starting from the existing data, the losses of the signal troops, the engineer troops, and so on.

Table 41

## Summary data about the personnel losses for Soviet troops in the march into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (17 September - 25 September 1939) [1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 127 | 150 | 575 | 852 |
| | | % of losses | | | 35.4 | 31.4 | 22.6 | 25.2 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 20 | 18 | 106 | 144 |
| | | % of losses | | | 5.6 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.3 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 147 | 168 | 681 | 996 |
| | | % | of losses | | 41 | 35.2 | 26.8 | 29.5 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 186 | 298 | 1518 | 2002 |
| | | % of losses | | | 51.8 | 62.5 | 59.7 | 59.2 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 26 | 11 | 344 | 381 |
| | | % of losses | | | 7.2 | 2.3 | 13.5 | 11.3 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 212 | 309 | 1862 | 2383 |
| | | % | of losses | | 59 | 64.8 | 73.2 | 70.5 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 359 | 477 | 2543 | 3379 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |

Table 42

[1] CSASA, file 35086, cat. 1, d. 396, p. 98; file 35084, cat. 1, d. 22, p. 22, 23; d. 23, p. 21; d. 24, p. 108; d. 25, p. 45, 46; file 35086, cat. 1, d. 213, p. 33; d. 235, p. 40; d. 244, p. 907; d. 396, p. 98; d. 435, p. 31, 32; d. 447, p. 84; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 193, p. 188; d. 217, p. 58, 63, 86; Archive of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, inventory No 22 (name list of losses for command personnel).

## Personnel losses of the Belorussian Front (17 September - 25 September 1939)[1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 32 | 63 | 221 | 316 |
| | | % of losses | | | 39.5 | 39.9 | 30.6 | 32.9 |
| | Missing in action | Number | | | 1 | | 2 | 3 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.2 | | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 33 | 63 | 223 | 319 |
| | | % | of losses | | 40.7 | 39.9 | 30.9 | 33.2 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 48 | 95 | 499 | 642 |
| | | % of losses | | | 59.3 | 60.1 | 69.1 | 66.8 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 48 | 95 | 499 | 642 |
| | | % | of losses | | 59.3 | 60.1 | 69.1 | 66.8 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 81 | 158 | 722 | 961 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |

Table 43

## Personnel losses of the Western Ukrainian Front

[1] CSASA, file 35086, cat. 1, d. 213, p. 33; d. 244, p. 907; d. 396, p. 99, 100; d. 435, p. 31,32; d. 447, p. 84. Information about the command personnel losses is incomplete.

**(17 September - 25 September, 1939)**[1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 50 | 87 | 354 | 491 |
| | | % of losses | | | 21.5 | 27.3 | 19.4 | 20.7 |
| | Missing in action | Number | | | 19 | 18 | 104 | 141 |
| | | % of losses | | | 8.2 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.9 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 69 | 105 | 458 | 632 |
| | | % | of losses | | 29.7 | 32.9 | 25.1 | 26.6 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 138 | 203 | 1019 | 1360 |
| | | % of losses | | | 59.2 | 63.6 | 56 | 57.3 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 26 | 11 | 344 | 381 |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.1 | 3.5 | 18.9 | 16.1 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 164 | 214 | 1363 | 1741 |
| | | % | of losses | | 70.3 | 67.1 | 74.9 | 73.4 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 233 | 319 | 1821 | 2373 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | |

## The Soviet-Finnish War (30 November, 1939 - 13 March, 1940)

[1] CSASA, file 35084, cat. 1, d. 22, p. 22, 23; d. 23, p. 21; d. 24, p. 108; d. 25, p. 45,46; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 193, p. 146, 188; CAMD, file 16-A, cat. 204, d. 3, p. 35, 54, 63, 64.Information about the command personnel losses is incomplete.

On the eve of the second world war a rapid rapprochement and military cooperation began between fascist Germany and Finland.

It should be noted that a significant part of the Finnish public did not reject the insistent desire by Hitler's government to convert the territory of Finland into a launching pad for aggression against the Soviet Union.

Military bases, arsenals, various sorts of fortifications etc. were erected with accelerated speeds on Finland's territory. This construction was being done with the help of foreign specialists, including Germans. Many of the military objects that were being erected were intended for a much larger sized armed forces than Finland possessed. For example, air bases built by the start of 1939 with the help of German specialists were able to receive 10 times more planes than existed in the Finnish air forces[1].

With the financial and technical cooperation of a number of western countries a system of long term fortifications (the Mannerheim line) with a length of 135 km and a depth of up to 90 km was built on the Karelian isthmus.

The military preparations by Finland caused a natural uneasiness on the part of the Soviet government. However its desire to improve relations with its neighbor collided with the lack of desire of the latter to act in this direction. The Soviet-Finnish negotiations on matters of mutual security which took place in 1939 at the initiative of the Soviet Union did not lead to success.

By the end of November 1939 Finnish armed forces, which together with the trained reserve numbered up to 600,000 men and about 900 guns of various calibers, were deployed on the borders with the Soviet Union. They also had 270 combat aircraft and 29 ships. Almost half of the ground forces (7 infantry divisions, 4 independent infantry and 1 cavalry brigade, and several independent infantry battalions), which were combined into the Karelian Army, was concentrated on the Karelian isthmus. In the Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Ukhta, Reboly, and Petrozavodsk sectors special groups of forces or other operational-tactical formations were created.

The Finnish armed forces had the task of holding the main grouping of Soviet forces on the Mannerheim line, isolating it, and then, after receiving help in troops and weapons from the western countries, moving combat operations to Soviet territory.

From the Soviet side, the northwestern border from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland at the start of the conflict was covered by four armies which were part of the Leningrad Military District: the 14th Army (two rifle divisions), which was supported by the Northern Fleet, was in the Arctic; the 9th Army (three rifle divisions) was in northern and middle Karelia; the 8th Army (four rifle divisions) was north of Lake Ladoga; and the 7th Army (nine rifle divisions, one tank corps and three tank brigades) was on the Karelian isthmus. For support, the 7th Army was allocated air forces, and also part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet. True, of the four named armies

[1] History of the Second World War 1939-1945. (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945). Vol. 3. P. 359.

only the 7th Army was in full combat and mobilization readiness at the start of the combat operations.

The plan of the Soviet command authorities in the event of war provided for active operations by the troops of the Leningrad Military District in the north and in the central part of Finland to hold the Finnish troops and to not allow landings by troops of the western powers from the direction of the Barents Sea, and the 7th Army was to carry out an attack on the Karelian isthmus with a breakthrough of the Mannerheim line and to eliminate the reinforced beachhead of the Finnish troops near Leningrad.

It should immediately be noted that the forces that were put at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the Leningrad Military District, Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov, to carry out this task were clearly inadequate. The plan of the chief of the General Staff, Army Commander 1st Rank B.M. Shaposhnikov, who proposed to create a more powerful grouping of forces, was rejected by I.V. Stalin and K.Ye. Voroshilov who underestimated the combat capability of the Finnish army.

A number of firings at Soviet troops from Finnish territory which occurred on 26 November and on subsequent days and which involved the death of Soviet servicemen served as the grounds for the unleashing of the Soviet-Finnish war[1]. By whom and with whose approval they were carried out it is now hard to say since these incidents were not investigated.

The Soviet government on 28 November renounced the joint nonaggression agreement of 1932 and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On 30 November troops of the Leningrad Military District received the order to push the Finnish troops away from Leningrad. At the same time the Soviet Union again offered Finland a chance to conclude a friendship and mutual assistance treaty.

The Finnish government did not react to this proposal and on the same day declared war on the Soviet Union.

True, with the start of combat operations the government of Finland relayed through the Swedish ambassador in Moscow a message about its readiness to renew negotiations. However, this time the proposal was rejected by the Soviet leadership.

The combat operations of the Soviet troops in the war with Finland are divided into two stages: the first lasted from 30 November, 1939, through 10 February, 1940, and the second lasted from 11 February through 13 March, 1940.

In the first stage the troops of the 14th Army in cooperation with the Northern Fleet in December captured the Rybachiy and Sredniy peninsulas and the city of Petsamo and closed the Finns outlet to the Barents Sea. At the same time troops of the 9th Army, which was attack to the further south, penetrated into the depth of the enemy defense by 35-40 km. Units of the 8th

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[1] The History of the Second World War 1939-1945. (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945). Vol. 3. P. 361.

Army moved forward with battles by up to 80 km, but several of them were surrounded and were forced to retreat.

The heaviest and bloodiest battles took place on the Karelian isthmus, where the 7th Army was attacking. By 12 December its troops with the support of air forces and the navy had overcome a strong forward defense area and had moved to the forward edge of the main area of the Mannerheim line all along its 110 km width. However, an attempt to breakthrough this area was not successful. The forces turned out to be inadequate.

The shortage of forces was also sharply felt in the 9th, 8th, and 14th Armies. The losses of Soviet troops, which numbered 69,686 men in December, turned out to be high[1]. They numbered:

killed and died from wounds and diseases - 11,676;
missing in action - 5965;
wounded - 35,800;
injured - 1164;
burned - 493;
frost bitten - 5725;
sick - 9163.

At the end of December the High Command of the Red Army decided to halt the unsuccessful attacks and to start a careful preparation for a breakthrough. With this goal, the North-Western Front, headed by Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Timoshenko and military council member, secretary of the Leningrad oblast committee and city committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) A.A. Zhdanov, was created on the Karelian isthmus. The front consisted of the 7th Army (commanded since 7 December 1939 by Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov) and the 13th Army (commanded by Corps Commander V.D. Grendal') which was created at the end of December. Both armies were reinforced with air forces, artillery, tank and engineer units[2].

At this time the total size of the active forces was growing intensively. Whereas on 1 January, 1949, there were 550,757 men in their ranks (of these, 46,776 were commanders, 79,520 were junior commanders, and 424,461 were soldiers)[3],by the first days of March the size of the active army had reached 760,578 men (of these, 78,309 were commanders, 126,690 were junior commanders, and 555,579 were soldiers), or, had grown by approximately 1.4 times. Here the

[1] CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 16.

[2] The North-Western Front, and also the 14th, 9th, 8th, and 15th Armies were in direct subordination to the Peoples Defense Commissariat of the Soviet Union until the end of the war.

[3] CAMD, file 15, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 5,7,9,11,13.

organic number of troops was 916,613 men[1]. On 12 February 1940 the 15th Army was separated out from the 8th Army.

The Finnish command authorities hurriedly sent the troops replacements, combat equipment that had arrived from behind the line, weapons, and ammunition. The western powers all together sent Finland 350 planes, 500 guns, over 6000 machine guns, about 100,000 rifles, 650,000 hand grenades, 2.5 million rounds of ammunition and 160 million cartridges during the war. Eleven thousand five hundred volunteers arrived from Scandinavia, the United States and other countries[2].

The concluding stage of the Soviet-Finnish War started on 11 February. Troops of the North-Western Front after a powerful artillery preparation went on the attack and during three days of fierce battles penetrated the main defense zone on the Mannerheim line.

Battles developed all along the front with the axis of the strikes on Vyborg (troops of the 7th Army) and on Keksholm (troops of the 13th Army). The complete crossing of the entire system of long term fortifications of the Mannerheim line with the simultaneous destroying of its weapons was completed by Soviet troops, in essence in the first third of March. Then the offensive by Soviet troops in the Vyborg sector began. The main forces of the Karelian Army of Finland were destroyed.

In spite of the opposition of England, the United States, and France, on 12 March, after brief negotiations, a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland, according to which military operations ceased along the entire front at 1200 on 13 March, was concluded in Moscow. In accordance with the treaty, the border north of Leningrad was moved to the Vyborg - Sortavala - Kareilian isthmus line, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, a small amount of territory with the city of Kuolayarvi, and part of the Rybachiy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was leased the Hanko peninsula for 30 years with the right to create a naval base on it which would cover the entrance into the Gulf of Finland and sea accesses to Leningrad.

In conclusion, it should be said that, in spite of the victory that had been won, the goals that had been achieved and the instructiveness of the combat experience that was acquired by the Soviet troops, the war with Finland did not bring glory to the victor. Moreover, the failures of the Leningrad Military District troops during the penetrating of the Mannerheim line during the December offensive that were connected with the miscalculations by the High Command of the Workers and Peasants Red Army shook public opinion to some degree in a number of western countries regarding the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. "The frontal attack that was undertaken by the Russians on the Karelian isthmus with weak forces from the start," notes West German military historian K. Tippelskirch, "was stopped in the forward defense area of the Mannerheim line by the skilful actions of the stubbornly defending Finns. All of December

[1] CAMD, file 15, cat. 2248, d. 48, p. 35,37.

[2] See: The History of the Second World War 1939-1945. (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945). Vol. 2. P. 363.

passed, and the Russians, in spite of... attacks, could not achieve significant successes"[1]. Then he talks about the great losses of the Soviet troops during the battles for the Mannerheim line, about their "tactical clumsiness" and the "poor command", as a result of which "an unfavorable opinion regarding the fighting capability of the Red Army developed throughout the whole world. Undoubtedly this had a significant effect on Hitler's decision"[2].

During the war with Finland, especially in its first stage, the Soviet troops really found themselves in a difficult position since there were not ready to carry out combat operations in conditions of a severe winter, during temperatures of minus 40-45 degrees and a deep snow cover. They were unprepared at the start of the war to overcome dense mine fields or to carry out decisive actions when penetrating a complex system of long term fortifications on the Karelian isthmus.

Serious shortcomings in the command and control of the troops, in their operational and tactical cooperation, in the supplying of a winter uniform and food to the troops and in the offering of medical care were revealed. A result of all of this was an unforeseen dragging out of military operations which lasted over three months and the numerous losses of personnel.

Analyzing the weak sides in the preparation of the Soviet troops which were revealed in the war with Finland, the Peoples Commissar for Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, in a meeting with the leaders of the Workers and Peasants Red Army at the end of 1940 noted: "The war with the White Finns revealed the entire baneful nature of our system for combat training - conducting exercises conventionally, with an office method. Our commanders and staffs, not having any practical experience, did not really know how to organize the efforts of the arms of service and close cooperation, and, most importantly, they did not really know how to command"[3].

The enemy ended up being better prepared for war, although it also suffered significant losses in personnel. The Finnish army, its equipment, weapons and tactics were well suited to conducting combat operations in a terrain with many lakes and small forests, in conditions of a severe winter with much snow. The strength of the Finn's defense also consisted of the skillful use of numerous natural obstacles.

We will examine the statistical data about the number of active Soviet troops and the number of personnel losses in the war. The former is shown by the table for the average monthly number of our troops who participated in the Soviet-Finnish war (see table 44).

Table 44

**Average monthly number of active Soviet troops during the**

[1] Tippelskirch, K. The History of the Second World War. (Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny).Moscow, 1956. p. 48.

[2] Tipplerskirch. Indicated work. P. 50.

[3] "Military History Journal". (Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal). 1989. No 11. P. 17.

**Soviet-Finnish War (30 November 1939 - 13 March 1940)**

| Name of fronts and armies | Total number of servicemen | For which period the average monthly size is taken |
|---|---|---|
| North-Western Front | 422,640 | December 1939 - March 1940 |
| 7th Army of North-Western Front | 254,290 | December 1939 - March 1940 |
| 13th Army of North-Western Front | 145,640 | January - March 1940 |
| 8th Army | 153,710 | December 1939 - March 1940 |
| 9th Army | 93,610 | December 1939 - March 1940 |
| 14th Army | 56,953 | December 1939 - March 1940 |
| 15th Army | 117,770 | February - March 1940 |
| Red Banner Baltic Fleet | 62,780 | November 1939 - January 1940 |
| Average monthly size of all of the grouping of troops | 848,570 | December 1939 - March 1940 |

During the 105 days of the war the Soviet troops suffered personnel losses consisting of 333,084 men (according to the summary reports from the units and formations on 15 March, 1940):

killed and died in stages of the medical evacuation - 65,384;
wounded, injured and burned - 186,584;
frostbitten - 9614;
sick - 51,892.

Concerning the missing in action (19,610 men), it should be noted that part of them were captured. After the signing of the peace treaty 5469 men were returned from captivity (of them, 301 were commanders, 787 were junior commanders, and 4380 were soldiers), and 99 men voluntarily remained in Finland (of which 8 were commanders, 1 was a junior commander,and 90 were soldiers)[1]. The rest (14,043 men, or 71.6% of all of those counted as missing in action) should be considered dead.

[1] CSASA,file 37933, cat. 1, d. 428, p. 237-240.

Table 45 [1]

| Arm of Service [2] | Category of servicemen | Types of losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Killed | Wounded | Missing in action | Sick and frost bitten |
| Rifle troops | Commanders<br>Junior commanders<br>Soldiers | 3,082<br>6,417<br>34,405 | 8,346<br>17,313<br>112,824 | 245<br>765<br>7,188 | 434<br>927<br>8,853 |
| | Total ..................<br>% | 43,904<br>94.4 | 138,483<br>97.4 | 8,198<br>92.6 | 10,214<br>94.7 |
| Tank troops | Commanders<br>Junior commanders<br>Soldiers | 269<br>469<br>775 | 337<br>614<br>932 | 57<br>105<br>261 | 19<br>19<br>73 |
| | Total ..................<br>% | 1513<br>3.3 | 1883<br>1.3 | 423<br>4.8 | 111<br>1 |
| Artillery | Commanders<br>Junior commanders<br>Soldiers | 27<br>42<br>188 | 81<br>134<br>479 | 2<br>4<br>9 | 11<br>31<br>182 |
| | Total ..................<br>% | 257<br>0.6 | 694<br>0.5 | 15<br>0.1 | 224<br>2.2 |
| Signal service troops | Commanders<br>Junior commanders<br>Soldiers | 4<br>6<br>50 | 6<br>14<br>70 | 14<br>19<br>138 | 1<br>3<br>21 |
| | Total ................<br>% | 60<br>0.1 | 90<br>0.1 | 171<br>1.9 | 25<br>0.2 |
| Engineering troops | Commanders<br>Junior commanders<br>Soldiers | 18<br>15<br>63 | 20<br>80<br>329 | -<br>5<br>20 | 6<br>4<br>69 |
| | Total ................<br>% | 96<br>0.2 | 429<br>0.3 | 25<br>0.3 | 79<br>0.7 |
| Airborne assault troops | Commanders<br>Junior commanders<br>Soldiers | 59<br>130<br>469 | 71<br>107<br>469 | 1<br>6<br>15 | 19<br>41<br>72 |
| | Total ..................<br>% | 658<br>1.4 | 647<br>0.4 | 22<br>0.3 | 132<br>1.2 |
| | Total ..................<br>% | 46,488<br>100 | 142,226<br>100 | 8,854<br>100 | 10,785<br>100 |

[1] CSASA,file 34980, cat. 10, d. 548, p. 109; d. 552, p. 288-308; cat. 14, d. 249, p. 182; cat. 16, d. 81, p. 244-252; cat. 17, d. 194, p. 302, 307; file 3977, cat. 1,d. 572, p. 132; CNA,file 92, cat. 25, d. 14, p. 2-31; file R-1877, cat. 1, d. 675, p. 519, 652; file R-1701, cat. 1, d. 57, p. 326; file R-1881, cat. 1, d. 1, p. 69. The losses are given for the 7th, 13th, 14th and 15th Armies.

[2] It was not possible to find complete information separately about the losses for the air force units during the Soviet-Finnish war. According to the report of the operational directorate of the Red Army General Staff (CSASA, file 39777, cat. 1, d. 572, p. 132) the losses for the air force units of the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th and 15th armies, the special group and the air force group of the North-Western Front were 785 men killed and missing in action, and 144 men wounded. Among the verified 642 killed and missing in action, pilots account for 40%, navigators and gunner-radio operators account for 28%, and others account for about 3%, and among the 106 wounded, pilots account for 24% and other personnel account for 76% (CSASA, file 37977, cat. 1, d. 441).

There are data about the outcome of the treatment for the wounded, injured, burned, frost bitten, and sick on 1 March 1941, numbering 248,090 men:

returned to duty - 172,203 men (69.4%);

discharged with removal from military accounting and offered sickness leaves - 46,925 (18.9%);

died from wounds and illnesses in medical facilities - 15,921 (6.4%);

the number of wounded, injured and so on whose treatment outcome in medical facilities had not been determined at the indicated time - 13,041 (5.3%).

Data about the total number of irrecoverable losses of personnel in the war are:

killed and died from wounds in stages of medical evacuation - 65,384;
declared dead from among the missing in action - 14,043;
died in hospitals from wounds and injures - 15,921 (on 1 March 1941).

From the armies that were not part of the North-Western Front, the greatest losses (49,795 men, of which 18,065 were killed and missing in action) belonged to the 15th Army during the time of its brief participation in the war (from 12 February through 13 March, 1940). This is explained by the unskillful directing of the combat operations on the part of the command authorities of the army, as a result of which many units of the 18th and other rifle divisions during an attack with spread out colonnade were surrounded and came under destructive enemy fire.

Data about the losses in terms of arms of service (only for the 7th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Armies) are presented in table 45.

We will present the existing statistical data about the losses of the middle and senior command personnel from the active Soviet troops in December 1939.

Of the 3500 commanders who died in December 1939 they are from the arms of service as follows:

rifle units - 2170 (62%)
artillery - 490 (14%);
air forces - 175 (5%);
political personnel - 525 (15%);
engineering troops - 53 (1.5%);
signal service commanders - 35 (1%);
administrative medical and veterinary personnel - 35 (1%);
other arms of service - 17 (0.5%).

The 2170 rifle troop commanders who were killed include[1]:

staff duty commanders - 28 (1.3%);
rifle battalion commanders - 52 (2.4%);
rifle company commanders - 340 (15.7%);
rifle platoon commanders - 1750 (80.6%).

[1] CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 19.

Among the total number of wounded who were sent from the troops of the North-Western Front to Leningrad for treatment (from 1 January through 13 March, 1940), the wounds were distributed by type in the following manner[1]:

gunshot - 68%;
wounds from artillery shells - 31.6%;
wounds from mines - 0.3%;
from nonfiring weapons - 0.1%.

Here the serious wounds and those of medium severity comprised 80.8%, and the light wounds comprised 19.2%.

Data about the nature of the wounds in a percentage relationship are[2]:

wounds to the head and neck - 10.2%
to the thorax - 7.4%;
to the abdomen and pelvis - 4.6%;
to the upper extremities - 45.5%;
to the lower extremities - 27.4%;
multiple wounds - 4.9%.

In the period of the Soviet-Finnish war there were cases of illness with typhus and typhoid. However they were not widespread among the personnel. According to the existing data, in the period from 1 January through 13 March, 1940, 20 cases of typhus and 59 cases of typhoid were found in the troops of the North-Western Front[3]. In units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in December, 1939 3 cases were found, and in the period from 1 January to 15 March, 1940 17 cases of typhoid were found[4].

Summarized statistical data about losses of personnel in the Soviet-Finnish war, on the whole in terms of the active troops, and separately for the North-Western Front, and for each army and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet are presented in tables 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 (according to reports from the troops). Here the summary table of personnel losses (table 46) in addition to the losses of the 7th, 13th, 8th, 9th, 14th and 15th Combined Arms Armies, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, units with front subordination for the North-Western Front and a number of special formations with central subordination also includes the personnel losses for the operational group of forces (commanded by Corps Commander V.D.Grendal'), which up to 26 December, 1939, operated independently on the Karelian peninsula.

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[1] CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 1855, p. 93.

[2] Ibid.

[3] CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 1855, p. 93.

[4] CNA, file R-1701, cat. 7, d. 57, p. 326; file R-1881, cat. 1, d. 1, p. 69.

The Northern Fleet, which supported the attack of the troops of the 14th Army, did not have any combat losses.

In 1949-1951 as a result of lengthy and painstaking work to clarify the number of losses by the Main Directorate for Personnel of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the High Command for the Ground Troops of the USSR, name rolls for servicemen of the Red Army[1] who died and were missing in action in the Soviet-Finnish of 1939-1940 war were compiled. In total, 126,875 soldiers, commanders, and workers making up the irrecoverable losses were included here. Their main summary indicators, calculated according to the name rolls, are presented in table 54a (see p.104).

[1] CSASA, file 34980, cat. 15, d. 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219;Archive of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, inventory No 21, 22.

Table 46

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 5027 | 9741 | 48,010 | 65,384 [1] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 19.6 |
| | Missing in action | Number | | | 830 | 2042 | 16,024 | 19,610 [2] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 5.9 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 5857 | 11,783 | 64,034 | 84,994 [3] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 25.5 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 10 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 2.95 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 11,780 | 23,675 | 145,755 | 186,584 [4] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 56 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 335 | 635 | 5792 | 51,582 [5] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 15.6 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 257 | 729 | 8315 | 9614 [6] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 2.9 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 12,372 | 25,039 | 159,862 | 248,090 [7] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 74.5 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 29.2 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 8.6 |

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total of losses | Number | | | 18,229 | 36,822 | 223,896 | 333,084 [8] |
| | % | of losses | | | | | 100 |
| | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 39.3 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | 11.55 |

[1] Of them, 2606 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[2] Of them, 714 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[3] Of them, 3320 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[4] Of them, 5374 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[5] Of them 45,130 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[6] Of them, 313 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[7] Of them, 50,817 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[8] Of them, 54,137 men are not distributed according to categories of servicemen. Information about the losses presented in the table is not complete since it is missing data about the noncombat losses of the troops, and also about the losses for sick in the 14th Army.

The information about the number of personnel losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war that is presented in the table is produced as a result of a summarizing of reports from the troops, including those who for the first time turned out not to be accounted for in the summary reports for the irrecoverable as well as the sick, injured and wounded losses that were compiled by the General Staff at the moment of the ending of military operations (CSASA, file 40442, cat. 1, d. 1875, p. 116-118).

Table 47

**Personnel losses for the North-Western Front (7 January to 13 March, 1940)** [1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 2791 | 5217 | 25,712 | 33,720<br>17.7 |
| | Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | | | 321 | 658 | 5131 | 6110<br>3.2 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 3112 | 5875 | 30,843 | 39,830 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 20.9 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 9.4 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 4.28 |

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | 7558 | 15,390 | 95,036 | 119,122 [2]<br>62.7 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | 199 | 318 | 2475 | 27,242 [3]<br>14.3 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | 153 | 366 | 3403 | 3922<br>2.1 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 7910 | 16,074 | 100,914 | 150,286 [4] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 79.1 |
| | | | of number of personnel — All losses | | | | 35.6 |
| | | | of number of personnel — Average monthly | | | | 16.16 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 11,022 | 21,949 | 131,757 | 190,116 [4] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel — All losses | | | | 45 |
| | | | of number of personnel — Average monthly | | | | 20.44 |

[1] The North-Western Front was created by order No 0977/017 of the Peoples Commissar for Defense of the USSR from 7 January, 1940 and consisted of the 7th and 13th Armies. The losses of the front include losses of the 7th and 13th Armies as well as of units with front line subordination.

[2] Of them, 1138 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.

[3] Of them, 24,250 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.

[4] Of them, 25,388 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.

CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 540, p. 81; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 572, p. 132, 140-143. CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 38, 61-73; file 5, cat. 176705, d. 67, p. 44-53; d. 68, p. 430.

The greatest percentage of sick, injured and wounded losses (79.1% in regards to the total number of losses) is noted in the troops of the North-Western Front (7th and 13th Armies). In other operational strategic formations that participated in the war (8th, 9th, 14, and 15th Armies), this indicator is smaller: 70.9, 70.6, 68.8, and 63.7% respectively.

The main reason for this higher figure is the fact that the battles on the Karelian peninsula by virtue of the special conditions (the restricting of the maneuvering of the forces, and the massed firepower of the enemy who was concealed in numerous emplacements, pillboxes and other fortress type installations) were accompanied by large losses of personnel. The proximity of major medical facilities of the Workers and Peasants Red Army (in Leningrad and other nearby cities),and also the well organized medical care for the wounded as well as the timely evacuation of them helped bring about a reduction in the number of those who died from wounds and, consequently, the predominance (on average by 4 times) of the sick, injured and wounded over the irrecoverable losses (calculated according to data from tables 47, 48 and 49).

Table 48

**Personnel losses of the 7th Army of the North-Western Front**
**(30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940)[1]**

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 1320 | 2649 | 12,453 | 16,422<br>16.4 |
| | Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | | | 86 | 189 | 1762 | 2037<br>2 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1406 | 2838 | 14,215 | 18,459 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 18.4 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 7.3 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 2.14 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 4021 | 8240 | 48,392 | 61,481 [2]<br>19.3 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 119 | 174 | 1464 | 19,256 [3]<br>19.3 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 25 | 45 | 653 | 723<br>0.8 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 4165 | 8459 | 50,509 | 81,460 [4] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 81.6 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 32 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 9.42 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 5571 | 11,297 | 64,724 | 99,919 [4] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 39.3 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 11.56 |

[1] The 7th Army participated in combat operations from 30 November 1939 through 13 March, 1940.
[2] Of them, 828 men who were burned were not distributed according to the categories of servicemen.
[3] Of them 17,499 men were not distributed according to the categories of servicemen.
[4] Of them 18,327 men were not distributed according to the categories of servicemen.
CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 540, p. 76-78; d. 522, p. 288-308; cat. 12, d. 73, p. 35, 148; d. 128, p. 62-77. CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 5, 202-309.

The 7th Army (commanded by Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev, and from 16 December, 1939 by Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov) during the entire Soviet-Finnish war had, in comparison with other armies that were active there, the largest number of troops (see table 44) since it was carrying out the attack in the main (Vyborg) sector. The relative

losses of its personnel, as the statistical data show, were significantly less than in the neighboring 13th and a number of other armies.

Table 49

**Personnel losses of the 13th Army of the North-Western Front (26 December 1939 to 13 March 1940)[1]**

| Types of losses | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | 1239 | 2430 | 13,209 | 16,878<br>18.9 |
| | Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | 106 | 376 | 3344 | 3826<br>4.3 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 1345 | 2806 | 16,553 | 20,704 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 23.2 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | | | | 14.2 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | | 5.47 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | 3476 | 7009 | 46,476 | 57,271[2]<br>64.2 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | 80 | 144 | 1011 | 7986[3]<br>9 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | 128 | 321 | 2750 | 3199<br>3.6 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 3684 | 7474 | 50237 | 68,456[4] |
| | | % of losses | | | | 76.8 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | | | | 47 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | | 18.08 |

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total of losses | Number | | | 5029 | 10,280 | 66,790 | 89,160 [4] |
| | % | of losses | | | | | 100 |
| | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 61.2 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | 23.56 |

[1] The 13th Army was created on 26 December, 1939 on the base of the troops of the operational group of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal' and a certain part of the troops that were allocated from the 7th Army.It participated in combat operations from 26 December, 1939 through 13 March 1940.

[2] Of them, 310 men who were burned were not distributed according to the categories of servicemen.

[3] Of them, 6751 men were not distributed according to the categories of servicemen.

[4] Of them, 7061 men were not distributed according to the categories of servicemen.

CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 546, p. 165-177; d. 540,k p. 78-80; d. 548, p. 109-113. CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 13, 316-335.

The 13th Army (commanded by Corps Commander V.D. Grendal', and from 2 March 1940 by Corps Commander F.A. Parusinov), was part of the North-Western Front. Its combat operations were accompanied by the largest, in comparison with other armies, losses in personnel (61.2% of the average monthly number of troops). In terms of the tempos of the offensive on the Karelian isthmus the 13th Army significantly lagged behind the 7th Army on its left flank, which served a the reason for the replacement of the commander.

Table 50

**Personnel losses of the 8th Army (30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940)** [1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 654 | 1273 | 6173 | 8100<br>18 |
| | Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | | | 129 | 446 | 4396 | 4971<br>11.1 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 783 | 1719 | 10,569 | 13,071 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 29.1 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 8.5 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 2.5 |

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 1524 | 2582 | 17,222 | 21,723 [2]<br>48.4 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 7296<br>16.3 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 45 | 154 | 2598 | 2797<br>6.2 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1569 | 2736 | 19,820 | 31,816 [3] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 70.9 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 20.7 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 6.09 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 2352 | 4455 | 30,389 | 44,887 [3] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 29.2 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 8.59 |

[1] The 8th Army participated in combat operations from 30 November, 1939 through 13 March, 1940.
[2] Of them, 395 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen (231 men were injured and 164 men were burned).
[3] Of them, 7691 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
CSASA, file 34980, cat. 13, d. 1272, p. 18-20, 25; d. 1276, p. 24-27. CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 5, 47, 385-387.

The 8th Army (commanded by Division Commander I.N. Khabarov) up to 12 February, 1940 operated in two main sectors - the Ilomantsi and Sortavala sectors, having a front width of over 200 km. There were six rifle divisions and a number of reinforcement units in it. The number of troops of the opposing sides here was identical at first, however the Finnish units had a number of advantages in tactical preparations.

The total personnel losses of the 8th Army are the smallest and number 29.2% of its average monthly size. It is behind only the 14th army for this indicator.

Table 51

## Personnel losses of the 9th Army (30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940)[1]

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 634 | 1214 | 5770 | 8540 [2] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 18.6 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 208 | 566 | 3895 | 4996 [3] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 10.8 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 842 | 1780 | 9665 | 13,536 [4] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 29.4 |
| | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 14.5 |
| | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | | | | 4.25 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1280 | 2635 | 13,070 | 17,674 [5] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 38.3 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | | 12,250 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 26.6 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 52 | 177 | 2107 | 2649 [6] |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 5.7 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1332 | 2812 | 15,177 | 32,573 [7] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 70.6 |
| | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 34.8 |
| | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | | | | 10.24 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 2174 | 4592 | 24,842 | 46,109 [8] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 100 |
| | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 49.3 |
| | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | | | | 14.49 |

[1] The 9th Army participated in combat operations from 30 November 1939 through 13 March 1940.
[2] Of them, 922 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[3] Of them, 327 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[4] Of them, 1249 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[5] Of them, 689 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[6] Of them, 313 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[7] Of them, 13,252 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[8] Of them, 14,501 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.

CSASA, file 34980, cat. 14, d. 246, p. 1; d. 249, p. 182; d. 253, p. 41; d. 255, p. 40; file 37977, cat. 1, d. 572, p. 146. CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 9; f. 5, cat. 176705, d. 69, p. 137-142, 378-381.

The attack by troops of the 9th Army (commanded by Corps Commander M.P. Dukhanov) in the Kuoliovaara, Suomussalmi, and Karpisalmi sectors was accompanied by significant personnel losses, especially because of the unsuccessful actions of the 44th and 163rd and 54th Rifle Divisions. The irrecoverable losses of these divisions in February 1940 reached 20-30% of their size (CASAS, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 658).

Table 52

**Personnel losses of the 14th Army (30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940)**[1]

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 40[2] | 22 | 119 | 181 |
| | | % of losses | | 71.4 | 26.8 | 26.6 | 30.9 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | 2 | 2 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 40 | 22 | 121 | 183 |
| | | % | of losses | 71.4 | 26.8 | 27 | 31.2 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| | | | Average monthly | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 14 | 36 | 251 | 301 |
| | | % of losses | | 25 | 43.9 | 56.2 | 51.5 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 2 | 24 | 75 | 101 |
| | | % of losses | | 3.6 | 29.3 | 16.8 | 17.3 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 16 | 60 | 326 | 402 |
| | | % | of losses | 28.6 | 73.2 | 73 | 68.6 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| | | | Average monthly | 0.07 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.21 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 56 | 82 | 447 | 585 |
| | | % | of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 1 | 0.9 | 1 | 1 |
| | | | Average monthly | 0.23 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.3 |

[1] The 14th Army took part in combat operations from 30 November, 1939 through 13 March, 1940.

[2] Including 19 air force officers. Information about the sick was not found.

CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 551, p. 197, 199, 313, 368; cat. 16, d. 81, p. 244-252. CAMD, file 15-A, cat. 2245, d. 48, p. 11, 426, 427, 430; file 5, cat. 176705, d. 66, p. 606, 607.

The 14th Army (commanded by Division Commander V.A. Frolov), consisting of two divisions and reinforcement units, conducted combat operations in the Arctic in the Petsamo and Nautsi regions. It successfully carried out the missions it was given. It had the smallest personnel losses (only 0.3% of the average monthly number of troops).

The frostbitten were a big part (about 25%) of the sick, injured and wounded losses of the 14th Army.

Table 53

**Personnel losses of the 15th Army (12 February to 13 March 1940)[1]**

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | 860 | 1976 | 10,169 | 14,689 [2]<br>29.5 |
| | Missing in action | Number<br>% of losses | | 127 | 339 | 2523 | 3376 [3]<br>6.8 |
| | Taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 987 | 2315 | 12,692 | 18,065 [4] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 36.3 |
| | | % | of number of personnel – All losses | | | | 15.3 |
| | | % | of number of personnel – Average monthly | | | | 15.34 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | 1350 | 2977 | 19,984 | 27,463 [5]<br>55.2 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | 136 | 317 | 3317 | 4259 [6]<br>8.5 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 1486 | 3294 | 23,301 | 31,722 [7] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 63.7 |
| | | % | of number of personnel – All losses | | | | 26.9 |
| | | % | of number of personnel – Average monthly | | | | 26.94 |

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total of losses | Number | | | 2783 | 6576 | 40,428 | 49,787 [8] |
| | % | of losses | | | | | 100 |
| | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 42.2 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | 42.28 |

[1] The 15th Army was separated out from the 8th Army. It took part in battles from 12 February through 13 March 1940.
[2] Of them, 1684 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[3] Of them, 387 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[4] Of them, 2071 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[5] Of them, 3152 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[6] Of them, 489 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen. The number of the sick also includes losses due to frostbite which could not broken out due to a lack of data.
[7] Of them, 3641 men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.
[8] Including the losses of the 18th Rifle Division during the period from 25 December 1939 through 13 March 1940 which were not distributed according to types of loss.
CSASA, file 34980, cat. 17, d. 190, p. 116-121, 175-344; d. 194, p. 210, 214, 302, 307, 308, 310, 311. CAMD, file 5, cat. 176705, d. 67, p. 258.

The 15th Army was formed during the course of the war on the base of the left flank formations and units of the 8th Army which were operating between Lake Ladoga and Laymola. The highest relative indicator for irrecoverable losses (15.3% of its average monthly size) is noted in the army. They occurred basically due to the large personnel losses in the 18th Rifle Division and the 34th Light Tank Brigade which in February 1940 because of the clumsy actions of the command authorities were cut off and blockaded by the enemy and then subjected to intensive fire (CSASA, file 34980, cat. 10, d. 210, p. 12,15).

Table 54

**Personnel losses of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940)**

| Types of losses | | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 48 | 39 | 67 | 154 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 9.6 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 45 | 33 | 77 | 155 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 9.7 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 93 | 72 | 144 | 309 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 19.3 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 0.5 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 0.15 |

| Types of losses | | | | Commanders | Junior commanders | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 54 | 55 | 192 | 301 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 18.8 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | 845 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 52.8 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 5 | 8 | 132 | 145 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 9.1 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 59 | 63 | 324 | 1291 [1] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 80.7 |
| | | | of number of personnel: All losses | | | | 2 |
| | | | of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | | 0.6 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 152 | 135 | 468 | 1600 [1] |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel: All losses | | | | 2.5 |
| | | | of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | | 0.75 |

[1] Of them, 845 sick men were not distributed according to categories of servicemen.

CSAN, file R-92, cat. 25, d. 14, p. 2-31; file R-1701, d. 56, p. 1-64, 90; d. 57, p. 326, 329; file 1877, cat. 1., d. 164, p. 183, 222; d. 675, p. 519, 652. CNA, file 2, cat. 0356360, d. 2, p. 5, 6, 8, 9.

Table 54a

## Clarified summary data about the number of irrecoverable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war

| Types of losses | Commanders | Junior commanders | Enlisted men | Rank not indicated | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed and died from wounds in stages of medical evacuation | 6000 | 9611 | 54,215 | 1388 | 71,214 |
| Died from wounds and diseases in hospitals | 802 | 1436 | 12,185 | 1869 | 16,292 |
| Missing in action | 1010 | 2998 | 33,827 | 1534 | 39,369 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 7812 | 14,045 | 100,227 | 4791 | 126,875 |

The number of the irrecoverable losses that is presented in table 54a differs to the larger side from the summary data that were calculated according to the reports of the troops that arrived up to the end of March, 1940 and are contained in table 46. These differences specifically are the following:

Table 54b

| Types of losses | Summary data about irrecoverable losses | | Size of difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| | according to troop reports | according to name rolls of losses | |
| Killed and died from wounds in stages of medical evacuation | 65,384 | 71,214 | 5830 |
| Died from wounds and diseases in hospitals | 15,921 | 16,292 | 371 |
| Missing in action | 14,043 | 39,369 | 25,326 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 95,348 | 126,875 | 31,527 |

The reason for this difference is that the name rolls include,first of all, previously uncounted personnel losses for the air forces (see table 45), and also servicemen from among those who died in hospitals after March 1940, and, secondly, the border guards and other servicemen who were not part of the Red Army and who died in the same hospitals from wounds and diseases. Also, the name rolls for the irrecoverable losses included a large number of servicemen who did not return home (on the basis of claims by relatives), especially from among those drafted in 1939-1940 with whom communications ceased in the period of the Soviet-Finnish war. After an unsuccessful search for them over many years they were called missing in action (we will note that the indicated rolls were compiled ten years after the Soviet-Finnish war). It is this that explains the presence on the rolls of an excessively large number of people who were missing in action - 39,369 men, who comprise 31% of all of the irrecoverable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war. According to reports from the troops only 14,093 servicemen, or about 15% of the irrecoverable losses indicated in these reports, were missing in action during combat operations.

Information about the losses that is calculated according to the name roll is presented in the book together with that data which were produced on the basis of a counting and analysis of the reports from the troops and the general summary report of the General Staff which was compiled at the end of March 1940, that is, right after the end of combat operations. However, we have accepted the number of all who were killed, missing in action and died from wounds and diseases who are counted on the name rolls, that is, 126,875 men, as the total number of irrecoverable personnel losses for the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Finnish war. This figure, in our opinion, more fully reflects the demographic irrecoverable losses of the country in the war with Finland.

According to Finnish sources (see: "Abroad" (Za rubezhom). No 48. 1989), Finland's personnel losses in the war were 48,243 killed and 43,000 wounded.

The summary data about the personnel losses for the Soviet Armed Forces in combat operations and military conflicts during the period from 1923 through 1940 are presented in table 55. It is clear from it that during the indicated period the combat irrecoverable personnel losses

for the Red Army (killed, died from wounds and diseases, not returned from captivity, and missing in action) numbered 139,100 men. The largest number of them are from battles to repel Japanese aggression in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 (8931 men) and in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 (126,875 men).

* * *

From materials published in the second chapter it is clear that the largest number of military conflicts, and also the personnel losses connected with them and suffered by Soviet troops during combat operations in the period under examination, come from the end of the '30's. All of this was evaluated then in the Soviet Union as a clear sign of the growth of the military danger for the Soviet Union from the direction of fascist Germany and its allies in the anti-Comintern pact[1].

In connection with the worsening of the military and political situation around the Soviet Union in the pre-war years the Soviet government undertook measures to strengthen the defense capability of the country, the western and eastern borders. In 1939 Soviet troops moved into the Baltic states on the basis of a treaty (see p. 126).

[1] The anti-Comintern pact was an treaty between Germany and Japan, concluded on 25 November, 1936, for the purposes of fighting for world hegemony under the flag of anti-communism. In 1937-1939 Italy and Franco's Spain joined it, as did the reactionary governments of hungary, Finland, Rumania, Denmark and several other countries.

Table 55

**Summary data about personnel losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in combat operations and military conflicts during the period from 1923 through 1940**

| Military conflicts and combat operations | Irrecoverable losses | | | | | | | | Sick, injured and wounded losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Killed, died in stages of evacuation, died as a result of accidents | | Missing in action and not returned from captivity | | Died from wounds and diseases in hospitals [1] | | Total | | Wounded, injured, burned | | Sick | | Frostbitten | | Total | |
| | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| Fight with Basmatch counter-revolutionary movement (1923-1931) | 516 | 82.4 | 58 | 9.3 | 52 | 8.3 | 626 | 100 | 867 | 100 | - | - | - | - | 867 | 100 |
| Sino-Soviet military conflict (1929) | 143 | 76.5 | 4 | 2.1 | 40 | 21.4 | 187 | 100 | 665 | 100 | - | - | - | - | 665 | 100 |
| Military aid to Spanish Republic (1936-1939) | 132 | 83.5 | 26 | 16.5 | - | - | 158 | 100 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Military aid to China (1937-1939) | 186 | 95.4 | 9 | 4.6 | - | - | 195 | 100 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Repelling of Japanese aggression in Lake Khasan region (1938) | 717 | 72.5 | 75 | 7.6 | 197 | 19.9 | 989 | 100 | 2752 | 83.9 | 527 | 16.1 | - | - | 3279 | 100 |
| Defeat of Japanese invaders in Khalkhin-Gol River region (1939) | 6831 | 76.5 | 1143 | 12.8 | 957 | 10.7 | 8931 | 100 | 15251 | 95.6 | 701 | 4.4 | - | - | 15952 | 100 |
| March into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (1939) | 852 | 74.8 | 144 | 12.6 | 143 | 12.6 | 1139 | 100 | 2002 | 84 | 381 | 16 | - | - | 2383 | 100 |
| Soviet-Finnish War (11/3039 - 3/13/40) | 71214 | 56.1 | 39369 | 31.1 | 16292 | 12.8 | 126875 | 100 | 188671[2] | 71.2 | 58370[2] | 22 | 17867[2] | 6.8 | 264908[2] | 100 |
| Total ........... | 80591 | 57.9 | 40828 | 29.4 | 17681 | 12.7 | 139100 | 100 | 210208 | 73 | 59979 | 20.8 | 17867 | 6.2 | 288054 | 100 |



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The composition of the Soviet troops that went into the Baltic states was:

- **into Estonia** - 25,000 men (command of 65th Rifle Corps, 16th Rifle Division, 18th Tank Brigade, command of 55th air brigade, 25th and 38th fighter regiments, 35th and 44th medium bomber air regiment, truck and other units). The start of the entry was 18 November, 1939;

- **into Latvia** - up to 25,000 men (command of the 2nd rifle corps, 67th rifle division, 6th tank brigade, 10th tank regiment, command of 18th air brigade, 31st and 15th fighter regiments, 39th medium bomber air regiment and other units). The start of the entry was 3 November, 1939;

- **into Lithuania** - up to 20,000 men (command of the 16th rifle corps, 5th rifle division, 2nd tank brigade, 10th fighter regiment, 31st medium bomber air regiment and other units) The start of the entry was 3 november, 1939.

In fact on 1 January 1940, 58,055[1] men from ground and air formations and units of the Red Army were sent to the territory of the Baltic republics. They consisted of:

- to Estonia - 20,954 men, including 2371 officers;
- to Latvia - 19,339 men, including 2210 officers;
- to Lithuania - 17,762 men, including 2210 officers.

No hostile actions were noted during the movement of the Soviet troops into the Baltic republics. There is no information about combat losses among Soviet servicemen.

After the new legislative organs of these republics carried out decisions about joining the Soviet Union as soviet republics, their national armies by a decree of the Soviet Council of Peoples Commissars (August 1940) were reformed into rifle territorial corps numbering 15-16,000 men each.

The experience of the combat operations that were conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces in the period between the wars, especially in 1938-1940, was used in the reorganizing of the army and navy, in the training of troops and staffs, and also in the course of the developing of new manuals.

[1] CSASA, file 39977, cat. 1, d. 638, p. 116, 127, 138, 139.

# Chapter III

## LOSSES OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941-1945

The Great Patriotic War is the most difficult experience in the history of our state.

Having carried out the attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany posed as its goal the rapid defeat of the Red Army and the destruction of the Soviet state. The massive extermination and enslavement of its peoples was planned.

The first strikes by the enemy were received by the border troops and divisions located along the border. Fierce battles started. The position of our troops was made more difficult by Germany's surprise attack. Troops of the border military districts were not fully deployed and were smaller in size when compared to the aggressor. Enemy divisions, fully manned and well armed, possessed high mobility. In a number of sectors the enemy was superior to Soviet troops by 3-4 times[1]. Italy, Rumania, Finland and Hungary also went against the Soviet Union.

In the most difficult conditions in which our army found itself the Soviet soldiers displayed exceptional courage, heroism and selflessness. However, the negative outcome of the border battles forced the Soviet troops to retreat. The unfavorable circumstances during which the war had begun also showed up in the losses of the Red Army. They were great in the first period of the war. The driving of the fascists from our native land, the liberation mission, required no fewer sacrifices from the Red Army. Approximately 11 million simultaneously men took part in the bitter struggle on both sides.

The high state of technical equipment of the warring sides, the great firepower, and the destructive power of weapons had a direct influence on the growth of human losses. The fight lasted for 1418 days in an expansive territory running from the Barents to the Black Seas. At the beginning the avalanche of deadly fire rolled from the state border to the Volga and Moscow, and then with growing force went to the West, to Berlin.

Tens of millions of Soviet soldiers went through a severe experience, and millions of them did not return from the fields of battle.

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[1] See: The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia. (Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945: entsiklopediya). Moscow, 1985. P. 11.

## Irrecoverable losses

According to the results of studies conducted by the Administration for Population Statistics of the Soviet State Statistics Committee and the Center for Studying Population Problems at Moscow State University, the total direct human losses for the country during all of the years of the Great Patriotic War are estimated at almost 27 million people. They include servicemen and partisans who were killed in battle and who died from wounds, peaceful Soviet citizens who died from hunger and diseases, those who died during bombings, artillery bombardments and punitive actions, and prisoners of war and underground patriots who were executed and tortured in concentration camps.

The number of the personnel losses of the Red Army and Navy was determined by means of analysis and summarizing statistical materials of the General Staff, reports from fronts, fleets, armies and military districts as well as reports from the Central Military Medical Directorate. Other documents that exist in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and the central state archives were studied as well. Information about the losses of the border and interior troops of the NKVD was received from the Committee for State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Losses of troops of the active fronts and armies that were suffered in the first months of the war, and also in those cases when reports about them did not come (border battles, the Kiev, Crimean, Khar'khov defensive and other operations) were determined by the calculation method.

The sacrifices of the first days of the war turned out to be great, and the tragedy that unexpectedly descended which caused the disruption of command and communications led to the fact that sometimes the headquarters were not able to count losses. Therefore during the summarizing of this data, information about the number of personnel on the rolls of formations and strategic formations that were in fact destroyed by the enemy or that ended up encircled, and also the archive materials from the German military command were used.

According to the results of the calculations, during the years of the Great Patriotic War (including the campaign in the Far East against Japan in 1945), the **total irrecoverable demographic losses** (killed, missing in action, captured and not returned from captivity, dead from wounds, diseases and as a result of accidents) for the Soviet Troops together with the border and interior troops **numbered 8,668,400 men**. Here the army and the navy lost 8,509,300 men, the interior troops lost 97,700 men, and border troops and state security organs lost 61,400 men.

This number did not include 939,700 servicemen that were counted at the start of the war as missing in action but who in 1942-1945 were again drafted into the army in territory that was liberated from occupation,and also 1,836,000 former servicemen who returned from captivity after the end of the war. These servicemen (2,775,700 men) are excluded from the number of total losses.

All of the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army, Navy, border and interior troops are presented in table 56 (in thousands of men).

The uncounted losses, shown in point 3 of table 56, belong to the number of the missing in action and are included in information of the corresponding fronts and independent armies that did not make reports in the third and fourth quarters of 1941.

The placing of these losses in the large group of missing in action is explained by the absence of complete information about the fate of a number of our strategic formations and formations that ended up encircled or destroyed in uneven battles. These data are determined by the calculation method and are not absolutely accurate, however on the whole they give a fully true picture of the scale of human losses in the first months of the war.

As is shown in table 56, the number of the irrecoverable (demographic) losses numbered 8,668,400, however from the military operations point of view[1] in the course of the Great Patriotic War-taking into account the missing in action and prisoners of war, 11,444,100 servicemen were irrecoverably out of commission. In order to maximally approach reality the calculations and estimates henceforth when comparing and analyzing the scale of losses by quarters, years, periods and campaigns of the war, strategic operations, fronts, fleets and other indicators the indicated maximum number of losses which reflects the factual loss of personnel during the war is used. All of the subsequent calculations are made taking this into account.

[1] From the military operations point of view irrecoverable losses means not only cases of death of personnel, but also every time they are out of commission (excluded from the rolls), including captured and missing in action.

Table 56

| Types of losses | | Total | Breakdown | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Red Army and Navy | Border troops* | Interior troops |
| 1 | Killed and died from wounds in stages of evacuation (according to troop reports) | 5226.8 | 5187.2 | 18.9 | 20.7 |
| | Died from wounds in hospitals (according to data of Central Military Medical Directorate of Defense Ministry) | 1102,8 | 1100.3 | | 2.5 |
| | Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 6329.6 | 6287.5 | 18.9 | 23.2 |
| 2 | Died from diseases, died as a result of accidents, sentenced to execution (noncombat losses) | 555.5 | 541.9 | 7.1 | 6.5 |
| 3 | Missing in action, captured (according to reports from the troops and repatriation organ data | 3396.4 | 3305.6 | 22.8 | 68 |
| | Uncounted losses of first months of war: died, missing in action in combat operations, when reports did not come from fronts and armies (learned from individual archive documents, including from the German military command | 1162.6 | 1150 | 12.6 | |
| | Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 4559 | 4455.6 | 35.4 | 68 |
| Total loses during Great Patriotic War | | 11,444.1 | 11,285 | 61.4 | 97.7 |
| Excluded from among losses | Drafted in liberated territory and sent to troops from among servicemen previously missing in encirclement or in action | 939.7 | | | |
| | Returned from captivity at end of war (according to repatriation organ data) | 1836 | | | |
| | Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2775.7 | | | |
| Factual number of irrecoverable losses | | 8668.4 | 8509.3 | 61.4 | 97.7 |
| Including those not returned from captivity (dead, killed, emigrated to other countries) | | 1783.3 | | | |

* Including state security troops and organs.

Thus, the percentage ratio of the irrecoverable losses in terms of the types of them will be characterized by the following indicators.

Table 57

**Total irrecoverable losses for Red Army and Navy on the Soviet-German front (from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945) and in the war with Japan (from 9 August to 2 September 1945)**

| Types of losses | Number | % of number of losses |
|---|---|---|
| Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 5,187,190 | 46 |
| Died of wounds in hospitals | 1,100,327 | 9.8 |
| Died from diseases, killed as a result of accidents, sentenced to execution (noncombat losses) | 541,920 | 4.8 |
| Missing in action, captured (together with uncounted losses of first months of war) | 4,455,620 | 39.4 |
| Total irrecoverable losses (without border and interior troops) | 11,285,057 | 100 |

If one analyzes the losses only in the war with Japan, this ratio will be somewhat different. During 25 days of combat operations in the East (from 9 August to 2 September 1945) the troops of three eastern fronts and forces of the Pacific Ocean Fleet lost over 12,000 men, of which, over 80% were killed and died from wounds.

Table 58

| Types of losses | Number | % of number of losses |
|---|---|---|
| Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 9780 | 81.3 |
| Died from diseases, killed as a result of accidents (noncombat losses) | 1340 | 11.1 |
| Missing in action | 911 | 7.6 |
| Total irrecoverable losses | 12,031 | 100 |

Table 59

**Total irrecoverable losses for and Navy on the Soviet-German front (from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945) and in the war with Japan (from 9 August to 2 September 1945)**

| Types of losses | Number | % of number of losses |
|---|---|---|
| Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | 47,699 | 30.8 |
| Died from diseases, killed as a result of accidents (noncombat losses) | 11,807 | 7.6 |
| Missing in action | 92,265 | 61.6 |
| Total irrecoverable losses | 154,771 | 100 |

Special features of the Navy, and also the specific nature of the tasks carried out by them were reflected also in the nature of the losses that the ships and units of the fleets suffered. Whereas in the ground troops a large part of the losses is due to the killed and those who died from wounds, in the fleet this ratio looks different. Here the number of the missing in action surpasses the number of the killed by two times. These basically are crews of ships and planes that did not return from a combat mission about whose fate there was no information.

When completing an analysis of the total number of irrecoverable losses, one should note that during the preparation for this work a source such as the books of the military commissariat for accounting for notifications that come for the dead and missing servicemen was studied. There are 12,400,900 men in them. This is 956,800 men more than was determined by the reports from the troops (11,444,100 men). As research as shown, the difference is explained by the duplicating of the counting of the personnel losses in those cases when two or more notifications with the appropriate registration were sent to different military commissariats about some killed or missing person (at the requests of relatives in connection with their evacuation or moving).

Also the accounting books of the military commissariats (at the site of the drafting of the servicemen or the site of the residency of their relatives) record all of the arriving notifications, including for those who were in the home guard, in party detachments, in specially formed other departments, for which the General Staff did not receive reports on the number and losses. The changes that concern the servicemen who were considered to be missing in action but who later were again drafted in territory that was liberated from the occupation and also those who returned from captivity after the war were not clarified in these books.

The indicated circumstances led to an overestimating of the personnel losses counted by the military commissariats. Therefore the authors of the statistical study took for a basis only reports of the troops and other archive documents.

## Losses for sickness, injury and wounds

According to reports of the fronts, fleets, independent armies and flotillas, the sickness, injury and wound losses for our troops (forces) numbered 18,344,148 men, including 15,205,592 wounded, injured and burned, 3,047,675 sick and 90,881 frostbitten.

However, as the military medical statistics show, the scale of these losses was significantly greater (see table 60).

Table 60

| Years of the war | Losses | Breakdown | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | wounded, injured, burned and frostbitten | sick |
| 1941 (for 6 months) | 2,118,666 | 1,712,981 | 405,685 |
| 1942 | 5,573,484 | 3,625,351 | 1,948,133 |
| 1943 | 6,299,955 | 4,124,093 | 2,175,862 |
| 1944 | 5,901,524 | 3,520,203 | 2,381,321 |
| 1945 | 2,433,276 | 1,702,965 | 730,311 |
| Total | 22,326,905 | 14,685,593 | 7,641,312 |

The number of sick, injured and wounded losses, counted by the military medical facilities, as is seen from tables 60 and 69, is larger due to the sick (by 4,593,000 more than in the troop reports). This can be explained by the fact that the number of the sick, wounded and injured losses includes all of the sick personnel, including those who went to treatment facilities from the troops (forces) not having taken part in combat operations, from troop echelons and replacement subunits located on the route to the front, and also from military formations of civilian departments, formations and units of the home guard. The General Staff did not receive reporting about their numbers and losses.

The difference in the number of wounded, injured and frostbitten (and they, according to the data from the troops, are 610,900 more than counted in the hospitals) could occur in connection with the fact that a significant part of the wounded after treatment in regimental and division medical stations remained fit for duty and were not removed from the rolls of the units.

When calculating and analyzing of the sick, injured and wounded losses it is necessary to consider that a large number of servicemen during the time of a stay at the front were wounded (injured) from two to seven times and in connection with this show up many times in the reports about losses.

Here (this was already spoken about in the preface) a repeat counting is possible not only among the wounded, but also in general when counting all of the combat losses. If, for example, a servicemen after being wounded returned to duty, but then he died, then he is counted twice among the combat losses: first as wounded and then as killed.

To complete the picture we will examine the following military medical statistics.

On 1 October 1945 more than a million Soviet Army servicemen who remained on duty after being wounded several times counted (see table 61).

It is clear from the table that 1,191,298 servicemen who received two or more wounds are shown in information about losses as 3,035,936, that is, on average each of them is included in the number of wounded 2.5 times. Since among the total number of those who received two or more wounds at the front and on 1 October 1945 remained on duty there were probably only an insignificant number left, there are grounds to assume that in fact during the course of the war there were not 15,205,592 servicemen wounded, but instead significantly fewer. This in equal measure goes for the sick and well.

Table 61

| Number of wounds | Number of servicemen who had wounds | | | | Frequency | Included among number of wounded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total | | |
| 2 wounding | 135,352 | 230,164 | 374,646 | 740,162 | X2 | 1,480,324 |
| 3 wounding | 64,613 | 106,698 | 137,762 | 309,073 | X3 | 927,219 |
| 4 wounding | 23,104 | 35,119 | 40,780 | 99,003 | X4 | 396,012 |
| 5 wounding | 7864 | 10,759 | 11,334 | 29,957 | X5 | 149,785 |
| 6 wounding | 2496 | 3395 | 3234 | 9125 | X6 | 54,570 |
| 7 or more wounding | 1226 | 1552 | 1200 | 3978 | X7 | 27,846 |
| Total ....... | 234,655 | 387,687 | 568,956 | 1,191,298 | | 3,035,936 |
| 1 wounding | 242,422 | 398,839 | 836,318 | 1,477,579 | | |

The military medical statistics show that among the number of the wounded, sick and frostbitten who went to medical facilities for treatment during the entire war, about 72% returned to duty, 20.8% were deemed unfit for service and discharged from the army or received long term sickness leaves, and about 7.5% died. Here the number of those who died in the hospitals is counted both the in injury, sickness and wounded losses as well as in the total irrecoverable losses.

Table 62 gives an idea about the number of sickness, injury and wounded losses according to type and outcome of the treatment of the wounded, sick and injured for the period from 1941 through 1945 taking into account the war with Japan.

Table 62

| Types of losses and outcomes of treatment | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Wounded, injured, burned and frostbitten | 14,685,593 | 100 |
| Of them: | | |
| returned to duty | 10,530,750 | 71.7 |
| discharged with removal from counting or sent on leave due to being wounded | 3,050,733 | 20.8 |
| died [1] | 1,104,110 | 7.5 |
| Sick | 7,641,312 | 100 |
| Of them: | | |
| returned to duty | 6,626,493 | 86.7 |
| discharged with removal from counting or sent on leave due to being sick | 747,425 | 9.8 |
| died [2] | 267,394 | 3.5 |
| Total of sick, injured and wounded losses | 22,326,905 [3] | 100 |
| Of them: | | |
| returned to duty | 17,157,243 | 76.9 |
| discharged with removal from counting or sent on leave due to being wounded (sick) | 3,798,158 | 17 |
| died | 1,371,504 | 6.1 |

[1] Included in the number of the irrecoverable combat losses in the column "Died from wounds in hospitals".
[2] Included in the number of irrecoverable noncombat losses.
[3] Henceforth when estimating the scale of the losses in terms of years, periods, strategic operations and fronts we will take for the base the number of sick, injury and wounded losses that is produced from the troop reports (18,344,148 men).

Analysis of over 14 million case histories of wounded servicemen showed the following distribution of wounds in terms of areas of the body.

Table 63

| Area of the body | Wounds | |
|---|---|---|
| | Number of men | % |
| Skull | 773,500 | 5.4 |
| Eye | 214,861 | 1.5 |
| Face | 501,342 | 3.5 |
| Neck | 157,565 | 1.1 |
| Chest | 1,289,166 | 9 |
| Abdomen | 444,046 | 3.1 |
| Back | 143,241 | 1 |
| Pelvis | 630,259 | 4.4 |
| Genital organs | 28,648 | 0.2 |
| Upper extremities | 5,042,074 | 35.2 |
| Lower extremities | 5,099,369 | 35.6 |
| Total .......... | 14,324,071 | 100 |

The average length of the stay in medical facilities for the sick and wounded was:

Table 64

| Categories of wounded and sick | Average number of days for stay in medical facilities |
|---|---|
| Wounded | 76.4 |
| Injured | 49.4 |
| Suffered from closed combat trauma (bone breaks and so on) | 69.4 |
| Burned | 51.8 |
| Frostbitten | 89 |
| Sick | 34.5 |

The enormous number of sick, injured and wounded losses shows how hard the work of the medical workers of the front and rear was. Over 22 million soldiers and commanders from the army and navy passed through their caring hands. It is to their credit that over 17 million of those wounded in battles and the sick returned to duty. Over 10.5 million men from among the wounded continued to fight the enemy after their treatment was finished.

General-Colonel of the Medical Service Ye.I. Smirnov, who during the war years was the head of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Red Army, in his book, Frontline Mercy (Frontovoye miloserdiye), justly writes that the "war medicine changed from the service of caring for the wounded in battles and the sick in past wars into one of the main sources for supplying the active army with combat experienced soldiers and officers who returned to duty after treatment".

The work of the people of this noble profession is highly valued by the Homeland. Eight medical battalions and 39 military hospitals were awarded orders, over 116,000 doctors, paramedics, nurses, and corpsmen were awarded orders and medals, and 43 medical personnel were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

## Number and losses

Summing up the totals of the overall losses of personnel by the army and navy, we see that during the war in all of its stages a large number of servicemen were put out of commission and had to be replaced quickly and fully.

Millions of people were drafted to replace the losses, to create new formations and to maintin, starting from 1943 and up to the end of the war, a total size of the Armed Forces in the range of 11.5 million men (including 6.5 million men in the active army). This was necessary first of all in order to support active combat operations on the fronts, to create a specific grouping of troops in the Far East, to cover the state border in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, and also to man the reserve and training units in the internal military districts where an intensive training of the replacement troops for the fronts was conducted.

The war was seriously reflected in various aspects of the activity of our state, especially in its economy. A significant part of the work capable population was removed from the production sphere, which required a search for labor resources, especially skilled personnel for the military industry and other branches of the national economy. The most complex problem of redistributing the human resources between the army and the national economy was resolved. But the recruiting of troops for the fronts and the replacing of losses was in the forefront.

The below presented statistical data about the increase of the number of personnel of the Red Army and Navy during the Great Patriotic War characterize the picture of the movement of an enormous mass of people.

At the start of the war (on 22 June 1941) the rolls of the Red Army and Navy stood at 4,826,907 servicemen. Also, there were 74,945 servicemen and military builders who were serving in formations of civilian departments on the pay of the Peoples Commissariat for Defense.

During the four years of the war another 29,574,900 men[1] were mobilized (minus those that were drafted twice), and all together with the regular personnel 34,476,700 men were called to the army, navy and military formations of other departments; in other words, a multi-million mass of the most active and able bodied people, equal in size to the entire populations of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Finland together, was removed from the

[1] This figure includes 767,750 men with service obligations who were at training assemblies in the troops at the start of the war.

population. In order to understand more clearly how enormous this figure is, it is sufficient to say that over half of all of those workers and collective farmers in the sphere of material production and in the non-production branches of the national economy[1] during the war were drafted into the army, and over 2 million were drafted twice.

How was this extremely significant part of the country's population used?

Of the 34,476,700 men who put on a uniform during the war, over a third (33%) were on duty each year (the rolls stood at 10.5-11.5 million men). Half of these personnel (5.0-6.5 million men) served in troops of the active army, that is, fought on the Soviet-German front.

During the years of the war for various reasons all together 21.7 million men, or 62.9% of the total number of all of those drafted and in military service, for various reasons were lost to the Armed Forces. Over half of this loss was irrecoverable losses.

Table 65

| Types of losses | Total, thous. of men | % | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | of loss | of total number of drafted |
| Killed and died from wounds and diseases, died as a result of accidents, etc. | 6885.1 | 31.7 | 19.9 |
| Missing in action, taken prisoner | 4559 | 21 | 13.2 |

Also, in the initial period of the war the enemy captured about 500,000 men with military obligations who were drafted during the mobilization but who did not enter the troops (1.5% of the total number of all those drafted).

The remaining part of the lost personnel was distributed in the following way.

[1] According to census data, in 1940 the size of the Soviet population had reached 194,100,00, and 33,900,000 and 29,000,000 collective farmers were employed in the national economy.

Table 66

| Types of losses | Personnel, thous. of men | % | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | of loss | of total number of drafted |
| Demobilized due to being wounded and sick | 3798.2 | 17.5 | 11 |
| Of them, remained disabled | 2576 | 11.9 | 7.5 |
| Transferred to work in industry and in military formations of other departments | 3614.6 | 16.7 | 10.5 |
| Sentenced | 994.3[1] | 4.6 | 2.9 |
| Of them, for desertion | 376.3 | | |

[1] Of this number, about 400,000 of those sentenced had the carrying out of their sentences delayed until the end of military operations and were sent to the front in punishment subunits.

The number of servicemen lost to the Armed Forces also includes servicemen who were removed from the army and navy due to political unreliability (these basically were people who were then suspected of traitorous activities, espionage and sabotage, and also servicemen of a number of nationalities whose families were forcibly resettled from their permanent homes to the eastern regions of the country),and also, a significant number of deserters who were not found. The wounded and sick personnel who were treated in hospitals (see tables 60 and 64) and who were en route to their service site in replacement units and subunits, including from hospitals, when the reports were being made were not included in the rolls.

After the end of the war with fascist Germany on 1 July 1945 there remained 11,390,600 men on the rolls of the Armed Forces, 403,200 men in uniforms of other departments and on the pay of the Peoples Commissariat for defense, and 1,046,000 men being treated in hospitals.

## Summary evaluation of the scale of losses

Returning to the analysis of the total number of personnel losses of the army and navy, it should be noted that the existing information about them makes it possible to evaluate quite confidently from the military operational point of view the losses of personnel by years and periods of the war, by campaigns, by strategic operations, by major battles and by separate battles.

With an attentive examination of table 69 an objective picture of the scale of our losses during the years of the war is formed. The passionless statistics recall the first heroic and more often tragic days, the position of the defenders of the Homeland in the memorable year of 1941. These were heavy battles along the border with a superior enemy in terms of numbers and

weaponry, the defense of the Brest fortress, the first successful counterattacks, the desperate attempts to breakout of encirclement and captivity. The irrecoverable and sick, injured and wounded losses during the six months and nine days of 1941 numbered 4,473,820 men. Of them, 465,400 were killed and died in stages of the medical evacuation, 101,500 men died from wounds in hospitals, 235,300 died from diseases, were killed in accidents and so on, 2,335,500 were missing in action and captured, 1,256,400 were wounded or injured, 66,100 were sick, and 13,600 were frostbitten. The percentage (55.2% of all losses) of the missing in action and captured was especially high.

It is impossible to say which year was more difficult or easier for the fighters of the army and navy. The irrecoverable losses were no smaller in 1942. The table strengthens this conclusion. The fascist forces were continuing the attack. The organized resistance of Soviet soldiers also was growing. The enemy suffered his first major defeat around Moscow. The high intensity of the combat operations is reflected in the number of the irrecoverable losses for this year, 3,258,200, and in the sick, injured and wounded losses, 4,111,100 men.

The data about the number of losses by quarters in the following years speak about the scale of the major battles which the Red Army conducted when chasing the fascist invaders from its native land.

During the entire Great Patriotic War (including the campaign in the Far East) the irrecoverable losses for the army and navy numbered 11,285,000 men and the sick, injured and wounded losses (according to reports from the troops) numbered 18,344,000 men.

How the irrecoverable and sick, injured and wounded losses were distributed among the categories of servicemen can be seen in tables 67 and 68. If all of the losses equal 100%, then of those that were put out of commission, 7.68% were officers, 17.62% were sergeants, and 74.70% were soldiers. The greatest losses befell the enlisted men.

Table 69, which shows the number of losses according to type, and the graph for the ratio of losses by quarters, years and periods of the war (table 70) characterize the serious front line situation during the entire war. The losses grow or decrease in strict dependence on the intensity of the combat operations on the front. If one follows the line that marks the percentage of the missing in action and captured, then it starts with its apogee in 1941. Fascist Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union placed the Soviet Armed Forces in the most difficult conditions. The border military districts immediately lost the main mass of people. The poorly organized counting of losses, and often the absence of any capability to report about them did not let the higher staffs determine exactly the true state of affairs in the troops at the front. Units and formations that were surrounded did not sent information about their position. Many of those lost on the battlefield were counted as missing in action or simply not counted at all. This was the general picture in the first months of the war. Later when the front stabilized somewhat the number of the missing in action and captured dropped markedly and by the first quarter of 1942 reached 10% of the total losses. Then there follows a number of unsuccessful defensive operations and again the number of the captured and missing in action reaches almost 35%. By the end of the year this indicator drops and then becomes minimal until the end of the war.

Table 67

## Personnel losses of the Red Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945
## By categories of servicemen, quarters and year

| Period | | Irrecoverable losses (killed, died, missing in action, taken prisoner, noncombat losses) | | | | | Sick, injured, wounded losses (wounded, injured, burned, sick, frostbitten etc.) | | | | | Total | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Officers | Ser-geants | Soldiers | Total | % | Officers | Ser-geants | Soldiers | Total | % | Officers | Ser-geants | Soldiers | Total | % |
| 1941 | 3rd qtr | 142043 | 310955 | 1676679 | 2129677 | 18.9 | 48192 | 81560 | 557874 | 687626 | 3.8 | 190235 | 392515 | 2234553 | 2817303 | 9.5 |
| | 4th qtr | 61040 | 137002 | 809954 | 1007996 | 8.9 | 42748 | 84257 | 521516 | 648521 | 3.5 | 103788 | 221259 | 1331470 | 1656517 | 5.6 |
| | Total for 1941 | 203083 | 447957 | 2486633 | 3137673 | 27.8 | 90940 | 165817 | 1079390 | 1336147 | 7.3 | 294023 | 613744 | 3566023 | 4473820 | 15.1 |
| 1942 | 1st qtr | 45678 | 92728 | 536909 | 675315 | 6 | 72324 | 152578 | 954555 | 1179457 | 6.4 | 118002 | 245306 | 1491464 | 1854772 | 6.3 |
| | 2nd qtr | 60185 | 135006 | 647707 | 842898 | 7.5 | 45684 | 94036 | 566927 | 706647 | 3.9 | 105869 | 229042 | 1214634 | 1549545 | 5.2 |
| | 3rd qtr | 101429 | 222404 | 900662 | 1224495 | 10.8 | 102136 | 217845 | 963081 | 1283062 | 7 | 203565 | 440249 | 1863743 | 2507557 | 8.5 |
| | 4th qtr | 47969 | 94151 | 373388 | 515508 | 4.6 | 75451 | 162866 | 703579 | 941896 | 5.1 | 123420 | 257017 | 1076967 | 1457404 | 4.9 |
| | Total for 1942 | 255261 | 544289 | 2458666 | 3258216 | 28.9 | 295595 | 627325 | 3188142 | 4111062 | 22.4 | 550856 | 1171614 | 5646808 | 7369278 | 24.9 |
| 1943 | 1st qtr | 63169 | 141781 | 521764 | 726714 | 6.4 | 128416 | 250600 | 1046676 | 1425692 | 7.8 | 191585 | 392381 | 1568440 | 2152406 | 7.2 |
| | 2nd qtr | 21523 | 33850 | 136531 | 191904 | 1.7 | 36877 | 70708 | 383052 | 490637 | 2.7 | 58400 | 104558 | 519583 | 682541 | 2.3 |
| | 3rd qtr | 77262 | 192069 | 534525 | 803856 | 7.1 | 149714 | 460238 | 1450853 | 2060805 | 11.2 | 226976 | 652307 | 1985378 | 2864661 | 9.7 |
| | 4th qtr | 40451 | 107259 | 442245 | 589955 | 5.3 | 107769 | 254326 | 1205845 | 1567940 | 8.5 | 148220 | 361585 | 1648090 | 2157895 | 7.3 |
| | Total for 1943 | 202405 | 474959 | 1635065 | 2312429 | 20.5 | 422776 | 1035872 | 4086426 | 5545074 | 30.2 | 625181 | 1510831 | 5721491 | 7857503 | 26.5 |
| 1944 | 1st qtr | 50556 | 113731 | 406474 | 570761 | 5 | 114468 | 284108 | 1174166 | 1572742 | 8.6 | 165024 | 397839 | 1580317 | 2143503 | 7.2 |
| | 2nd qtr | 38815 | 66035 | 239408 | 344258 | 3.1 | 70665 | 165666 | 728877 | 965208 | 5.3 | 109480 | 231701 | 968608 | 1309466 | 4.4 |
| | 3rd qtr | 46673 | 105457 | 358660 | 510790 | 4.5 | 122830 | 300419 | 1122193 | 1545442 | 8.4 | 169503 | 405876 | 1480853 | 2056232 | 7 |
| | 4th qtr | 28762 | 61861 | 247459 | 338082 | 3 | 76606 | 186155 | 771597 | 1031358 | 5.6 | 105368 | 245016 | 1019056 | 1369440 | 4.6 |
| | Total for 1944 | 164806 | 347084 | 1252001 | 1763891 | 15.6 | 384569 | 933348 | 3796833 | 5114750 | 27.9 | 549375 | 1280432 | 5048834 | 6878641 | 23.2 |

Table 67 continued

| Period | | Irrecoverable losses (killed, died, missing in action, taken prisoner, noncombat losses) | | | | | Sick, injured, wounded losses (wounded, injured, burned, sick, frostbitten etc.) | | | | | Total | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total | % | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total | % | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total | % |
| 1945 | 1st qtr | 49661 | 121812 | 386048 | 557521 | 4.9 | 125932 | 339103 | 1129600 | 1594635 | 8.7 | 175593 | 460915 | 1515648 | 2152156 | 7.3 |
| | 2nd qtr | 23502 | 48502 | 171292 | 243296 | 2.2 | 52480 | 123697 | 441878 | 618055 | 3.4 | 75982 | 172199 | 613170 | 861351 | 2.9 |
| | Total for 1945 | 73163 | 170314 | 557340 | 800817 | 7.1 | 178412 | 462800 | 1571478 | 2212690 | 12.1 | 251575 | 633114 | 2128818 | 3013507 | 10.2 |
| Total for war with Germany | | 898718 | 1984603 | 8389705 | 11273026 | 99.9 | 1372292 | 3225162 | 13722269 | 18319723 | 99.9 | 2271010 | 5209765 | 22111974 | 29592749 | 99.9 |
| Campaign in the Far East (9 Aug - 2 Sep 1945) | | 1470 | 3568 | 6993 | 12031 | 0.1 | 2019 | 7123 | 15283 | 24425 | 0.1 | 3489 | 10691 | 22276 | 36456 | 0.1 |
| Total for Great Patriotic War | | 900188 | 1988171 | 8396698 | 11285057 | | 1374311 | 3232285 | 13737552 | 18344148 | | 2274499 | 5220456 | 22134250 | 29629205 | 100 |
| % | | 7.98 | 17.62 | 74.40 | 100 | 100 | 7.49 | 17.62 | 74.89 | 100 | 100 | 7.68 | 17.62 | 74.70 | 100 | |

Table 68

**Ratio of average monthly size and losses of personnel of the Red Army and Navy according to categories of servicemen**

Notes for table 68 A - Average monthly size; B - All losses; C - Sergeants; D - Officers; E - Soldiers; F - Irrecoverable losses; G - Sickness, injury and wounded losses

Table 69

## Personnel losses of the Red Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 By types of losses, quarters and years (ratio)

| Period | | Irrecoverable losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | | Died from wounds in hospitals | | Died from disease, as a result of an accident, etc (noncombat losses) | | Missing in action, taken prisoner, including the uncounted losses of first months | |
| | | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| 1941 | 1st qtr | 236372 | 8.4 | 40680 | 1.4 | 153526 | 5.5 | 1699099 | 60.3 |
| | 2nd qtr | 229009 | 13.8 | 60791 | 3.7 | 81813 | 4.9 | 636383 | 38.4 |
| | Total for year | 465381 | 10.4 | 101471 | 2.3 | 235339 | 5.2 | 2335482 | 52.2 |
| 1942 | 1st qtr | 413681 | 22.3 | 45651 | 2.4 | 34328 | 1.9 | 181655 | 9.8 |
| | 2nd qtr | 232388 | 15 | 55761 | 3.6 | 26294 | 1.7 | 528455 | 34.1 |
| | 3rd qtr | 416569 | 16.6 | 69470 | 2.8 | 53689 | 2.1 | 684767 | 27.3 |
| | 4th qtr | 310978 | 21.3 | 49344 | 3.4 | 34842 | 2.4 | 120344 | 8.3 |
| | Total for year | 1373616 | 18.6 | 220226 | 3 | 149153 | 2 | 1515221 | 20.6 |
| 1943 | 1st qtr | 486912 | 22.6 | 65474 | 3 | 30200 | 1.4 | 144128 | 6.8 |
| | 2nd qtr | 100967 | 14.8 | 53254 | 7.8 | 15231 | 2.2 | 22452 | 3.3 |
| | 3rd qtr | 562604 | 19.6 | 111125 | 3.9 | 14413 | 0.5 | 115714 | 4 |
| | 4th qtr | 418225 | 19.3 | 70903 | 3.3 | 15315 | 0.7 | 85512 | 4 |
| | Total for year | 1568708 | 20 | 300756 | 3.8 | 75159 | 1 | 367806 | 4.6 |
| 1944 | 1st qtr | 414298 | 19.3 | 95021 | 4.4 | 8779 | 0.4 | 52663 | 2.5 |
| | 2nd qtr | 206193 | 15.8 | 86901 | 6.6 | 12787 | 1 | 38377 | 2.9 |
| | 3rd qtr | 374817 | 18.2 | 75017 | 3.6 | 15491 | 0.8 | 45465 | 2.2 |
| | 4th qtr | 216754 | 15.8 | 72907 | 5.3 | 17363 | 1.3 | 31058 | 2.3 |
| | Total for year | 1212062 | 17.6 | 329846 | 4.8 | 54420 | 0.8 | 167563 | 2.4 |
| 1945 | 1st qtr | 410066 | 19.1 | 78017 | 3.6 | 17979 | 0.8 | 51459 | 2.4 |
| | 2nd qtr | 147577 | 17.1 | 70011 | 8.1 | 8530 | 1 | 17178 | 2 |
| | Total for year | 557643 | 18.5 | 148028 | 4.9 | 26509 | 0.9 | 68637 | 2.3 |
| Total for war with Germany | | 5177410 | 17.5 | 1100327 | 3.7 | 540580 | 1.8 | 4454709 | 15.1 |
| Campaign in Far East (9 Aug - 2 Sep 45) | | 9780 | 26.8 | | | 1340 | 3.7 | 911 | 2.5 |
| Total for Great Patriotic War | | 5187190 | 17.5 | 1100327 | 3.7 | 541920 | 1.8 | 4455620 | 15.1 |

Table 69 continued

| Total | | Sick, wounded, injured losses (with evacuation to hospital) | | | | | | | | Total losses | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Wounded, injured, burned | | Sick | | Frostbitten | | Total | | | |
| Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| 2129677 | 75.6 | 665961 | 23.6 | 21665 | 0.8 | - | - | 687626 | 24.4 | 2817303 | 100 |
| 1007996 | 60.8 | 590460 | 35.7 | 44504 | 2.7 | 13557 | 0.8 | 648521 | 39.2 | 1656517 | 100 |
| 3137673 | 70.1 | 1256421 | 28.1 | 66169 | 1.5 | 13557 | 0.3 | 1336147 | 29.9 | 4473820 | 100 |
| 675315 | 36.4 | 1011040 | 54.5 | 117007 | 6.3 | 51410 | 2.8 | 1179457 | 63.6 | 1854772 | 100 |
| 842898 | 54.4 | 552437 | 35.6 | 154210 | 10 | - | - | 706647 | 45.6 | 1549545 | 100 |
| 1224495 | 48.8 | 1146667 | 45.7 | 136395 | 5.5 | - | - | 1283062 | 51.2 | 2507557 | 100 |
| 515508 | 35.4 | 765577 | 52.5 | 169461 | 11.6 | 6858 | 0.5 | 941896 | 64.6 | 1457404 | 100 |
| 3258216 | 44.2 | 3475721 | 47.2 | 577073 | 7.8 | 58268 | 0.8 | 4111062 | 55.8 | 7369278 | 100 |
| 726714 | 33.8 | 1181338 | 54.9 | 230055 | 10.6 | 14299 | 0.7 | 1425692 | 66.2 | 2152406 | 100 |
| 191904 | 28.1 | 252954 | 37.1 | 237683 | 34.8 | - | - | 490637 | 71.9 | 682541 | 100 |
| 803856 | 28.1 | 1829666 | 63.9 | 231139 | 8 | - | - | 2060805 | 71.9 | 2864661 | 100 |
| 589955 | 27.3 | 1349890 | 62.6 | 217607 | 10.1 | 443 | - | 1567940 | 72.7 | 2157895 | 100 |
| 2312429 | 29.4 | 4613848 | 58.7 | 916484 | 11.7 | 14742 | 0.2 | 5545074 | 70.6 | 7857503 | 100 |
| 570761 | 26.6 | 1289049 | 60.2 | 280714 | 13.1 | 2979 | 0.1 | 1572742 | 73.4 | 2143503 | 100 |
| 344258 | 26.3 | 677318 | 51.7 | 287890 | 22 | - | - | 965208 | 73.7 | 1309466 | 100 |
| 510790 | 24.8 | 1261089 | 61.4 | 284353 | 13.8 | - | - | 1545442 | 75.2 | 2056232 | 100 |
| 589955 | 24.7 | 1349890 | 54.7 | 282385 | 20.6 | 248 | - | 1031358 | 75.3 | 1369440 | 100 |
| 1763891 | 25.6 | 3976181 | 57.8 | 1135342 | 16.5 | 3227 | 0.1 | 5114750 | 74.4 | 6878641 | 100 |
| 557521 | 25.9 | 1341025 | 62.3 | 252523 | 11.7 | 1087 | 0.1 | 1594635 | 74.1 | 2152156 | 100 |
| 243296 | 28.2 | 522834 | 60.7 | 95221 | 11.1 | - | - | 618055 | 71.8 | 861351 | 100 |
| 800817 | 26.6 | 1863859 | 61.9 | 347744 | 11.5 | 1087 | - | 2212690 | 73.4 | 3103507 | 100 |
| 112173026 | 38.1 | 15186030 | 51.3 | 3042812 | 10.3 | 90881 | 0.3 | 18319723 | 61.9 | 29592749 | 100 |
| 12031 | 33 | 19562 | 53.7 | 4863 | 13.3 | - | - | 24425 | 67 | 36456 | 100 |
| 11285057 | 38.1 | 15205592 | 51.3 | 3047675 | 10.3 | 90881 | 0.3 | 18344148 | 61.9 | 29629205 | 100 |

Table 70

**Ratio of personnel losses of Red Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic War According to types of losses, quarters, years and periods of the war, % of total number of losses**

Notes to table 70 A - Periods of War; B - Period I (22 June 1941 - 18 November 1942); C - Period II (19 November 1942 - 31 December 1943); D - Period III (1 January 1944 - 9 May 1945); E - Quarters and years; F - Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation; G - Died from wounds in hospitals; H - Died from diseases, killed as a result of accidents and do on (noncombat losses); I - Missing in action, taken prisoner, including uncounted losses; J - Wounded, injured, burned; K - Sick and frostbitten

Table 71

**Ratio of irrecoverable and sick, injured and wounded losses by war years**

Notes to table 71 A - Irrecoverable losses (for whole war - 100%); B - Sick, injured and wounded losses (for whole war - 100%)

The number of wounded, injured and burned is also a graphic reflection of the events at the front. In a percentage regard this indicator was always high. But it especially rose in the summer of 1943, reaching 65% of all losses. It is known that at this time there were heavy battles in the Kursk region. The German-fascist command tried here to take revenge for Stalingrad. But the fascist forces were defeated in this battle. Both sides suffered great losses. The number of the killed and those who died from wounds in our forces rose to almost 20%.

The fact that during the drop in the activity of the combat operations the number of the wounded and killed drops but the number of the sick and wounded rises is also seen. This indicator reaches its peak in the second quarter of 1943 (about 35%), when there was a certain period of quiet on the front. Such a connection was preserved in 1944 and 1945 as well.

The change of the number of losses (by each type of them) that is depicted graphically in table 70, reflects the direct dependence between these indicators and the position on the fronts in a campaign or period of the Great Patriotic War.

Table 71 gives the opportunity to see the ratio of the irrecoverable losses and the wounded, sick and injured losses for the years of the war.

In 1941 our forces were waging fierce defensive battles and retreating, often becoming surrounded. This explains the high percentage (27.8%) of irrecoverable losses and the comparatively low percentage (7.3%) of sick, injured and wounded losses. Really, the sick, injured and wounded losses were also great, but it was not possible to count them fully. Many wounded were left on the battlefield, taken by the enemy and were among the missing in action. The columns for the loss type indicators in the table are of varying heights for this reason.

This ratio changed significantly in 1942. As before, the irrecoverable losses were great (28.9%). However, the sick, injured and wounded losses grew, although at the start of the year a significant part of the wounded also were among the missing in action.

The irrecoverable losses dropped somewhat in 1943 in many ways due to the reduction in the number of missing in action and captured. The evacuation of the wounded was better organized. The counting, including in the medical facilities, became better and more complete. The number of sick, injured and wounded losses rose to 30.2%.

The year 1944 was a time of offensive battles and major operations for the Red Army. During this year the number of irrecoverable losses dropped, but the sick,injured and wounded remained almost twice as high. Approximately the same ratio remained in 1945 as well.

## The active army, its size and its losses

The active army and navy are the part of the Armed Forces of the state that is used during time of war directly to carry out combat operations. During the period of the Great Patriotic War according to a decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the USSR the active army included: field commands of fronts and command organs for fleets which directed the preparation for and conducting of operations; strategic formations, formations, units (ships), rear services and other units and installations which were part of these fronts and fleets during the time when they were carrying out missions in the limits of the rear boundary of the active front or operational zone of a fleet, including on the shore to a distance of up to 100 km from the water.

The air defense troops, long range aviation formations and units, and other troops not a part of the active fronts belong to an active army or fleet only in the period of their direct participation in combat operations and carrying out of combat support missions in the limits of the rear boundaries of active fronts.

The fighting strength and the size of the active army were not constant. They changed depending on the scale of the operational-strategic missions and the intensity of the combat operations. Thus, at the start of the war the number of personnel of the active fronts numbered a little more than 3 million men, and by the end of 1944 it had grown to 6.7 men.

Table 72 is presented for comparing the number of losses of active army troops with the number of troops[1] It shows the average monthly size for each quarter (year) of the war and the personnel losses for these same periods of time. Comparing them, we see what part of the personnel was out of commission for each quarter throughout the war. Comparisons are given in a quantitative and percentage ratio. The dynamics of the change of these ratios in terms of time is reflected graphically in table 73.

The average monthly strength level that is presented in table 72 is produced by adding the number for each month (as a rule, on the first day), quarter, year and the entire war and dividing by the corresponding number of months.

The statistical data that are offered for analysis reveal on the whole a true picture of the scale of the total and average monthly human losses. They show that the fierce fighting every day knocked thousands soldiers of the fronts out of commission.

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[1] The table gives the average monthly number of personnel on the rolls and losses only for active fronts and independent armies (not including the navy, military districts, reserve troops of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, as well as air defense fronts and armies).The average monthly roll number and the losses of the active fleets and independent flotillas are given on p. **299-300 xxxxxxxx**).

Table 72

## Average monthly strength and personnel losses of active fronts and independentarmies for period from 22 June 1941 through 9 May 1945

| Period | | Average monthly strength | Irrecoverable losses | | | | Sick,injured, wounded losses | | | | All losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Number of men | % | | | Number of men | % | | | Number of men | % | | |
| | | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | |
| | | | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly |
| 1941 | 3rd qtr | 3334400 | 2067801 | 75.34 | 62.01 | 18.79 | 676964 | 24.66 | 20.30 | 6.15 | 2744765 | 100 | 82.31 | 24.94 |
| | 4th qtr | 2818500 | 926002 | 59.23 | 32.85 | 10.95 | 637327 | 40.77 | 22.61 | 7.54 | 1563329 | 100 | 55.46 | 18.49 |
| | Total for year | 3024900 | 2993803 | 69.49 | 98.97 | 15.71 | 1314291 | 30.51 | 43.45 | 6.90 | 4308094 | 100 | 142.42 | 22.61 |
| 1942 | 1st qtr | 4186000 | 619167 | 34.56 | 14.79 | 4.93 | 1172274 | 65.44 | 28 | 9.33 | 1791441 | 100 | 42.79 | 14.26 |
| | 2nd qtr | 5060300 | 776578 | 52.52 | 15.35 | 5.12 | 702150 | 47.48 | 13.87 | 4.63 | 1478728 | 100 | 29.22 | 9.75 |
| | 3rd qtr | 5664600 | 1141991 | 47.21 | 20.16 | 6.72 | 1276810 | 52.79 | 22.54 | 7.51 | 2418801 | 100 | 42.70 | 14.23 |
| | 4th qtr | 6343600 | 455800 | 32.75 | 7.19 | 2.40 | 936031 | 67.25 | 14.76 | 4.92 | 1391831 | 100 | 21.95 | 7.32 |
| | Total for year | 5313600 | 2993536 | 42.28 | 56.34 | 4.69 | 4087265 | 57.72 | 76.92 | 6.41 | 7080801 | 100 | 133.26 | 11.10 |
| 1943 | 1st qtr | 5892800 | 656403 | 31.60 | 11.14 | 3.71 | 1421140 | 68.40 | 24.12 | 9.04 | 2077543 | 100 | 35.26 | 11.75 |
| | 2nd qtr | 6459800 | 125172 | 20.97 | 1.94 | 0.65 | 471724 | 79.03 | 7.30 | 2.43 | 596896 | 100 | 9.24 | 3.08 |
| | 3rd qtr | 6816800 | 694465 | 25.27 | 10.19 | 3.40 | 2053492 | 74.73 | 30.12 | 10.04 | 2747957 | 100 | 40.31 | 13.44 |
| | 4th qtr | 6387200 | 501087 | 24.31 | 7.84 | 2.62 | 1560164 | 75.69 | 24.43 | 8.14 | 2061251 | 100 | 32.27 | 10.76 |
| | Total for year | 6389200 | 1977127 | 26.42 | 30.95 | 2.58 | 5506520 | 73.58 | 86.18 | 7.18 | 7483647 | 100 | 117.13 | 9.76 |

| Period | | Average monthly strength | Irrecoverable losses | | | | Sick,injured, wounded losses | | | | All losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Number of men | % | | | Number of men | % | | | Number of men | % | | |
| | | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | |
| | | | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly |
| 1944 | 1st qtr | 6268600 | 470392 | 23.11 | 7.51 | 2.51 | 1565431 | 76.89 | 24.97 | 8.32 | 2035823 | 100 | 32.48 | 10.83 |
| | 2nd qtr | 6447000 | 251745 | 20.83 | 3.91 | 1.30 | 956828 | 79.17 | 14.84 | 4.95 | 1208573 | 100 | 18.75 | 6.25 |
| | 3rd qtr | 6714300 | 430432 | 21.82 | 6.41 | 2.13 | 1541965 | 78.18 | 22.97 | 7.66 | 1972397 | 100 | 29.38 | 9.79 |
| | 4th qtr | 6770100 | 259766 | 20.19 | 3.84 | 1.28 | 1026645 | 79.81 | 15.16 | 5.05 | 1286411 | 100 | 19 | 6.33 |
| | Total for year | 6550000 | 1412335 | 21.72 | 21.57 | 1.80 | 5090869 | 78.28 | 77.72 | 6.48 | 6503204 | 100 | 99.29 | 8.28 |
| 1945 | 1st qtr | 6461100 | 468407 | 22.84 | 7.25 | 2.42 | 1582517 | 77.16 | 24.49 | 8.16 | 2050924 | 100 | 31.74 | 10.58 |
| | 2nd qtr | 6135300 | 163226 | 21.13 | 2.66 | 2.05 | 609231 | 78.87 | 9.93 | 7.63 | 772457 | 100 | 12.59 | 9.68 |
| | Total for year | 6330880 | 631633 | 22.37 | 9.98 | 2.32 | 2191748 | 77.63 | 34.62 | 8.05 | 2823381 | 100 | 44.60 | 10.37 |
| Total for war | | 5778500 | 100008434 | 35.49 | 173.20 | 3.72 | 18190693 | 64.51 | 314.80 | 6.77 | 28199127 | 100 | 488 | 10.49 |

<u>Comments</u>: 1. Losses from 22 June through 30 June 1941 are included in the 3rd quarter of 1941, and losses from 1 April through 9 May 1945 are included in the second quarter of 1945.
2. The wounded and sick who subsequently died in hospitals are included in the sick, injured and wounded losses.

Table 73

**Relationship of average monthly active army personnel losses to the average monthly strength level.**
**By quarters, years and periods of the war, %**

Notes for table 73: A - Periods of the war; B - Period I (22 June 1941 to 18 November 1942); C - Period II (19 november 1942 to 31 December 1943); D - Period III (1 January 1941 to 9 May 1945); E - Quarters and years; F - All losses; G - Irrecoverable losses; H - Sick, injured and wounded losses

Considering that the losses of the fronts were constantly being replaced, the strength level as much as possible was maintained approximately on a specific level, but the percentage of average monthly losses changed depending on the intensity of the combat operations. If one adds up all of the losses for a specific period of the war, then their total amount often will significantly exceed the average strength level for the active army (front, arm of service). Sometimes by several times. For example, if in a company with an average number of personnel on the rolls of 100 men the average monthly losses numbered 25%, then for a year with the same size company in terms of numbers on the rolls (100%) the total losses will number 300%.

If, for example, one takes the Western Front, its average monthly size in 1941 was 501,120 men[1], but the irrecoverable losses for that year numbered 956,293 men[2]. Consequently, in 1941 the front lost 190.8% of its roster strength, and here each month 30.3% of its personnel were irrecoverably put out of commission. Together with the sick, injured and wounded losses for this same period, 259% of the average monthly size was lost. Thus, taking into account the replacements, each month in 1941 41.1% of the personnel in the troops of this front were lost.

The summarized data about the roster number and the losses for the entire active army (table 72) show that just in 1941 the irrecoverable losses for the fronts and independent armies numbered 98.9% of the average monthly roster number, and the sick, injured and wounded losses numbered 43.5%. All together during 1941 142.4% of the personnel were out of commission. In 1942 the irrecoverable losses of the fronts dropped to 56.3%, but the sick, injured and wounded losses rose to 76.9% of the average monthly roster number. All together for 1942 133.2% of the personnel were out of commission.

In subsequent years the total losses were somewhat smaller than at the start of the war. All together for the entire war on the Soviet-German front 488% of the personnel of the average monthly roster number in the active were out of commission, and the irrecoverable losses numbered 173.2% while the sick, injured and wounded losses numbered 314.8%.

The graph that depicts the correlation of the losses to the roster size (table 73) shows what kind of sharp fluctuations in the number of different types of losses took place throughout the war. In the first months of 1941 the irrecoverable losses reach the greatest level, exceeding the sick, wounded and injured losses. Then during a certain stabilization of the front and an improvement in counting, the irrecoverable losses decrease but the sick, injured and wounded increase. The percentage correlation of the total losses to the roster strength of the army, as seen from the graph, has sharp fluctuations connected with the intensity of the combat operations on the front. There is also a sharp drop in the number of losses in the second quarter of 1943 in the period of the so-called operational pause (1 April to 30 June 1943).

## Losses according to periods and campaigns of the war

In the strategic military regard the Great Patriotic War is divided into three periods, in each of which several campaigns were conducted.

The **first period**, which lasted from 22 June 1941 through 18 November 1942, included three campaigns: the summer-fall of 1941, the winter of 1941/42, and the summer-fall of 1942.

The **second period** (19 November 1942 to 31 December 1943) encompassed two campaigns: the winter of 1942/43 and the summer-fall of 1943.

[1] The average monthly size of the front is taken for August to December 1941.

[2] The losses for the front for June to December 1941.

The **third period** (1 January 1944 to 9 May 1945) consisted of three campaigns: the winter-spring of 1944, the summer-fall of 1944 and the campaign of 1945 in Europe.

The independent Far Eastern campaign was carried out in the war with Japan.

Thus, in the years of the war the Soviet Armed Forces conducted 9 campaigns, 7 of which were offensive. The latter in terms of time comprised 70% of the entire length of the military operations on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese fronts.

The summary data about the personnel losses in terms of the periods and campaigns of the Great Patriotic War presented in table 74 show that they were the greatest for the Soviet Armed Forces in the first period of the war (37.7% of the total losses and 54.6% of the irrecoverable losses for the entire war). Most of the irrecoverable losses were in the summer-fall defensive campaigns of 1941 and 1942 (25.2 and 18.3% respectively), when the troops of the active fronts and armies were withdrawing while fighting running battles into the depth of the territory of the country.

In these campaigns the irrecoverable losses (over 1 million men) exceed the sick, injured and wounded losses. In subsequent periods of the war the irrecoverable losses were smaller and were 2-2.5 times less than the sick, injured and wounded losses.

What concerns the total personnel losses (irrecoverable as well as sick, injured and wounded) in the military campaigns is that they were the greatest in the summer-fall of 1943 (17%), and the smallest in the winter campaigns of 1941/42 and 1942/43 (9.6 and 9.5% of all of the losses for the war respectively).

Table 74

## Relationship of number of personnel losses for Red Army and Navy for periods and campaigns of the Great Patriotic War

| Periods of the war | Campaigns | Personnel losses, thous. of men | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Irrecoverable | | Sick,injured and wounded | | Total | |
| | | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| First (22 Jun 41 to 18 Nov 42) | Summer-fall (22 Jun to 4 Dec 41) | 2841.9 / 17.1 | 25.2 / 0.15 | 1145.8 / 6.9 | 6.2 / 0.04 | 3987.7 / 24 | 13.5 / 0.08 |
| | Winter (5 Dec 41 to 30 Apr 42 | 1249 / 8.5 | 11.1 / 0.08 | 1602.7 / 10.9 | 8.7 / 0.06 | 2851.7 / 19.4 | 9.6 / 0.07 |
| | Summer-fall (1 May to 18 Nov 42) | 2064.1 / 10.2 | 18.3 / 0.09 | 2258.5 / 11.2 | 12.3 / 0.06 | 4322.6 / 21.4 | 14.6 / 0.07 |
| | Total in first period | 6155 / 12 | 54.6 / 0.11 | 5007 / 9.7 | 27.2 / 0.05 | 11,162 / 21.7 | 37.7 / 0.07 |
| Second (19 Nov 42 to 31 Dec 43) | Winter (19 Nov 42 to 31 Mar 43 | 967.7 / 7.3 | 8.6 / 0.06 | 1865.9 / 14 | 10.2 / 0.08 | 2833.6 / 21.3 | 9.5 / 0.07 |
| | Operational-strategic pause (1 Apr to 30 Jun 43) | 191.9 / 2.1 | 1.7 / 0.02 | 490.6 / 5.4 | 2.7 / 0.03 | 682.5 / 7.5 | 2.3 / 0.03 |
| | Summer-fall (1 Jul to 31 Dec 43) | 1393.8 / 7.6 | 12.3 / 0.07 | 3628.8 / 19.7 | 19.8 / 0.11 | 5022.6 / 27.3 | 17 / 0.09 |
| | Total in second period | 2553.4 / 6.3 | 22.6 / 0.06 | 5985.3 / 14.7 | 32.7 / 0.08 | 8538.7 / 20.9 | 28.8 / 0.07 |
| Third (1 Jan 44 to 9 May 45) | Winter-spring (1 Jan to 31 May 44) | 801.5 / 5.3 | 7.1 / 0.05 | 2219.7 / 14.6 | 12.1 / 0.08 | 3012.2 / 19.9 | 10.2 / 0.07 |
| | Summer-fall (1 Jun to 31 Dec 44) | 962.4 / 4.5 | 8.5 / 0.04 | 2895 / 13.5 | 15.8 / 0.07 | 3857.4 / 18 | 13 / 0.06 |
| | Campaign in Europe (1 Jan to 9 May 45) | 800.8 / 6.2 | 7.1 / 0.05 | 2212.7 / 17.2 | 12.1 / 0.09 | 3013.5 / 23.4 | 10.2 / 0.08 |
| | Total in third period | 2564.7 / 5.2 | 22.7 / 0.05 | 7327.4 / 14.8 | 40 / 0.08 | 9892.1 / 20 | 33.4 / 0.07 |
| Total for war on Soviet-German front | | 11,272.1 / 7.9 | 99.9 / 0.07 | 18,319.7 / 12.9 | 99.9 / 0.07 | 29,592.8 / 20.9 | 99.9 / 0.07 |
| Campaign in Far East (9 Aug to 2 Sep 45) | | 12 / 0.5 | 0.1 / — | 24.4 / 0.97 | 0.1 / — | 36.4 / 1.5 | 0.1 / — |
| Total for Great Patriotic War | | 11,285.1 / 7.8 | 100 / 0.07 | 18,344.1 / 12.7 | 100 / 0.07 | 29,629.2 / 20.5 | 100 / 0.07 |

Comment: The numerator shows all of the losses, and the denominator shows the average daily losses

The losses of Soviet army and naval forces in the Far Eastern campaign, during the course of which in 25 days of combat operations 36,400 men were put of commission, including 12,000 killed, died and missing in action, were comparatively small.

Data about the number of average daily losses deserve special attention. Each day on the Soviet-German front on average 20,869 men were put out of commission, of which, about 8000 were irrecoverably lost. The greatest average daily losses are noted in the summer-fall campaigns of 1941 - 24,000 men, and of 1943 - 27,300 men a day.

## Losses in strategic operations

In order to achieve operational, operational-strategic and strategic goals the Soviet Armed Forces during the course of the war conducted various operations. They represented a set of battles, major battles, and strikes by various forces, coordinated and mutually connected in terms of goals, missions, place and time and carried out simultaneously or sequentially in a set period of time. In terms of scale of the combat operations, the operations are divided into strategic, front and army operations, and in terms of character they are divided into offensive and defensive operations.

The strategic operations consisted, as a rule, of front operations, and the front operations consisted of army operations. Each of them had its own indicators which characterize its scope, the number of participating forces[1], the width of the zone of combat operations, the length, the depth of the movement (in defensive operations, the depth of the withdrawal) and the tempo of the offensive.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed Forces conducted over 500 strategic operations, about 250 front operations, and over 1000 army operations. Part of the front and army operations were carried out in the framework of strategic operations, and some were carried out independently.

In the past war a strategic operation meant an operation during which one of the most important tasks of the entire campaign or one of its stages in a strategic sector or theater of

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[1] In the tables which characterize the combat strength, the number of troops and the personnel losses, the combat strength is given to a Ground Troop formation. The corps include only tank and mechanized corps that were formed in May 1942.

At the foundation of the tables lie the monthly reports from fronts which are the most complete and reliable. But in the case when operations lasted for less than a month, ten-day front reports were used. But from the monthly or ten-day reports it was not always possible exactly to count fully the personnel losses for all of the days of the operation. In cases when a front participated
in an operation of over five days, losses for the front for 10 days were, as a rule, added to the summary reports, and if it participated in an operation of less than five days, information about the front losses for the ten-day period was not added.

For example, the Kursk defensive operation started on 5 July 1943. Information about the losses for 10 days exists from 1 July. In this case the information not for five days, but instead for 10 days is added to the total data for July.

military operations was carried out. To conduct such operations, characteristically troops from one or several fronts, long range aviation formations, and National Air Defense forces were used, and in coastal sectors, fleet (flotilla) forces were used.

As a rule, troops for a group of fronts were used to conduct strategic operations. This was brought about by the fact that it was difficult to perform an important military-political task in a strategic sector or theater of military operations with the forces of one front. Therefore, a new form of strategic operations such as the operation of a group of fronts was developed and successfully used. In it a front performed tasks of an operational-strategic importance, operating in one of the strategic or operational sectors. Thus, 82.3% of all strategic operations by Soviet troops were conducted by the forces of two or more fronts, 9.8% were conducted by the forces of a front and fleet, and only 7.9% were conducted by the forces of one front.

In the following tables about personnel losses in specific strategic operations, it is possible to conclude that most of all our forces suffered irrecoverable losses in defensive operations of the first period of the war numbering 3,580,000 men, or 31.8% of the total number of irrecoverable losses for the entire war. In the Kiev defensive operation they numbered 616,300 men, 486,200 in the Smolensk defensive operation, 514,300 in the Moscow defensive operation, 370,500 in the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive operation, and 323,800 in the Stalingrad defensive operation.

The irrecoverable losses for our forces were significantly less in the defensive strategic operations of the second period of the war.

They numbered 45,200 in the Khar'khov defensive operation (March 1943) and 70,300 in the Kursk defensive operation (July 1943).

In the third period of the war the Soviet Armed Forces did not conduct preplanned defensive operations (except for the Balaton defensive operation). The total losses in the Balaton defensive operation numbered 32,900 men, of which 8500 were irrecoverable.

A tendency towards a reduction of the number of irrecoverable personnel losses and an increase, by 2-2.5 times, of the sick, injured and wounded losses, is observed in offensive strategic operations. In the Rzhev-Vyazma operation of 1942 the irrecoverable losses numbered 272,300 men, but the sick, injured and wounded numbered 504,600 men (1:1.8), in the Stalingrad operation the numbers were 154,900 and 330,900 men (1:2.1), and in the Orel operation they were 112,500 and 317,400 men (1:2.8) respectively. The ratio of irrecoverable losses and sick, injured and wounded losses in operations of the third period of the war especially changed. In the Leningrad-Novgorod operation the ratio of irrecoverable losses to sick,injured and wounded losses was 1:3, in the L'vov-Sandomir operation it was 1:3.4, in the Baltic operation it was 1:3.5, in the Vistula-Oder operation it was 1:3.5, in the Berlin operation it was 1:3.5, and in the Manchurian operation it was 1:2.

When examining the scale of the total personnel losses in strategic operations, it is necessary to keep in mind that they depended both on the number of forces (fronts, armies) involved and on the time for the conducting of the operations. For example, the greatest total

losses in personnel, as is seen from the tables were in the Dnepr-Carpathian offensive operation (1,109,500 men), the Belorussian offensive operation (765,800 men), and the East Prussian offensive operation (548,800 men). However, their daily losses were not the highest in view of the length of the time in which these operations were conducted.

The tables that characterize the strategic operations show only that combat strength and that number of troops that existed at the start of the operation (that is, without the troops and replacements that were additionally sent during the course of combat operations). The losses are given for all of the troops (forces) that took part in the corresponding operation.

Table 75 gives information about the personnel losses of a number of front operations (including unsuccessful ones) which had a definite influence on the course of the armed conflict.

## THE DEFENSIVE OPERATION IN LITHUANIA AND LATVIA (THE BALTIC STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION)

22 June to 9 July 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the North-Western Front and part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet. During the course of combat operations another 14 divisions and one brigade were added to the composition of the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 18 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 350-450 km. The depth of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was 400-450.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| North-Western Front (entire period) | 19 rifle div<br>2 mech. div<br>4 tank div<br>1 rifle brig<br>3 airborne brig<br>1 fortified area | 440,000 | 73,924 | 13,284 | 87,208 | 4845 |
| Baltic Fleet (part of the forces, entire period) | - | 58,000 | 1278 | - | 1278 | 71 |
| Total ............. | 25 divisions<br>4 brigades<br>1 fortified area | 498,000 | 75,202 | 13,284 | 88,486 | 4916 |

**Results of the operation**. Repelling the surprise attack by superior enemy forces, the troops of the North-Western Front with heavy battles were forced to withdraw into the territory of our country in diverging directions: to Estonia and to the East, to the Velikaya River. In the course of stubborn battles with the cooperation of the Baltic Fleet, displaying courage and persistence, our troops slowed the speed of the advance of the "North" army group and inflicted significant losses to its strike grouping.

## THE DEFENSIVE OPERATION IN BELORUSSIA (THE BELORUSSIAN STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION)

22 June to 9 July 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the Western Front with the participation of the Pina flotilla. During combat operations an additional 45 divisions were added to the composition of the Soviet troops. The length of the operation was 18 days. The width of the front of the combat operations was 450-800 km. The depth of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was 450-600 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Western Front (entire period) | 24 rifle div<br>2 cav. div<br>6 mech. div<br>12 tank div<br>3 airborne brig<br>8 fortified areas | 625,000 | 341,012 | 76,717 | 417,729 | 23,207 |
| Pina flotilla (entire period) | - | 2,300 | 61 | - | 61 | 3 |
| Total | 44 divisions<br>3 brigades<br>8 fortified areas | 627,300 | 341,073 | 76,717 | 417,790 | 23,210 |

**Results of the operation.** In spite of enormous sacrifices made in this operation by the Red Army, it was not possible to hold up the enemy forces. The troops of the Western Front under the effect of strikes by superior enemy forces were forced to withdraw to the east. Nevertheless, with a stubborn resistance in the border regions in combination with counterattacks they inflicted perceptible damage to the Wehrmacht grouping, army group "Center", and slowed the rates of its attack on Smolensk and Moscow. This gave the opportunity to the Soviet High Command to deploy troops of the second strategic echelon on the line from the Western Dvina River to the Dnepr.

## THE DEFENSIVE OPERATION IN WESTERN UKRAINE (L'VOV-CHERNOVTSY STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION)

22 June - 6 July 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the South-Western Front. During combat operations, 12 divisions, six brigades and the command of the 18th Army were additionally added to the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 15 days. The width of the front for the combat operations was 600-700 km. The depth of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was 300-350 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| South-Western Front (entire period) | 32 rifle div<br>2 cavalry div<br>8 mech div<br>16 tank div<br>3 airborne brig<br>14 fortified areas | 864,600 | 165,452 | 65,755 | 231,207 | 15,414 |
| 18th Army of the Southern Front (25 June to 6 July 1941 | | | 6871 | 3516 | 10,387 | 866 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 58 divisions<br>3 brigades<br>14 fortified areas | 864,600 | 172,323 | 69,271 | 241,594 | 16,106 |

**Results of the operation.** During the active combat operations in the border regions and on the intermediate defensive lines, with counterstrikes by mechanized corps and combined arms formations in the region of Dubno, Lutsk, and Rovno the troops of the South-Western Front inflicted great losses on the enemy and slowed the offensive of his main grouping in the Kiev sector which made it possible to withdraw the forces of the front and to take up the defense in fortified areas on the old state border.

## THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION IN THE ARCTIC AND KARELIA

29 June - 10 October 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the Northern Front (on 23 August 1941 it was divided into the Karelian and the Leningrad Fronts) and the 7th Independent Army with the cooperation of forces from the Northern Fleet. During the course of combat operations an additional 10 divisions, five brigades and the White Sea Flotilla were added to the composition of the Soviet forces. The length of the operations was 104 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 800 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet forces was 50-150 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Northern Front (29 June - 23 August 1941) | 8 rifle div<br>1 tank div<br>1 rifle brigade<br>7 fortified areas | 358,390 | 36,822 | 35,714 | 72,546 | 1295 |
| Karelian front (23 August - 10 October 1941) | | — | 29,856 | 32,336 | 62,192 | 1269 |
| 7th Independent Army (25 September - 10 October 1941) | The combat<br>for in information | strength,<br>of the | number and<br>Northern and | losses are<br>Karelian | accounted<br>Fronts | |
| Part of the forces of the Northern Fleet and the White Sea Flotilla (1 September - 1 October 1941) | | — | 587 | 398 | 985 | 32 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 9 divisions<br>1 brigade<br>7 fortified areas | 358,390 | 67,265 | 68,448 | 135,713 | 1305 |

**The results of the operation**. During stubborn defensive battles Soviet troops stopped the offensive of the German-Finnish troops in the Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Petrozavodsk and Svir' sectors. The enemy plans to seize Murmansk and the Kirov railroad and to take Leningrad from the north and northwest were thwarted.

## THE KIEV STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

7 July - 26 September 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the South-Western Front and part of the forces of the Pina Flotilla. During combat operations the 21st Army of the Central Front, the 6th and 12th Armies of the Southern Front, and the 37th, 38th and 40th Armies, newly created in the South-Western Front, were additionally added. All together there were 28 divisions and four brigades.

The length of the operation was 82 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 300 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet forces was 600 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| South-Western Front (entire period) | 26 rifle div<br>1 cavalry div<br>4 mech div<br>13 tank div<br>6 airborne brig<br>12 fortified areas | 627,000 | 531,471 | 54,127 | 585,598 | 7141 |
| 21st Army of the Central Front (10 August - 30 August 1941) | — | — | 31,792 | 3793 | 35,585 | 1695 |
| 6th and 12 Armies of the Southern Front (20 August - 26 September 1941) | — | — | 52,900 | 26,320 | 79,220 | 2085 |
| Part of the forces of the Pinsk Flotilla (10 August - 9 September 1941) | — | — | 141 | — | 141 | 3 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 44 divisions<br>6 brigades<br>12 fortified areas | 627,000 | 616,304 | 84,240 | 700,544 | 8543 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of lengthy (over 2.5 months) continuous fierce battles Soviet troops abandoned Kiev and a number of regions of the Left Bank of Ukraine while suffering heavy losses. However the long and stubborn defense by the troops of the South-Western Front and the major losses of the formations of the German army group "South" forced the enemy command to reinforce this grouping at the expense of troops form army group "Center" which had attacked in the main direction, Moscow. This played an important role in disrupting Hitler's plan for a "lightning war", an unstopped offensive on Moscow.

## THE LENINGRAD STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

10 July - 30 September 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the Northern (the Leningrad Front from 23 August 1941) and the North-Western Fronts with the cooperation of forces of the Baltic Fleet. From 1 September 1941 the 52nd Independent Army took part in the operation. During the combat operations 5 headquarters of armies and 20 divisions were additionally added. A number of front and army operations were conducted within the framework of the Leningrad strategic operation: the Tallin defensive operation, defensive operations in the western and south-western approaches to Leningrad and on the Karelian isthmus, counterstrikes by troops of the North-Western Front in the Sol'tsy region and around Staraya Russa and Kholm, and the Demyansk defensive operation.

The length of the operation was 83 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 450 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 270-300 km.

The operation marked the start of the heroic battle for Leningrad.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Northern Front (10 July-23 August 1941) | 7 rifle div<br>2 tank div<br>1 mech div<br>1 rifle brig<br>5 fortified areas | 153,000 | 40,491 | 15,044 | 55,535 | 1234 |
| North-Western Front (10 July - 30 September 1941) | 23 rifle div<br>4 mech div<br>5 tank div<br>3 rifle brig<br>3 airborne brig<br>3 fortified areas | 272,000 | 96,953 | 47,835 | 144,788 | 1744 |
| Leningrad Front (23 August - 30 September 1941) | — | — | 65,529 | 50,787 | 116,316 | 2982 |
| 52nd Independent Army (1 September - 30 September 1941) | — | — | 1721 | 2389 | 4110 | 137 |
| Baltic Fleet (entire period) | — | 92,000 | 9384 | 14,793 | 24,177 | 291 |
| Total ............. | 42 divisions<br>7 brigades<br>8 fortified areas | 517,000 | 214,078 | 130,848 | 344,926 | 4155 |

**The results of the operation.** In spite of the stubborn defense, Soviet troops could not stop the enemy on the distant approaches to Leningrad. At the cost of great losses the enemy was able to capture Estonia and a significant part of the Leningrad oblast and to break through to the city. However, the plans by Hitler's command to take Leningrad on the march and to use the freed up forces of army group "North" for the offensive on Moscow were not justified. By the end of September 1941 the front around Leningrad had stabilized. A lengthy fight for the city, which lasted more than three years, began.

## THE BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

10 July - 10 September 1941

The battle of Smolensk is a set of defensive and offensive operations conducted by Soviet troops with the goal of not allowing an enemy breakthrough in the Moscow strategic sector. Headquarters of the Central, Reserve and Bryansk fronts, nine headquarters of armies, 59 divisions and two brigades were additionally added to the composition of the Soviet troops in the course of the battle. A number of front operations were conducted within the framework of this battle: the Smolensk defensive and Smolensk offensive operations of the Western Front, the offensive operation of the Western Front in the Bobruysk sector, the Gomel'-Trubchevsk defensive operation of the Central Front and the Yel'nya offensive operation of the Reserve Front.

The length of the operation was 63 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 600-650 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 200-250 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Western Front 10 July - 10 September 1941) | 49 rifle div<br>6 mech div<br>11 tank div<br>2 airborne brig<br>6 fortified areas | 579,400 | 309,959 | 159,625 | 469,584 | 7454 |
| Central Front (26 July - 25 August 1941) | — | — | 79,216 | 28,009 | 107,225 | 3459 |
| Reserve Front (30 July - 10 September 1941) | — | — | 45,774 | 57,373 | 103,147 | 2399 |
| Bryansk Front (16 August - 10 September 1941) | — | — | 50,972 | 28,603 | 79,575 | 3061 |
| Pina Flotilla (10 July - 10 September 1941) | — | 2200 | 250 | 193 | 443 | 7 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 66 divisions<br>2 brigades<br>6 fortified areas | 581,600 | 486,171 | 273,803 | 759,974 | 12,063 |

**The results of the operation.** During bloody defensive and offensive battles Soviet troops thwarted the plans of the German-fascist command for an unchecked offensive on Moscow. The strongest German group of armies, "Center", suffered major losses, and was forced to switch to the defensive and to postpone by almost two months its plans for an advance on Moscow. The battle of Smolensk was an important stage in the thwarting of Hitler's plans for a "lightning war" against the Soviet Union.

## THE DONBASS-ROSTOV STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

29 September - 16 November 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the Southern Front and the 6th Army of the South-Western front with the participation of the Azov Flotilla. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the 56th Independent Army and eight divisions were added to the composition of the Soviet troops. The Donbass and Rostov defensive front operations were conducted within the framework of the Donbass-Rostov strategic defensive operation.

The length of the operation was 49 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 400-670 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 150-300 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Southern Front (29 September - 16 November 1941) | 20 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>1 fortified area<br>4 tank brig | 491,500 | 132,014 | 15,356 | 147,370 | 3007 |
| 6th Army of the South-Western Front (29 September - 16 November 1941) | 3 rifle div<br>2 cavalry div<br>2 tank brig | 45,000 | 11,201 | 1862 | 13,063 | 267 |
| Azov Flotilla (29 September - 1 November 1941) | — | 5100 | 98 | 45 | 143 | 4 |
| Total ............. | 28 divisions<br>6 brigades<br>1 fortified area | 541,600 | 143,313 | 17,263 | 160,576 | 3277 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of heavy defensive battles the troops of the Southern Front were not able to stop the enemy offensive and were forced to abandon the southwestern part of the Donbass and to withdraw to the approaches to Rostov. However, the German-fascist command's plan to encircle and destroy the troops of the Southern Front and to develop an attack on the Caucasus was thwarted. The enemy suffered major losses and moved to the defensive in an unfavorable operational position, which was used by the Soviet command to move to a counteroffensive around Rostov.

## THE MOSCOW STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

30 September - 5 December 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the Western, Reserve, Bryansk and Kalinin Fronts. Additionally added to the composition of the Soviet troops in the course of the combat operations were: the headquarters of the Kalinin Front, headquarters of the 1st Shock, 5th, 10th and 16th Armies, 34 divisions and 40 brigades.

The Orel-Bryansk, Vyazma, Kalinin, Mozhaysk-Maloyaroslavets, Tula and Klin-Solnechnegorsk front defensive operations were conducted in the course of the Moscow strategic defensive operation.

The length of the operation was 67 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 700-1100 km. The depth of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was 250-300 km. The operation marked the start of the battle for Moscow and was its first stage.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Western Front (1 October - 5 December 1941) | 31 rifle div<br>2 motor rifle div<br>3 cav div<br>1 rifle brig<br>4 tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 558,000 | 254,726 | 55,514 | 310,240 | 4700 |
| Reserve Front (1 October - 12 October 1941) | 28 rifle div<br>2 cav div<br>5 tank brig | 448,000 | 127,566 | 61,195 | 188,761 | 15,730 |
| Bryansk Front (30 September - 10 November 1941) | 25 rifle brig<br>4 cav div<br>1 tank div<br>4 tank brig | 244,000 | 103,378 | 6537 | 109,915 | 2617 |
| Kalinin Front (20 October - 5 December 1941) | — | — | 28,668 | 20,695 | 49,363 | 1050 |
| Total ............. | 96 divisions<br>14 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 1,250,000 | 514,338 | 143,941 | 658,279 | 9825 |

**The results of the operation**. In the course of fierce battles on the far and near approaches to Moscow Soviet troops stopped the advance of the main German grouping - army group "Center", and inflicted a serious defeat on it. Conditions were prepared for the switch to the counteroffensive and the defeating of the enemy near Moscow.

# THE TIKHVIN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION
# (THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE AROUND TIKHVIN)

10 November - 30 December 1941

The operation was conducted by troops of the 4th and 52 Independent Armies (from 17 December 1941 they were part of the newly created Volkhov Front), the 54th Army of the Leningrad front and the Novgorod Army Group of the North-Western Front. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the Volkhov Front and the 59th Army, 16 divisions and two brigades were added to the composition of the troops.

The length of the operation was 51 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 300-350 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 100-120 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 2-2.5 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 54th Army of the Leningrad Front (entire period) | 4 rifle div<br>1 tank div<br>2 rifle brig<br>2 tank brig | 55,600 | 6065 | 11,486 | 17551 | 344 |
| 4th Independent Army (entire period) | 6 rifle div<br>1 cav div<br>1 tank div | 62,700 | 8916 | 16,018 | 24,934 | 489 |
| 52nd Independent Army (entire period) | 4 rifle div | 42,660 | 871 | 1769 | 2640 | 52 |
| Novgorod Army Group of the North-Western Front (entire period) | 2 rifle div<br>1 tank div | 31,990 | 2072 | 1704 | 3776 | 74 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 20 divisions<br>4 brigades | 192,950 | 17,924 | 30,977 | 48,901 | 959 |

**The results of the operation**. In the course of the operation Soviet troops defeated 10 enemy divisions, liberated a number of important regions, and thwarted the German command's plan to isolate Leningrad completely. Favorable conditions were created for setting up an offensive in the northwest direction and for switching to the counteroffensive around Moscow.

# THE ROSTOV STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION (THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE AROUND ROSTOV)

17 November - 2 December 1941

Troops of the Southern Front and the 56th Independent Army (on 23 November it joined the Southern Front) conducted it. In the course of the operation five brigades were added to the composition of the troops.

The length of the operation was 16 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 140-180 km. The depth of the advance by Soviet troops was 60-80 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 4-5 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Southern Front (entire period, except for 12th Army) | 16 rifle div<br>5 cav div<br>7 tank brig | 262,500 | 11,163 | 12,758 | 23,921 | 1495 |
| 56th Independent Army (entire period) | 5 rifle div<br>5 cav div<br>1 tank brig | 86,500 | 4101 | 5089 | 9190 | 574 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 31 divisions<br>8 brigades | 349,000 | 15,264 | 17,847 | 33,111 | 2069 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of offensive battles Soviet troops inflicted a serious defeat on the German army group "South", pushed its formations from Rostov to the Mius River, and did not allow the enemy to breakthrough to the Caucasus. The position on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front stabilized, which helped bring about the success of the counteroffensive by the Red Army in the winter of 1941-42 around Moscow.

# THE MOSCOW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION (THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE AROUND MOSCOW)

5 December 1941 - 7 January 1942

The operation was conducted by troops of the Western, Kalinin and right wing of the South-Western Fronts. The Bryansk Front participated in the operation starting from 14 December 1941. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the Bryansk Front, the headquarters of the 39th and 61st Armies, 22 divisions and 11 brigades were added to the composition of the troops.

The length of the operation was 34 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 1000 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 100-250 km. The average daily

speed of the offensive of the rifle formations was 3-6 km. The Kalinin, Klin-Solnechnegorsk, Tula, Yelets, and Kaluga front operations were conducted within the framework of the Moscow strategic offensive operation.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Western Front (entire period) | 50 rifle div<br>1 motor rifle div<br>16 cav div<br>3 tank div<br>16 rifle brig<br>2 airborne brig<br>22 tank brig | 748,7000 | 101,192 | 160,038 | 261,230 | 7683 |
| Kalinin front (entire period) | 15 rifle div<br>1 cav div<br>1 rifle brig | 192,200 | 27,343 | 54,944 | 82,287 | 2420 |
| Right wing of the South-Western Front: 3rd and 13th Armies, operational group of General Kostenko (6 December - 31 December 1941) | 12 rifle div<br>7 cav div<br>1 motor rifle brig<br>2 tank brig | 80,800 | 9709 | 12,186 | 21,895 | 842 |
| Bryansk Front (24 December 1941 - 7 January 1942) | — | — | 1342 | 4201 | 5543 | 370 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 105 divisions<br>44 brigades | 1,021,700 | 139,586 | 231,369 | 370,955 | 10,910 |

**The results of the operation.** Soviet troops routed the strike groupings of army group "Center" which had tried to go around Moscow from the north and south, and removed the threat to the capital of the Soviet state and the Moscow industrial region. The first major defeat for the German army in the second world war was inflicted in the fields around Moscow, and the myth about its invincibility was shattered. The Red Army took the strategic initiative from the enemy and created conditions for a switch to a general offensive.

## THE KERCH-FEODOSIYA ASSAULT OPERATION

25 December 1941 - 2 January 1942

The operation was conducted by troops of the Transcaucasus (Caucasus after 30 December 1941) Front with part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla.

The length of the operation was 9 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 250 km. The average daily speed of the offensive for the rifle formations was 10-12 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | Personnel losses in operation, men |
|---|---|---|

| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transcaucasus (Caucasus from 30 December 1941) Front (25 December 1941 - 2 January 1942) | 8 rifle div 2 rifle brig | 62,000 | 30,547 | 7714 | 38,261 | 4251 |
| Part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla (25 December 1941 - 2 January 1942) | — | 20,500 | 1906 | 1768 | 3674 | 408 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 8 divisions 2 brigades | 82,500 | 32,453 | 9428 | 41,935 | 4659 |

**The results of the operation**. Soviet troops liberated the Kerch peninsula, captured the seaports of Kerch and Feodosiya, which made it possible for the Soviet command subsequently to deploy troops of the Crimean Front here. The defeat of the enemy's Kerch grouping forced the German command to halt the offensive against Sevastopol and to transfer part of the forces from there to the region of the Kerch peninsula. With the freeing of the Kerch peninsula from enemy troops the possibility of the invasion by German troops into the Caucasus through the Taman' peninsula was prevented.

## THE RZHEV-VYAZMA STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

8 January - 20 April 1942

The operation was conducted by troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies, 29 divisions and 33 brigades were added to the composition of the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 103 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 650 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 80-250 km. The average daily speed of the offensive for rifle formations was 1-2.5 km. The Sychevka-Vyazma, Vyazma and Rzhev front offensive operations were conducted in the framework of the Rzhev-Vyazma strategic operation..

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Kalinin Front (8 January - 20 April 1942) | 32 rifle div<br>5 cav div<br>4 tank brig | 346,100 | 123,380 | 217,847 | 341,227 | 3313 |
| Western Front (8 January - 20 April 1942) | 45 rifle div<br>12 cav div<br>1 tank div<br>26 rifle brig<br>2 airborne brig<br>14 tank brig | 713,100 | 148,940 | 286,722 | 435,662 | 4230 |
| Total .......... | 95 divisions<br>46 brigades | 1,059,200 | 272,320 | 504,569 | 776,889 | 7543 |

**The results of the operation.** The Soviet command was not able completely to carry out their plan. However, in spite of the lack of completion, the operation had an important military and political meaning. In the course of the offensive our troops inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy, threw him back by 80-250 km and completely liberated the Moscow and Tula oblasts as well as many regions of the Kalinin and Smolensk oblasts. Having executed a close deep envelopment of army group "Center" on two sides, Soviet troops placed the enemy in an unfavorable operational position. The German troops were able to avoid a complete destruction only as a result the transfer of additional forces from Western Europe.

## THE VORONEZH-VOROSHILOVGRAD STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

28 June - 14 July 1942

The operation was conducted by troops of the Bryansk (part of the forces), Voronezh, South-Western Fronts and the Azov Flotilla (part of the forces). In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, the headquarters of three armies, four tank corps and 20 divisions were added to the composition of the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 27 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 150-400 km. The Kastornye, Valuyki-Rossosh', and Voroshilovgrad-Shakhtinsk front defensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad strategic defensive operation.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Bryansk Front - 13th, 40th Armies, 5th Tank Army (28 June - 24 July 1942) | 12 rifle div<br>4 rifle brig<br>2 tank corps<br>4 indep. tank brig | 169,400 | 36,883 | 29,329 | 66,212 | 2452 |
| South-Western Front (28 June - 12 July 1942) | 33 rifle div<br>6 cav div<br>6 rifle brig<br>5 fortified areas<br>4 tank corps<br>3 mech rifle brig<br>10 indep.tank brig | 610,000 | 161,465 | 71,276 | 232,741 | 15,516 |
| Southern Front (28 June - 24 July 1942) | 23 rifle div<br>4 rifle brig<br>1 fortified area<br>6 tank brig | 522,500 | 128,460 | 64,753 | 193,213 | 7156 |
| Voronezh Front (9-24 July 1942 | — | — | 43,687 | 32,442 | 76,129 | 4758 |
| Azov Flotilla (Don detachment) | — | 8900 | 27 | 25 | 52 | 2 |
| Total ............. | 74 divisions<br>6 tank corps<br>37 brigades<br>6 fortified areas | 1,310,800 | 370,522 | 197,825 | 568,347 | 21,050 |

**The results of the operation.** The combat operations in this operation took place in conditions when the troops of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts, not having restored their forces after the previous heavy battles and not having been able to dig in defensively, were forced to repel attacks by superior enemy forces. They were not able to hold their defensive positions and withdrew with heavy losses to the region of Voronezh on the Don River. The 6th and 60th Armies from the reserve of the Supreme Command that were put into the battle and the counterattack of the 5th Tank Army on the northern enemy grouping weakened his attack, but did not change the overall development of the situation. The enemy was able to set up a subsequent offensive against Rostov and Stalingrad.

## THE STALINGRAD STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

17 July - 18 November 1942

The operation was conducted by troops of the Stalingrad (Don), South-Eastern and (Stalingrad) Fronts with the cooperation of forces from the Volga Flotilla. During the course of combat operations the headquarters of the South-Eastern Front, five headquarters of combined arms armies, and two headquarters of tank armies as well as 56 divisions and 33 brigades were added to the composition of the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 125 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 250-520 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 150 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Stalingrad Front 1st and 2nd times formed (entire period) | 34 rifle div<br>3 cav div<br>3 tank div<br>8 rifle brig<br>14 indep.tank brig | 540,300 | 194,685 | 215,305 | 409,990 | 3280 |
| South-Eastern Front (7 August - 30 September 1942) | — | — | 110,636 | 62,440 | 173,076 | 3147 |
| Don Front (30 September - 18 November 1942) | — | — | 18,028 | 41,941 | 59,969 | 1200 |
| Volga Flotilla (25 July - 18 november 1942) | — | 6700 | 507 | 300 | 807 | 7 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 37 divisions<br>3 tank corps<br>22 brigades | 547,000 | 323,856 | 319,986 | 643,842 | 5151 |

**The results of the operation.** In fierce defensive battles which developed in the great bend of the Don, and then on the Stalingrad perimeters as well as in the city itself not only was the enemy's offensive might destroyed and the main attack group of the Germany army on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front bled white, but the conditions were also prepared for the switch by Soviet troops to the decisive counteroffensive.

## THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

25 July - 31 December 1942

The operation was conducted by troops of the Southern (up to 28 July 1942), Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasus Fronts with the cooperation of forces from the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. In the course of combat operations headquarters of the Transcaucasus Front, the Northern Group of Forces, the 44th and 46th Armies, 31 divisions and 27 brigades were added to the composition of the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 160 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 320-1000 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 400-800 km. The following front operations were conducted in the framework of the Northern Caucasus strategic defensive operation: the defensive operation in the Stavropol and Krasnodar sectors, the Armavir-Maykop, Novorossiysk, Mozdok-Malgobek, Tuapse, and Nal'chik-Ordzhonikidze defensive operations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Southern Front (25 July - 28 July 1942) | 26 rifle div<br>1 cav div<br>8 rifle brig<br>1 tank corps<br>5 tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 300,000 | 15,317 | 1412 | 16,729 | 4182 |
| Northern Caucasus Front (28 July - 31 August 1942, reformed into the Black Sea Group of Forces) | 2 rifle div<br>4 cav div<br>3 rifle brig<br>1 fortified area | 216,100 | 35,245 | 8748 | 43,993 | 1257 |
| Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasus Front (10 August - 31 August 1942) | — | — | 7324 | 5132 | 12,456 | 566 |
| Transcaucasus Front (Northern and Black Sea Groups of Forces, 46th Army) (1 September - 31 December 1942) | — | — | 132,020 | 163,723 | 295,743 | 2424 |
| Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla (27 July - 31 December 1942) | — | 87,100 | 2885 | 2105 | 4990 | 31 |
| Total ............. | 33 divisions<br>1 tank corps<br>16 brigades<br>3 fortified regions | 603,200 | 192,791 | 181,120 | 373,911 | 2337 |

**The results of the operation.** Under the attack of superior enemy forces, Soviet troops were forced to abandon regions of the Northern Caucasus and to withdraw to the passes of the Main Caucasus ridge and the Terek River. In November-December 1942 the advance by enemy troops was stopped. The plans by the German-fascist command to seize the oil regions of the Caucasus and to bring Turkey into the war did not bring the expected results.

# THE STALINGRAD STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

19 November 1942 - 2 February 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the South-Western, Don, and Stalingrad Fronts with the cooperation of forces from the Volga Flotilla. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Guards, 5th Shock, and 6th Armies, five tank and three mechanized corps, and six brigades were added to the composition of the Soviet troops.

The length of the operation was 76 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 850 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 150-200 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was: 1.5-2.5 km for rifle formations, and 4-4.5 km for tank and mechanized formations.

The following front operations were conducted within the framework of the Stalingrad strategic operation: the November offensive operation to encircle the Stalingrad enemy grouping ("Uranus"), the Kotel'nikovo, Middle Don ("Little Saturn") operations, and also the operation to eliminate the encircled enemy troops in Stalingrad ("Ring").

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| South-Western Front (19 November - 31 December 1942) | 18 rifle div<br>6 cav div<br>2 rifle brig<br>1 mech corps<br>3 tank corps<br>1 tank brig | 398,100 | 64,649 | 148,043 | 212,692 | 4946 |
| Don Front (19 November 1942 - 2 February 1943) | 24 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>6 tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 307,500 | 46,365 | 123,560 | 169,925 | 2236 |
| Stalingrad Front (19 November - 31 December 1942) | 24 rifle div<br>2 cav div<br>17 rifle brig<br>1 mech corps<br>1 tank corps<br>8 tank brig<br>7 fortified areas | 429,200 | 43,552 | 58,078 | 101,630 | 2363 |
| 6th Army and 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front (16 December - 18 December 1942) | — | — | 304 | 1184 | 1148 | 496 |
| Volga Flotilla (19 November 1942 - 2 February 1943) | — | 8700 | 15 | 27 | 52 | 0.5 |
| Total ............. | 7 corps<br>74 divisions<br>34 brigades<br>9 fortified areas | 1,143,500 | 154,885 | 330,892 | 485,777 | 6392 |

**Results of the operation.** In the course of combat operations Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed the main forces of the 4th and 6th German field armies, and routed the 3rd and

4th Rumanian and 8th Italian armies. The enemy losses numbered over 800,000 men, 32 of his divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, and 16 enemy divisions suffered heavy losses. Just in the course of the elimination of the encircled grouping from 10 January through 2 February 1943 over 91,000 men were taken prisoner, including 2500 officers and 24 generals. The victory at Stalingrad marked the start of the fundamental break in the war and had a decisive influence on the subsequent course of the whole war. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative and held it until the end of the war.

## THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION "DON"

1 January - 4 February 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the Transcaucasus, Southern, and Northern Caucasus Fronts with the cooperation of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the 5th Shock Army, five divisions and six brigades were added. The Rostov, Mozdok-Stavropol, Novorossiysk-Maykop, and Tikhoretsk front operations were conducted within the framework of the Northern Caucasus strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 35 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 840 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 300-600 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 9-17 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Southern Front (1 January - 4 February 1943) | 13 rifle div<br>2 cav div<br>7 rifle brig<br>3 fortified areas<br>3 mech corps<br>2 tank corps<br>3 tank brig | 393,800 | 54,353 | 47,364 | 101,717 | 2906 |
| Transcaucasus Front (1 January - 4 February 1943) | 37 rifle div<br>7 cav div<br>35 rifle brig<br>2 fortified areas<br>8 tank brig | 685,600 | 12,088 | 30,430 | 42,428 | 1212 |
| Northern Caucasus Front (24 January - 4 February 1943) | — | — | 2970 | 6986 | 9956 | 830 |
| Black Sea Fleet (1 January - 4 February 1943) | — | 65,900 | 216 | 222 | 438 | 13 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 59 divisions<br>5 tank&mech corps<br>53 brigades<br>5 fortified areas | 1,145,300 | 69,627 | 84,912 | 154,539 | 4415 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of the offensive that unfolded Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the enemy army group "A" and moved to the approaches to Rostov northeast of Krasnodar and to the Kuban' River line. Although the operation plan was not completely carried out and the main enemy forces were able to retreat to the Donbass, having

avoided a complete destruction, the German command's plans to take the Caucasus and its oil regions suffered a crash. The Red Army liberated the Stavropol region, the Chechen-Ingushsk, The North Ossetian ASSR, and part of the Rostov oblast and Krasnodar regions from their occupiers.

## THE OPERATION TO BREAK THE BLOCKADE OF LENINGRAD ("ISKRA")

12-30 January 1943

The strategic offensive operation to break the blockade of Leningrad was conducted by forces of assault groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts with the cooperation of part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and the long range aviation.

The length of the operation was 19 days.The width of the front for combat operations was 45 km. The depth of the advance by Soviet troops was 60 km. The average daily speed for the offensive was 3-3.5 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Leningrad Front (entire period) | 6 rifle div<br>7 rifle brig<br>3 tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 133,300 | 12,320 | 28,944 | 41,264 | 2172 |
| Breakdown:<br>67th Army | 6 rifle div<br>7 rifle brig<br>3 tank brig<br>1 fortified region | 130,780 | 12,268 | 28,726 | 40,994 | 2158 |
| 13th Air Army (air crews) | — | 2520 | 52 | 218 | 270 | 14 |
| Volkhov Front (Entire period) | 15 rifle div<br>7 rifle brig<br>4 tank brig | 169,500 | 21,620 | 52,198 | 73,818 | 3885 |
| Breakdown:<br>2nd Shock Army | 11 rifle div<br>4 rifle brig<br>4 tank brig | 114,000 | 19,017 | 46,301 | 65,318 | 3438 |
| 8th Army | 4 rifle div<br>3 rifle brig | 52,500 | 2593 | 5871 | 8464 | 445 |
| 14th Air Army (air crews) | — | 3000 | 10 | 26 | 36 | 2 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 21 divisions<br>21 brigades<br>1 fortified area | 302,800 | 33,940 | 81,142 | 115,082 | 6057 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of the offensive troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts broke the enemy blockade of Leningrad, having created a corridor with a width of 8-11 km which made it possible to restore land communications between the city and the rest of the country. The enemy was cleared from the entire southern shore of Lake Ladoga. In spite of the fact that the subsequent offensive of the Soviet troops did not receive development, the operation to lift the blockade had an important strategic importance and was a turning point in

the battle for Leningrad. The enemy's plan to starve out the defenders and inhabitants of the city was thwarted. The initiative in waging combat operations in this sector moved to the Red Army.

## THE VORONEZH-KHAR'KOV STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

13 January - 3 March 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the Voronezh Front, the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front and the 6th Army of the South-Western Front. In the course of the combat operations the headquarters of the 69th and 64th Armies, a tank and cavalry corps, nine divisions and five brigades were added. The Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh', the Voronezh-Kastornye and the Khar'kov front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Voronezh-Khar'kov strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 50 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 250-400 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 360-520 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 7-10 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Bryansk Front, 13th Army (13 January - 3 March 1943) | 7 rifle div<br>1 anti-tank gun<br>partisan div<br>2 tank brig | 95,000 | 13,876 | 23,547 | 37,423 | 748 |
| Voronezh Front (13 January - 3 March 1943) | 20 rifle div<br>1 anti-tank gun<br>partisan div<br>2 cavalry div<br>10 rifle brig<br>2 tank corps<br>10 indep.tank brig | 347,200 | 33,331 | 62,384 | 95,715 | 1914 |
| South-Western Front, 6th Army (13 January - 3 March 1943) | 5 rifle div<br>1 rifle brig<br>2 tank brig | 60,200 | 8268 | 12,155 | 20,423 | 408 |
| Total .......... | 36 divisions<br>2 tank corps<br>25 brigades | 502,400 | 55,475 | 98,086 | 153,561 | 3071 |

**The results of the operation**. In the course of the offensive that was undertaken the Soviet troops inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy army group "B". The 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies that were a part of it were almost completely destroyed. A significant territory, major industrial and administrative centers of Voronezh, Kursk, Belgorod, Khar'kov and others were liberated from their occupiers. At the start of March the attacking forces exhausted their capabilities and, not having been able to perform all of the tasks that were assigned, moved to the defensive.

## THE KHAR'KOV DEFENSIVE OPERATION

4-25 March 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the left wing of the Voronezh Front and the 6th Army of the South-Western Front. In the course of the operation the headquarters of the 21st army, six divisions and one tank corps were added.

The length of the operation was 22 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 200-240 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 100-150 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Voronezh Front (entire period), left wing: 3rd Tank, 40th and 69th Armies | 8 rifle div<br>1 antitank gun partisan div<br>2 cavalry div<br>4 rifle brig<br>1 tank corps<br>5 indep.tank brig | 281,800 | 29,807 | 28,437 | 58,244 | 2647 |
| 6th Army of the South-Western Front (entire period) | 5 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>1 rifle brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 64,100 | 15,412 | 12,813 | 28,225 | 1283 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19 divisions<br>11 brigades<br>1 tank corps | 345,900 | 45,219 | 41,250 | 86,469 | 3930 |

**The results of the operation**. Under attacks by superior enemy forces the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh Front and the 6th Army of the South-Western Front were forced to abandon Khar'kov and to withdraw to the line consisting of Krasnopol'ye to Berezov to Belgorod to The Northern Donets River. However, the German command was not able to carry out its plan to surround and destroy the Soviet troops in the Khar'kov region and to take the strategic initiative.

## THE KURSK DEFENSIVE OPERATION
5-23 July 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the Central, Voronezh, and Steppe Fronts. In the course of the combat operations the headquarters of the Steppe Front, the headquarters of the 27th, 47th and 53 Combined Arms, the 5th Guards Tank and the 5th Air Armies, five tank and one mechanized corps, 19 divisions and one brigade were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 19 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 550 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was 12-35 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Central Front (5 July - 11 July 1943) | 41 rifle div<br>1 anti-tank gun<br>partisan div<br>5 rifle brig<br>4 tank corps<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>3 fortified areas | 738,000 | 15,336 | 18,561 | 33,897 | 4842 |
| Voronezh Front (entire period) | 35 rifle div<br>1 mech corps<br>4 tank corps<br>6 indep.tank brig | 534,700 | 27,542 | 46,350 | 73,892 | 3889 |
| Steppe Front (9 July - 23 July 1943) | — | - | 27,452 | 42,606 | 70,058 | 4670 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 77 divisions<br>1 mech corps<br>8 tank corps<br>14 brigades<br>3 fortified areas | 1,272,700 | 70,330 | 107,517 | 177,847 | 9360 |

**The results of the operation**. In terms of its scope and intensity the Kursk defensive operation, the first stage of the battle of Kursk, is one of the largest battles of the second world war. In the course of the defensive battles the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts bled white and then stopped the offensive by strike groupings of the German-fascist armies and created favorable conditions for the switching to the counteroffensive in the Orel and Belgorod-Khar'kov sectors. Hitler's plan to defeat the Soviet troops in the Kursk salient suffered a major defeat.

## THE OREL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION ("KUTUZOV")
12 July - 18 August 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts and part of the forces of the Western Front. In the course of the offensive the headquarters of the 11th Combined Arms, 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies, five tank corps, one mechanized corps, one cavalry corps and 11 divisions were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 38 days. The width of the front for the combat operations was 400 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 150 km. The average daily speeds of the offensive were 4-5 km for rifle formations and 7-10 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Western Front (left wing): | 19 rifle div<br>2 tank corps<br>5 indep.tank brig | 233,300 | 25,585 | 76,856 | 102,441 | 4241 |
| 11th Guards Army (12 July 30 July 1943) | 12 rifle div<br>2 tank corps<br>4 indep.tank brig | 170,500 | 12,768 | 38,513 | 51,281 | 2699 |
| 50th Army (12 July - 18 August 1943) | 7 rifle div<br>1 indep.tank brig | 62,800 | 5395 | 17,767 | 23,162 | 609 |
| 11th Army (20 July - 18 August 1943) | — | — | 4979 | 15,580 | 20,559 | 685 |
| 4th Tank army (20 July - 18 August 1943) | — | — | 2443 | 4996 | 7439 | 248 |
| Bryansk Front (entire period) | 21 rifle div<br>1 rifle brig<br>2 tank corps<br>1 indep.tank brig | 409,000 | 39,173 | 123,234 | 162,407 | 4274 |
| Central Front (entire period) | 41 rifle div<br>1 anti-tank gun partisan div<br>3 rifle brig<br>4 tank corps<br>2 indep. tank brig<br>3 fortified areas | 645,300 | 47,771 | 117,271 | 165,042 | 4343 |
| Total ............. | 82 divisions<br>8 tank corps<br>14 brigades<br>3 fortified areas | 1,287,600 | 112,589 | 317,361 | 429,890 | 11,313 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of the offensive that was begun the Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the German "Center" army group, and freed significant territory, including the oblast center of Orel, from the occupiers. With the elimination of the Orel enemy staging area, from which it began the offensive on Kursk, the situation in the central part of the Soviet-German front changed dramatically and broad opportunities opened up for the development of an offensive in the Bryansk sector and the movement of Soviet troops to the eastern regions of Belorussia.

# THE BELGOROD-KHAR'KOV STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION ("RUMYANTSEV)

3-23 August 1943

The concluding operation of the battle of Kursk was conducted by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. In the course of the offensive the headquarters of the 4th Guards, 47th and 57th Armies, a tank and a mechanized corps, 19 divisions and two brigades were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 21 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 300-400 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 140 km. The average daily speeds for the offensive were 7 km for rifle formations, and 10-15 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Voronezh Front (entire period) | 28 rifle div<br>8 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>2 indep.tank brig | 739,400 | 48,339 | 108,954 | 157,293 | 7490 |
| Steppe Front (entire period) | 22 rifle div<br>1 mech corps<br>3 indep.tank brig | 404,600 | 23,272 | 75,001 | 98,273 | 4680 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 50 divisions<br>11 tank&mech corps<br>5 brigades | 1,144,000 | 71,611 | 183,955 | 255,566 | 12,170 |

**The results of the operation**. In the course of the offensive troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts routed the powerful Belgorod-Khar'kov enemy grouping, and liberated the Khar'kov industrial region and the cities of Belgorod and Khar'kov. Favorable conditions were created to liberate the Left Bank of the Ukraine.

# THE SMOLENSK STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION ("SUVOROV")

7 August - 2 October 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts. In the course of the combat operations the 2nd Guards Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and two divisions were added to the forces. The Spas-Demensk, Yel'nya-Dorogobuzh, Dukhovshchina-Demidov and the Smolensk-Roslavl' front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Smolensk strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 57 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 400 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 200-250 km. The average daily speeds of the offensive were 4-5 km for rifle formations and 6-10 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Kalinin Front (entire period) | 26 rifle div<br>10 rifle brig<br>4 indep.tank brig<br>3 fortified areas | 428,400 | 28,106 | 90,172 | 118,278 | 2075 |
| Western Front (entire period) | 58 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>2 rifle brig<br>1 mech corps<br>10 indep.tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 824,200 | 79,539 | 253,649 | 333,188 | 5845 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 87 divisions<br>1 corps<br>26 brigades<br>5 fortified areas | 1,252,600 | 107,645 | 343,821 | 451,466 | 7920 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of the full scale offensive the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts liberated Smolensk and part of the Kalinin oblast with the cities of Yel'nya, Dukhovshchina, Roslavl', and Smolensk and moved to the borders of Belorussia. The rapid advance of Soviet troops guaranteed the smashing of the Eastern fork in the upper flow of the Dnepr and created a threat to the northern flank of army group "Center". The German command was forced to transfer additional forces from the Orel-Bryansk sector, which supported the successful advance by Soviet troops at Kursk.

## THE DONBASS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

13 August - 22 September 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts. In the course of the combat operations the 11th Tank, 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and four divisions were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 41 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 450 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 250-300 km, and the average daily speeds of the offensive were 7-8 km for rifle formations and 10-15 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| South-Western Front (entire period) | 41 rifle div<br>1 rifle brig<br>3 cavalry div<br>1 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>1 motor rifle brig<br>4 indep.tank brig | 565,200 | 40,275 | 117,074 | 157,349 | 3838 |
| Southern Front (entire period) | 30 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>1 rifle brig<br>2 mech corps<br>4 indep.tank brig<br>3 fortified areas | 446,700 | 25,891 | 90,282 | 116,173 | 2833 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 77 divisions<br>4 tank&mech corps<br>11 brigades<br>3 fortified areas | 1,011,900 | 66,166 | 207,356 | 273,522 | 6671 |

**The results of the operation.** In the course of the offensive battles the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts liberated the Donbass, moved into the Zaporozh'ye region and to the Molochnaya River, and seized a beachhead on the right shore of the Dnepr. An important economic region was returned to the country. The advance by Soviet troops to the Dnepr and the Molochnaya River created favorable conditions for a successful offensive in the southern regions of the Right Bank Ukraine and in Northern Tavriya.

## THE CHERNIGOV-POLTAVA STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

26 August - 30 September 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the Central, Voronezh, and Steppe Fronts and was the first stage of the battle for the Dnepr. In the course of combat operations a major regrouping of forces was conducted in the fronts. Only the headquarters of the 37, 46th and 61st Armies, the headquarters of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, one mechanized and two cavalry corps, 14 divisions and 15 brigades were added to the forces. Simultaneously one combined arms and two tank armies were removed. The Chernigov-Pripyat', Sumy-Priluki, and Poltava front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Chernigov-Poltava strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 36 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 600 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 250-300 km. The average daily speeds of the offensive were 7-8 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | Personnel losses in operation, men |
|---|---|---|

| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central Front (entire period) | 35 rifle div<br>3 airborne div<br>1 anti-tank gun partisan div<br>3 rifle brig<br>3 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>3 indep tank brig | 579,600 | 33,523 | 107,878 | 141,401 | 3928 |
| Voronezh Front (entire period) | 42 rifle div<br>5 airborne div<br>7 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig | 665,500 | 46,293 | 131,211 | 177,504 | 4930 |
| Steppe Front (entire period) | 30 rifle div<br>2 tank corps<br>5 mech corps<br>5 indep.tank brig | 336,200 | 23,141 | 85,906 | 109,407 | 3029 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 116 divisions<br>17 corps<br>12 brigades | 1,581,300 | 102,957 | 324,995 | 427,952 | 11,887 |

**The results of the operation**. The offensive by the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts after the breaking through of the enemy defense grew into a pursuit during which our troops moved to the Dnepr and seized beachheads on its right bank. Significant territories of the Left Bank Ukraine and a number of major cities, including the oblast centers of Sumy, Chernigov, and Poltava were liberated. The German command's plans for a lengthy defense of the Left Bank Ukraine were thwarted. Conditions were prepared for the liberation of the Right Bank Ukraine.

## THE NOVOROSSIYSK-TAMAN' STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

10 September - 9 October 1943

The concluding stage of the battle for the Caucasus. It was conducted by troops of the Northern Caucasus Front and forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. The Novorossiysk assault landing operation was carried out within the framework of the Novorossiysk-Taman' strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 30 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 80 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 150 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 5-6 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Northern Caucasus Front (entire period) | 20 rifle div<br>5 rifle brig<br>2 tank brig | 248,700 | 13,912 | 50,323 | 64,235 | 2141 |
| Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla (entire period) | — | 68,700 | 652 | 623 | 1275 | 43 |
| Total ............. | 20 divisions<br>7 brigades | 317,400 | 14,564 | 50,946 | 65,510 | 2184 |

**The results of the operation.** The troops of the Northern Caucasus Front and forces from the Black Sea Fleet inflicted a defeat on enemy formations of army group "A", with an attack from the sea and land liberated Novorossiysk, moved to the coast of the Kerch Straights, and completed the liberation of the Caucasus. The enemy beachhead,which supported his defense of the Crimea was eliminated. The removing of enemy troops from Novorossiysk and the Taman' peninsula significantly improved the basing for the Black Sea Fleet and created favorable opportunities for attacks on the enemy Crimean grouping from the sea and through the Kerch Straights.

## THE LOWER DNEPR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

26 September - 20 December 1943

The concluding operation of the battle for the Dnepr was conducted by troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), South-Western (3rd Ukrainian), and Southern (4th Ukrainian) Fronts. The Melitopol', Zaporozh'ye, Pyatikhatki, Dnepropetrovsk and Znamenka front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Lower Dnepr strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 86 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 750-800 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 100-300 km. The average daily speeds of the offensive were 2-4 km for rifle formations and 5-10 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Steppe (2nd Ukrainian) Front (entire period) | 38 rifle div<br>4 airborne brig<br>1 mech corps<br>5 indep.tank brig | 463,500 | 77,400 | 226,217 | 303,617 | 3530 |
| South-Western (3rd Ukrainian) Front (entire period) | 29 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>1 motor rifle brig<br>2 indep.tank brig | 461,600 | 34,821 | 132,248 | 167,069 | 1943 |
| Southern (4th Ukrainian) Front (entire period) | 35 rifle div<br>6 cavalry div<br>4 rifle brig<br>3 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>5 indep.tank brig<br>3 fortified areas | 581,300 | 60,980 | 222,726 | 283,706 | 3299 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 112 divisions<br>8 corps<br>17 brigades<br>3 fortified areas | 1,506,400 | 173,201 | 581,191 | 754,392 | 8772 |

**The results of the operation.** The troops of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts completed the liberation of the Left Bank of the Ukraine in the lower part of the Dnepr, blocked the Crimean enemy grouping of forces by land, and seized a beachhead on the western shore of the Dnepr up to 400 km along the front and up to 100 km in depth, which then played a big role in the liberation of the Right Bank of the Ukraine.

## THE KIEV STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

3-13 November 1943

The operation was conducted by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front for the purpose of destroying the Kiev grouping of enemy forces and liberating the capital of Ukraine.

The length of the operation was 11 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 320-250 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 150 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 12-14 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 1st Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 42 rifle div<br>3 airborne div<br>3 cavalry div<br>2 rifle brig<br>5 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>4 indep.tank brig | 671,000 | 6491 | 24,078 | 30,569 | 2779 |

**The results of the operation**. The troops of the front during a rapid offensive liberated the capital of Ukraine, the city of Kiev, and formed a strategic beachhead on the right bank of the Dnepr with a front of over 300 km and a depth of 150 km, which played an important role during the conduct of later operations to liberate the Right Bank of the Ukraine.

## THE DNEPR-CARPATHIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION (LIBERATION OF THE RIGHT BANK OF THE UKRAINE)

24 December 1943 - 17 April 1944

One of the largest operations of the second world war was the system of ten front operations that were mutually connected in terms of time and direction of the attacks. It was conducted by troops of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. Troops from the 2nd Belorussian Front took part in the concluding stage.

In the course of the offensive operations the composition of the Soviet forces was supplemented by: the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front, headquarters of the 47th, 61st, and 70th Armies, the 2nd, 4th and 6th Tank Armies, the 6th Air Army, six tank corps, two mechanized corps and 33 divisions.

The length of the operation was 116 days. The width front for combat operations was 1300-1400 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 250-450 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 2-4 km.

The Zhitomir-Berdichev, Kirovograd, Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy, Rovno-Lutsk, Nikopol'-Krivoroy Rog, Proskurov-Chernovitsy, Uman'-Botoshani, Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka, Polessk and Odessa front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Dnepr-Carpathian operation.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 1st Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 62 rifle div<br>1 airborne div<br>3 cavalry div<br>6 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>5 indep.tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 924,300 | 124,467 | 331,902 | 456,369 | 3934 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 52 rifle div<br>7 airborne div<br>3 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>4 mech corps<br>3 indep.tank brig | 594,700 | 66,059 | 200,914 | 266,973 | 2301 |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 19 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>1 indep.tank brig | 336,900 | 54,997 | 214,238 | 269,235 | 2321 |
| 4th Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 38 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>1 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>1 ind mot rif brig<br>3 fortified areas | 550,200 | 21,914 | 83,905 | 105,819 | 912 |
| 2nd Belorussian Front (15 March - 5 April 1944) | — | — | 2761 | 8371 | 11,132 | 506 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 188 divisions<br>19 corps<br>13 brigades<br>5 fortified areas | 2,406,100 | 270,198 | 839,330 | 1,109,258 | 9565 |

**The results of the operation**. The destruction of the entire southern wing of fascist Germany's eastern front was completed, which fundamentally changed the situation in other theaters of military operations. The German command was forced to transfer large forces to the Right Bank of the Ukraine from the west (34 divisions and 4 brigades), which weakened the grouping of their forces in Europe. Soviet troops liberated an enormous territory of the Right Bank of the Ukraine, moved to the approaches to Southern Poland and Czechoslovakia, and on 28 March, having made a forced crossing of the Prut River, moved into Rumania. For the first time in the war years the combat operations were transferred beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

# THE LENINGRAD-NOVGOROD STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE OPERATION

14 January - 1 March 1944

The operation was conducted by troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov, and part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic Fronts. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the 3rd Shock, 10th Guards, and 22nd Armies, 30 divisions, and six brigades were added to the forces. The Krasnoye Selo-Ropsha, Novgorod-Luga, Kingisepp-Gdov and Starorussk-Novorzhev front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic operation.

The length of the operation was 48 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 600 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 220-280 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 5-6 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Leningrad Front (entire period except for 23rd Army) | 30 rifle div<br>3 rifle brig<br>3 fortified areas<br>4 indep.tank brig | 417,600 | 56,654 | 170,876 | 227,440 | 4738 |
| Volkhov Front (14 January - 15 February 1944) | 22 rifle div<br>6 rifle brig<br>2 fortified areas<br>4 indep.tank brig | 260,000 | 12,011 | 38,289 | 50,300 | 1524 |
| 1st Shock Army of 2nd Baltic Front (14 January - 10 February 1944) | 5 rifle div<br>1 rifle brig | 54,900 | 1283 | 3759 | 5042 | 180 |
| 2nd Baltic Front (10 February - 1 March 1944) | — | — | 6559 | 23,051 | 29,710 | 1485 |
| Baltic Fleet (entire period) | — | 89,600 | 169 | 1292 | 1461 | 30 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 57 divisions<br>18 brigades<br>5 fortified arcs | 822,100 | 76,686 | 237,267 | 313,953 | 6541 |

**Results of the operation.** In the course of offensive battles Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the German army group "Center", completely lifted the blockade of Leningrad, liberated almost all of the Leningrad and Novgorod oblasts as well as the main part of the Kalinin oblast, and entered into the territory of Estonia. The offensive by the Soviet troops in the northwest direction deprived the German command of the opportunity of transferring forces of army group "North" to the south where our Armed Forces carried out the main attack in the winter campaign.

## THE CRIMEAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

8 April - 12 May 1944

The operation was conducted by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Independent Primorskaya Army, forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla.

The length of the operation was 35 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 160 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 200-260 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 20 km before the movement to Sevastapol, and 3-5 km during the breakthrough of the defenses around Sevastapol.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 4th Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 18 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 278,400 | 13,332 | 50,498 | 63,830 | 1824 |
| Independent Primorskaya Army and 4th Air Army (entire period) | 12 rifle div<br>2 rifle brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 143,500 | 4196 | 16,305 | 20,501 | 586 |
| Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla (entire period) | — | 40,500 | 262 | 262 | 488 | 14 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 30 divisions<br>1 corps<br>5 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 462,400 | 17,754 | 67,065 | 84,819 | 2423 |

**The results of the operation.** Soviet troops broke through the deeply echelonned enemy defense on the Perekopsk isthmus, the Kerch peninsula, and in the Sevastapol region and destroyed his 17th field army. The last major enemy beachhead which threatened the rear of the fronts that were active on the Right Bank of the Ukraine was eliminated. The Black Sea Fleet received its main base, Sevastapol, which significantly improved its basing conditions and its conducting of combat operations.

## THE VYBORG-PETROZAVODSK STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

10 June - 9 August 1944

The concluding operation of the battle for Leningrad was conducted by troops of the right wing of the Leningrad and left wing of the Karelia Fronts with the cooperation of forces from the Baltic Fleet, as well as the Ladoga and Onega Flotillas.

The length of the operation was 61 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 280 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 110-250 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 2-5 km. The Vyborg and Svir'-Petrozavodsk front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk strategic operation.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Karelian Front - left wing (7th and 32 Armies, 7th Air Army) (21 June - 9 August 1944) | 16 rifle div<br>3 rifle brig<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 202,300 | 16,924 | 46,679 | 63,603 | 1272 |
| Leningrad Front - right wing (21st and 23rd Armies and 13th Air Army) (10-20 June 1944) | 15 rifle div<br>2 fortified areas<br>1 indep.tank brig | 188,800 | 6018 | 24,011 | 30,029 | 2730 |
| Baltic Fleet, Ladoga and Onega Flotillas (entire period) | — | 60,400 | 732 | 2011 | 2743 | 45 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 31 divisions<br>6 brigades<br>4 fortified areas | 451,500 | 23,674 | 72,701 | 96,375 | 1580 |

**The results of the operation.** Soviet troops liberated the territory of the Karelian-Finnish ASSR and northern regions of the Leningrad oblast, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Finnish Army. Successful actions in this operation significantly changed the situation in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front, predetermined the withdrawal of Finland from the war, and created conditions for the liberation of the Soviet Arctic and northern regions of Norway.

## THE BELORUSSIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

23 June - 29 August 1944

One of the largest strategic operations of the second world war was conducted by troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts with the participation of forces from the Dnepr Flotilla. The 1st Army of the Polish Forces operated as part of the 1st Belorussian Front. In the course of the operation the headquarters of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies, the 19th Tank Corps and 24 divisions were added to the forces. In terms of the nature of the combat operations and content of the missions that were carried out, the Belorussian strategic operation is divided into two stages. In the first stage (23 June - 4 July 1944) the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruysk, Polotsk and Minsk front offensive operations were conducted, and in the second stage (5 July - 29 August 1944) the Shyaulyay, Vilnius, Kaunas, Belostok and Lyublin-Brest front offensive operations were conducted.

The length of the operation was 68 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 1100 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 550-600 km. The average daily speeds for the offensive were 20-25 km in the first stage and 13-14 km in the second.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Baltic Front (entire period) | 24 rifle div<br>1 rifle brig<br>1 tank corps<br>4 indep.tank brig<br>1 mech brig<br>1 fortified area | 359,500 | 41,248 | 125,053 | 166,301 | 2446 |
| 3rd Belorussian Front (entire period) | 33 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>5 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 579,300 | 45,117 | 155,165 | 200,282 | 2945 |
| 2nd Belorussian Front (entire period) | 22 rifle div<br>4 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 319,500 | 26,315 | 91,421 | 117,736 | 1731 |
| 1st Belorussian Front (entire period) | 77 rifle div<br>9 cavalry div<br>1 rifle brig<br>6 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>2 self-propelled artillery brig<br>4 fortified areas | 1,071,100 | 65,779 | 215,615 | 281,394 | 4138 |
| Dnepr Flotilla (entire period) | — | 2300 | 48 | 54 | 102 | 2 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 168 divisions<br>12 corps<br>20 brigades<br>7 fortified areas | 2,331,700 | 178,507 | 587,308 | 765,815 | 11,262 |
| 1st Army of Polish Forces | 4 infantry div<br>1 cavalry brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 79,900 | 1533 | 3540 | 5073 | 75 |

**Results of the operation.** The troops of the attacking fronts routed one of the strongest enemy groupings - army group "Center", 17 of its divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, and 50 divisions lost over half of their personnel. The Belorussian SSR, and part of the Latvian and Lithuanian SSR were liberated. The Red Army entered the territory of Poland and advanced to the borders of Eastern Prussia. In the course of the operation major water obstacles of the Berezina, Neman, and Vistula were forced, and important beachheads on their western banks were seized for the purpose of ensuring conditions for making attacks deep into Eastern Prussia and the central regions of Poland. In order to stabilize the front line the German command was forced to transfer 46 divisions and four brigades to Belorussia from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and the west. This made the conducting of combat operations in France significantly easier for the Anglo-American forces.

## THE L'VOV-SANDOMIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

13 July - 29 August 1944

The operation was conducted by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In terms of the nature of the carrying out of the combat missions and the course of the combat operations the L'vov-Sandomir operation is divided into two stages. In the first stage (13-17 July) the troops of the front broke through the enemy defense, surrounded and then destroyed the Brody enemy grouping, routed the L'vov and Rava-Russkaya enemy groupings, and liberated L'vov, Rava-

Russkaya, Peremyshl', Stanislav and other places. In the second stage (28 July - 29 August) the troops of the front, developing the offensive, forced the Vistula River, and seized a beachhead on its western shore in the region of Sandomir.

The length of the operation was 48 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 440 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 350 km.

The average daily speeds of the offensive were 3-10 km during the breakthrough of the enemy defense, and then 17-22 km up to the Vistula River for rifle formations and 50-65 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 1st Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 72 rifle div<br>6 cavalry div<br>2 airborne div<br>7 tank corps<br>3 mech corps<br>4 indep.tank brig | 1,002,200 | 65,001 | 224,295 | 289,296 | 6027 |

**The results of the operation.** Soviet troops routed an enemy strategic grouping - army group "North Ukraine", and liberated western areas of Ukraine and southeastern regions of Poland. A major beachhead was seized on the western shore of the Vistula from which an offensive was subsequently developed in the direction of Silesia, in the central regions of Poland and towards the border of fascist Germany.

## THE IASI-KISHINEV STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

20-29 August 1944

It was conducted by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts with the cooperation of forces from the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Flotilla. The 4th Guards Cavalry Corps (3 cavalry divisions) and two rifle brigades were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 10 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 500 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 300-320 km. The average speeds of the offensive were: 20-25 km for rifle formations, and 30-32 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 46 rifle div<br>7 airborne div<br>3 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 self-propelled artillery brig<br>2 fortified areas | 771,200 | 7316 | 32,669 | 39,985 | 3998 |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 34 rifle div<br>1 airborne div<br>1 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 ind mot rif brig<br>1 fortified area | 523,000 | 5820 | 21,126 | 26,946 | 2695 |
| Black Sea Fleet and Danube Flotilla (entire period) | — | 20,000 | 61 | 138 | 199 | 20 |
| Total ............. | 91 rifle div<br>6 corps<br>4 brigades<br>3 fortified areas | 1,314,200 | 13,197 | 53,933 | 67,130 | 6713 |

**The results of the operation.** The Soviet troops in a short time routed the main forces of army group "South Ukraine" and destroyed 22 German as well as almost all of the Rumanian divisions that were located on the Soviet-German front. Moldavia was liberated, and Romania was removed from the fascist block and declared war on Germany. The breakthrough of the enemy defense on a broad front opened up to Soviet forces the opportunity for a swift offensive deep into Romania, to the borders of Hungary and Bulgaria.

## THE EASTERN CARPATHIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

8 September - 28 October 1944

The operation was conducted by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front for the purpose of giving assistance to the Slovak national uprising. The 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps took part in the operation. In the course of the combat operations the 4th Guards and 31st Tank Corps as well as five divisions were added to the forces. The Carpathian-Duklya and Carpathian-Uzhgorod front offensive operations were conducted within the framework of the Eastern Carpathian operation.

The length of the operation was 51 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 400 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 50-110 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 102 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Ukrainian Front (38th Army, 2nd Air Army, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, 25th Tank Corps) (entire period) | 9 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>1 tank corps | 99,100 | 13,264 | 48,750 | 62,014 | 1216 |
| 4th Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 20 rifle div<br>1 airborne div<br>2 indep.tank brig | 264,000 | 13,579 | 50,618 | 64,197 | 1259 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 33 divisions<br>1 corps<br>2 brigades | 363,100 | 26,843 | 99,368 | 126,211 | 2475 |
| 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps (entire period) | 2 inf brig<br>1 airborne brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 14,900 | 1630 | 4069 | 5699 | 112 |

**The results of the operation.** Soviet troops inflicted a defeat on the enemy army group "Heinritsy", liberated Carpathian Ukraine, and, having crossed the Main Carpathian ridge, entered into the territory of Czechoslovakia. Having drawn out major enemy forces to themselves, the Soviet troops helped the Slovak national uprising. German forces were deprived of an important strategic line which covered Czechoslovakia from the east.

## THE BALTIC STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

14 September - 24 November 1944

The operation was conducted by forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts and part of the forces of the Leningrad Front with the cooperation of the Baltic Fleet. The Riga, Tallin, and Memel' front offensive operations and the Muhun Zund assault landing operation were conducted within the framework of the Baltic strategic operation. In the course of the operation the headquarters of the 39th Army, six divisions and one brigade were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 72 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 1000 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 300 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 4-5 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Leningrad Front (2nd Shock and 8th Armies, 13th Air Army) (entire period) | 16 rifle div<br>3 fortified areas | 195,000 | 6219 | 22,557 | 28,776 | 400 |
| 3rd Baltic Front (14 September - 10 October 1944) | 35 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>2 fortified areas | 345,500 | 11,867 | 43,621 | 55,488 | 2055 |
| 2nd Baltic Front (14 September - 20 October 1944) | 33 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 339,400 | 15,735 | 58,000 | 73,735 | 1993 |
| 1st Baltic Front (14 September - 20 October 1944) | 51 rifle div<br>4 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>6 indep.tank brig | 621,000 | 24,188 | 79,758 | 103,496 | 2809 |
| 39th Army of 3rd Belorussian Front (1 October - 31 October 1944) | — | — | 3201 | 13,154 | 16,355 | 528 |
| Baltic Fleet (entire period) | — | 45,500 | 258 | 1532 | 1790 | 25 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 135 divisions<br>7 corps<br>11 brigades<br>6 fortified areas | 1,546,400 | 61,468 | 218,622 | 280,090 | 3890 |

**The results of the operation**. Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the German army group "North", its remaining formations found themselves pressed to the sea in Kurlandia, in the region of Memel' (Klaipeda), and cutoff from Eastern Prussia by land. The liberation of the Baltic states was almost totally complete, and favorable conditions were created for developing an offensive in Eastern Prussia.

## THE BELGRADE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

28 September - 20 October 1944

The operation was conducted by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian and part of the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Fronts together with formations from the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and forces of the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria. The Danube Flotilla participated in the operation.

The length of the operation was 23 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 400-620 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 200 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 8-9 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front (57th Army, 17th Air Army, 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, 236th Rifle Division, 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 96th Independent Tank Brigade)(entire period) | 10 rifle div<br>3 rifle brig<br>1 fortified area<br>1 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig | 200,000 | 3242 | 9498 | 12,740 | 554 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (46th Army, 5th Air Army)(entire period) | 9 rifle div | 93,500 | 1100 | 4990 | 6090 | 265 |
| Danube Flotilla (entire period) | — | 6500 | 8 | — | 8 | — |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19 divisions<br>1 corps<br>4 brigades<br>1 fortified area | 300,000 | 4350 | 14,488 | 18,838 | 819 |

There is no complete information about the personnel losses in the armies of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

**The results of the operation**. Soviet troops in close cooperation with the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia routed the German army group "Serbia", a large part of which was subjected to complete destruction. The eastern and northeastern regions of Yugoslavia with its capital, Belgrade, were liberated, and favorable conditions were created for the offensive in the direction of Budapest. The front for the enemy forces in the Balkan peninsula was pushed back by over 200 km and the main communications between Salonika and Belgrad was cut, which forced the German command quickly to withdraw forces from the south of the Balkan peninsula along mountainous and difficult to cross regions controlled by the Yugoslav partisans.

## THE PESTAMO-KIRKENES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

7-29 October, 1944

The operation was conducted by troops of the Karelian Front and forces of the Northern Fleet. No additional forces were involved.

The length of the operation was 23 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 80 km. The depth of the advance of the soviet troops was 150 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 6-7 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Karelian Front (14th Army, 7th Air Army) (entire period | 8 rifle div<br>5 rifle brig<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 113,200 | 5298 | 13,137 | 18,435 | 801 |
| Northern Fleet (entire period) | — | 20,300 | 786 | 2012 | 2798 | 122 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 8 divisions<br>6 brigades<br>1 fortified area | 133,500 | 6084 | 15,149 | 21,233 | 923 |

**The results of the operation.** Troops of the 14th Army in cooperation with the Northern Fleet in the severe conditions of the Arctic inflicted a defeat on the enemy and liberated the occupied part of the Murmansk oblast, the Pestamo (Pechenga) region, and northern regions of Norway, including the city of Kirkenes, having given aid to the Norwegian people in driving out the German occupiers. The possession of Pestamo and Kirkenes by Soviet troops sharply restricted the actions of the German fleet in the northern communication lines and deprived Germany of nickel ore.

## THE BUDAPEST STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

29 October 1944-13 February 1945

The operation was conducted by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts and the Danube Flotilla. The 1st and 4th Rumanian Armies operated as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. In the course of the operation the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the headquarters of the 4th Guards, 26th, and 57th Armies, the headquarters of the 5th Air Army, and 22 divisions were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 108 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 420 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 250-400 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 2.5-4 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 39 rifle div<br>4 airborne div<br>9 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>4 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 self-propelled artillery brig<br>2 fortified areas | 712,000 | 35,027 | 130,156 | 165,183 | 1529 |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front (12 December 1944 - 13 February 1945) | — | — | 44,887 | 109,900 | 154,787 | 2418 |
| Danube Flotilla | 1 marine brig | 7500 | 112 | — | 112 | 1 |
| Total ............. | 52 divisions<br>7 corps<br>3 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 719,500 | 80,026 | 240,056 | 320,082 | 2964 |

**The results of the operation**. Troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts liberated the central regions of Hungary and its capital, Budapest. A 188,000 man enemy grouping was surrounded and destroyed. Hungary was taken out of the war on the German side. With the end of the operation significant forces were freed up and favorable conditions were created for developing an offensive in Czechoslovakia and Austria.

## THE VISTULA-ODER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

12 January - 3 February 1945

One of the largest operations of the second world war was conducted by troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. The 1st Army of the Polish Forces operated as part of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The length of the operation was 23 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 500 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 500 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 20-22 km for rifle formations and 30-35 km for tank and mechanized formations. The Vistula-Oder strategic operation includes the Warsaw-Poznan and Sandomir-Silesia front offensive operations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 1st Belorussian Front (entire period) | 63 rifle div<br>6 cavalry div<br>5 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>4 indep.tank brig<br>2 self-propelled artillery brig<br>2 fortified areas | 1,028,900 | 17,032 | 60,310 | 77,342 | 3363 |
| 1st Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 65 rifle div<br>1 airborne div<br>3 cavalry div<br>6 tank corps<br>3 mech corps<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>3 self-propelled artillery brig<br>1 fortified area | 1,083,800 | 26,219 | 89,564 | 115,783 | 5034 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 138 divisions<br>16 corps<br>12 brigades<br>3 fortified areas | 2,112,700 | 43,251 | 149,874 | 193,125 | 8397 |
| 1st Army of Polish Forces (entire period) | 5 infantry div<br>1 cavalry brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 90,900 | 225 | 841 | 1066 | 46 |

**The results of the operation**. Soviet troops liberated the largest part of Poland and moved onto German territory and to the Oder, having seized a number of beachheads on its western shore. During this 35 German divisions were destroyed and 25 suffered heavy losses. The successful operations of the Soviet troops created conditions for the offensive in Pomerania, Silesia and in the direction of Berlin.

## THE WESTERN CARPATHIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

12 January - 18 February 1945

The operation was conducted by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 1st and 4th Rumanian Armies, which operated as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and the 1st Czechoslovakian Army Corps, which operated on the 4th Ukrainian Front, took part in it. The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the headquarters of two light mountain infantry corps (six brigades), and one self-propelled artillery brigade were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 38 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 440 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 170-230 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 4-6 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | Personnel losses in operation, men |
|---|---|---|

| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 24 rifle div<br>1 airborne div<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 267,500 | 12,316 | 45,836 | 58,152 | 1530 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (right wing) (entire period) | 25 rifle div<br>4 airborne div<br>6 cavalry div<br>1 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 214,700 | 4021 | 16,815 | 20,836 | 548 |
| Total ............. | 60 divisions<br>3 corps<br>4 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 482,200 | 16,337 | 62,651 | 78,988 | 2078 |
| 1st and 4th Rumanian Armies | 5 infantry div<br>3 mount.rifle div<br>2 cavalry div | 99,300 | 2486 | 9488 | 11,974 | 315 |
| 1st Czechoslovakian Army Corps | 2 infantry brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 11,500 | 257 | 713 | 970 | 25 |

**The results of the operation.** The troops of the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts liberated the largest part of Slovakia and southern regions of Poland. Having crossed the Western Carpathians, they moved to the region of the upper flow of the Vistula, which helped bring about the routing of a German grouping of forces in Silesia by the 1st Ukrainian Front. Conditions were created for unleashing an offensive for the purpose of possessing the Moravska-Ostrav industrial region. The friendship of the Soviet, Rumanian and Czechoslovakian forces was made strong in the difficult battles of the winter of 1945.

## THE EASTERN PRUSSIA STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

13 January - 25 April 1945

The operation was conducted by troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts with the cooperation of the forces of the Baltic Fleet. In the course of combat operations the headquarters of the 19th Army and nine divisions were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 103 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 550 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet forces was 120-200 km.The average daily speed of the offensive was 2-6 km during the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defense zone (13-18 January 1945), then up to the encircling of the enemy grouping (19-30 January 1945) 15 km for rifle formations and 22-36 km for tank and mechanized formations. The Insterburg, Mlava-El'bing, Heilsberg, Konigsberg, and Zemland front offensive operations were carried within the framework of the Eastern Prussia strategic operation.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd Belorussian Front (entire period) | 54 rifle div<br>2 tank corps<br>6 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 708,600 | 89,463 | 332,300 | 421,763 | 4095 |
| 2nd Belorussian Front (13 January - 10 February 1942) | 63 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>5 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>3 fortified areas | 881,500 | 36,396 | 123,094 | 159,490 | 5500 |
| 43rd Army of 1st Baltic Front (13 January - 20 January 1945 | 13 rifle div<br>1 indep.tank brig | 79,000 | 195 | 1265 | 1460 | 183 |
| Baltic Fleet (1 February - 25 April 1945) | — | — | 410 | 1655 | 2065 | 25 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 133 divisions<br>8 corps<br>10 brigades<br>4 fortified areas | 1,669,100 | 126,464 | 458,314 | 584,778 | 5677 |

**The results of the operation**. Soviet troops captured Eastern Prussia and eliminated the enemy grouping of forces that was defending here. In the course of the offensive 25 enemy divisions were destroyed, and 12 divisions suffered heavy losses. The German navy lost some most important naval bases which sharply reduced the supplying of the Kurlyand enemy grouping. The elimination of the Eastern Prussia enemy grouping significantly weakened the Wehrmacht forces and worsened its overall operational-strategic position on the Soviet-German front.

## THE EASTERN POMERANIA STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

10 February - 4 April 1945

The operation was conducted by forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. After 1 March 1945 the 1st Army of the Polish Forces took part in the operation.

The length of the operation was 54 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 460 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops was 130-150 km. The average speed of the offensive was 2-3 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 2nd Belorussian Front (entire period) | 45 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 560,900 | 40,471 | 132,918 | 173,389 | 3211 |
| 1st Belorussian Front (3rd Shock, 47th, 61st Armies, 1st and 42nd Guards Tank and 16th Air Armies (1 March - 4 April 1945) | 27 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>4 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>1 self-propelled artillery brig<br>1 fortified area | 359,600 | 12,269 | 40,034 | 52,303 | 1494 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 78 divisions<br>10 corps<br>4 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 920,500 | 52,740 | 172,952 | 225,692 | 4179 |
| 1st Army of Polish Forces (1 March - 4 April 1945) | 5 infantry div<br>1 cavalry brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 75,600 | 2575 | 6093 | 8668 | 248 |

**The results of the operation.** Soviet troops, in which the 1st Army of the Polish Forces operated, moved to the coast of the Baltic Sea and captured Kol'berg, Gdynya, and Danzig. The enemy who was pressed to the sea capitulated. With the destruction of the German army group "Vistula" the threat of an enemy counterattack on the flank and the rear of the main forces on the 1st Belorussian Front which was preparing for the offensive against Berlin was ended. All of the Polish coast with major cities and ports on the Baltic Sea was returned to the Polish people.

## THE VIENNA STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

16 March - 15 April 1945

The operation was conducted by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, part of the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the Danube Flotilla. The 1st Bulgarian Army operated as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

The length of the operation was 31 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 230 km. The depth of the advance of Soviet forces was 150-250 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 5-8 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 42 rifle div<br>4 airborne div<br>3 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>1 mech brig<br>1 self-propelled artillery brig<br>1 fortified area | 536,700 | 32,846 | 106,969 | 139,815 | 4510 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (46th Army, 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, part of the forces of the 5th Air Army) (entire period) | 12 rifle div<br>1 mech corps | 101,500 | 5815 | 22,310 | 28,125 | 907 |
| Danube Flotilla (entire period) | 1 marine brig | 6500 | — | — | — | — |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 61 divisions<br>6 corps<br>3 brigades<br>1 fortified area | 644,700 | 38,661 | 129,279 | 167,940 | 5417 |
| 1st Bulgarian Army (entire period) | 6 infantry div | 100,900 | 2698 | 7107 | 9805 | 316 |

**The results of the operation**. In the course of the swift offensive the troops of the 3rd and left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Fronts routed the main forces of the German army group "South" and completely liberated Hungary, southern regions of Czechoslovakia and the eastern part of Austria with its capital, Vienna, from the fascist occupiers. The successful offensive in the Vienna sector and the movement by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front into the eastern regions of Austria accelerated the liberation of Yugoslavia. Army group "E" which was operating there found itself in isolation and was forced to begin a general retreat.

## THE BERLIN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

16 April - 8 May 1945

The operation was conducted by troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Ukrainian Fronts for the purpose of capturing Berlin and moving to the Elbe River in order to connect up with troops from the allies. The Dnepr Flotilla, and part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet as well as the 1st and 2nd Armies of the Polish Forces participated in the operation. The 28th Army (9 rifle divisions) and the 31st Army (9 rifle divisions) were added to the forces.

The length of the operation was 23 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 300 km.The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 100-220 km. The average daily speed of the offensive was 5-10 km.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 2nd Belorussian Front (minus the 5th Guards Tank and 19th Armies) (entire period) | 33 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>3 tank corps<br>1 mech corps<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>1 self-propelled artillery brig | 441,600 | 13,070 | 46,040 | 59,110 | 2570 |
| 1st Belorussian Front (entire period) | 72 rifle div<br>6 cavalry div<br>5 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>6 indep.tank brig<br>2 fortified areas<br>2 self-propelled artillery brig | 908,500 | 37,610 | 141,880 | 179,490 | 7804 |
| 1st Ukrainian Front (3rd and 5th Guards, 13th, and 52nd Armies, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies and 2nd Air Army) (entire period) | 44 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>5 tank corps<br>4 mech corps<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>3 self-propelled artillery brig | 550,900 | 27,580 | 86,245 | 113,825 | 4949 |
| Dnepr Flotilla (entire period) | — | 5200 | 16 | 11 | 27 | 1 |
| Baltic Fleet (ships and air forces) 20 April - 8 May 1945) | — | — | 15 | 8 | 23 | 1 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 161 divisions<br>20 corps<br>15 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 1,906,200 | 78,291 | 274,181 | 352,475 | 15,325 |
| 1st and 2nd Armies of Polish Forces | 10 infantry div<br>1 tank corps<br>1 cavalry brig | 155,900 | 2825 | 6067 | 8892 | 387 |

**The results of the operation**. Soviet troops routed the Berlin enemy group of forces and with an assault took, Berlin, the capital of Germany. Developing the offensive further, they moved to the Elbe River, where they joined up with American and English troops. With the fall of Berlin and the loss of vitally important regions Germany lost the capability for organized resistance and soon surrendered. With the completion of the Berlin operation favorable conditions were created for encircling and destroying the last major enemy groupings on the territory of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

## THE PRAGUE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

6-11 May 1945

The final operation of the Red Army in Europe. It was conducted by troops of the 1st, 4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. The 2nd Army of the Polish Forces, the 1st and 4th Rumanian Armies, and the 1st Czechoslovakian Army Corps took part in the operation.

The length of the operation was 6 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 1200 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 160-200 km. The average daily

speeds of the offensive were 20-30 km for rifle formations, and 50-60 km for tank and mechanized formations.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total-- | average daily |
| 1st Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 71 rifle div<br>3 cavalry div<br>5 tank corps<br>4 mech corps<br>3 indep.tank brig<br>3 self-propelled artillery brig | 806,400 | 6384 | 16,999 | 23,383 | 3897 |
| 4th Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 34 rifle div<br>1 tank corps<br>6 rifle brig<br>2 indep.tank brig<br>1 fortified area | 350,900 | 2299 | 9230 | 11,529 | 1922 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front (entire period) | 37 rifle div<br>6 cavalry div<br>1 tank corps<br>3 mech corps<br>1 rifle brig<br>1 indep.tank brig<br>2 self-propelled artillery brig<br>1 fortified area | 613,400 | 2582 | 11,854 | 14,436 | 2406 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 151 divisions<br>14 corps<br>18 brigades<br>2 fortified areas | 1,770,700 | 11,265 | 38,083 | 49,348 | 8225 |
| 2nd Army of the Polish Forces (entire period) | 5 infantry div<br>1 tank corps | 69,500 | 300 | 587 | 887 | 148 |
| 1st and 4th Rumanian Armies (entire period) | 12 infantry div<br>3 cavalry div | 139,500 | 320 | 1410 | 1730 | 288 |
| 1st Czechoslovakian Army Corps (entire period) | 4 infantry brig<br>1 indep.tank brig | 48,400 | 112 | 421 | 533 | 89 |

**The results of the operation**. In the course of the swift offensive of the 1st, 4th, and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts an 860,000 man enemy grouping of forces which had continued resistance after the signing of the surrender act was eliminated. Czechoslovakia and its capital of Prague were liberated from fascist occupation. On 11 May Soviet troops moved to the of Chemnitz-Karlovy Varyi-Plzen line, where they met up with advance units of the American army.

# THE MANCHURIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION

9 August - 2 September 1945

The operation was conducted by troops of the Transbaykal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts and forces of the Pacific Ocean Fleet and Amur Flotilla. Formations and units of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Army took part in the operation. In the course of the combat operations the 3rd Guards Mechanized and 126th Light Rifle Corps arrived.

The length of the operation was 25 days. The width of the front for combat operations was 2700 km. The depth of the advance of the Soviet troops was 200-800 km. The average daily speeds of the offensive were 35-40 km for rifle formations, and 70-90 km for tank and mechanized formations. The Hingan-Mukden, Harbin-Girin, Sungari, and South Sakhalin offensive operations and the Kuril assault landing operation were conducted within the framework of the Manchurian strategic operation.

Combat strength, number of troops, personnel losses

| Name of strategic formation and time of their participation in the operation | Combat strength and number of troops at start of operation | | Personnel losses in operation, men | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of formations | Size | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| Transbaykal Front (entire period) | 27 rifle div<br>2 motor rifle div<br>1 motor rifle brig<br>2 tank div<br>1 airborne div<br>1 cavalry div<br>1 tank corps<br>2 mech corps<br>6 indep.tank brig<br>2 self-propelled artillery brig<br>2 fortified areas | 638,300 | 2228 | 6155 | 8383 | 335 |
| 2nd Far Eastern Front (entire period) | 11 rifle div<br>4 rifle brig<br>9 indep.tank brig<br>5 fortified areas | 334,700 | 2449 | 3134 | 5583 | 223 |
| 1st Far Eastern Front (entire period) | 31 rifle div<br>1 cavalry div<br>1 mech div<br>11 indep.tank brig<br>14 fortified areas | 586,500 | 6324 | 14,745 | 21,069 | 843 |
| Pacific Ocean Fleet (entire period) | 1 marine brig | 97,500 | 998 | 300 | 1298 | 52 |
| Amur Flotilla (entire period) | — | 12,500 | 32 | 91 | 123 | 5 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 76 divisions<br>4 corps<br>34 brigades<br>21 fortified areas | 1,669,500 | 12,031 | 24,425 | 36,456 | 1458 |
| Formations of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Army (entire period) | 4 cavalry div<br>1 motor rifle brig | 16,000 | 72 | 125 | 197 | 8 |

**The results of the operation.** The troops of the Transbaykal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts with the cooperation of the forces of the Pacific Ocean Fleet and the Amur Flotilla in a short time routed the strongest grouping of Japanese forces - the Kwantung army, and liberated Manchuria, Northeastern China, the northern part of Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril islands. The destruction of the Kwantung army and the loss of the military and economic bases in China and Korea deprived Japan of real forces and capabilities to continue the war. On 2 September 1945 representatives of the Japanese government were forced to sign an unconditional surrender act.

Table 75

Personnel losses in certain major front operations of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)

| | Name of operations, time which they were conducted, forces involved | Number of troops at start of operation | Losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| | FIRST PERIOD OF WAR 22 Jun 41 - 18 Nov 42 | | | | | |
| 1 | Defensive operation in Moldavia (1 Jul - 26 Jul 41) Southern Front | 364,700 | 8519 | 9374 | 17,893 | 688 |
| 2 | Defense of Odessa (5 Aug - 15 Oct 41) Odessa defensive region (Primorskaya Army, Black Sea Fleet) | 34,500 | 16,578 | 24,690 | 41,268 | 565 |
| 3 | Yel'nin offensive operation (30 Aug - 8 Sep 41) Reserve Front (24th Army) | 103,200 | 10,701 | 21,152 | 31,853 | 3185 |
| 4 | Tikhvin defensive operation (16 Oct - 18 Nov 41) 54th Army of Leningrad Front, 4th and 52nd Independent Armies | 135,700 | 22,743 | 17,846 | 40,589 | 1194 |
| 5 | Crimean defensive operation (18 Oct - 18 Nov 41) Primorskaya and 51st Independent Army, Black Sea Fleet | 235,600 | 48,438 | 15,422 | 63,860 | 2129 |
| 6 | Defense of Sevastapol (30 Oct 41 - 4 July 42) Sevastapol defensive region (Black Sea Fleet, Primorskaya Army) | 52,000 | 156,880 | 43,601 | 200,481 | 808 |
| 7 | Lyuban' offensive operation (7 Jan - 30 Apr 42) Volkhov Front, 54th Army of Leningrad Front | 325,700 | 95,064 | 213,303 | 308,367 | 2705 |
| 8 | Demyansk offensive operation (7 Jan - 20 May 42) North-Western Front (1st Shock, 11th, 34th, and 53rd Armies) | 105,700 | 88,908 | 156,603 | 245,511 | 1832 |
| 9 | Volkhov offensive operation (8 Jan - 20 Apr 42) Bryansk Front | 317,000 | 21,319 | 39,807 | 61,126 | 593 |
| 10 | Toropets-Kholm offensive operation (9 Jan - 6 Feb 42) 3rd and 4th Shock Armies of North-Western Front (transferred to the Kalinin Front on 21 Jan 42) | 122,100 | 10,400 | 18,810 | 29,210 | 1007 |
| 11 | Barvenkovo-Lozovaya offensive operation (18 Jan - 31 Jan 42) South-Western and Southern Fronts | 204,000 | 11,095 | 29,786 | 40,881 | 2920 |
| 12 | Kerch offensive operation (8 May - 19 May 42) Crimean Front, part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet | 249,800 | 162,282 | 14,284 | 176,566 | 14,714 |

| | Name of operations, time which they were conducted, forces involved | Number of troops at start of operation | Losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 13 | Battle of Khar'kov (12 May - 29 May 42) South-Western Front, 9th and 57th Armies of Southern Front | 765,300 | 170,958 | 106,232 | 277,190 | 15,399 |
| 14 | Operation to remove 2nd Shock Army of Volkhov Front from encirclement (13 May - 10 Jul 42) 2nd Shock, 52nd and 59th Armies of Volkhov Front | 231,900 | 54,774 | 39,977 | 94,751 | 1606 |
| 15 | Rzhev-Sychevka offensive operation (30 Jul - 23 Aug 42) Kalinin Front (29th and 30th Armies, 3rd Air Army), Western Front (20th and 31st Armies, 1st Air Army) | 345,100 | 51,482 | 142,201 | 193,683 | 7747 |
| 16 | Sinyavino offensive operation (19 Aug - 10 Oct 42) Leningrad Front (Neva Operational Group, 13th Air Army), Volkhov Front (2nd Shock and 8th Armies, 14th Air Army), part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Flotilla) | 190,000 | 40,085 | 73,589 | 113,674 | 2145 |
| | SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR (19 Nov 42 - 31 Dec 43) | | | | | |
| 17 | Velikiye Luki offensive operation (24 Nov 42 - 20 Jan 43) Kalinin Front (3rd Shock Army, 3rd Air Army) | 86,700 | 31,674 | 72,348 | 104,022 | 1793 |
| 18 | Krasnodar offensive operation (9 Feb - 24 May 43)[1] Northern Caucasus Front | 390,000 | 66,814 | 173,902 | 240,716 | 2293 |
| 19 | Demyansk offensive operation (15 Feb - 28 Feb 43) North-Western Front | 327,600 | 10,016 | 23,647 | 33,663 | 2405 |
| 20 | Rzhev-Vyazma offensive operation (2-31 Mar 43) Kalinin and Western Fronts | 876,000 | 38,862 | 99,715 | 138,577 | 4619 |
| 21 | Mgin offensive operation (22 Jul - 22 Aug 43) Leningrad Front (67th Army and 13th Air Army), Volkhov Front (8th Army and 14th Air Army) | 253,300 | 20,890 | 59,047 | 79,937 | 2498 |
| 22 | Bryansk offensive operation (1 Sep - 3 Oct 43) Bryansk Front | 530,000 | 13,033 | 43,624 | 56,657 | 1717 |

[1] The length of the operation takes into account the time of the combat operations of the troops of the Northern Caucasus Front up to their movement to the enemy fortified defensive line (the "blue line").

| | Name of operations, time which they were conducted, forces involved | Number of troops at start of operation | Losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 23 | Melitopol' offensive operation (26 Sep - 5 Nov 43) Southern (4th Ukrainian Front) | 555,300 | 42,760 | 155,989 | 198,749 | 4847 |
| 24 | Nevel'-Gorodok offensive operation (6 Oct - 31 Dec 43) Kalinin (1st Baltic) Front - 3rd and 4th Shock, 11th Guards, 43rd Armies, 3rd Air Army | 198,000 | 43,551 | 125,351 | 168,902 | 1941 |
| 25 | Zaparozhye offensive operation (10 Oct - 14 Oct 43) South-Western Front (3rd and 8th Guards and 12th Armies, 17th Air Army) | 150,500 | 3443 | 14,265 | 17,708 | 3542 |
| 26 | Kerch-El'tigen assault landing operation (31 Oct - 11 Dec 43) Northern Caucasus Front (from 20 Nov 43 - Independent Primorskaya Army),part of the force of the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla | 150,000 | 6985 | 20,412 | 27,397 | 652 |
| 27 | Gomel'-Rechitsa offensive operation (10 Nov - 30 Nov 43) Belorussian Front | 761,300 | 21,650 | 66.556 | 88,206 | 4200 |
| 28 | Kiev defensive operation (13 Nov - 22 Dec 43) 1st Ukrainian Front | 730,000 | 26,443 | 61,030 | 87,473 | 2187 |
| | THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR (1 Jan 44 - 9 May 45) | | | | | |
| 29 | Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive operation (24 Dec 43 - 14 Jan 44) 1st Ukrainian Front | 831,000 | 23,163 | 76,855 | 100,018 | 4546 |
| 30 | Kalinkovichi-Mozyr' offensive operation (8-30 Jan 44) Belorussian Front | 232,600 | 12,350 | 43,807 | 56,157 | 2442 |
| 31 | Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy offensive operation (24 Jan - 17 Feb 44) 1st Ukrainian Front (27th and 40th Armies, 6th Tank and 2nd Air Armies) 2nd Ukrainian Front (4th Guards, 52nd and 53rd Armies, 5th Tank and 5th Air Armies) | 336,700 | 24,286 | 55,902 | 80,188 | 3208 |
| 32 | Rogachev-Zhlobin offensive operation (21 Feb - 26 Feb 44) Belorussian (after 24 Feb the 1st Belorussian) Front (3rd, 48th and 50th Armies, 16th Air Army) | 232,000 | 7164 | 24,113 | 31,277 | 5213 |
| 33 | Rezhitsa-Dvinsk offensive operation (10 Jul - 27 Jul 44) 2nd Baltic Front | 391,200 | 12,880 | 45,115 | 57,995 | 3222 |
| 34 | Pskov-Ostrov offensive operation (11 Jul - 31 Jul 44) 3rd Baltic Front | 258,400 | 7633 | 25,951 | 33,584 | 1599 |

| | Name of operations, time which they were conducted, forces involved | Number of troops at start of operation | Losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | irrecoverable | sick, injured and wounded | total | average daily |
| 35 | Madona offensive operation (1-28 Aug 44) 2nd Baltic Front, part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet | 390,000 | 14,669 | 50,737 | 65,406 | 2336 |
| 36 | Tartus offensive operation (10 Aug - 6 Sep 44) 3rd Baltic Front | 272,800 | 16,292 | 55,514 | 71,806 | 2564 |
| 37 | Debrecen offensive operation (6 Oct - 28 Oct 44) 2nd Ukrainian Front | 698,200 | 19,713 | 64,297 | 84,010 | 3653 |
| 38 | Goldap offensive operation (16 Oct - 30 Oct 44) 3rd Belorussian Front | 377,300 | 16,819 | 62,708 | 79,527 | 5302 |
| 39 | Lower Silesia offensive operation (8 Feb - 24 Feb 45) 1st Ukrainian Front | 980,800 | 23,577 | 75,809 | 99,386 | 5846 |
| 40 | Balaton defensive operation (6 Mar - 15 Mar 45) 3rd Ukrainian Front | 465,000 | 8492 | 24,407 | 32,899 | 3290 |
| 41 | Upper Silesia offensive operation (15 Mar - 31 Mar 45) 1st Ukrainian Front | 408,400 | 15,876 | 50,925 | 66,801 | 3929 |
| 42 | Moravska-Ostrav offensive operation (10 Mar - 5 May 45) 4th Ukrainian Front | 317,300 | 23,964 | 88,657 | 112,621 | 1976 |
| 43 | Bratislava-Brno offensive operation (25 Mar - 5 May 45) 2nd Ukrainian Front, Danube Flotilla | 272,200 | 16,933 | 62,633 | 79,596 | 1895 |

## Losses by fronts and independent armies

The front was a most important level in the command system for the armed forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War. It was an operational-strategic formation for the armed forces that was capable of performing strategic and operational missions. Usually there were several armies, mechanized, tank, air force, and artillery corps as well as other formations in it. Already in the first months of the war it was shown that in order to achieve success the efforts of not just one front, but two-three or even four fronts was often needed. In the course of the war up to 90% of the offensive and defensive strategic operations were conducted with the participation of precisely these groupings of forces.

At the start of the war 5 fronts were set up on the Soviet-German front, in December there were 10, by the end of 1942 there were 12, and in 1943 there became 13 (see table 76). These changes were connected with the expanding of the territory of the armed conflict and the necessity to divide the groupings of forces in the interests of improving the command over them.

In the course of the war the Headquarters of the Supreme Command gradually increased the number of active army strategic formations. Whereas at the start of the war there were 14 combined arms armies in the active fronts, on 1 December 1941 there were 49. In November 1942 there were 67 combined arms armies, two tank armies and 11 air armies. On 1 July 1943 there were 69 combined arms, 5 tank and 13 air armies.

Depending on the strategic situation that was developing, individual front strategic formations were broken apart, others were created anew, several were reformed, etc. For example, in July 1942 the South-Western Front was disbanded and its troops were put into the Stalingrad Front. This was the fate of the Southern Front: in July 1942 it was abolished, and its withdrawing troops were put into the Northern Caucasus Front.

In the second half of 1943 the number of front strategic formations started to drop and by the end of the war there were 8 fronts (Leningrad, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian). There also remained three independent armies (14th, 37th and Primorskaya). This was also brought about by the reduction of the length of the entire Soviet-German front and by the acquisition of experience in leading larger front strategic formations by the military commanders.

In the following tables information is given about the losses for each front and independent army for the period of their existence and for each year of the war[1], except for air defense fronts and armies, military districts, formations and units of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander that are not part of the active army. Information about the losses for these troops is included in the summary tables for the army and navy by quarters and years of the war.

The percentage ratio of losses to the number of troops (forces) was determined by means of comparing the number of the losses of the appropriate front (fleet) to the average monthly actual strength for a specific period of time.

The first Transcaucasus Front (August - December 1941), which did not directly participate in combat operations, is not included in table 76.

The personnel losses for the Karelian Front (tables on p. 222) for the period from December 1944 through April 1945 include the noncombat losses for the headquarters and troops of the front that were allocated on 15 November 1944 to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. This time (5 months) is not included in the number of days that the Karelian existed.

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Here, those who died from wounds and diseases in hospitals are shown in the sick, injured and wounded losses.

Table 76

## ACTIVE FRONTS AND INDEPENDENT ARMIES

Key on following page

Notes to table 76

1 - Name of fronts and independent armies
2 - Years, quarters, months
3 - Number of days
4 - Northern
5 - North-Western
6 - Western - 3rd Belorussian
7 - South-Western (1st time formed)
8 - Southern (1st time formed)
9 - Central (1st time formed)
10 - Reserve (1st time formed)
11 - Bryansk (1st and 2nd time formed)
12 - Leningrad
13 - Karelian
14 - Kalinin - 1st Baltic - Western Group of Forces
15 - Volkhov (1st and 2nd time formed)
16 - Caucasus-Crimean
17 - Transcaucasus (2nd time formed)
18 - Northern Caucasus (1st and 2nd time formed)
19 - Voronezh - 1st Ukrainian
20 - Stalingrad (1st time formed) - Don
21 - South-Eastern - Stalingrad (2nd time formed)
22 - South-Western (2nd time formed) - 3rd Ukrainian
23 - Southern (2nd time formed) - 4th Ukrainian (1st and 2nd time formed)
24 - Reserve (2nd time formed) - Kursk - Orel - Bryansk (3rd time formed)
25 - Steppe - 2nd Ukrainian
26 - Baltic - 2nd Baltic
27 - Central (2nd time formed) - Belorussian - 1st Belorussian
28 - 2nd Belorussian (1st and 2nd time formed)
29 - 3rd Baltic
30 - Transbaykal
31 - 1st Far-Eastern
32 - 2nd Far Eastern
33 - Moscow Defense Zone
34 - 51st Independent Army
35 - 7th Independent Army
36 - 52nd Independent Army
37 - 4th Independent Army
38 - Primorskaya - Independent Primorskaya Army
39 - 14th Independent Army
40 - 37th Independent Army
41 - FRONTS
42 - INDEPENDENT ARMIES

## Personnel losses for Northern Front
## Total for 64 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 1938 | 3326 | 17,070 | 22,334 |
| | | % of losses | | | 19.54 | 18.20 | 14.20 | 15.05 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 3791 | 7075 | 50,671 | 61,537 |
| | | % of losses | | | 38.20 | 38.71 | 42.17 | 41.48 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 137 | 313 | 1138 | 1588 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.38 | 1.71 | 0.95 | 1.07 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 5866 | 10,714 | 68,879 | 85,459 |
| | | % | of losses | | 59.12 | 58.62 | 57.32 | 57.60 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 9.18 | 11.28 | 13.77 | 12.97 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.37 | 5.37 | 6.56 | 6.18 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 3826 | 7279 | 49,166 | 60,271 |
| | | % of losses | | | 38.56 | 39.83 | 40.92 | 40.62 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 231 | 284 | 2119 | 2634 |
| | | % of losses | | | 2.32 | 1.55 | 1.76 | 1.78 |
| | Frostbitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 4057 | 7563 | 51,285 | 62,905 |
| | | % | of losses | | 40.88 | 41.38 | 42.68 | 42.40 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 6.35 | 7.96 | 10.26 | 9.55 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.02 | 3.79 | 4.88 | 4.55 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 9923 | 18,277 | 120,164 | 148,364 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 15.53 | 9.16 | 24.03 | 22.52 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 7.39 | | 11.44 | 10.73 |

## Personnel losses for North-Western Front
## Total for 882 days

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 19,446 | 42,772 | 180,629 | 242,847 |
| | | % of losses | | 23.21 | 23.16 | 20.15 | 20.85 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 10,877 | 26,066 | 155,498 | 192,441 |
| | | % of losses | | 12.98 | 14.12 | 17.35 | 16.53 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 1422 | 2280 | 16,335 | 20,037 |
| | | % of losses | | 1.71 | 1.23 | 1.83 | 1.72 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 31,745 | 71,118 | 352,462 | 455,325 |
| | | % of losses | | 37.90 | 38.51 | 39.33 | 39.10 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 64 | 110.78 | 159.05 | 135.76 |
| | | | Average monthly | 2.21 | 3.83 | 5.50 | 4.70 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 45,032 | 99,542 | 446,587 | 591,161 |
| | | % of losses | | 53.76 | 53.90 | 49.83 | 50.75 |
| | Sick | Number | | 6928 | 13,824 | 95,097 | 115,849 |
| | | % of losses | | 8.27 | 7.49 | 10.61 | 9.95 |
| | Frostbitten | Number | | 63 | 188 | 2060 | 2311 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.20 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 52,023 | 113,554 | 543,744 | 709,321 |
| | | % of losses | | 62.10 | 61.49 | 60.67 | 60.90 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 104.89 | 176.88 | 245.37 | 211.49 |
| | | | Average monthly | 3.63 | 6.12 | 8.49 | 7.32 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 83,768 | 184,672 | 896,206 | 1,164,646 |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 168.89 | 287.66 | 404.43 | 347.25 |
| | | | Average monthly | 5.84 | 9.95 | 13.99 | 12.02 |

## Personnel losses for North-Western Front by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 31,511 | 133,573 | 77,763 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.67 | 23.89 | 23.18 | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 142,190 | 41,720 | 8531 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 52.64 | 7.47 | 2.54 | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 8563 | 8970 | 2594 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.17 | 1.60 | 0.75 | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 182,264 | 184,263 | 88,798 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 67.48 | 32.96 | 26.47 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 70.17 | 51.26 | 25.84 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 11.14 | 4.27 | 2.44 | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 83,816 | 319,111 | 188,234 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 31.03 | 57.07 | 56.11 | | |
| | Sick | Number | | | 3741 | 53,878 | 58,230 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.39 | 9.64 | 17.36 | | |
| | Frostbitten | Number | | | 266 | 1856 | 189 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.10 | 0.33 | 0.06 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 87,823 | 374,845 | 246,653 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 32.52 | 67.04 | 73.53 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 33.81 | 104.28 | 71.79 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.37 | 8.69 | 6.77 | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 270,087 | 559,108 | 335,451 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 103.99 | 155.54 | 97.63 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 16.51 | 12.96 | 9.21 | | |

## Personnel losses for Western Front
## Total for 1037 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 46,086 | 104,016 | 436,234 | 586,336 |
| | | % of losses | 18.22 | 18.72 | 16.01 | 16.59 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 61,875 | 130,511 | 674,218 | 866,604 |
| | | % of losses | 24.46 | 23.48 | 24.74 | 24.52 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 3623 | 69,305 | 9441 | 82,349 |
| | | % of losses | 1.43 | 2.54 | 1.69 | 2.33 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 111,584 | 243,948 | 1,179,757 | 1,535,289 |
| | | % of losses | 44.11 | 43.89 | 43.29 | 43.44 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses[1] | 102.46 | 163.29 | 231.64 | 200.01 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 3.01 | 4.80 | 6.81 | 5.88 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 122,483 | 279,888 | 1,301,150 | 1,703,521 |
| | | % of losses | 48.41 | 50.35 | – 47.74 | 48.20 |
| | Sick | Number | 18,637 | 31,310 | 238,096 | 288,043 |
| | | % of losses | 7.37 | 5.63 | 8.73 | 8.15 |
| | Frostbitten | Number | 270 | 707 | 6445 | 7422 |
| | | % of losses | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 0.21 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 141,390 | 311,905 | 1,545,691 | 1,998,986 |
| | | % of losses | 55.89 | 56.11 | 56.71 | 56.56 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 129.83 | 208.77 | 303.50 | 260.42 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 3.82 | 6.14 | 8.93 | 7.66 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 252,974 | 555,853 | 2,725,448 | 3,534,275 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 232.29 | 372.06 | 535.14 | 460.43 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 6.83 | 10.94 | 15.74 | 13.54 |

## Personnel losses for Western Front by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number of losses by years 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 106,997 | 244,574 | 195,525 | 39,240 | |
| | | % of losses | | 8.24 | 22.46 | 20.81 | 18.87 | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 798,465 | 44,966 | 21,333 | 1840 | |
| | | % of losses | | 61.52 | 4.13 | 2.27 | 0.88 | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 50,831 | 25,095 | 5541 | 882 | |
| | | % of losses | | 3.92 | 2.31 | 0.59 | 0.43 | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 956,293 | 314,635 | 222,399 | 41,962 | |
| | | % of losses | | 73.68 | 28.90 | 23.67 | 20.18 | |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 190.83 | 32.89 | 28.96 | 7.87 | |
| | | | Average monthly | 30.29 | 2.74 | 2.41 | 2.13 | |
| Sickness injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 328,735 | 665,341 | 582,977 | 126,468 | |
| | | % of losses | | 25.33 | 61.11 | 62.05 | 60.81 | |
| | Sick | Number | | 9069 | 105,540 | 133,954 | 39,480 | |
| | | % of losses | | 0.70 | 9.69 | 14.26 | 18.98 | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 3857 | 3249 | 245 | 71 | |
| | | % of losses | | 0.29 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 341,661 | 774,130 | 717,176 | 166,019 | |
| | | % of losses | | 26.32 | 71.10 | 76.33 | 79.82 | |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 68.18 | 80.92 | 93.41 | 31.15 | |
| | | | Average monthly | 10.82 | 6.74 | 7.79 | 8.42 | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 1,297,954 | 1,088,765 | 939,575 | 207,981 | |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 259.01 | 113.81 | 122.37 | 39.02 | |
| | | | Average monthly | 41.11 | 9.48 | 10.55 | 10.55 | |

## Personnel losses for 3rd Belorussian Front
## Total for 381 days

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 15,196 | 33,642 | 112,848 | 161,686 |
| | | % of losses | | 22.61 | 21.30 | 18.25 | 19.17 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 826 | 1488 | 6978 | 9292 |
| | | % of losses | | 1.22 | 0.94 | 1.13 | 1.10 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 496 | 987 | 3669 | 5152 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.74 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.61 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 16,518 | 36,117 | 123,495 | 176,130 |
| | | % of losses | | 24.57 | 22.87 | 19.97 | 20.88 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 17.17 | 24.29 | 32.10 | 27.97 |
| | | | Average monthly | 1.37 | 1.94 | 2.57 | 2.24 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 42,309 | 104.987 | 409,189 | 556,485 |
| | | % of losses | | 62.95 | 66.48 | 66.19 | 65.99 |
| | Sick | Number | | 8389 | 16,800 | 85,586 | 110,775 |
| | | % of losses | | 12.48 | 10.64 | 13.84 | 13.13 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 1 | 8 | 28 | 37 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.01 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 50,699 | 121,795 | 494,803 | 667,297 |
| | | % of losses | | 75.43 | 77.13 | 80.03 | 79.12 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 52.70 | 81.91 | 128.62 | 105.99 |
| | | | Average monthly | 4.22 | 6.55 | 10.29 | 8.48 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 67,217 | 157,912 | 618,298 | 843,427 |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 69.87 | 106.20 | 160.72 | 133.96 |
| | | | Average monthly | 5.59 | 8.49 | 12.86 | 10.72 |

## Personnel losses for 3rd Belorussian Front by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number of losses by years: 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | | | 77,733 | 83,953 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 18.44 | 19.91 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | | 5518 | 3774 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 1.31 | 0.89 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | | 3323 | 1829 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 0.79 | 0.43 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | | | 86,574 | 89,556 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 20.54 | 21.23 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 15.54 | 12.01 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | 1.87 | 2.86 |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | | | 258,611 | 297,874 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 61.34 | 70.61 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | 76,379 | 34,396 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 18.12 | 8.15 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | 37 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | 0.01 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | | 334,990 | 332,307 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 79.46 | 78.77 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 60.13 | 44.57 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | 7.25 | 10.61 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | | 421,564 | 421,863 |
| | | % of losses | | | | | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 75.67 | 56.58 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | 9.12 | 13.47 |

## Personnel losses for South-Western Front (1st time formed)
## Total for 386 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 10,144 | 18,580 | 89,441 | 118,165 |
| | | % of losses | 9.98 | 9.94 | 8.66 | 8.94 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 65,552 | 121,847 | 656,044 | 843,443 |
| | | % of losses | 64.49 | 65.16 | 63.51 | 63.82 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 2227 | 5098 | 48,165 | 55490 |
| | | % of losses | 2.19 | 2.72 | 4.66 | 4.20 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 77,923 | 145,525 | 793,650 | 1,017,098 |
| | | % of losses | 76.66 | 77.82 | 76.83 | 76.96 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 127.12 | 185.38 | 237.90 | 214.85 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 10.09 | 14.71 | 18.88 | 17.05 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 21,536 | 37,815 | 211,716 | 271,067 |
| | | % of losses | 21.19 | 20.22 | 20.50 | 20.50 |
| | Sick | Number | 1747 | 2226 | 16,194 | 20,167 |
| | | % of losses | 1.72 | 1.19 | 1.57 | 1.53 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | 445 | 1440 | 11,411 | 13,296 |
| | | % of losses | 0.43 | 0.77 | 1.10 | 1.01 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 23,728 | 41,481 | 239,321 | 304,530 |
| | | % of losses | 23.34 | 22.18 | 23.17 | 23.04 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 38.71 | 52.84 | 71.74 | 64.33 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 3.07 | 4.19 | 5.69 | 5.11 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 101,651 | 187,006 | 1,032,971 | 1,321,628 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 165.83 | 238.22 | 309.64 | 279,18 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 13.16 | 18.90 | 24.57 | 22.16 |

## Personnel losses for South-Western Front (1st time formed) by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 60,016<br>7.05 | 58,149<br>12.38 | | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 607,860<br>71.36 | 235,583<br>50.14 | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 49,957<br>5.87 | 5533<br>1.17 | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 717,833 | 299,265 | | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 84.28 | 63.69 | | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 151.39 | 63.29 | | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 24.03 | 10.05 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 128,973<br>15.14 | 142,094<br>30.24 | | | |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 4069<br>0.48 | 16,098<br>3.43 | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 888<br>0.10 | 12,408<br>2.64 | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 133,930 | 170,600 | | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 15.72 | 36.31 | | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 28.25 | 36.08 | | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.48 | 5.72 | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 851,763 | 469,865 | | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 179.64 | 99.37 | | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 28.51 | 15.77 | | | |

## Personnel losses for Southern Front (1st time formed)
## Total for 399 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 9302<br>16.91 | 17,159<br>16.30 | 87,997<br>13.91 | 114,458<br>14.44 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 20,769<br>37.73 | 32,030<br>30.44 | 252,631<br>39.95 | 305,430<br>38.53 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 1092<br>1.98 | 2904<br>2.76 | 24,775<br>3.92 | 28,771<br>3.63 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 31,163 | 52,093 | 365,403 | 448,659 |
| | | % | of losses | | 56.62 | 49.50 | 57.78 | 56.60 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 53.00 | 66.28 | 103.02 | 91.17 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.05 | 5.07 | 7.88 | 6.97 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 20,289<br>36.86 | 46,379<br>44.07 | 216,302<br>3402 | 282,970<br>35.70 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 2959<br>5.38 | 4471<br>4.26 | 33,435<br>5.29 | 40,865<br>5.15 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 630<br>1.14 | 2285<br>2.17 | 17,280<br>2.73 | 20,195<br>2.55 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 23,878 | 53,135 | 267,017 | 344,030 |
| | | % | of losses | | 43.38 | 50.50 | 42.22 | 43.40 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 40.61 | 67.60 | 75.28 | 69.91 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.10 | 5.17 | 5.76 | 5.34 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 55,041 | 105,228 | 632,420 | 792,689 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 93.61 | 133.88 | 178.30 | 161.08 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 7.15 | 10.24 | 13.64 | 12.31 |

Personnel losses for the Southern Front (1st time formed)
by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 32,362<br>10.36 | 82,069<br>17.09 | | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 188,306<br>60.30 | 117,124<br>24.38 | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 17,909<br>5.73 | 10,862<br>2.26 | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 238,577 | 210,082 | | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 76.39 | 43.73 | | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 62.50 | 36.79 | | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 10.08 | 5.33 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 66,809<br>21.39 | 216,161<br>45 | | | |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 4927<br>1.58 | 35,938<br>7.48 | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 2004<br>0.64 | 18,191<br>3.79 | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 73,740 | 270,290 | | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 23.61 | 56.27 | | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 19.32 | 47.34 | | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.12 | 6.86 | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 312,317 | 480,372 | | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 81.82 | 84.13 | | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 13.20 | 12.19 | | | |

## Personnel losses for Central Front (1st time formed)
## Total for 32 days

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 931 | 1330 | 6938 | 9199 |
| | | % of losses | | 8.61 | 7.06 | 6.12 | 6.43 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 2568 | 4093 | 39,163 | 45,824 |
| | | % of losses | | 23.77 | 21.75 | 34.54 | 32.05 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 4797 | 9741 | 41,447 | 55,985 |
| | | % of losses | | 44.39 | 51.76 | 36.56 | 39.15 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 8296 | 15,164 | 87,584 | 111,008 |
| | | % | of losses | 76.77 | 80.57 | 77.22 | 77.63 |
| | | | of number of personnel: All losses | 30.06 | 44.34 | 44.64 | 43.04 |
| | | | of number of personnel: Average monthly | 30.06 | 44.34 | 44.64 | 43.04 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 2442 | 3588 | 25,620 | 31,650 |
| | | % of losses | | 22.60 | 19.06 | 22.60 | 22.13 |
| | Sick | Number | | 69 | 68 | 210 | 347 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.63 | 0.37 | 0.18 | 0.24 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 2511 | 3656 | 25,830 | 31,997 |
| | | % | of losses | 23.23 | 19.43 | 22.78 | 22.37 |
| | | | of number of personnel: All losses | 9.10 | 10.69 | 13.17 | 12.41 |
| | | | of number of personnel: Average monthly | 9.10 | 10.69 | 13.17 | 12.41 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 10,807 | 18,820 | 113,378 | 143,005 |
| | | % | of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel: All losses | 39.16 | 55.03 | 57.81 | 55.45 |
| | | | of number of personnel: Average monthly | 39.16 | 55.03 | 57.81 | 55.45 |

## Personnel losses for Reserve Front (1st time formed)
## Total for 76 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 2942 | 6246 | 29,267 | 38,455 |
| | | % of losses | | | 12.84 | 15.89 | 11.19 | 11.88 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 10,003 | 21,384 | 107,243 | 138,630 |
| | | % of losses | | | 43.67 | 54.41 | 41.04 | 42.82 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 262 | 750 | 5944 | 6956 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.14 | 1.91 | 2.27 | 2.15 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 13,207 | 28,380 | 142,454 | 184,041 |
| | | % | of losses | | 57.65 | 72.21 | 54.47 | 56.85 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 31.98 | 46.75 | 40.67 | 40.69 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 12.79 | 18.70 | 16.27 | 16.28 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 9588 | 10,800 | 118,063 | 138,451 |
| | | % of losses | | | 41.86 | 27.48 | 45.14 | 42.76 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 113 | 123 | 1033 | 1269 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.49 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.39 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 9701 | 10,923 | 119,096 | 139,720 |
| | | % | of losses | | 42.35 | 27.29 | 45.53 | 43.15 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 23.49 | 18 | 34 | 30.89 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 9.40 | 7.20 | 13.60 | 12.36 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 22,908 | 39,303 | 261,550 | 323,761 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 55.47 | 64.75 | 74.67 | 71.58 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 22.19 | 25.90 | 29.87 | 28.64 |

## Personnel losses for Bryansk Front (1st and 2nd time formed)
## Total for 529 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 8399 | 20,049 | 73,492 | 101,940 |
| | | % of losses | 18.83 | 20.24 | 16.58 | 17.37 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 13,109 | 27,817 | 149,385 | 190,311 |
| | | % of losses | 29.40 | 28.09 | 33.71 | 32.43 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 522 | 1720 | 8616 | 10,858 |
| | | % of losses | 1.17 | 1.73 | 1.94 | 1.85 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 22,030 | 49,586 | 231,493 | 303,109 |
| | | % of losses | 49.40 | 50.06 | 52.23 | 51.65 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 54.81 | 86.57 | 109.95 | 104.04 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 3.17 | 5 | 6.36 | 6.01 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 20,227 | 45,108 | 179,132 | 244,467 |
| | | % of losses | 45.36 | 45.55 | 40.42 | 41.66 |
| | Sick | Number | 2278 | 4191 | 30,984 | 37,453 |
| | | % of losses | 5.11 | 4.23 | 6.99 | 6.38 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | 56 | 159 | 1603 | 1818 |
| | | % of losses | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0.31 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 22,561 | 49,458 | 211,719 | 283,738 |
| | | % of losses | 50.60 | 49.94 | 47.77 | 48.35 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 56.14 | 86.34 | 100.56 | 97.39 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 3.24 | 4.99 | 5.81 | 5.63 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 44,591 | 99,044 | 443,212 | 586,847 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 110.95 | 172.91 | 210.51 | 201.43 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 6.41 | 9.99 | 12.17 | 11.64 |

## Personnel losses for Bryansk Front (1st and 2nd times formed) by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | Number of losses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 14,231 | 49,689 | 38,020 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 7.17 | 19.59 | 28.18 | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 138,417 | 46,706 | 5188 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 69.79 | 18.42 | 3.85 | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 3044 | 7088 | 726 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.53 | 2.80 | 0.54 | | |
| | Total of irrecov-erable losses | Number | | | 155,692 | 103,483 | 43,934 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 78.49 | 40.81 | 32.57 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 86.21 | 30.50 | 11.22 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 29.73 | 2.54 | 4.82 | | |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacu-ation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 41,133 | 122,890 | 80,444 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 20.74 | 48.46 | 59.63 | | |
| | Sick | Number | | | 998 | 26,215 | 10,247 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.50 | 10.34 | 7.60 | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 529 | 1004 | 278 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.27 | 0.39 | 0.20 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 42,660 | 150,109 | 90,969 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 21.51 | 59.19 | 67.43 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 23.62 | 44.24 | 23.23 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 8.15 | 3.69 | 9.97 | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 198,352 | 253,592 | 134,903 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 109.83 | 74.74 | 34.45 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 37.88 | 6.23 | 14.79 | | |

## Personnel losses for Leningrad Front
Total for 1353 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 26,789 | 64,523 | 240,747 | 332,059 |
| | | % of losses | | | 21.88 | 21.11 | 18.14 | 18.92 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 6664 | 14,225 | 90,253 | 111,142 |
| | | % of losses | | | 5.44 | 4.66 | 6.80 | 6.33 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 1971 | 3550 | 18,803 | 24,324 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.61 | 1.16 | 1.42 | 1.39 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 35,424 | 82,298 | 349,803 | 467,525 |
| | | % | of losses | | 28.93 | 26.93 | 26.36 | 26.64 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 45.71 | 72.64 | 104.85 | 89.16 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.03 | 1.64 | 2.36 | 2.01 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 67,822 | 176,583 | 705,356 | 949,761 |
| | | % of losses | | | 55.39 | 57.78 | 53.16 | 54.12 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 19,101 | 46,252 | 267,973 | 333,326 |
| | | % of losses | | | 15.61 | 15.14 | 20.20 | 18.99 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 91 | 452 | 3743 | 4286 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 87,014 | 223,287 | 977,072 | 1,287,373 |
| | | % | of losses | | 71.07 | 73.07 | 73.64 | 73.36 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 112.27 | 197.08 | 292.89 | 245.49 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 2.54 | 4.44 | 6.60 | 5.53 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 122,438 | 305,585 | 1,326,875 | 1,754,898 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 157.98 | 269.71 | 397.74 | 334.65 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.57 | 6.08 | 8.96 | 7.54 |

## Personnel losses for Leningrad Front by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 62,187 | 62,747 | 74,473 | 128,999 | 3653 |
| | | % of losses | | 18.87 | 19.65 | 19.06 | 19.37 | 7.40 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 74,280 | 14,560 | 9841 | 12,231 | 230 |
| | | % of losses | | 22.54 | 4.56 | 2.52 | 1.84 | 0.46 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 8284 | 6371 | 4431 | 3872 | 1366 |
| | | % of losses | | 2.52 | 1.99 | 1.13 | 0.58 | 2.77 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 144,751 | 83,678 | 88,745 | 145,102 | 5249 |
| | | % of losses | | 43.93 | 26.20 | 22.71 | 21.79 | 10.63 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 28.09 | 20.14 | 17.26 | 23.70 | 0.86 |
| | | | Average monthly | 6.69 | 1.68 | 1.44 | 1.97 | 0.21 |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 165,305 | 153,661 | 213,602 | 406,153 | 11,040 |
| | | % of losses | | 50.17 | 48.11 | 54.66 | 61 | 22.37 |
| | Sick | Number | | 17,712 | 80,184 | 88,263 | 114,094 | 33,073 |
| | | % of losses | | 5.37 | 25.11 | 22.58 | 17.14 | 67 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 1762 | 1861 | 184 | 478 | 1 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.53 | 0.58 | 0.05 | 0.07 | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 184,779 | 125,706 | 302,049 | 520,725 | 44,114 |
| | | % of losses | | 56.07 | 73.80 | 77.29 | 78.21 | 89.37 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 35.85 | 56.73 | 58.74 | 85.06 | 7.27 |
| | | | Average monthly | 8.53 | 4.73 | 4.89 | 7.09 | 1.73 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 329,530 | 319,384 | 390,794 | 665,827 | 49,363 |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 63.94 | 76.87 | 76 | 108.76 | 8.13 |
| | | | Average monthly | 15.22 | 6.41 | 6.33 | 9.06 | 1.94 |

## Personnel losses for Karelian Front by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | Number of losses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 14,720 | 22,927 | 8111 | 29,777 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 18.92 | 18.53 | 14.16 | 18.65 | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 18,685 | 8086 | 456 | 3318 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 24.02 | 6.53 | 0.80 | 2.08 | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 632 | 1491 | 406 | 1705 | 121 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.81 | 1.21 | 0.71 | 1.07 | 6.58 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 34,037 | 32,504 | 8973 | 34,800 | 121 |
| | | % | of losses | | 43.75 | 26.27 | 15.67 | 21.80 | 6.58 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 18.55 | 12.09 | 3.58 | 10.56 | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.64 | 1 | 0.30 | 1 | |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 37,092 | 53,849 | 15,181 | 73,873 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 47.68 | 43.53 | 26.51 | 46.27 | |
| | Sick | Number | | | 5292 | 36,202 | 32,933 | 50,258 | 1718 |
| | | % of losses | | | 6.80 | 29.27 | 57.50 | 31.48 | 93.42 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 1374 | 1154 | 185 | 714 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.77 | 0.93 | 0.32 | 0.45 | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 43,758 | 91,205 | 48,299 | 124,845 | 1718 |
| | | % | of losses | | 56.25 | 73.73 | 84.33 | 78.20 | 93.42 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 23.84 | 33.92 | 19.25 | 37.89 | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.96 | 2.83 | 1.60 | 3.61 | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 77,795 | 123,709 | 57,272 | 159,645 | 1839 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 43.29 | 46.01 | 22.83 | 48.45 | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 10.60 | 3.83 | 1.90 | 4.61 | |

## Personnel losses for Kalinin and 1st Baltic Fronts and Zemland Group of Forces
## Total for 1262 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 38,938 | 95,286 | 356,422 | 490,646 |
| | | % of losses | 24.15 | 24.22 | 22.02 | 22.58 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 6655 | 13,755 | 79,888 | 100,298 |
| | | % of losses | 4.12 | 3.50 | 4.94 | 4.62 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 1544 | 4069 | 24,572 | 30,185 |
| | | % of losses | 0.96 | 1.03 | 1.52 | 1.39 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 47,137 | 113,110 | 460,882 | 621,129 |
| | | % of losses | 29.23 | 28.75 | 24.48 | 28.59 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 66.20 | 107.52 | 147.01 | 126.79 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 1.60 | 2.60 | 3.55 | 3.06 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 97,351 | 244,001 | 955,129 | 1,296,481 |
| | | % of losses | 60.37 | 62.03 | 59.02 | 59.67 |
| | Sick | Number | 16,662 | 35,706 | 195,638 | 248,006 |
| | | % of losses | 10.34 | 9.09 | 12.09 | 11.41 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | 96 | 516 | 6663 | 7275 |
| | | % of losses | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.41 | 0.33 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 114,109 | 280,223 | 1,157,430 | 1,551,762 |
| | | % of losses | 70.77 | 71.25 | 71.52 | 71.41 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 160.27 | 266.37 | 369.20 | 316.75 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 3.87 | 6.43 | 8.92 | 7.65 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 161,246 | 393,333 | 1,618,312 | 2,172,891 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 226.47 | 373.89 | 516.21 | 443.54 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 5.47 | 9.03 | 12.47 | 10.71 |

## Personnel losses for the Kalinin and 1st Baltic Fronts and Zemland Group of Forces by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 23,186 | 221,726 | 112,753 | 115,090 | 17,891 |
| | | % of losses | 19.56 | 25.62 | 22.67 | 19.22 | 19.29 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 18,866 | 55,826 | 9429 | 13,788 | 2326 |
| | | % of losses | 15.92 | 6.45 | 1.91 | 2.30 | 2.51 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 7973 | 13,984 | 2488 | 4379 | 1361 |
| | | % of losses | 6.73 | 1.61 | 0.50 | 0.73 | 1.47 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 50,025 | 291,536 | 124,733 | 133,257 | 21,578 |
| | | % of losses | 42.21 | 33.68 | 25.08 | 22.25 | 23.27 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 25.55 | 47.97 | 26.92 | 27.12 | 6.86 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 10.65 | 4 | 2.24 | 2.26 | 2.28 |
| Sickness injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 65,491 | 507,607 | 301,602 | 367,995 | 53,786 |
| | | % of losses | 55.26 | 58.66 | 60.66 | 61.45 | 57.99 |
| | Sick | Number | 1990 | 60.534 | 70,615 | 97,519 | 17,348 |
| | | % of losses | 1.68 | 6.99 | 14.20 | 16.28 | 18.71 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | 1003 | 5818 | 297 | 124 | 33 |
| | | % of losses | 0.85 | 0.67 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 68,484 | 573,959 | 372,514 | 465,638 | 71,167 |
| | | % of losses | 57.79 | 66.32 | 74.92 | 77.75 | 76.73 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 34.98 | 94.44 | 80.38 | 94.78 | 22.64 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 14.57 | 7.87 | 6.70 | 7.90 | 7.52 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 118,509 | 865,495 | 497,427 | 598,895 | 92,745 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 60.53 | 142.41 | 107.30 | 121.90 | 29.50 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 25.22 | 11.87 | 8.94 | 10.16 | 9.80 |

# Personnel losses for the Volkhov Front (1st and 2nd times formed) Total for 746 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 17,428 | 36,027 | 145,254 | 198,709 |
| | | % of losses | | | 21.34 | 22.49 | 20.06 | 20.57 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 9788 | 14,759 | 64,776 | 89,323 |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.99 | 9.21 | 8.95 | 9.25 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 770 | 1267 | 8554 | 10,591 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.94 | 0.79 | 1.18 | 1.10 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 27,986 | 52,053 | 218,584 | 298,623 |
| | | % | of losses | | 34.27 | 32.49 | 30.19 | 30.92 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 49.53 | 75.44 | 99.31 | 86.41 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 2.02 | 3.08 | 4.05 | 3.53 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 45,705 | 94,936 | 410,073 | 550,714 |
| | | % of losses | | | 55.97 | 59.25 | 56.64 | 57.02 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 7893 | 12,919 | 90,974 | 111,786 |
| | | % of losses | | | 9.66 | 8.06 | 12.57 | 11.57 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 81 | 315 | 4338 | 4734 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.60 | 0.49 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 53,679 | 108,710 | 505,385 | 667,234 |
| | | % | of losses | | 65.73 | 67.51 | 69.81 | 69.08 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 95.01 | 156.77 | 229.62 | 193.06 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.88 | 6.40 | 9.37 | 7.88 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 81,665 | 160,223 | 723,969 | 965,857 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 144.54 | 232.21 | 328.93 | 279.47 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.90 | 9.48 | 13.42 | 11.41 |

## Personnel losses for the Volkhov Front (1st and 2nd times formed) by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 199 | 117,237 | 69,794 | 11,479 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 9.72 | 19.80 | 21.72 | 22.82 | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | 82,337 | 6520 | 466 | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 13.91 | 2.03 | 0.93 | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | 8935 | 1590 | 66 | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 1.51 | 0.49 | 0.13 | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 199 | 208,509 | 77,904 | 12,011 | |
| | | % | of losses | | 9.72 | 35.22 | 24.24 | 23.88 | |
| | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.08 | 60.07 | 22.35 | 4.10 | |
| | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | 0.16 | 5.72 | 1.86 | 2.73 | |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1307 | 326,477 | 1,895,587 | 33,343 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 63.82 | 55.14 | 58.99 | 66.28 | |
| | Sick | Number | | | | 53,081 | 53,766 | 4939 | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 8.96 | 16.73 | 9.82 | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 542 | 4034 | 147 | 11 | |
| | | % of losses | | | 26.46 | 0.68 | 0.04 | 0.02 | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1849 | 383,592 | 243,500 | 38,293 | |
| | | % | of losses | | 90.28 | 64.78 | 75.76 | 76.12 | |
| | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.76 | 110.52 | 69.87 | 13.07 | |
| | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | 1.52 | 10.53 | 5.82 | 8.71 | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 2048 | 592,101 | 321,404 | 50,304 | |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.84 | 170.59 | 92.22 | 17.17 | |
| | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | 1.68 | 16.25 | 7.68 | 11.44 | |

Personnel losses for the Caucasus Front
Total for 29 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 596<br>21.14 | 1358<br>23.42 | 5950<br>16.45 | 7904<br>17.65 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 1027<br>36.43 | 2073<br>35.75 | 17,292<br>47.82 | 20,392<br>45.53 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 141<br>5 | 305<br>5.25 | 1805<br>4.99 | 2251<br>5.03 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1764 | 3736 | 25,047 | 30,547 |
| | | % | of losses | | 62.57 | 64.42 | 69.26 | 68.21 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 3.21 | 4.85 | 6.63 | 5.99 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.21 | 4.85 | 6.63 | 5.99 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 844<br>29.94 | 1637<br>28.23 | 7068<br>19.55 | 9549<br>21.33 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 85<br>3.02 | 134<br>2.31 | 1538<br>4.25 | 1757<br>3.92 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 126<br>4.47 | 292<br>5.04 | 2511<br>6.94 | 2929<br>6.54 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1055 | 2063 | 11,117 | 14,235 |
| | | % | of losses | | 37.43 | 35.58 | 30.74 | 31.79 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.92 | 2.68 | 2.94 | 2.79 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.92 | 2.68 | 2.94 | 2.79 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 2819 | 5799 | 36,164 | 44,782 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 5.13 | 7.53 | 9.57 | 8.78 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.13 | 7.53 | 9.57 | 8.78 |

## Personnel losses for the Crimean Front
## Total for 111 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 2722 | 5952 | 22,377 | 31,051 |
| | | % of losses | | | 12.52 | 13.70 | 10.51 | 11.17 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 12,446 | 23,835 | 125,609 | 161,890 |
| | | % of losses | | | 57.27 | 54.84 | 59.02 | 58.22 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 97 | 206 | 1563 | 1866 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.73 | 0.67 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 15,265 | 29,993 | 149,549 | 194,807 |
| | | % | of losses | | 70.24 | 69.01 | 70.26 | 70.06 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 55.31 | 70.57 | 87.40 | 80.76 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 15.36 | 19.60 | 24.28 | 22.43 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 6019 | 12,925 | 56,803 | 75,747 |
| | | % of losses | | | 27.69 | 29.75 | 26.69 | 27.24 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 445 | 500 | 6026 | 6971 |
| | | % of losses | | | 2.05 | 1.15 | 2.83 | 2.51 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 5 | 41 | 472 | 518 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.19 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 6469 | 13,466 | 63,301 | 83,236 |
| | | % | of losses | | 29.76 | 30.99 | 29.74 | 29.94 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 23.44 | 31.69 | 37.0 | 34.51 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 6.51 | 8.80 | 10.28 | 9.59 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 21,734 | 43,459 | 212,850 | 278,043 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 78.75 | 102.26 | 124.40 | 115.27 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 21.87 | 28.40 | 34.56 | 32.02 |

# Personnel losses for the Transcaucasus Front (2nd time formed)
## Total for 320 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 7022 | 14,213 | 51,454 | 72,689 |
| | | % of losses | 21.82 | 22.41 | 18.99 | 19.83 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 5120 | 10,419 | 56,790 | 72,329 |
| | | % of losses | 15.90 | 16.43 | 20.95 | 19.73 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 532 | 1161 | 7447 | 9140 |
| | | % of losses | 1.65 | 1.83 | 2.75 | 2.49 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 12,674 | 25,793 | 115,691 | 154,158 |
| | | % of losses | 39.37 | 40.67 | 42.69 | 42.05 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 9.17 | 14.28 | 17.41 | 15.68 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 0.87 | 1.36 | 1.66 | 1.49 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 16,594 | 32,288 | 122,637 | 171,519 |
| | | % of losses | 51.55 | 50.92 | 45.26 | 46.79 |
| | Sick | Number | 2740 | 4610 | 29,459 | 36,809 |
| | | % of losses | 8.51 | 7.27 | 10.87 | 10.04 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | 180 | 721 | 3207 | 4108 |
| | | % of losses | 0.56 | 1.14 | 1.18 | 1.12 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 19,514 | 37,619 | 155,303 | 212,436 |
| | | % of losses | 60.63 | 59.33 | 57.31 | 57.95 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 14.12 | 20.83 | 23.37 | 21.60 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 1.35 | 1.98 | 2.22 | 2.06 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 32,188 | 63,412 | 270,994 | 366,594 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 23.29 | 35.11 | 40.78 | 37.28 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 2.22 | 3.34 | 3.88 | 3.55 |

## Personnel losses for the Transcaucasus Front (2nd time formed) by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | Number oflosses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | | 61,569 | 11,120 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 19.82 | 19.89 | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | 69,540 | 2789 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 22.38 | 4.99 | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | 8235 | 905 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 2.65 | 1.62 | | |
| | Total of irrecov-erable losses | Number | | | | 139,344 | 144,814 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | | 44.85 | 26.50 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | 13.17 | 2.16 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | | 1.73 | 0.74 | | |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacu-ation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | | 14,250 | 27,269 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 46.43 | 48.77 | | |
| | Sick | Number | | | | 25,395 | 11,414 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 8.17 | 20.42 | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | 1696 | 2412 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.55 | 4.31 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | 171,341 | 41,095 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | | 55.15 | 73.50 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | 16.20 | 5.99 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | | 2.13 | 2.07 | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | 310,685 | 55,909 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | | 100 | 100 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | 29.37 | 8.15 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | | 3.86 | 2.81 | | |

## Personnel losses for the Northern Caucasus Front (1st time formed)
## Total for 107 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 1543 | 2545 | 10,055 | 14,143 |
| | | % of losses | | | 15.23 | 13.01 | 10.54 | 11.31 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 4640 | 9958 | 54,277 | 68,875 |
| | | % of losses | | | 45.81 | 50.92 | 56.89 | 55.06 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 313 | 872 | 5134 | 6319 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.09 | 4.46 | 5.38 | 5.05 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 6496 | 13,375 | 69,466 | 89,337 |
| | | % | of losses | | 64.13 | 68.39 | 72.81 | 71.42 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 21.51 | 31.92 | 51.15 | 42.97 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 6.15 | 9.12 | 14.62 | 12.28 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 3256 | 5257 | 21,938 | 30,451 |
| | | % of losses | | | 32.15 | 26.88 | 23 | 24.34 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 377 | 925 | 3999 | 5301 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.72 | 4.73 | 4.19 | 4.24 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 3633 | 6182 | 25,937 | 35,752 |
| | | % | of losses | | 35.87 | 31.61 | 27.19 | 28.58 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 12.03 | 14.76 | 19.10 | 17.20 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.44 | 4.22 | 5.45 | 4.91 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 10,129 | 19,557 | 95,403 | 125,089 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 33.54 | 46.68 | 70.25 | 60.17 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 9.58 | 13.34 | 20.07 | 17.19 |

Personnel losses for the Northern Caucasus Front (2nd time formed)
Total for 301 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 10,545<br>22.45 | 18,763<br>21.95 | 70,184<br>18.62 | 99,492<br>19.54 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 2018<br>4.30 | 3355<br>3.92 | 18,503<br>4.91 | 23,876<br>4.69 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 526<br>1.11 | 902<br>1.06 | 4508<br>1.20 | 5936<br>1.16 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 13,089 | 23,020 | 93,195 | 129,304 |
| | | % | of losses | | 27.86 | 26.93 | 24.73 | 25.39 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 19.50 | 27.31 | 35.11 | 31.02 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.99 | 2.79 | 3.58 | 3.17 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 25,588<br>54.47 | 50,367<br>58.93 | 210,549<br>55.87 | 89,756<br>17.62 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 8098<br>17.24 | 11,688<br>13.67 | 69,970<br>18.57 | 286,504<br>56.26 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 198<br>0.43 | 401<br>0.47 | 3126<br>0.83 | 3725<br>0.73 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 33,884 | 62,456 | 283,645 | 379,985 |
| | | % | of losses | | 72.14 | 73.07 | 75.27 | 74.61 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 50.50 | 74.09 | 106.88 | 91.17 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.15 | 7.56 | 10.91 | 9.30 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 46,973 | 85,476 | 376,840 | 509,289 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 70.00 | 101.40 | 141.99 | 122.19 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 7.14 | 10.35 | 14.49 | 12.47 |

## Personnel losses for the Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian Fronts
## Total for 1036 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 45,533 | 111,337 | 344,528 | 501,398 |
| | | % of losses | | | 22.20 | 21.41 | 18.37 | 19.28 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 12,881 | 33,368 | 135,876 | 182,125 |
| | | % of losses | | | 6.28 | 6.42 | 7.24 | 7 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 2334 | 5807 | 25,264 | 33,405 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.13 | 1.11 | 1.35 | 1.28 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 60,748 | 150,512 | 505,668 | 716,928 |
| | | % | of losses | | 29.61 | 28.94 | 29.96 | 27.56 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 60.87 | 94.54 | 113.05 | 101.50 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.79 | 2.78 | 3.33 | 2.98 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 124,254 | 330,993 | 1,177,271 | 1,632,518 |
| | | % of losses | | | 60.57 | 63.64 | 62.77 | 62,77 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 20,074 | 38,465 | 191,709 | 250,248 |
| | | % of losses | | | 9.79 | 7.39 | 10.22 | 9.62 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 57 | 140 | 1001 | 1198 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 144,385 | 369,598 | 1,369,981 | 1,883,964 |
| | | % | of losses | | 70.39 | 71.06 | 73.04 | 72.44 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 144.67 | 232.16 | 306.28 | 266.74 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.26 | 6.83 | 9 | 7.85 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 205,133 | 520,110 | 1,875,649 | 2,600,892 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 205.54 | 326.70 | 419.33 | 368.24 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 6.05 | 9.61 | 12.33 | 10.83 |

## Personnel losses for the Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian Fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number oflosses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 49,984 | 169,952 | 172,828 | 109,634 |
| | | % of losses | | | 19.22 | 19.73 | 18.09 | 20.72 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 46,949 | 77,333 | 45,909 | 11,934 |
| | | % of losses | | | 18.42 | 8.98 | 4.80 | 2.26 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 7849 | 12,896 | 8748 | 3912 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.08 | 1.50 | 0.92 | 0.74 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 103,782 | 260,181 | 227,485 | 125,480 |
| | | % | of losses | | 40.72 | 30.21 | 23.81 | 23.72 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | 34.17 | 46.42 | 24.22 | 12.80 |
| | | | Average monthly | | 5.89 | 3.87 | 2.02 | 3.05 |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 138,769 | 536,285 | 593,361 | 364,103 |
| | | % of losses | | | 54.44 | 62.26 | 62.09 | 68.81 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 12,265 | 64,153 | 134,361 | 39,469 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.81 | 7.45 | 14.06 | 7.46 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 68 | 668 | 404 | 58 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 151,102 | 601,106 | 728,126 | 403,630 |
| | | % | of losses | | 59.28 | 69.79 | 76.19 | 76.28 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | 49.76 | 107.25 | 77.52 | 41.17 |
| | | | Average monthly | | 8.58 | 8.94 | 6.46 | 9.80 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 254,884 | 861,287 | 955,611 | 529,110 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | 83,93 | 153.67 | 101.74 | 53.97 |
| | | | Average monthly | | 14.47 | 12.81 | 8.48 | 12.85 |

## Personnel losses for the Stalingrad (1st time formed) and Don Fronts
## Total for 218 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 11,303<br>17.09 | 22,526<br>16.25 | 82,301<br>14.02 | 116.130<br>14.66 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 25,056<br>37.90 | 50,382<br>36.35 | 223,692<br>38.10 | 299,130<br>37.77 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 571<br>0.86 | 2086<br>1.50 | 11,126<br>1.89 | 13,783<br>1.74 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 36,930 | 74,994 | 317,119 | 429,043 |
| | | % | of losses | | 55.85 | 54.10 | 54.01 | 54.17 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 56.21 | 88.64 | 113.05 | 99.59 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 7.92 | 12.49 | 15.92 | 14.03 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 27,099<br>40.98 | 60,352<br>43.53 | 248,031<br>42.24 | 335,482<br>42.36 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 2050<br>3.10 | 3188<br>2.30 | 21,133<br>3.60 | 26,371<br>3.33 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 44<br>0.07 | 94<br>0.07 | 920<br>0.15 | 1058<br>0.14 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 29,193 | 63,634 | 270,084 | 362,911 |
| | | % | of losses | | 44.15 | 45.90 | 45.99 | 45.83 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 44.43 | 75.22 | 96.29 | 84.24 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 6.26 | 10.59 | 13.56 | 11.86 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 66,123 | 138,628 | 587,203 | 791,954 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 100.64 | 163.86 | 209.34 | 183.83 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 14.18 | 23.08 | 29.48 | 25.89 |

## Personnel losses for the Stalingrad (1st time formed) and Don Fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 92,642 | 23,488 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 13.47 | 22.59 | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 297,726 | 1404 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 43.27 | 1.35 | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 12,948 | 835 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 1.88 | 0.81 | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 403,316 | 25,727 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 58.62 | 24.75 | | |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | | 88.60 | 7.19 | | |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | | 15.82 | 4.79 | | |
| Sickness injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 266,644 | 68,838 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 38.76 | 66.21 | | |
| | Sick | Number | | 17,775 | 8614 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 2.58 | 8.29 | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 270 | 788 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 0.04 | 0.75 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 284,671 | 78,240 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 41.38 | 75.25 | | |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | | 62.54 | 21.86 | | |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | | 11.17 | 14.57 | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 687,987 | 103,967 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | | |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | | 151.14 | 29.05 | | |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | | 26.99 | 19.36 | | |

## Personnel losses for the South-Eastern and Stalingrad (2nd time formed) Fronts
## Total for 147 days

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 6194 | 12,505 | 47,632 | 66,331 |
| | | % of losses | | 20.84 | 19.44 | 191.6 | 19.36 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 8931 | 20,259 | 75,300 | 104,490 |
| | | % of losses | | 30.05 | 31.50 | 30.30 | 30.50 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 352 | 1009 | 9116 | 10,477 |
| | | % of losses | | 1.18 | 1.57 | 3.67 | 3.06 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 15,477 | 33,773 | 132,048 | 181,298 |
| | | % of losses | | 52.07 | 52.51 | 53.13 | 52.92 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 30.77 | 50.33 | 62.73 | 55.29 |
| | | | Average monthly | 6.41 | 10.49 | 13.07 | 11.52 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 13,215 | 29,092 | 108,436 | 150,743 |
| | | % of losses | | 44.46 | 45.22 | 43.62 | 44 |
| | Sick | Number | | 1017 | 1406 | 7651 | 10,074 |
| | | % of losses | | 3.43 | 2.19 | 3.08 | 2.94 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 12 | 50 | 418 | 480 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.14 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 14,244 | 30,548 | 116,505 | 161,297 |
| | | % of losses | | 47.93 | 47.49 | 46.87 | 47.08 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 28.32 | 45.53 | 55.35 | 49.19 |
| | | | Average monthly | 5.90 | 9.48 | 11.53 | 10.25 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 29,721 | 64,321 | 248,553 | 342,595 |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 59,09 | 95,86 | 118.08 | 104.48 |
| | | | Average monthly | 12.31 | 19.97 | 24.60 | 21.77 |

# Personnel losses for South-Western (2nd time formed) and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts
## Total for 928 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 28,615<br>22.05 | 65,155<br>21.27 | 217,211<br>18.38 | 310,981<br>19.22 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 6851<br>5.27 | 14,994<br>4.90 | 61,714<br>5.22 | 83,559<br>5.16 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 1025<br>0.79 | 2634<br>0.86 | 12,177<br>1.03 | 15,836<br>0.98 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 36,491 | 82,783 | 291,102 | 410,376 |
| | | % | of losses | | 28.11 | 27.03 | 24.63 | 25.36 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 50.33 | 80.30 | 94.64 | 84.93 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.66 | 2.64 | 3.11 | 2.79 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 76,101<br>58.63 | 193,069<br>63.04 | 746,988<br>-63.20 | 1,016,158<br>62.80 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 17,042<br>13.13 | 29,684<br>9.69 | 139,645<br>11.81 | 186,371<br>11.52 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 167<br>0.13 | 731<br>0.24 | 4198<br>0.36 | 5096<br>0.32 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 93,310 | 223,484 | 890,831 | 1,207,625 |
| | | % | of losses | | 71.89 | 72.97 | 75.37 | 74.64 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 128.70 | 216.76 | 289.61 | 249.92 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.23 | 7.13 | 9.53 | 8.22 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 129,801 | 306,267 | 1,181,933 | 1,018,001 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 179.03 | 297.06 | 384.25 | 334.85 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.89 | 9.77 | 12.64 | 11.01 |

Personnel losses for the South-Western (2nd time formed) and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number oflosses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 32,265 | 136,178 | 94,365 | 48,173 |
| | | % of losses | | | 21.77 | 19.98 | 17.56 | 19.22 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 6543 | 48,391 | 12,223 | 16.402 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.41 | 7.10 | 2.27 | 6.54 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 3790 | 4401 | 5487 | 2158 |
| | | % of losses | | | 2.56 | 0.65 | 1.02 | 0.86 |
| | Total of irrecov-erable losses | Number | | | 42,598 | 188,970 | 112,075 | 66,733 |
| | | % of losses | | | 28.74 | 27.73 | 20.85 | 26.62 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | 12.70 | 38.12 | 22.87 | 12.70 |
| | | | Average monthly | | 5.77 | 3.18 | 1.91 | 3.02 |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacu-ation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 97,707 | 431,710 | 327,742 | 158,999 |
| | | % of losses | | | 65.91 | 63.34 | 60.97 | 63.43 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 5651 | 58,642 | 97,588 | 24,490 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.81 | 8.60 | 18.15 | 9.77 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 2285 | 2227 | 136 | 448 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.54 | 0.33 | 0.03 | 0.18 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 105,643 | 402,579 | 425,566 | 183,037 |
| | | % of losses | | | 71.26 | 59.07 | 79.15 | 73.38 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | 31.49 | 99.37 | 86.80 | 35.01 |
| | | | Average monthly | | 14.32 | 8.28 | 7.23 | 8.34 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 148,241 | 681,549 | 537,541 | 250,670 |
| | | % of losses | | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | 44.19 | 137.49 | 109.67 | 47.41 |
| | | | Average monthly | | 20.09 | 11.46 | 9.14 | 11.36 |

Personnel losses for the Southern (2nd time formed) and 4th Ukrainian (1st and 2nd time formed) Fronts
Total for 795 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 21,911 | 46,199 | 174,791 | 242,901 |
| | | % of losses | | | 21.86 | 21.04 | 18.41 | 19.13 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 4971 | 10,813 | 41,045 | 56,829 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.96 | 4.92 | 4.32 | 4.48 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 994 | 3085 | 13,309 | 17,388 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.99 | 1.41 | 1.40 | 1.37 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 27,876 | 60,097 | 229,145 | 317,118 |
| | | % | of losses | | 27.81 | 27.37 | 24.13 | 24.98 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 44.07 | 68.09 | 87.24 | 76.57 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.69 | 2.61 | 3.34 | 2.93 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 60,830 | 19,329 | 97,165 | 127,854 |
| | | % of losses | | | 60.69 | 8.81 | 10.23 | 10.07 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 11,360 | 139,711 | 620,296 | 820,837 |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.33 | 63.63 | 65.32 | 64.66 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 172 | 421 | 3061 | 3654 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.32 | 0.29 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 72,362 | 159,461 | 720,522 | 952,345 |
| | | % | of losses | | 72.19 | 72.63 | 75.87 | 75.02 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 114.41 | 180.67 | 274.33 | 229.95 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.38 | 6.92 | 10.51 | 8.81 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 100,238 | 219,558 | 949,667 | 1,269,463 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 158.48 | 248.76 | 361.57 | 306.52 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 6.07 | 9.53 | 13.85 | 11.74 |

## Personnel losses for Southern (2nd time formed) and 4th Ukrainian (1st and 2nd time formed) Fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | Number of losses by years: 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 150,026 | 58,209 | 34.666 |
| | | % of losses | | | 19.59 | 18.11 | 19.02 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 48,583 | 5542 | 2704 |
| | | % of losses | | | 6.34 | 1.73 | 1.48 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 13,553 | 2626 | 1209 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.77 | 0.82 | 0.66 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 212,162 | 66,377 | 38,579 |
| | | % of losses | | | 27.70 | 20.66 | 21.16 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | | | 43.29 | 18.02 | 11.59 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | 3.61 | 1.82 | 2.76 |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 488,227 | 206,611 | 125,999 |
| | | % of losses | | | 63.75 | 64.30 | 69.12 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 62,646 | 47,804 | 17,404 |
| | | % of losses | | | 8.18 | 14.87 | 9.55 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 2784 | 550 | 320 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.37 | 0.17 | 0.17 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 553,657 | 254,965 | 143,732 |
| | | % of losses | | | 72.30 | 79.34 | 78.84 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | | | 112.98 | 69.23 | 43.17 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | 9.41 | 6.99 | 10.28 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 765,819 | 321,342 | 182,302 |
| | | % of losses | | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | | | 156.27 | 87.25 | 54.76 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | | | 13.02 | 8.81 | 13.04 |

## Personnel losses for Reserve, (2nd time formed), Kursk, Orel, and Bryansk (3rd time formed) Fronts
## Total for 213 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 6685 | 18,498 | 48,514 | 73,697 |
| | | % of losses | | | 27.67 | 25.93 | 21.78 | 23.16 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 312 | 1407 | 6473 | 8192 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.29 | 1.97 | 2.91 | 2.57 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 91 | 207 | 1010 | 1308 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0.41 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 7088 | 20,112 | 55,997 | 83,197 |
| | | % | of losses | | 29.34 | 28.19 | 25.14 | 26.14 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 11 | 21.45 | 20.44 | 19.25 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.57 | 3.07 | 2.92 | 2.75 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 15,969 | 48,920 | 149,848 | 214,737 |
| | | % of losses | | | 66.09 | 68.58 | 67.26 | 67.47 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 1104 | 2301 | 16,927 | 20,332 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.57 | 3.23 | 7.60 | 6.39 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | - | - | - | - |
| | | % of losses | | | - | - | - | - |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 17,073 | 51,221 | 166,775 | 235,069 |
| | | % | of losses | | 70.66 | 71.81 | 74.86 | 73.86 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 26.49 | 54.63 | 60.88 | 54.40 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.78 | 7.80 | 8.70 | 7.77 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 24,161 | 71,333 | 222,772 | 318,266 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 37.49 | 76.08 | 81.32 | 73.65 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.35 | 10.87 | 1162 | 10.52 |

## Personnel losses for Steppe and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts
## Total for 671 days

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 25,321 | 57,558 | 207,779 | 290,658 |
| | | % of losses | | 21.37 | 20.40 | 17.63 | 18.41 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 5141 | 14.024 | 51,481 | 70,646 |
| | | % of losses | | 4.34 | 4.98 | 4.37 | 4.47 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 818 | 2069 | 6199 | 9086 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.69 | 0.73 | 0.52 | 0.57 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 31,280 | 73,651 | 265,459 | 370,390 |
| | | % | of losses | 26.40 | 26.11 | 22.52 | 23.45 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 33.71 | 52.91 | 64.62 | 57.62 |
| | | | Average monthly | 1.53 | 2.41 | 2.94 | 2.62 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 69,973 | 178,094 | 764,871 | 1,012,938 |
| | | % of losses | | 59.05 | 63.13 | 64.90 | 64.15 |
| | Sick | Number | | 17,199 | 30,334 | 148,009 | 195,542 |
| | | % of losses | | 14.52 | 10.75 | 12.56 | 12.38 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 35 | 28 | 230 | 293 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 87,207 | 208,456 | 913,110 | 1,208,773 |
| | | % | of losses | 73.60 | 73.89 | 77.48 | 76.55 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 93.97 | 149.75 | 222.28 | 188.05 |
| | | | Average monthly | 4.27 | 6.80 | 10.10 | 8.65 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 118,487 | 282,107 | 1,178,569 | 1,579,163 |
| | | % | of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 127.68 | 202.66 | 286.90 | 245.67 |
| | | | Average monthly | 5.80 | 9.21 | 13.04 | 11.17 |

## Personnel losses for Steppe and 2nd Ukrainian fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number of losses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | | 118,995 | 131,318 | 40,345 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 19.54 | 17.68 | 17.74 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | 40,462 | 23,943 | 6241 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 6.64 | 3.22 | 2.75 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | 3642 | 3937 | 1507 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.06 | 0.53 | 0.66 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | | 163,099 | 159,198 | 48,093 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 26.78 | 21.43 | 21.15 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 32.25 | 21.65 | 8.22 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | 5.56 | 1.81 | 1.96 |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | | 415,395 | 456,080 | 141,463 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 68.20 | 61.41 | 62.21 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | 30,489 | 127,256 | 37,797 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 5.01 | 17.13 | 16.62 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | 60 | 194 | 39 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | 445,944 | 585,530 | 179,299 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 73.22 | 78.57 | 78.85 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 88.18 | 79.35 | 30.65 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | 15.20 | 6.61 | 7.30 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | 609,043 | 742,728 | 227,392 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 120.43 | 101 | 38.87 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | 20.76 | 8.42 | 9.26 |

## Personnel losses for Baltic and 2nd Baltic Fronts
## Total for 539 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 15,728<br>21.54 | 35,707<br>20.85 | 115,804<br>18.67 | 167,239<br>19.35 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 1358<br>1.86 | 1668<br>0.97 | 10,092<br>1.63 | 13,118<br>1.52 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 370<br>0.51 | 967<br>0.57 | 3566<br>0.58 | 4903<br>0.57 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 17,456 | 38,342 | 129,462 | 185,260 |
| | | % | of losses | | 23.91 | 22.39 | 20.88 | 21.43 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 24.45 | 36.24 | 47.53 | 41.21 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.38 | 2.05 | 2.69 | 2.33 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 44,810<br>61.37 | 108,806<br>63.53 | 379,943<br>61.27 | 533,559<br>61.72 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 10,732<br>14.70 | 24,051<br>14.04 | 110,523<br>17.82 | 145,306<br>16.81 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 15<br>0.02 | 70<br>0.04 | 218<br>0.03 | 303<br>0.04 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 55,557 | 132,927 | 490,684 | 679,168 |
| | | % | of losses | | 76.09 | 77.61 | 79.12 | 78.57 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 77.81 | 125.64 | 180.13 | 151.06 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.40 | 7.10 | 10.17 | 8.53 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 73,013 | 171,269 | 620,146 | 864,428 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 102.26 | 161.88 | 227.66 | 192.27 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.78 | 9.15 | 12.86 | 10.86 |

## Personnel losses for the Baltic and 2nd Baltic Fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number of losses by years | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | | 22,133 | 110,710 | 34,396 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 20.96 | 19.52 | 17.94 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | 1631 | 7831 | 3656 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 1.55 | 1.38 | 1.91 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | 553 | 2823 | 1527 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.80 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | | 24,317 | 121,364 | 39,579 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 23.03 | 21.40 | 20.65 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 5.69 | 28.42 | 7.04 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | 2.11 | 2.37 | 2.35 |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | | 62,428 | 354,284 | 116,847 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 59.12 | 62.46 | 60.96 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | 18,814 | 91,302 | 35,190 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 17.82 | 16.10 | 18.36 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | 35 | 208 | 60 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | 81,277 | 445,794 | 152,097 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 76.97 | 78.60 | 79.35 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 19.03 | 104.41 | 27.03 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | 7.05 | 8.70 | 9.01 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | 105,594 | 567,158 | 191,676 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 24.72 | 132.83 | 34.07 |
| | | | Average monthly | | | 9.16 | 11.07 | 11.36 |

## Personnel losses for the Central (2nd time formed), Belorussian and 1st Belorussian Fronts
## Total for 815 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 36,866 | 90,258 | 283,804 | 410,928 |
| | | % of losses | | | 23.43 | 22.32 | 19.88 | 20.66 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 4141 | 9384 | 39,281 | 52,806 |
| | | % of losses | | | 2.63 | 2.32 | 2.76 | 2.66 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 1647 | 3986 | 15,024 | 20,57 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.05 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 1.04 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 42,654 | 103,628 | 338,109 | 484,391 |
| | | % | of losses | | 27.11 | 25.63 | 23.69 | 24.36 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 37.32 | 56.60 | 68.08 | 61.00 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.40 | 2.12 | 2.55 | 2.28 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 94,945 | 261,030 | 909,182 | 1,265,157 |
| | | % of losses | | | 60.36 | 64.56 | 63.71 | 63.62 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 19,701 | 39,599 | 179,344 | 238,644 |
| | | % of losses | | | 121.52 | 9.79 | 12.57 | 11.99 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 15 | 70 | 474 | 559 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 114,661 | 300,699 | 1,089,000 | 1,504,360 |
| | | % | of losses | | 72.89 | 74.37 | 76.31 | 75.64 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 100.32 | 164.23 | 219.29 | 189.47 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.75 | 6.15 | 8.21 | 7.10 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 157,15 | 404,327 | 1,427,109 | 1,988,751 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 137.64 | 220.83 | 287.37 | 250.47 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.15 | 8.27 | 10.76 | 9.38 |

## Personnel losses for the Central (2nd time formed), Belorussian and 1st Belorussian Fronts by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | Number of losses by years: 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | | 173,558 | 140,636 | 96,374 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 22.76 | 18.71 | 20.38 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | 31,114 | 16,321 | 5371 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 4.08 | 2.17 | 1.13 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | 7428 | 9087 | 4142 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.98 | 1.21 | 0.87 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | | 212,100 | 166,044 | 106,247 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 27.82 | 22.09 | 22.38 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 34.26 | 19.45 | 10.26 |
| | | % of number of personnel | Average monthly | | | 3.26 | 1.62 | 2.44 |
| Sicknessi njury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | | 489,514 | 454,419 | 321,224 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 64.19 | 60.47 | 67.67 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | 60,447 | 130,981 | 47,216 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 7.93 | 17.43 | 9.95 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | 475 | 59 | 25 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.06 | 0.01 | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | 550,436 | 585,459 | 368,465 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 72.18 | 77.91 | 77.62 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 88.90 | 68.58 | 35.59 |
| | | % of number of personnel | Average monthly | | | 8.47 | 5.72 | 8.47 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | 762,536 | 751,503 | 474,712 |
| | | % | of losses | | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | 123.16 | 88.03 | 45.85 |
| | | % of number of personnel | Average monthly | | | 11.73 | 7.34 | 10.91 |

## Personnel losses for 2nd Belorussian Front (1st time formed)
## Total for 42 days (1944)

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 406 | 1119 | 3462 | 4987 |
| | | % of losses | | | 25 | 24.35 | 21.58 | 22.40 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 28 | 108 | 315 | 451 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.72 | 2.35 | 1.96 | 2.02 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 6 | 15 | 63 | 84 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.38 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 440 | 1242 | 3840 | 5522 |
| | | % | of losses | | 27.09 | 27.03 | 23.93 | 24.80 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.81 | 3.43 | 3.29 | 3.11 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.39 | 2.64 | 2.53 | 2.40 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 991 | 3027 | 10,404 | 14.422 |
| | | % of losses | | | 61.02 | 65.88 | 64.85 | 64.78 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 193 | 326 | 1800 | 2319 |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.89 | 7.09 | 11.22 | 10.42 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1184 | 3353 | 12,204 | 16,741 |
| | | % | of losses | | 72.91 | 72.97 | 76.07 | 75.20 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 4.87 | 9.26 | 10.45 | 9.44 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.75 | 7.12 | 8.04 | 7.26 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 1624 | 4595 | 16,044 | 22,263 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 6.68 | 12.69 | 13.74 | 12.55 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 5.14 | 9.76 | 10.57 | 9.66 |

## Personnel losses for 2nd Belorussian Front (2nd time formed)
## Total for 381 days

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Types of losses</th><th>Officers</th><th>Sergeants</th><th>Soldiers</th><th>Total</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="7">Irrecoverable losses</td><td>Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation</td><td colspan="3">Number<br>% of losses</td><td>11,676<br>23.03</td><td>26,474<br>21.30</td><td>82,950<br>18.19</td><td>121,100<br>19.20</td></tr>
<tr><td>Missing in action, taken prisoner</td><td colspan="3">Number<br>% of losses</td><td>802<br>1.57</td><td>1294<br>1.04</td><td>7255<br>1.59</td><td>9351<br>1.48</td></tr>
<tr><td>Noncombat losses</td><td colspan="3">Number<br>% of losses</td><td>557<br>1.10</td><td>1178<br>0.95</td><td>3911<br>0.86</td><td>5646<br>0.89</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Total of irrecoverable losses</td><td colspan="3">Number</td><td>13,035</td><td>28,946</td><td>94,116</td><td>136,097</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">%</td><td colspan="2">of losses</td><td>25.70</td><td>23.29</td><td>20.64</td><td>21.57</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">of number of personnel</td><td>All losses</td><td>16.36</td><td>21.84</td><td>27.36</td><td>24.47</td></tr>
<tr><td>Average monthly</td><td>1.31</td><td>1.75</td><td>2.19</td><td>1.96</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="7">Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital)</td><td>Wounded, injured and burned</td><td colspan="3">Number<br>% of losses</td><td>30,513<br>60.17</td><td>80,392<br>64.68</td><td>289,777<br>63.56</td><td>400,682<br>63.51</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sick</td><td colspan="3">Number<br>% of losses</td><td>7157<br>14.12</td><td>14,948<br>12.02</td><td>71,965<br>15.79</td><td>94,070</td></tr>
<tr><td>Frost bitten</td><td colspan="3">Number<br>% of losses</td><td>5<br>0.01</td><td>15<br>0.01</td><td>33<br>0.01</td><td>53<br>0.01</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Total of sick, injury and wounded losses</td><td colspan="3">Number</td><td>37,675</td><td>95,355</td><td>361,775</td><td>494,805</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">%</td><td colspan="2">of losses</td><td>74.30</td><td>76.71</td><td>79.36</td><td>78.43</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">of number of personnel</td><td>All losses</td><td>47.27</td><td>71.97</td><td>105.17</td><td>88.96</td></tr>
<tr><td>Average monthly</td><td>3.78</td><td>5.75</td><td>8.41</td><td>7.12</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="4">Total of losses</td><td colspan="3">Number</td><td>50,710</td><td>124,301</td><td>455,891</td><td>630,902</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">%</td><td colspan="2">of losses</td><td>100</td><td>100</td><td>100</td><td>100</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">of number of personnel</td><td>All losses</td><td>63.63</td><td>93.81</td><td>132.53</td><td>113.43</td></tr>
<tr><td>Average monthly</td><td>5.09</td><td>7.50</td><td>10.60</td><td>9.08</td></tr>
</table>

Personnel losses for the 2nd Belorussian Front (2nd time formed)
by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 40,138<br>16.81 | 80,962<br>20.65 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 3430<br>1.44 | 5921<br>1.51 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 2592<br>1.08 | 3054<br>0.78 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | | | | 46,160 | 89,937 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 19.33 | 22.94 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 10.17 | 12.49 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 1.23 | 2.97 |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 136,645<br>57.23 | 38,107<br>9.72 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 55,963<br>23.44 | 264,037<br>67.33 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 12 | 41<br>0.01 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | | | 192,620 | 302,185 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 80.67 | 77.06 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 42.44 | 41.96 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 5.11 | 9.99 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | | | 238,780 | 392,122 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | | 52.61 | 54.45 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | | 6.34 | 12.96 |

## Personnel losses for the 3rd Baltic Front
## Total for 179 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 3773 | 7814 | 28,123 | 39,710 |
| | | % of losses | 22.39 | 22.53 | 19.33 | 20.15 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 225 | 308 | 2000 | 2533 |
| | | % of losses | 1.33 | 0.89 | 1.38 | 1.29 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 80 | 154 | 678 | 912 |
| | | % of losses | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.46 | 0.46 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 4078 | 8276 | 30,801 | 43,155 |
| | | % of losses | 24.19 | 23.87 | 21.17 | 21.90 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 9.08 | 13.22 | 17.87 | 15.42 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 1.57 | 2.28 | 3.08 | 2.66 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 10,867 | 22,961 | 96,599 | 130,427 |
| | | % of losses | 64.47 | 66.22 | 66.39 | 66.20 |
| | Sick | Number | 1910 | 3439 | 18,100 | 23,449 |
| | | % of losses | 11.34 | 9.91 | 12.44 | 11.90 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 12,777 | 26,400 | 114,699 | 153,876 |
| | | % of losses | 75.81 | 76.13 | 78.83 | 78.10 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 28.46 | 42.17 | 66.53 | 54.97 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 4.90 | 7.27 | 11.47 | 9.48 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 16,855 | 34,676 | 145,500 | 197,031 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 37.54 | 55.39 | 84.40 | 70.39 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 6.47 | 9.55 | 14.55 | 12.14 |

## Personnel losses for Transbaykal Front
## Total for 25 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 162 | 566 | 955 | 1683 |
| | | % of losses | | | 23.28 | 25.88 | 17.37 | 20.08 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 5 | 8 | 10 | 23 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.72 | 0.37 | 0.18 | 0.27 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 74 | 168 | 280 | 522 |
| | | % of losses | | | 10.63 | 7.68 | 5.09 | 6.23 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 241 | 742 | 1245 | 2228 |
| | | % | of losses | | 34.63 | 33.93 | 22.64 | 26.58 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.30 | 0.48 | 0.31 | 0.35 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.30 | 0.48 | 0.31 | 0.35 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 271 | 983 | 1905 | 3159 |
| | | % of losses | | | 38.93 | 44.95 | 34.63 | 37.68 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 184 | 462 | 2350 | 2996 |
| | | % of losses | | | 26.44 | 21.12 | 42.73 | 35.74 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 455 | 1445 | 4255 | 6155 |
| | | % | of losses | | 65.37 | 66.07 | 77.36 | 73.42 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.58 | 0.94 | 1.05 | 0.96 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.58 | 0.94 | 1.05 | 0.96 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 696 | 2187 | 5500 | 8383 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.88 | 1.42 | 1.36 | 1.31 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.88 | 1.42 | 1.36 | 1.31 |

## Personnel losses for 1st Far Eastern Front
## Total for 25 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 603 | 1657 | 2894 | 5154 |
| | | % of losses | | | 30.27 | 26.53 | 22.55 | 24.46 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 39 | 109 | 233 | 381 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.96 | 1.74 | 1.82 | 1.81 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 137 | 201 | 451 | 789 |
| | | % of losses | | | 6.88 | 3.22 | 3.52 | 3.75 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 779 | 1967 | 3578 | 6324 |
| | | % | of losses | | 39.11 | 31.49 | 27.89 | 30.02 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.03 | 1.28 | 1 | 1.08 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.03 | 1.28 | 1 | 1.08 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1097 | 3824 | 8037 | 12,958 |
| | | % of losses | | | 55.07 | 61.22 | 62.63 | 61.50 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 116 | 455 | 1216 | 1787 |
| | | % of losses | | | 5.82 | 7.29 | 9.48 | 8.48 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1213 | 4279 | 9253 | 14,745 |
| | | % | of losses | | 60.89 | 68.51 | 72.11 | 69.98 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.60 | 2.78 | 2.59 | 2.51 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.60 | 2.78 | 2.59 | 2.51 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 1992 | 6246 | 12,831 | 21.069 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 2.63 | 4.06 | 3.59 | 3.59 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 2.63 | 4.06 | 3.59 | 3.59 |

## Personnel losses for the 2nd Far Eastern Front
## Total for 25 days

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 224 | 564 | 1220 | 2008 |
| | | % of losses | | 40.0 | 28.91 | 39.71 | 35.97 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 3 | 67 | 342 | 412 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.53 | 3.43 | 11.13 | 7.38 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 1 | 9 | 19 | 29 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.18 | 0.46 | 0.62 | 0.52 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 228 | 640 | 1581 | 2449 |
| | | % of losses | | 40.71 | 32.80 | 51.46 | 43.87 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 0.51 | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.73 |
| | | | Average monthly | 0.51 | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.73 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 330 | 1308 | 1474 | 3112 |
| | | % of losses | | 58.93 | 67.04 | 47.98 | 55.74 |
| | Sick | Number | | 2 | 3 | 17 | 22 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.36 | 0.16 | 0.56 | 0.39 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 332 | 1311 | 1491 | 3134 |
| | | % of losses | | 59.29 | 67.20 | 48.54 | 56.13 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 0.73 | 1.53 | 0.73 | 0.93 |
| | | | Average monthly | 0.73 | 1.53 | 0.73 | 0.93 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 560 | 1951 | 3072 | 5583 |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 1.24 | 2.28 | 1.51 | 1.66 |
| | | | Average monthly | 1.24 | 2.28 | 1.51 | 1.66 |

## Personnel losses for troops of the Moscow Defense Zone
### Total for 667 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 94 | 132 | 668 | 894 |
| | | % of losses | 18.95 | 11.11 | 9.28 | 10.06 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 17 | 55 | 668 | 740 |
| | | % of losses | 3.43 | 4.63 | 9.28 | 8.33 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 60 | 288 | 1104 | 1452 |
| | | % of losses | 12.10 | 24.24 | 15.33 | 16.35 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 171 | 475 | 2440 | 3086 |
| | | % of losses | 34.48 | 39.98 | 33.89 | 34.74 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 1.54 | 2.45 | 3.95 | 3.35 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.15 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 157 | 214 | 896 | 1267 |
| | | % of losses | 31.65 | 18.02 | 12.45 | 14.26 |
| | Sick | Number | 168 | 498 | 3858 | 4524 |
| | | % of losses | 33.87 | 41.92 | 53.59 | 50.93 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| | | % of losses | | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 325 | 713 | 4759 | 5797 |
| | | % of losses | 65.52 | 60.02 | 66.11 | 65.26 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 2.93 | 3.67 | 7.71 | 6.29 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 0.29 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 496 | 1188 | 7199 | 8883 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel: All losses | 4.47 | 6.12 | 11.66 | 9.64 |
| | | % of number of personnel: Average monthly | 0.20 | 0.28 | 0.53 | 0.44 |

## Personnel losses for the troops of the Moscow Defense Zone by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 477 | 376 | 41 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 28.16 | 13.09 | 0.95 | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 739 | | 1 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 43.62 | | 0.02 | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 9 | 790 | 653 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.53 | 27.49 | 15.13 | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1225 | 1166 | 695 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 72.31 | 40.58 | 16.10 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.79 | 0.98 | 1.27 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.79 | 0.08 | 0.14 | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 452 | 751 | 64 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 26.68 | 26.14 | 1.48 | | |
| | Sick | Number | | | 15 | 956 | 3553 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.89 | 33.28 | 82.33 | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 2 | | 4 | | |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.12 | | 0.09 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 469 | 1707 | 3621 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 27.69 | 59.42 | 83.90 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.30 | 1.44 | 6.64 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.74 | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 1694 | 2873 | 4316 | | |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | | |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.09 | 2.42 | 7.91 | | |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.09 | 0.20 | 0.88 | | |

## Personnel losses for the 51st Independent Army
## Total for 94 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 542 | 1304 | 7634 | 9480 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | % of losses | | | 13.79 | 17.49 | 13.47 | 13.93 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 1852 | 3063 | 27,258 | 32,173 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Missing in action, taken prisoner | % of losses | | | 47.11 | 41.09 | 48.10 | 47.28 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 395 | 1023 | 9132 | 10,550 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Noncombat losses | % of losses | | | 10.05 | 13.72 | 16.12 | 15.50 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 2789 | 5390 | 44,024 | 52,203 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | % | of losses | | 70.95 | 72.30 | 77.69 | 76.71 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | % | of number of personnel | All losses | 34.43 | 42.11 | 51.43 | 49.02 |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | 11.11 | 13.58 | 16.59 | 15.81 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1030 | 1907 | 11,451 | 14,388 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | % of losses | | | 26.20 | 25.58 | 20.20 | 21.14 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Sick | Number | | | 111 | 158 | 1194 | 1463 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Sick | % of losses | | | 2.82 | 2.12 | 2.11 | 2.15 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Frost bitten | Number | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Frost bitten | % of losses | | | 0.03 | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1142 | 2065 | 12,645 | 15,852 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | % | of losses | | 29.05 | 27.70 | 22.31 | 23.29 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | % | of number of personnel | All losses | 14.10 | 16.13 | 14.77 | 14.88 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | 4.55 | 5.20 | 4.76 | 4.80 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 3931 | 7455 | 56,669 | 68,055 |
| Total of losses | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Total of losses | | % | of number of personnel | All losses | 48.53 | 58.24 | 66.20 | 63.90 |
| Total of losses | | % | of number of personnel | Average monthly | 15.66 | 18.78 | 21.35 | 20.61 |

# Personnel losses for 7th Independent Army
## Total for 883 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 1036 | 2785 | 11,971 | 15,792 |
| | | % of losses | | | 23.37 | 23.28 | 18.60 | 19.55 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 235 | 761 | 6014 | 7010 |
| | | % of losses | | | 5.30 | 6.36 | 9.34 | 8.68 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 79 | 191 | 1265 | 1535 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.78 | 1.60 | 1.97 | 1.90 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1350 | 3737 | 19,250 | 24,337 |
| | | % | of losses | | 30.45 | 31.24 | 29.91 | 30.13 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 12.74 | 20.42 | 31.77 | 27.19 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.44 | 0.71 | 1.10 | 0.94 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 2169 | 5681 | 27,455 | 35,305 |
| | | % of losses | | | 48.92 | 47.50 | 42.65 | 43.72 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 907 | 2522 | 17,250 | 20,679 |
| | | % of losses | | | 20.45 | 21.08 | 26.80 | 25.60 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 8 | 22 | 411 | 441 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.64 | 0.55 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 3084 | 8225 | 45,116 | 56,425 |
| | | % | of losses | | 69.55 | 68.76 | 70.09 | 69.87 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 29.09 | 44.95 | 74.45 | 63.05 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1 | 1.55 | 2.57 | 2.18 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 4434 | 11,962 | 64,366 | 80,762 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 41.83 | 65.37 | 106.22 | 90.24 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.44 | 2.26 | 3.67 | 3.12 |

## Personnel losses for 7th Independent Army by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 4637 | 9304 | 1781 | 70 | |
| | | % of losses | | 18.35 | 22.18 | 14.04 | 8.28 | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 5609 | 1289 | 110 | 2 | |
| | | % of losses | | 22.19 | 3.07 | 0.87 | 0.24 | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 346 | 908 | 268 | 13 | |
| | | % of losses | | 1.37 | 2.16 | 2.11 | 1.54 | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 10,592 | 11,501 | 2159 | 85 | |
| | | % of losses | | 41.91 | 27.41 | 17.02 | 10.06 | |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 14.16 | 11.77 | 2.49 | 0.10 | |
| | | | Average monthly | 4.42 | 0.98 | 0.21 | 0.05 | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 13,112 | 19,023 | 3072 | 98 | |
| | | % of losses | | 51.88 | 45.34 | 24.21 | 11.60 | |
| | Sick | Number | | 1245 | 11,343 | 7429 | 662 | |
| | | % of losses | | 4.93 | 27.04 | 58.56 | 78.34 | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | 325 | 89 | 27 | | |
| | | % of losses | | 1.28 | 0.21 | 0.21 | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 14,682 | 30,455 | 10.528 | 760 | |
| | | % of losses | | 58.09 | 72.59 | 82.98 | 89.94 | |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 19.62 | 31.16 | 12.15 | 0.90 | |
| | | | Average monthly | 6.13 | 2.60 | 1.01 | 0.50 | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 25,274 | 41,956 | 12,687 | 845 | |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 33.78 | 42.93 | 14.64 | 1 | |
| | | | Average monthly | 10.55 | 3.58 | 1.22 | 0.55 | |

## Personnel losses for 52nd Independent Army
## Total for 81 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | 225<br>19.72 | 521<br>20.60 | 2811<br>15.51 | 3557<br>16.32 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | 293<br>25.68 | 989<br>39.11 | 8356<br>46.10 | 9638<br>44.22 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 23<br>2.01 | 166<br>6.56 | 375<br>2.07 | 564<br>2.59 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 541 | 1676 | 11,542 | 13,759 |
| | | % | of losses | | 47.41 | 66.27 | 63.68 | 63.13 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 10.02 | 22.35 | 29.22 | 26.26 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.85 | 8.59 | 11.24 | 10.10 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | 540<br>47.33 | 818<br>32.35 | 6077<br>33.53 | 7435<br>34.12 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 55<br>4.82 | 23<br>0.91 | 411<br>2.27 | 489<br>2.24 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | 5<br>0.44 | 12<br>0.47 | 94<br>0.52 | 111<br>0.51 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 600 | 853 | 6582 | 8035 |
| | | % | of losses | | 52.59 | 33.73 | 36.32 | 36.87 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 11.11 | 11.37 | 16.66 | 15.33 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.27 | 4.37 | 6.41 | 5.90 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 1141 | 2529 | 18,124 | 21,794 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 21.13 | 33.72 | 45.88 | 41.59 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 8.12 | 12.96 | 17.65 | 16 |

# Personnel losses for 4th Independent Army
## Total for 80 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 692 | 1578 | 8676 | 10,946 |
| | | % of losses | | | 26.45 | 27.56 | 24.25 | 24.81 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 205 | 510 | 4675 | 5390 |
| | | % of losses | | | 7.84 | 8.91 | 13.06 | 12.21 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 102 | 220 | 1085 | 1407 |
| | | % of losses | | | 7.84 | 3.84 | 3.03 | 3.19 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 999 | 2308 | 14,436 | 17,743 |
| | | % | of losses | | 38.19 | 40.31 | 40.34 | 40.21 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 16.11 | 26.53 | 33.19 | 30.38 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 6.20 | 10.20 | 12.76 | 11.68 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1503 | 3215 | 19,750 | 24,468 |
| | | % of losses | | | 57.45 | 56.16 | 55.18 | 55.44 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 100 | 137 | 880 | 1117 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.82 | 2.39 | 2.46 | 2.53 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 14 | 65 | 724 | 803 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.54 | 1.14 | 2.02 | 1.82 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1617 | 3417 | 21,354 | 26,388 |
| | | % | of losses | | 61.81 | 59.69 | 59.66 | 59.79 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 26.08 | 39.28 | 49.09 | 45.19 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 10.03 | 15.11 | 18.88 | 17.38 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 2616 | 5725 | 35,790 | 44,131 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 42.19 | 65.81 | 82.28 | 75.57 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 16.23 | 25.31 | 31.64 | 29.06 |

# Personnel losses for Independent Primorskaya Army (1st time formed)
## Total for 303 days
## (Losses for period from 15 July through 1 September 1941 are included in losses for Southern front)

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 968 | 1828 | 9224 | 12,020 |
| | | % of losses | | | 7.60 | 8.98 | 7.12 | 7.39 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 8192 | 12,099 | 63,930 | 84,221 |
| | | % of losses | | | 64.32 | 59.42 | 49.36 | 51.79 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 126 | 271 | 8130 | 8527 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.99 | 1.33 | 6.28 | 5.25 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 9286 | 14,198 | 81,284 | 104,768 |
| | | % | of losses | | 72.91 | 69.73 | 62.76 | 64.43 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 122.18 | 127.91 | 147.25 | 141.77 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 12.22 | 12.79 | 14.72 | 14.18 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 3192 | 5706 | 44,322 | 53,220 |
| | | % of losses | | | 25.05 | 28.03 | 34.22 | 32.73 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 253 | 444 | 3490 | 4187 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.99 | 2.18 | 2.70 | 2.57 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 6 | 12 | 419 | 437 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.32 | 0.27 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 3451 | 6162 | 48,231 | 57,844 |
| | | % | of losses | | 27.09 | 30.27 | 37.24 | 35.57 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 45.41 | 55.51 | 87.38 | 78.27 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 4.54 | 5.55 | 8.74 | 7.83 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 12,737 | 20,360 | 129,515 | 162,612 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 167.59 | 183.42 | 234.63 | 220.04 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 16.76 | 18.34 | 23.46 | 22.01 |

## Personnel losses for Independent Primorskaya Army (1st time formed) by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 6881 | 5139 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | % of losses | | 9.87 | 5.53 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 21,350 | 62,871 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Missing in action, taken prisoner | % of losses | | 30.64 | 67.67 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Noncombat losses | Number | | 7419 | 1108 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Noncombat losses | % of losses | | 10.64 | 1.19 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 35,650 | 69,118 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | % of losses | | 51.15 | 74.39 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | % of number of personnel | All losses | 54.68 | 86.74 | | | |
| Irrecoverable losses | Total of irrecoverable losses | % of number of personnel | Average monthly | 13.67 | 14.46 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 32,977 | 20.243 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | % of losses | | 47.31 | 21.79 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Sick | Number | | 986 | 3201 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Sick | % of losses | | 1.41 | 3.45 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Frost bitten | Number | | 89 | 348 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Frost bitten | % of losses | | 0.13 | 0.37 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 34,052 | 23,792 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | % of losses | | 48.85 | 25.61 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | % of number of personnel | All losses | 52.22 | 29.86 | | | |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | % of number of personnel | Average monthly | 13.05 | 4.97 | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 69,702 | 92,910 | | | |
| Total of losses | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | | | |
| Total of losses | | % of number of personnel | All losses | 106.90 | 116.60 | | | |
| Total of losses | | % of number of personnel | Average monthly | 26.72 | 19.43 | | | |

## Personnel losses for Independent Primorskaya Army (2nd time formed)
## Total for 504 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 1327 | 2579 | 7741 | 11,647 |
| | | % of losses | | | 19.21 | 17.07 | 16.08 | 16.60 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 220 | 332 | 1111 | 1663 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.19 | 2.20 | 2.31 | 2.37 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 91 | 178 | 515 | 784 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.32 | 1.17 | 1.07 | 1.12 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1638 | 3089 | 9367 | 14,094 |
| | | % | of losses | | 23.72 | 20.44 | 19.46 | 20.09 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 11.78 | 14.37 | 16.55 | 15.32 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.71 | 0.87 | 1 | 0.93 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 2883 | 7385 | 22,093 | 32,361 |
| | | % of losses | | | 41.74 | 48.87 | 45.89 | 46.12 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 2369 | 4572 | 16,507 | 23,448 |
| | | % of losses | | | 34.30 | 30.25 | 34.29 | 33.42 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 17 | 66 | 177 | 260 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.24 | 0.44 | 0.36 | 0.37 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 5269 | 12,023 | 38,777 | 56,069 |
| | | % | of losses | | 76.28 | 79.56 | 80.54 | 79.91 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 37.91 | 55.92 | 68.51 | 60.94 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 2.30 | 3.39 | 4.15 | 3.69 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 6907 | 15,112 | 48,144 | 70,163 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 49.69 | 70.29 | 85.06 | 76.26 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 3.01 | 4.26 | 5.15 | 4.62 |

Personnel losses for Independent Primorskaya Army (2nd time formed)
by years of the war

| Types of losses | | | | | Number of losses by years: 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | 2762<br>19.84 | 8881<br>15.97 | 4<br>0.61 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | 1302<br>9.35 | 361<br>0.65 | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | 130<br>0.94 | 638<br>1.15 | 16<br>2.43 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | | | 4194 | 9880 | 20 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 30.13 | 17.77 | 3.04 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | 2 | 8.88 | 0.07 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | 1.43 | 0.81 | 0.02 |
| Sicknessinjury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hosp.) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | 6075<br>43.64 | 26,282<br>47.28 | 4<br>0.61 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | 3651<br>26.23 | 19,164<br>34.48 | 633<br>96.35 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | 260<br>0.47 | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | | | 9726 | 45,706 | 637 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 69.87 | 82.23 | 96.96 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | 4.64 | 41.11 | 2.11 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | 3.31 | 3.77 | 0.50 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | | | 13,920 | 55,586 | 657 |
| | | % | of losses | | | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | | | 6.64 | 49.99 | 2.18 |
| | | | | Average monthly | | | 4.74 | 4.58 | 0.52 |

## Personnel losses for 37th Independent Army
## Total for 146 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | | | 39<br>9.47 | 89<br>8.68 | 298<br>9.06 | 426<br>9.02 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 39 | 89 | 298 | 426 |
| | | % | of losses | | 9.47 | 8.68 | 9.06 | 9.02 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.51 | 0.47 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.09 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | 2<br>0.06 | 2<br>0.04 |
| | Sick | Number<br>% of losses | | | 373<br>90.53 | 936<br>91.32 | 2988<br>90.88 | 4297<br>90.94 |
| | Frost bitten | Number<br>% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 373 | 936 | 2990 | 4299 |
| | | % | of losses | | 90.53 | 91.32 | 90.94 | 90.98 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 3.52 | 4.36 | 5.14 | 4.76 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.73 | 0.91 | 1.07 | 0.99 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 412 | 1025 | 3288 | 4725 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 3.89 | 4.77 | 5.65 | 5.23 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.80 | 0.99 | 1.17 | 1.08 |

## Personnel losses for 14th Independent Army
## Total for 176 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 15 | 39 | 107 | 161 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.23 | 2.05 | 1.70 | 1.86 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 6 | | 2 | 8 |
| | | % of losses | | | 1.29 | | 0.03 | 0.09 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 38 | 59 | 146 | 243 |
| | | % of losses | | | 8.17 | 3.10 | 2.31 | 2.80 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 59 | 98 | 255 | 412 |
| | | % | of losses | | 12.69 | 5.15 | 4.04 | 4.75 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.60 | 0.54 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 21 | 91 | 254 | 366 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.52 | 4.78 | 4.03 | 4.22 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 384 | 1711 | 5789 | 7884 |
| | | % of losses | | | 82.58 | 89.96 | 91.82 | 90.91 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | 1 | 2 | 7 | 10 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 406 | 1804 | 6050 | 8260 |
| | | % | of losses | | 87.31 | 94.85 | 95.96 | 95.25 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 4.14 | 9.97 | 13.01 | 11.11 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.73 | 1.75 | 2.28 | 1.85 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 465 | 1902 | 6305 | 8672 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 4.74 | 10.51 | 13.56 | 11.66 |
| | | | | Average monthly | .083 | 1.84 | 2.38 | 1.95 |

**Losses for fleets and flotillas**

From the start of the war the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Ocean Fleets, the Caspian Flotilla, and also a number of river and lake flotillas which were created and disbanded depending on the situation were a part of the Navy. During the course of the war the Navy conducted active combat operations to destroy the enemy naval forces and transports, cooperated with coastal Red Army groupings, defended naval bases and major ports, landed landing forces, and guarded military and national economic sea, lake and river shipments.

The length of the conducting of combat operations by the Northern and Baltic Fleets was 1418 days, and for the Black Sea Fleet it was 1183 days. Baltic sailors and Black Sea sailors together with the ground forces conducted a lengthy defense of coastal cities and the evacuation of residents. Northern Fleet ships disrupted enemy communications lines, ensured the security of allied convoys, and landed landing forces. The Pacific Ocean Fleet actively prepared personnel for the active fleets, sent surface ships and submarines to aid the Northern Fleet, and formed naval brigades for the front. The Pacific Ocean sailors participated in the defeat of Japanese forces and landed forces in ports of North Korea, on the Kurile Islands, and Southern Sakhalin. The Amur Flotilla helped bring about the successful completion of the Manchurian offensive operation by Soviet troops.

The Azov, Dnepr, Danube, Pina, Ladoga, Onega, Volga, and Chudskoye Flotillas as well as a detachment of ships on Lake Il'men' conducted combat operations on the rivers and lakes. The length of their participation in battles is indicated in the table. The combat losses for many of them are included in the number of losses for the fleet of which they were a part.

Table 77

| Name | Periods for which it is in active army | Number of days | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Fleets | | |
| Baltic | 22 Jun 1941 - 9 May 1945 | 1418 | |
| Northern | 22 Jun 1941 - 9 May 1945 | 1418 | |
| Pacific Ocean | 9 Aug 1945 - 2 Sep 1945 | 25 | |
| Black Sea | 22 Jun 1941 - 16 Sep 1944 | 1193 | |
| | Flotillas | | |
| Azov | 22 Jul 1941 - 14 Oct 1942<br>31 May 1943 - 20 Apr 1944 | 776 | Losses indicated in Black Sea Fleet losses |
| Amur | 9 Aug 1945 - 2 Sep 1945 | 25 | |
| White Sea | 15 Aug 1941 - 9 May 1945 | 1364 | Losses indicated in Northern Fleet losses |
| Volga | 25 Jul 1942 - 2 Feb 1943 | 193 | |
| Dnepr | 14 Sep 1943 - 9 May 1945 | 604 | |
| Danube (1st and 2nd times formed) | 22 Jun 1941 - 20 Nov 1941<br>20 Apr 1944 - 9 May 1945 | 537 | |
| Caspian | 8 Aug 1942 - 2 Feb 1943 | 179 | |
| Ladoga | 25 Jun 1941 - 2 Oct 1944 | 1197 | Losses indicated in Baltic Fleet losses |
| Onega | 7 Aug 1941 - 28 Nov 1941<br>13 Dec 1942 - 10 Jul 1944 | 690 | |
| Pina | 22 Jun 1941 - 28 Sep 1941 | 99 | Losses indicated in Baltic Fleet losses |
| Chudskoye | 3 Jul 1941 - 19 Oct 1941 | 109 | |
| Navy units with central subordination | 1941 - 1942 | | |

Average monthly strength and personnel losses for active fleets and independent flotillas for period from 22 Jun 1941 through 9 May 1945 (except for Pacific Ocean Fleet and Amur Flotilla)

Table 78

| Period | | Average monthly strength | Irrecoverable losses | | | | Sick, injured wounded losses | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Number | % | | | Number | % | | | Number | |
| | | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | | | of lo |
| | | | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly | | |
| 1941 | 3rd qtr. | 260200 | 25071 | 70.28 | 9.64 | 2.92 | 10602 | 29.72 | 4.07 | 1.23 | 35673 | 1( |
| | 4th qtr. | 280600 | 34732 | 75.65 | 12.38 | 4.12 | 11178 | 24.35 | 3.98 | 1.33 | 45910 | 1( |

| Period | | Average monthly strength | Irrecoverable losses | | | | Sick, injured wounded losses | | | | All losses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Number | % | | | Number | % | | | Number | % | | |
| | | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | | | of losses | of size | |
| | | | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly | | | All losses | Average monthly |
| | Total for year | 274360 | 59803 | 73.30 | 21.80 | 3.46 | 21780 | 26.70 | 7.94 | 1.26 | 81538 | 100 | 29.74 | 4.72 |
| 1942 | 1st qtr. | 251400 | 20049 | 73.71 | 7.97 | 2.66 | 7150 | 26.29 | 2.84 | 0.95 | 27199 | 100 | 10.81 | 3.61 |
| | 2nd qtr. | 283000 | 7426 | 62.70 | 2.62 | 0.87 | 4417 | 37.30 | 1.56 | 0.52 | 11843 | 100 | 4.18 | 1.39 |
| | 3rd qtr. | 282000 | 42498 | 90.01 | 15.07 | 5.02 | 4715 | 9.99 | 1.67 | 0.56 | 47213 | 100 | 16.74 | 5.58 |
| | 4th qtr. | 274000 | 3924 | 42.82 | 1.43 | 0.48 | 5241 | 57.18 | 1.90 | 0.64 | 9165 | 100 | 3.33 | 1.12 |
| | Total for year | 284700 | 73897 | 77.44 | 25.96 | 2.16 | 21523 | 22.56 | 7.56 | 0.63 | 95420 | 100 | 33.52 | 2.79 |
| 1943 | 1st qtr. | 253800 | 2625 | 42.82 | 1.04 | 0.35 | 3541 | 57.18 | 1.40 | 0.47 | 6193 | 100 | 2.44 | 0.82 |
| | 2nd qtr. | 255460 | 2995 | 42.90 | 1.17 | 0.39 | 3987 | 57.10 | 1.56 | 0.52 | 6982 | 100 | 2.73 | 0.91 |
| | 3rd qtr. | 226800 | 2469 | 42.12 | 1.09 | 0.36 | 3393 | 57.88 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 5862 | 100 | 2.59 | 0.86 |
| | 4th qtr. | 242250 | 2653 | 31.42 | 1.10 | 0.37 | 5791 | 68.56 | 2.39 | 0.80 | 8444 | 100 | 3.49 | 1.17 |
| | Total for year | 257460 | 10769 | 39.19 | 4.18 | 0.35 | 16712 | 60.81 | 6.49 | 0.54 | 27481 | 100 | 10.67 | 0.89 |
| 1944 | 1st qtr. | 148770 | 2038 | 22.06 | 0.82 | 0.27 | 7200 | 77.94 | 2.89 | 0.96 | 9238 | 100 | 3.71 | 1.23 |
| | 2nd qtr. | 262300 | 2653 | 29.12 | 1.01 | 0.34 | 6459 | 70.88 | 2.46 | 0.82 | 9112 | 100 | 3.47 | 1.16 |
| | 3rd qtr. | 268750 | 2029 | 37.88 | 0.75 | 0.25 | 3327 | 62.12 | 1.24 | 0.41 | 5356 | 100 | 1.99 | 0.66 |
| | 4th qtr. | 295800 | 1876 | 35.26 | 0.63 | 0.21 | 3445 | 64.74 | 1.16 | 0.39 | 5321 | 100 | 1.79 | 0.60 |
| | Total for year | 273200 | 8596 | 29.61 | 3.15 | 0.26 | 20431 | 70.39 | 7.48 | 0.62 | 29027 | 100 | 10.63 | 0.88 |
| 1945 | 1st qtr. | 307900 | 386 | 9.75 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 3575 | 90.25 | 1.16 | 0.39 | 3961 | 100 | 1.29 | 0.43 |
| | 2nd qtr. | 312700 | 290 | 25.39 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 852 | 74.61 | 0.27 | 0.21 | 1142 | 100 | 0.36 | 0.28 |
| | Total for year | 311000 | 676 | 13.25 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 4427 | 86.75 | 1.42 | 0.33 | 5103 | 100 | 1.64 | 0.38 |
| Total for war | | 270000 | 153741 | 64.43 | 56.94 | 1.22 | 84873 | 35.57 | 31.43 | 0.68 | 238614 | 100 | 88.37 | 1.90 |

Personnel losses for the Baltic Fleet
Total for 1418 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 3001 | 4038 | 12,797 | 19,836 |
| | | % of losses | | | 30.38 | 27.35 | 19.11 | 21.66 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 3528 | 4920 | 24,261 | 32,709 |
| | | % of losses | | | 35.72 | 33.32 | 36.24 | 35.71 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 323 | 624 | 2398 | 3345 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.27 | 4.22 | 3.58 | 3.65 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 6852 | 9582 | 39,456 | 55,890 |
| | | % | of losses | | 69.37 | 64.89 | 58.93 | 61.02 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 48.15 | 42.16 | 64.94 | 57.20 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.03 | 0.91 | 1.4 | 1.23 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 2038 | 2530 | 20,941 | 25,509 |
| | | % of losses | | | 20.64 | 17.14 | 31.28 | 27.85 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 987 | 2654 | 6552 | 10,193 |
| | | % of losses | | | 9.99 | 17.97 | 9.79 | 11.13 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 3025 | 5184 | 27,493 | 35,702 |
| | | % | of losses | | 30.63 | 35.11 | 41.07 | 38.98 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 21.26 | 22.80 | 45.25 | 36.53 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.46 | 0.49 | 0.97 | 0.79 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 9877 | 14,766 | 66,949 | 91,592 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 69.41 | 64.96 | 110.19 | 93.73 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.49 | 1.4 | 2.37 | 2.02 |

## Personnel losses for Northern Fleet
## Total for 1418 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 1291 | 1727 | 4836 | 7854 |
| | | % of losses | | | 35.26 | 26.43 | 18.61 | 21.71 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 383 | 299 | 1061 | 1743 |
| | | % of losses | | | 10.46 | 4.58 | 4.08 | 4.81 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 141 | 224 | 943 | 1308 |
| | | % of losses | | | 3.86 | 3.43 | 3.63 | 3.62 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 1815 | 2250 | 6840 | 10,905 |
| | | % | of losses | | 49.58 | 34.44 | 26.32 | 30.14 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 18.39 | 14.08 | 13.53 | 14.27 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.4 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.31 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 635 | 1589 | 6754 | 8978 |
| | | % of losses | | | 17.34 | 24.32 | 25.99 | 24.81 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 1211 | 2695 | 12,393 | 16,299 |
| | | % of losses | | | 33.08 | 41024 | 47.69 | 45.05 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1846 | 4284 | 19,147 | 25,277 |
| | | % | of losses | | 50.42 | 65.56 | 73.68 | 69.86 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 18.70 | 26.81 | 37.87 | 33.08 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.40 | 0.58 | 0.81 | 0.71 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 3661 | 6534 | 25,987 | 36,182 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 37.09 | 40.89 | 51.40 | 47.35 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.8 | 0.88 | 1.10 | 1.02 |

Personnel losses for Pacific Ocean Fleet Total for 25 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 195 | 201 | 507 | 903 |
| | | % of losses | | | 83.33 | 73.90 | 64.02 | 69.57 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 23 | 12 | 60 | 95 |
| | | % of losses | | | 9.83 | 4.41 | 7.57 | 7.32 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number, % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 218 | 213 | 567 | 998 |
| | | % | of losses | | 93.16 | 78.31 | 71.59 | 76.89 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.16 | 0.59 | 0.52 | 0.61 |
| | | | | Avg.month | 1.16 | 0.59 | 0.52 | 0.61 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured, and burned | Number | | | 16 | 58 | 212 | 286 |
| | | % of losses | | | 6.84 | 21.32 | 26.77 | 22.03 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | 1 | 13 | 14 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 0.37 | 1.64 | 1.08 |
| | Frost bitten | Number;% of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 16 | 59 | 225 | 300[2] |
| | | % | of losses | | 6.84 | 21.69 | 28.41 | 23.11 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.18 |
| | | | | Avg month | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.18 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 234 | 272 | 792 | 1298 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 1.24 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.79 |
| | | | | Avg month | 1.24 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.79 |

[2] According to fleet reports. According to information of treatment facilities, from ships, units and subunits of the Pacific Ocean Fleet 4076 men went to hospitals, including 777 wounded and injured and 3299 sick.

## Personnel losses for Black Sea Fleet
## Total for 1183 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 3017 | 3649 | 10,276 | 16,942 |
| | | % of losses | | | 30.19 | 21.93 | 13.10 | 16.12 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 4669 | 7886 | 46,824 | 59,379 |
| | | % of losses | | | 46.71 | 47.41 | 59.69 | 56.51 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 458 | 1061 | 4554 | 6073 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.58 | 6.38 | 5.80 | 5.78 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 8144 | 12,596 | 61,654 | 82,394 |
| | | % | of losses | | 81.48 | 75.72 | 78.59 | 78.41 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 66.81 | 64.13 | 106.63 | 91.91 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.72 | 1.65 | 2.75 | 2.37 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 1587 | 3302 | 14,147 | 19,036 |
| | | % of losses | | | 15.88 | 19.85 | 18.03 | 18.12 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 264 | 738 | 2651 | 3653 |
| | | % of losses | | | 2.64 | 4.43 | 3.38 | 3.47 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 1851 | 4040 | 16,798 | 22,689 |
| | | % | of losses | | 18.52 | 24.28 | 21.41 | 21.59 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 15.18 | 20.57 | 29.05 | 25.30 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.39 | 0.53 | 0.75 | 0.65 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 9995 | 16,636 | 78,452 | 105,083 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 81.99 | 84.70 | 135.68 | 117.21 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 2.11 | 2.18 | 3.50 | 3.02 |

# Personnel losses for Amur Flotilla
## Total for 25 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 4 | 6 | 22 | 32 |
| | | % of losses | 57.14 | 17.14 | 27.16 | 26.02 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 4 | 6 | 22 | 32 |
| | | % of losses | 57.14 | 17.14 | 27.16 | 26.02 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.26 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.26 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | 3 | 16 | 28 | 47 |
| | | % of losses | 42.86 | 45.72 | 34.57 | 38.21 |
| | Sick | Number | | 13 | 31 | 44 |
| | | % of losses | | 37.14 | 38.27 | 35.77 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | 3 | 29 | 59 | 91 |
| | | % of losses | 42.86 | 82.86 | 72.84 | 73.98 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 0.18 | 0.91 | 0.77 | 0.72 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 0.18 | 0.91 | 0.77 | 0.72 |
| Total of losses | | Number | 7 | 35 | 81 | 123 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel – All losses | 0.41 | 1.10 | 1.06 | 0.98 |
| | | % of number of personnel – Average monthly | 0.41 | 1.10 | 1.06 | 0.98 |

## Personnel losses for Volga Flotilla
## Total for 193 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 43 | 65 | 164 | 272 |
| | | % of losses | | | 31.16 | 29.41 | 27.70 | 28.60 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 19 | 17 | 116 | 152 |
| | | % of losses | | | 13.77 | 7.69 | 19.60 | 15.98 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 21 | 60 | 117 | 198 |
| | | % of losses | | | 15.21 | 27.15 | 19.76 | 20.82 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 83 | 142 | 397 | 622 |
| | | % | of losses | | 60.14 | 64.25 | 67.06 | 65.40 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 6.29 | 8.02 | 8.58 | 8.06 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1 | 1.27 | 1.36 | 1.28 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 54 | 77 | 193 | 324 |
| | | % of losses | | | 39.14 | 34.85 | 32.60 | 34.08 |
| | Sick | Number | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.72 | 0.90 | 0.34 | 0.52 |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 55 | 79 | 195 | 329 |
| | | % | of losses | | 39.86 | 35.75 | 32.94 | 34.60 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 4.16 | 4.46 | 4.21 | 4.26 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.67 | 0.68 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 138 | 221 | 592 | 951 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 10.45 | 12.48 | 12.79 | 12.32 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 1.66 | 1.98 | 2.03 | 1.96 |

# Personnel losses for Dnepr Flotilla
## Total for 604 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecov-erable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 35 | 57 | 186 | 278 |
| | | % of losses | | | 79.55 | 53.27 | 57.59 | 58.65 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 3 | 6 | 17 | 26 |
| | | % of losses | | | 6.81 | 5.61 | 5.26 | 5.49 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 2 | 17 | 38 | 57 |
| | | % of losses | | | 4.55 | 15.89 | 11.76 | 12.02 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 40 | 80 | 241 | 361 |
| | | % | of losses | | 90.91 | 74.77 | 74.61 | 76.16 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 5.41 | 6.40 | 6.97 | 6.63 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.33 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 4 | 27 | 82 | 113 |
| | | % of losses | | | 9.09 | 25.23 | 25.39 | 23.84 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 4 | 27 | 82 | 113 |
| | | % | of losses | | 9.09 | 25.23 | 25.39 | 23.84 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 0.54 | 2.16 | 2.37 | 2.07 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.10 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 44 | 107 | 323 | 474 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 5.95 | 8.56 | 9.34 | 8.70 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.30 | 0.43 | 0.47 | 0.43 |

## Personnel losses for Danube Flotilla
Total for 537 days

| Types of losses[1] | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 34 | 41 | 99 | 174 |
| | | % of losses | 97.14 | 83.67 | 86.09 | 87.44 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | 1 | 8 | 16 | 25 |
| | | % of losses | 2.86 | 16.33 | 13.91 | 12.56 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 35 | 49 | 115 | 199 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel, All losses | 3 | 2.58 | 2.26 | 2.44 |
| | | % of number of personnel, Average monthly | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.14 |

[1] Because of a lack of data about the sick, injured and wounded losses, the corresponding blocks are missing from the following tables for three flotillas.

## Personnel losses for the Caspian Flotilla
Total for 179 days

| Types of losses | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | 18 | 15 | 61 | 94 |
| | | % of losses | 58.06 | 27.27 | 27.23 | 30.32 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | 13 | 40 | 163 | 216 |
| | | % of losses | 41.94 | 72.73 | 72.77 | 69.68 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | 31 | 55 | 224 | 310 |
| | | % of losses | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel, All losses | 2.42 | 1.92 | 3.80 | 3.09 |
| | | % of number of personnel, Average monthly | 0.41 | 0.32 | 0.64 | 0.53 |

## Personnel losses for Onega Flotilla
## Total for 690 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 8 | 13 | 51 | 72 |
| | | % of losses | | | 88.89 | 56.52 | 80.95 | 75.79 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.11 | 4.35 | 4.76 | 5.26 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | | 9 | 9 | 18 |
| | | % of losses | | | | 39.13 | 14.29 | 18.95 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 9 | 23 | 63 | 95 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 5.63 | 7.93 | 9.84 | 8.72 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.44 | 0.39 |

## Personnel losses for the Pina Flotilla
## Total for 99 days

| Types of losses | | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | | 33 | 12 | 37 | 82 |
| | | % of losses | | | 11.79 | 11.65 | 11.42 | 11.60 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | | 221 | 44 | 165 | 430 |
| | | % of losses | | | 78.93 | 42.72 | 50.93 | 60.82 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | | 2 | | | 2 |
| | | % of losses | | | 0.71 | | | 0.28 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | | 256 | 56 | 202 | 514 |
| | | % | of losses | | 91.43 | 54.37 | 62.35 | 72.70 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 80 | 11.20 | 13.29 | 21.97 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 25 | 3.50 | 4.15 | 6.86 |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | | 24 | 47 | 122 | 193 |
| | | % of losses | | | 8.57 | 45.63 | 37.65 | 27.30 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | | 24 | 47 | 122 | 193 |
| | | % | of losses | | 8.57 | 45.63 | 37.65 | 27.30 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 7.50 | 9.40 | 8.03 | 8.25 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 2.34 | 2.94 | 2.51 | 2.58 |
| Total of losses | | Number | | | 280 | 103 | 324 | 707 |
| | | % | of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | | of number of personnel | All losses | 87.50 | 20.60 | 21.32 | 30.22 |
| | | | | Average monthly | 27.34 | 6.44 | 6.66 | 9.44 |

## Personnel losses for centrally subordinated Navy units
## Total for 1941-1942

| Types of losses | | | | Officers | Petty officers, sergeants | Sailors, soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | Number | | 400 | 102 | 658 | 1160 |
| | | % of losses | | 62.99 | 24.40 | 33.43 | 38.40 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Number | | 162 | 65 | 474 | 701 |
| | | % of losses | | 25.51 | 15.55 | 24.09 | 23.20 |
| | Noncombat losses | Number | | 36 | 142 | 412 | 590 |
| | | % of losses | | 5.67 | 33.97 | 20.94 | 19.53 |
| | Total of irrecoverable losses | Number | | 598 | 309 | 1544 | 2451 |
| | | % of losses | | 94.17 | 73.92 | 78.46 | 81.13 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | | |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Sickness, injury and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded, injured and burned | Number | | 37 | 109 | 424 | 570 |
| | | % of losses | | 5.83 | 26.08 | 21.54 | 18.87 |
| | Sick | Number | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | |
| | Frost bitten | Number | | | | | |
| | | % of losses | | | | | |
| | Total of sick, injury and wounded losses | Number | | 37 | 109 | 424 | 570 |
| | | % of losses | | 5.83 | 26.08 | 21.54 | 18.87 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | | |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | |
| Total of losses | | Number | | 635 | 418 | 1968 | 3021 |
| | | % of losses | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | | % of number of personnel | All losses | | | | |
| | | | Average monthly | | | | |

Table 79

## Personnel losses of the Red Army by arms of service (for 1943-1945)

| Name of arm of service | Irrecoverable losses | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Killed and died in stages of medical evacuation | | Noncombat losses (died from diseases, as a result of accidents) | | Missing in action, taken prisoner | | Total | | |
| | Number | % of losses | Number | % of losses | Number | % of losses | Number | % | |
| | | | | | | | | of losses | of size |
| Infantry troops | 2850139 | 85.95 | 103329 | 68.48 | 439313 | 78.91 | 3392781 | 84.23 | 126.93 |
| Fortified areas | 11866 | 0.36 | 1142 | 0.76 | 1845 | 0.33 | 14853 | 0.37 | 18.27 |
| Cavalry | 54546 | 1.64 | 2828 | 1.87 | 19773 | 3.52 | 77147 | 1.92 | 61.94 |
| Armored and mechanized troops | 241236 | 7.27 | 8071 | 5.35 | 61180 | 10.90 | 310487 | 7.71 | 71.95 |
| Supreme Command Headquarters Reserve artillery | 76365 | 2.30 | 6424 | 4.26 | 14123 | 2.52 | 96912 | 2.41 | 17.15 |
| Guards mortar units | | | | | | | | | |
| Supreme Command Headquarters Reserve air | 4118 | 0.12 | 392 | 0.26 | 1117 | 0.20 | 5627 | 0.14 | 5.88 |
| defense units | 9213 | 0.28 | 7750 | 5.14 | 1290 | 0.23 | 18253 | 0.45 | 10.89 |
| Rocket units | | | | | | | | | |
| Signal service units | 2219 | 0.07 | 331 | 0.22 | 666 | 0.12 | 3216 | 0.08 | 26.12 |
| Engineer units | 3159 | 0.10 | 1380 | 0.91 | 619 | 0.11 | 5158 | 0.13 | 3.35 |
| Military-road units | 30222 | 0.91 | 5296 | 3.51 | 6415 | 1.14 | 41933 | 1.04 | 21.91 |
| Truck transport units | 2072 | 0.06 | 2923 | 1.94 | 322 | 0.06 | 5317 | 0.13 | 3.55 |
| Other units and installations | 398 | 0.01 | 576 | 0.38 | 51 | 0.01 | 1025 | 0.03 | 1.07 |
| Air forces | 21063 | 0.64 | 6008 | 3.98 | 3483 | 0.62 | 30554 | 0.75 | 2.32 |
| | 9456 | 0.29 | 4438 | 2.94 | 10941 | 1.95 | 24853 | 0.63 | 6.30 |
| Total for period from 1 Jan 43 through 9 May 45 | 3316072 | 100 | 150888 | 100 | 561138 | 100 | 4028098 | 100 | |

Table 79 continued

| Sick, injured and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | | | | | | | Total of losses | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wounded, injured, burned | | Sick, frostbitten | | Total | | | | | |
| Number | % of losses | Number | % of losses | Number | % | | Number | % | |
| | | | | | of losses | of size | | of losses | of size |
| 9263165 | 88.84 | 1946637 | 80.98 | 11209802 | 87.37 | 419.39 | 14602583 | 86.62 | 546.32 |
| 27741 | 0.27 | 16938 | 0.70 | 44679 | 0.35 | 54.97 | 59532 | 0.35 | 73.24 |
| 131223 | 1.26 | 20483 | 0.85 | 151706 | 1.18 | 121.81 | 228853 | 1.36 | 183.75 |
| 637857 | 6.12 | 73175 | 3.04 | 711032 | 5.54 | 164.78 | 1021519 | 6.06 | 236.73 |
| 194421 | 1.86 | 82113 | 3.42 | 276534 | 2.16 | 49.83 | 373446 | 2.22 | 66.08 |
| 9134 | 0.09 | 5416 | 0.23 | 14550 | 0.11 | 15.21 | 20177 | 0.12 | 21.09 |
| 20406 | 0.20 | 42780 | 1.78 | 63186 | 0.49 | 37.71 | 81439 | 0.48 | 48.59 |
| 5479 | 0.05 | 2785 | 0.12 | 8264 | 0.06 | 67.12 | 11480 | 0.07 | 93.24 |
| 6744 | 0.06 | 15902 | 0.66 | 22646 | 0.18 | 14.70 | 27804 | 0.16 | 18.05 |
| 73811 | 0.71 | 45830 | 1.91 | 119641 | 0.93 | 62.51 | 161574 | 0.96 | 84.41 |
| 4454 | 0.04 | 38853 | 1.62 | 43307 | 0.34 | 28.90 | 48624 | 0.29 | 32.44 |
| 714 | 0.01 | 6988 | 0.29 | 7702 | 0.06 | 8.01 | 8727 | 0.05 | 9.08 |
| 46134 | 0.44 | 87423 | 3.64 | 133373 | 1.04 | 10.14 | 164291 | 0.97 | 12.46 |
| 5632 | 0.05 | 18526 | 0.76 | 24158 | 0.19 | 6.12 | 48993 | 0.29 | 12.42 |
| 10427095 | 100 | 2403849 | 100 | 12830944 | 100 | | 16859042 | 100 | |

Comments: 1. In connection with the lack of sufficient data about the affiliation of losses to the appropriate arms of service for 1941-1942, ingormation only for the period from 1 January 1943 through 9 May 1945 is summarized in the table.

2. Losses of rifle and airborne assault troops are shown together, losses of artillery units which are part of rifle and tank divisions (brigades) are shown correspondingly in the losses of these arms of service.

3. Losses of the national air defense forces are shown in the line "Other units and facilities", which also includes losses for other units that are not included in the listed arms of service, including reserve, training, rear service and military educational establishments.

4. The column "% of size" gives the relationship of all of the losses for the period from 1 January 1943 through 9 May 1945 to the average monthly number of personnel of a specific arm of service.

## Losses for arms of service

The active army in the period of the Great Patriotic War included various arms of service. The most numerous of these were the rifle troops (infantry) who also formed the basis of the Ground Troops. In cooperation with units of the armored and mechanized troops, artillery, and others they performed the most important missions and took on the greatest burden of the war both on the offense and on the defense. Their losses were especially great. This is confirmed by table 79 in which the summary data about the losses of the arms of service for 28 months of the war (1943-1945) are given.

Just in this period the total losses of the arms of service were 16,859,000 men, including 4,028,000 irrecoverable and 12,831,000 sick, injured and wounded losses. If these losses are taken as 100%, then the share for the rifle troops is 86.6%, 6% for armored troops, 2.2% for the artillery of the High Command reserve, 0.29% for the air forces, etc.

When comparing the total number of losses suffered during these years by each arm of service with its average monthly strength in personnel one can conclude that in 28 months the following were knocked out of commission: 546.3% in the rifle troops, 236.7% in the armored troops, 183.7% in the cavalry, 93.2% in the flamethrower troops , 84.4% in the engineer, 66% in the artillery, etc.

And if we could add to each number of losses for every arm of service the losses for 1941 and 1942, then this percentage relationship (especially for the rifle troops) would be significantly greater.

## Irrecoverable losses among the officers

During an analysis of the officers in the years of the Great Patriotic War the statistical documentary information of the Main Directorate for Personnel of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, prepared in 1963 by the authors' collective under the direction of General of the Army A.P. Beloborodov, was used.

The officers, being the backbone of the army, have suffered perceptible losses in all wars in an armed fight with the enemy during the organizing and waging of combat operations.

For example, in the first world war the army of Tsarist Russia lost over 72,000 officers alone, or 14.6% of the size of the officer corps. They included:

generals - 208;
staff officers - 3368;
junior officers - 30,330;
warrant officers - 37,392;
military doctors - 1076;

clerks - 485.

Great responsibility in the fierce fight with the fascist German invaders lay on the shoulders of all Red Army and Navy officers. Over one million men[3], or 35% of the total number of officers who served in the Armed Forces personnel in the period of the war, were killed, died from wounds, were missing in action or taken prisoner.

By rank these losses are divided as follows:

generals and admirals - 421;
colonels - 2502;
lt. colonels - 4887;
majors - 19,404;
captains - 71,738;
senior lieutenants - 168,229;
lieutenants - 353,040;
junior lieutenants - 279,967;
servicemen without officer rank who occupied officer positions - 122,905.

The Red Army and Navy lost 14 times more officers in the Great Patriotic War than the army of tsarist Russia lost in the first world war.

The irrecoverable losses for officers are divided in the following manner:

killed, died from wounds and diseases - 631,008 or 61.68%;
missing in action, taken prisoner - 392,085 or 38.32%.

According to data from repatriation organs, on 1 January 1950 over 126,000 officers who had been captured were repatriated.

The irrecoverable losses of officers in terms of position and arms of service (services) were distributed in the following manner:

a) by positions:

Table 80

| Position | Died, killed | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Total | % of total number of losses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Command | 536,364 | 284,571 | 820,935 | 80.3 |
| Political | 57,608 | 42,126 | 99,734 | 9.7 |
| Technical | 14,033 | 21,803 | 35,386 | 3.5 |
| Administrative | 8,746 | 22,914 | 31,660 | 3.1 |
| Medical | 11,971 | 15,431 | 27,402 | 2.7 |
| Veterinary | 1,642 | 3,798 | 5,440 | 0.5 |
| Legal | 644 | 1,442 | 2,086 | 0.2 |

Including about 123,000 servicemen who occupied officer positions but who did not have officer ranks.

| Total ..................... | 631,008 | 392,085 | 1,023,093 | 100 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

The data that is presented graphically confirms that the greatest number of losses in the war were in the command and political positions (90%).

The losses of officers from other positions, although they do comprise a an insignificant percentage in comparison to the command and political positions (only 10%) also were great. For comparison, we will point out that in the first world war the irrecoverable losses in the service positions (doctors and military clerks) numbered only 2.1% of the total number of officers killed. From this it follows that with more improved combat equipment, the presence of aviation and the high maneuverability of the forces not only formations and units that operated on the battle fields, but also army and front rear areas suffered significant losses and were subjected to attack.

b) by branches and arms of service (services)

Table 81

| Branch, arm of service (service) | Died, killed | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Total | % of total number of losses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ground troops | 607,217 | 366,043 | 973,620 | 95.13 |
| Including command personnel: | | | | |
| infantry | 389,467 | 180,327 | 569,794 | 58.54 |
| artillery | 56,610 | 37,576 | 94,186 | 9.68 |
| armored and mechanized troops | 35,166 | 11,939 | 47,105 | 4.84 |
| engineer troops | 10,260 | 8,047 | 18,307 | 1.88 |
| communications | 11,172 | 13,167 | 24,339 | 2.50 |
| cavalry | 6,757 | 5,836 | 12,593 | 1.29 |
| other arms of service and services | 4,401 | 6,385 | 10,786 | 1.11 |
| Air forces | 18,420 | 20,684 | 39,104 | 3.82 |
| Including command personnel | 17,170 | 18,753 | 35,923 | 91.87 |
| Navy | 5,371 | 5,358 | 10,729 | 1.05 |
| Including command personnel | 3,413 | 3,431 | 6,844 | 63.79 |
| Total ..................... | 631,008 | 392,085 | 1,023,093 | |

From the table it is clear that the greatest losses were suffered by the Ground Troops - 95.13%; for the Air Forces they numbered 3.82%, and for the Navy they numbered 1.05% of the total number of losses among officers.

According to statistical data of the Main Directorate for Personnel, the greatest number of irrecoverable losses among officer personnel of the army and navy were suffered in the first years of the war. For 1941-1942 they number over 50% of all of the losses among officers for the war.

In 1942 the active army and fleets lost 161,857 officers killed, 124,488 missing in action, including 125,000 platoon commanders, about 16,000 company, battery, or squadron commanders, and about 5500 battalion or division commanders. The greatest losses were in the rifle units. In the command personnel of the infantry they comprised 50% of the total losses of officers. The losses were great in the command cadres. It is enough to say that in 1942 11 corps commanders, 76 division commanders and 16 brigade commanders died.

The Air Force had great losses in air crews. During 1942 6178 pilots, which comprised about 24% of the number of combat crews of the active air forces, died.

In the Navy the main losses were suffered by the infantry which took part in the heroic defense of Sevastapol and Novorossiysk, and in combat operations in other coastal areas.

Together with the irrecoverable losses, the loss of the officers in connection with wounds and diseases was significant.

Over the course of a year about 300,000 men were sent from the troops to hospitals for these reasons.

Thus, the total losses for the officers in 1942 was over 550,000 men.

In 1943 the army and navy lost 173,584 killed and 43,423 missing in action, for a total of 217,000 officers. Also, over 400,000 officers left the active army in connection with wounds and disease.

As in past years, the main losses were suffered by the ground troops. Their irrecoverable losses numbered over 200,000 officers.

The persistent nature of the battles for supremacy in the air, especially in the period of the offensive by our troops around Stalingrad and in the battle at Kursk, and also in air battles in the Kuban' in April-May 1943 was the reason for the exceedingly high losses in Air Force air crews. In 1943 these losses were the greatest in comparison with all other years of the war. They numbered 8255 men,that is, 39.2% of the size of the combat crews of the active army.

The losses in command personnel for the Navy reached almost 2000 officers.

In 1944 a marked reduction of the number of combat losses for officers was observed, which was a natural result of the growth of the degree to which the army was equipped technically and of the increase of the combat skill as well as organizational capabilities of the command personnel. However, even then the losses continued to be high. In the course of a year our army and navy lost 169,553 officers killed and 36,704 missing in action. The total losses taking into account the wounded and sick numbered over 500,000 officers.

In 1945 the army and navy lost over 80,000 officers killed and missing.

The combat losses of the army and navy in command personnel in terms of the main duties are characterized in the following way.

Table 82

| Name of positions | Died, killed | Missing in action | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| For the Ground Troops | | | |

| Name of positions | Died, killed | Missing in action | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Front commanders | 4 | - | 4 |
| Front chiefs of staff | 3 | - | 3 |
| Army commanders | 19 | - | 19 |
| Army chiefs of staff | 9 | 2 | 11 |
| Corps commanders | 42 | 6 | 48 |
| Corps chiefs of staff | 12 | - | 12 |
| Division (brigade) commanders | 400 | 163 | 563 |
| Division (brigade) chiefs of staff | 345 | 221 | 566 |
| Section heads of division headquarters | 160 | 153 | 313 |
| Regiment commanders | 2,545 | 1,114 | 3,659 |
| Regiment chiefs of staff | 1,372 | 775 | 2,147 |
| Battalion (artillery battalion) commanders | 14,547 | 6,366 | 20,913 |
| Company (battery, squadron) commanders | 90,210 | 34,554 | 124,764 |
| Platoon commanders | 296,744 | 137,776 | 434,510 |

| Name of positions | Died, killed | Missing in action | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| For the Air Force | | | |
| Air corps, air division commanders and deputy commanders, air regiment commanders and deputy commanders | 464 | 294 | 758 |
| Air squadron commanders and deputy commanders | 1,946 | 2,110 | 4,056 |
| Detachment and flight commanders | 2,792 | 2,587 | 5,379 |
| Ship commanders, fliers, pilots | 7,855 | 10,609 | 18,464 |
| Chiefs of air-gunner service | 154 | 181 | 335 |
| Air regiment, air division navigators | 51 | 118 | 169 |
| Air squadron navigators, deputy commanders for political affairs | 258 | 320 | 578 |
| Air flight navigators | | | |
| Chiefs of signal service for air-gunner service and air squadrons | 729 | 878 | 1,607 |
| Pilot-observers, bombardier-gunners | 44 | 74 | 118 |
| Air corps, division and regiment chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff | 1,715 | 2,659 | 4,374 |
| Air corps, division and regiment chiefs of operations and chiefs of intelligence sections | 58 | 17 | 75 |
| Air corps, division, regiment chiefs of signal service and chemical service | 60 | 17 | 77 |
| Adjutants | 73 | 57 | 130 |
| | 32 | 14 | 46 |
| For the Navy | | | |
| Squadron and brigade commanders | 2 | - | 2 |
| Ship commanders of 1st rank and assistants | 2 | - | 2 |
| Ship commanders of 2nd and 3rd ranks and submarine commanders | 364 | 49 | 413 |
| Ship commanders of 4th rank | | | |
| Ship detachment and element commanders | 283 | 59 | 342 |
| Ship division commanders | 98 | 14 | 112 |
| Surface ship navigators | 45 | 8 | 53 |
| Submarine navigators | 111 | 29 | 140 |
| Ship gunners | 124 | 9 | 133 |
| Surface ship minemen | 112 | 30 | 142 |
| Submarine minemen | 65 | 18 | 83 |
| Fleet signalmen | 107 | 9 | 116 |
| Submarine mechanics | 57 | 28 | 85 |
| Surface ship mechanics | 117 | 4 | 121 |
| Operator officers | 172 | 39 | 211 |
| Fleet staff officers | 8 | 6 | 14 |
| Marine staff officers | 20 | 3 | 23 |
| Marine brigade commanders | 27 | 37 | 64 |
| Battalion commanders | 3 | - | 3 |
| Coastal defense battery commanders and their assistants | 30 | 29 | 59 |
| Marine platoon commanders | 45 | 78 | 123 |
| Marine company commanders and assistant marine company | 569 | 1,292 | 1,861 |
| commanders | 150 | 233 | 383 |

Analyzing this data, one can conclude that of the number of officers killed and missing in action a large percentage is to the command personnel of the active armies and fleet, corps, division and regiment commanders, the chiefs of staff for units and formations, and, most of all, the company and platoon commanders. True to their patriotic and military duty, by their personal example they inspired the soldiers on the battlefield and were the first to rise up for an attack. They were victorious together with the soldiers, and they died together with the soldiers. The nation will always remember the glorious military leaders of our army who gave their lives to liberate the Homeland from the fascist enslavers: front commanders Generals of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovskiy, N.F. Vatutin, and I.R. Apanasenko, General-Colonel M.P. Kirponos; front chiefs of staff General-Lieutenant P.I. Bodin, General-Majors G.D. Stel'makh and V.I. Typikov, army commanders General-Lieutenants S.D. Akimov, P.P. Korzun, A.M. Gorodnyanskiy, M.G. Yefremov, A.I. Zygin, V.Ya. Kachalov, K.P. Podlas, P.S. Pshennikov, A.K. Smironv, P.M.

Filatov, and V.A. Khomenko, General-Majors A.I. Lizyukov, M.P. Petrov and K.I. Rakutin; members of front military councils, division commissars D.A. Lestev and Ye.P. Rykov; members of army military councils General-Major B.O. Galstyan, I.A. Gavrilov, and I.V. Vasil'yev, division commissar I.P. Sheklanov, and others.

In total during the war 421 generals and admirals were killed, missing, or died from disease or other causes, including 344 general-majors, 7 rear admirals, 59 general-lieutenants, 2 vice admirals, 4 general-colonels (I.G. Zakharkin, M.P. Kirponos, K.N. Leselidze, and V.I. Pestov), 4 generals of the army (I.R. Apanasenko, N.F. Vatutin, I.D. Cheryakhovskiy, and D.G. Pavlov) and 1 Marshal of the Soviet Union (B.M. Shaposhinkov).

Under the direction of the officers, the Soviet soldiers during the years of the Great Patriotic War displayed mass heroism, drove the aggressor from their native land and together with their allies brought freedom to the peoples of Europe.

## The price of the liberation mission

The creeping barrage of war for almost a year and a half rolled to the east, burning villages and destroying cities in its path. Its first victims were people in army coats. They shielded the country. Suffering losses, the Soviet soldiers in fierce battles ground up the fascist divisions that had striven for the riches of Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic republics, the central regions of Russia and the Caucasus. Acquiring experience in combat operations and receiving the powerful support of the rear, the Red Army more and more often beat the enemy, inflicting on him ever more strongly felt losses. It beat the enemy in order to turn this creeping barrage to the west, to free the people from the fascist invasion.

So, in the battle of Moscow (September 1941 - January 1942) Hitler's plan for a "lightning war" was thwarted by the Soviet troops who pushed the enemy far from the walls of the capital and destroyed the myth about the invincibility of the German army. The German-fascist invaders collided then, in spite of our temporary failures, with the unprecedented resistance of the Red Army and the great strength of the spirit of the defenders of our native land. Those who fought on the front and those who worked day and night in the rear believed in what they were doing, in victory.

In speeches by the leaders of the Soviet state, and in many international documents signed by them, the missions of defeating Naziism and of liberating the peoples of Europe and Asia from fascist-militaristic invaders, as well as of assisting these peoples in restoring state independence were formed jointly.

Attentively, with hope, the peoples of the occupied countries followed the events on the Soviet-German front. They saw their savior in the Red Army and therefore they wished it success, strengthening the resistance to the German-fascist troops. With the start of the Great Patriotic War the sociopolitical nature of the second world war changed as well. The anti-Hitler coalition of the peoples from countries that fought against Germany was gradually formed. The

leaders of England and the United States highly valued the role of our country in the common fight against fascism. In a personal message to J. Stalin in July 1941, W. Churchill said, "We all here are very glad that the Russian armies are offering such strong, brave and courageous resistance to the completely unprovoked and heartless invasion by the Nazis. The bravery and stubbornness of the Soviet soldiers and people arouses universal admiration..."[4]

In the spring of 1942, when the Soviet troops were waging fierce battles on a broad front, an encouraging telegram came from the other side of the ocean. In the name of the American people, President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote, "The resolve of your armies and people to defeat Hitlerism inspires the free nations of the entire world"[5]. Messages like these came to Moscow from various corners of the globe. In many countries they well knew that the Red Army, suffering great losses, was waging a fight not only for their own land, but also to save the freedom loving peoples of the world. Therefore, it can be stated that the liberation mission of the Soviet soldiers did not start with the crossing of the western border by them and the moving into the territory of Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It started with the first border battles and lasted the entire 1418 days of the war. The Red Army came to the day of victory via great tests, difficulties and sacrifices of defensive and offensive battles.

In the spring of 1944 it started the direct liberation of the European nations from the German-fascist occupation. Romania was the first on its liberation path. On the night of 28 March 1944 our troops made a forced crossing of the Prut River on the border.

Soviet troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy at Iasi and Kishinev. This helped bring about the armed rebellion in Rumanian its departure from the fascist block. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front together with Rumanian units which had arisen on the side of the people by the end of October had completely liberated Rumania. The irrecoverable losses among our troops in the Iasi-Kishinev operation numbered 13,197, the sick, injured and wounded losses numbered 53,933, and the total losses of soldiers and officers were 67,130.

The Bulgarians met the liberating army in September 1944 with bread, salt and flowers. Here power moved to the patriots - members of the Fatherland Front. Bulgaria declared war on Germany.

There were heavy battles for the liberation of Hungary. The Debrecen offensive operation was conducted from 8 through 28 October 1944. Then the Budapest operation started, and as a result of it the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front which had attacked Budapest from the east and northeast, and of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, which attacked from the south, completed the encirclement of an 188,000 man enemy grouping. After the Balaton defensive operation Soviet

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Correspondence by the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (Perepiska Predsedatelya Sovet Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SShA i prem'yer-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoj Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg). Moscow, 1976. Vol. 1. P. 17.

Ibid. Vol. 2. P. 17.

soldiers together with Bulgarian and Yugoslav armies on 4 April completed the liberation of Hungary.

Great efforts and sacrifices were demanded to drive the fascists from Polish territory. The liberation of this country started in the second half of 1944, during the Belorussian operation. It was conducted from 23 June through 29 August for the purpose of destroying the German-fascist army group "Center" and the complete liberation of Belorussia. Our troops were opposed by 63 divisions and 3 brigades with a size of 1.2 million men. They blocked the road to Warsaw.

As a result of fierce battles the German army group "Center" was defeated and its main forces were surrounded and destroyed.In the second stage of the operation (from 5 July through 29 August 1944) the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping was completed and a significant loss was inflicted on the newly formed formations that were transferred here.

Soviet soldiers moved into Polish territory. Here it was necessary to overcome stubborn resistance by the enemy which relied on a powerful defensive system. As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation the Red Army with the participation of the Polish Forces liberated the western and southern regions of Poland and moved to the territory of fascist Germany. Twenty-five enemy divisions were routed and 35 were completely destroyed.

The losses of the liberating Soviet soldiers were great as well. Their irrecoverable losses in the operation numbered 43,251 men, and the sick, injured and wounded losses numbered 149,874 men. The total was 193,125 men.

Soviet soldiers extended a helping hand to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia and helped the Yugoslav army to defeat the German-fascist occupiers. The feats of the Soviet soldiers are remembered in Austria, Norway and Denmark.

In order to speed up the completion of the second world war and to help the peoples of China, Korea and other Asian countries to liberate themselves from Japanese dominance, the Soviet Union, true to its oath to its allied, entered the war with Japan. This decision was met with delight by the peoples of China, Indonesia, Korea and other countries. The wave of excitement even reached the United States.

The Manchurian strategic offensive operation (9 August - 2 September 1945) was carried out by soldiers of the Transbaykal, 1st, and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, and by forces of the Pacific Ocean and Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Formations of the Peoples Revolutionary Army of the Peoples Republic of Mongolia also took part in the operation. The million-man Kwantung Army was subjected to simultaneous blows from the air, land and sea.

The attacking forces in the first six days broke the Japanese resistance in all sectors, forced the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, crossed the Lesser and Greater Khingan Ranges and many other mountain ranges and desert plains of Inner Mongolia, and moved to the central regions of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army was cut off and its path of retreat was blocked. Pacific Ocean Fleet soldiers landed at North Korean ports. Airborne landings were made in Harbin, Girin, Dalian, Changchun, Shenyang and other cities.

The Chinese and Korean peoples greeted the liberating Soviet soldiers with excitement. The successful offensive by the Red Army created favorable conditions for the actions by the Peoples Liberation Army of China.

The South Sakhalin offensive (11-25 August) and the Kurile assault landing (18 August - 1 September) operations were conducted at the same time. As a result the earlier seized southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands which had served Japan for a long time in the conducting an anti-Soviet policy were liberated.

Territory with an area of over 1.3 million square meters and a population of over 40 million people was liberated. Favorable opportunities arose for the uprising of the national liberation fight by the peoples of many countries of Eastern and Southeastern Asia.

Table 83

| State [6] | Irrecoverable losses | | Sick, injured and wounded losses | | Total of losses | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total | Including those killed or who died from wounds and diseases | Total | Including the wounded, injured and burned | Number | % |
| Poland | 600,212 | 541,029 | 1,416,032 | 1,415,329 | 2,016,244 | 51.83 |
| Czechoslovakia | 139,918 | 122,392 | 411,514 | 346,044 | 551,432 | 14.18 |
| Hungary | 140,004 | 112,625 | 344,296 | 290,136 | 484,300 | 12.45 |
| Germany | 101,961 | 92,316 | 262,861 | 241,522 | 364,822 | 9.38 |
| Rumania | 68,993 | 59,499 | 217,349 | 150,311 | 286,342 | 7.36 |
| Austria | 26,006 | 23,128 | 68,179 | 60,143 | 94,185 | 2.42 |
| Yugoslavia | 7,995 | 6,307 | 21,589 | 14,617 | 29,584 | 0.76 |
| Norway | 3,436 | 2,887 | 14,726 | 4,750 | 18,162 | 0.47 |
| Bulgaria | 977 | 154 | 11,773 | 514 | 12,750 | 0.33 |
| China | 9,272 | 6,729 | 20,630 | 15,885 | 29,902 | 0.77 |
| South Korea | 691 | 528 | 1,272 | 1,154 | 1,963 | 0.05 |
| Total ..... | 1,099,465 | 967,594[7] | 2,790,221 | 2,270,405 | 3,889,686 | 100 |

While carrying out the liberation mission in the West and East in 1944-1945, the Soviet Armed Forces conducted a number of major operations. Among them are the Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, L'vov-Sandomir, Budapest, Vienna, Belgrade, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, Prague and Manchuria operations. Eleven front strategic formations, 4 fleets, 50 combined arms armies, 6 tank armies, 13 air armies and 3 flotillas took part in them. About 7 million Soviet servicemen for more than a year conducted fierce battles with the enemy. They completely or partially liberated territory from 13 countries of Europe and Asia with a population of over 147 million people[8].

The final defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan, and the liberation of the peoples of Europe and Asia, demanded enormous efforts and sacrifices from the Soviet Armed Forces. Data about them are presented in table 83.

It is clear from the table that all together about a million Soviet soldiers rest in peace in the countries of Europe and Asia that were completely or partially liberated by the Red Army.

The Soviet people paid an expensive price for the liberation of a number of countries of Europe and Asia from German fascism and Japanese militarism. All of our losses, irrecoverable, sick, injured and wounded, in this liberation period numbered about four million men.

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Personnel losses for the Soviet Armed Forces are shown for the territories of the states using postwar boundaries.

Including 10,825 men who died from diseases.

See: The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945). P. 519.

The following table shows how these losses were distributed in terms of the categories of servicemen.

Table 84

| Types of losses | | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | Killed and died from wounds | 86,203 | 205,848 | 664,718 | 956,769 |
| | Missing in action, taken prisoner | 6,467 | 17,725 | 70,392 | 94,584 |
| | Noncombat losses (died in accidents, from diseases, etc.) | 4,228 | 9,688 | 34,196 | 48,112 |
| | Total irrecoverable losses | 96,898 | 233,261 | 769,306 | 1,099,465 |
| Sick, injured and wounded losses (with evacuation to hospital) | Wounded,injured, burned and so on | 174,539 | 459,340 | 1,636,526 | 2,270,405 |
| | Sick | 43,696 | 91,399 | 383,420 | 518,515 |
| | Frostbitten | 73 | 201 | 1,027 | 1,301 |
| | Total sick, injured and wounded losses | 218,308 | 550,940 | 2,020,973 | 2,790,221 |
| Total losses | | 315,206 | 784,201 | 2,790,279 | 3,889,686 |

The Soviet people and their army viewed the defense of the Fatherland and the defeat of the German-fascist forces as being directly connected with the liberation of the countries that were enslaved by Nazi Germany. Soviet Armed Forces performed their liberation mission in Europe and Asia with honor.

In this period the high combat and moral qualities of the liberating soldier were displayed with special strength. Ready for self-sacrifice, he bravely fought the enemy and risked his life for the sake of preserving ancient cities and centers of world culture. He had a humanitarian regard for the people of the country from which the aggression and bloody war was directed at us, and he was concerned about the women, children and elderly who were saved. In the ruins of despotism he helped to set up a new life. He shared bread with the German population - in Berlin alone 3.5 million people were given food.

Much work was done in the liberated countries in the post-war years to preserve the memory about Soviet soldiers who brought a rescue from fascism. However, events and facts of recent times talk, unfortunately, about the fact that for some people in a number of countries this memory has turned out to be short. Attempts to consign to oblivion the liberation feats of the Soviet soldiers and the relics connected with it, the manifestations of vandalism in regards to monuments to the liberating soldiers and their tombs which are located outside the Fatherland are received with pain, bitterness and disbelief.

## About the losses of other formations

Together with the personnel of the army and navy, the home guard, partisans and underground actively participated in the armed fight against the German-fascist invaders. However, information about the losses of the home guard formations exists only for those formations and units which were part the active fronts and armies. Because of the lack of necessary documents in the military archives it seems impossible to determine the losses for other formations.

One must keep in mind that the forming of the home guard formations was done under the direction of local party and soviet organs. They included volunteers who were not subject to the first draft upon mobilization. The divisions and regiments of the home guard played a significant role in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Smolensk, Tula, Stalingrad and other cities. They suffered losses, great losses, since they were inadequately armed and poorly trained for combat operations.

All together over 4 million people around the country announced a desire to join the home guard. Formations, units and subunits of the home guard were formed from those selected for training. But it was not possible everywhere to complete the forming of them. About 2 million people entered the active army through the home guard. Formations of volunteers were armed, replenished according to the strength levels of regular units, and included in the composition of the Red Army. All together 40 home guard divisions were added to the active army, and 26 of them went through the entire war.

Partisans and the underground operated actively on the territory temporarily seized by the enemy. Among those who waged an armed fight in the enemy's rear, a significant part consisted of servicemen who had escaped from encirclement and captivity.

At the end of 1941 over 2000 partisan detachments (over 90,000 people) were located on occupied territory. All together in the war years there were over 6000 partisan detachments in the enemy's rear in which over 1 million men, including 10,000 officers of the Red Army fought (they had gotten out of encirclement and escaped from captivity).

The general strategic leadership of the partisan fight was done by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. On 30 May 1942 a Central Staff for the Partisan Movement was created. It existed until 13 January 1944, after which leadership of the partisan detachments lay with the Central Committees of the soviet republics and the oblast party committees. While working on this book, the authors studied short reports from several oblast committees about the partisan fight and reports from the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement which served as the source for determining the size and losses of the partisans in the war years. But this is clearly inadequate for a full picture of the losses.

For example, take a report from the Orel oblast. By 1 July 1942 9693 men were waging an armed fight against the occupier on the territory of the oblast. By 15 April 1943 this number had grown to 14,142 men. In the period from 2 May through 6 July 1943 the German forces conducted a punitive expedition against the Orel partisans, as a result of which 841 men were killed, 128 were drowned, 697 were wounded, 2450 partisans were missing in action (the majority of them then on their own left for a Soviet troop location) and 30 were captured.

According to incomplete data which came from the Chernigov, Stalin (Donets), Kirovograd, Nikolayevsk, Poltava, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, and Orel oblasts, the Krasnodarsk kray, the Kalmyk ASSR, and the Karelian-Finn SSR, 6528 men were killed, wounded, missing in action or taken prisoner.

It is known that over 127,000 men were awarded the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" 1st and 2nd degree, and over 184,000 were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

In our work did we also did not take into account the losses of other active participants of the war - sailors of the commercial fleet and river transport workers. The crews of many ships participated in assault landing operations and carried cargoes for the fronts in conditions of constant action by enemy air forces as well as submarines and surface ships.

A great burden also lay on the rail and truck transport workers and the special formations of them. They delivered replacements to the front, they evacuated the equipment of enterprises and the wounded, and they rebuilt destroyed roads at an intense rhythm. Railroad stock and truck columns often fell under bombing by Nazi air forces. In these conditions the losses were real.

They say that war does not have a feminine face. But when a mortal threat hung over the country, women rose up together with the men. At the front they were pilots, doctors, medical orderlies, anti-aircraft gunners, snipers, communications personnel, laundry workers, and weather forecasters. In all, 490,235 women were drafted into the army and navy. Many of them did not return from the war.

In the period during which this book was being prepared for publication much work was done in the oblasts, krays and republics of the country to find and to determine by name all those who died in the years of the Great Patriotic War, including the home guard, partisans, underground, specialists in ocean, river, rail and truck transport, health care workers, and communications personnel who served in special formations of various departments. The noble goal was to name all of those who, like the soldiers at the front, when carrying out their service and patriotic duty gave their lives in the name of saving the Homeland.

Their names will be published in the Memory books that are being prepared.

On the basis of the learning of the names of all who died and were missing in action in the Great Patriotic War it seems possible clarify the total number of the personnel losses of the Soviet Union as well.

The number of victims of the country and its Armed Forces once again testifies about the fact that it is our state, our army that carried the main burden of the fight against fascist Germany and Japan in the years of the second world war.

Really, the price of victory is great. But this is a necessary payment for the dearest thing - freedom and independence of our beloved Homeland, the rescuing of many nations from

enslavement, for the complete destruction of fascism and militarism, and for the establishing of a long peace on Earth.

## The prisoners and the missing in action

The problem connected with determining the number of prisoners and the missing in action occupied a special place in the determining of the personnel losses for the Soviet Armed Forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The surprise attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union placed the troops of the western border military districts, which were reformed at the start of the war into fronts, in serious conditions. The advance deployment of superior forces by the enemy in the main sectors and the extremely unfavorable conditions in which the troops of our fronts hand to operate in the first days of the war, as well as the loss of communications and command on the front and army level led to the formation of enormous breaches in the defense and to the encircling and cutting off from the main forces of the fronts not only of individual units and formations, but even whole armies. Here the rapid advance of the enemy tank groupings, their movement to the flanks and into the rear of the defending troops, the continuous air attacks, and the diversionist actions of various enemy groups in a number of cases caused confusion of both the command and the enlisted personnel. Far from everyone was able to endure such tests, the unprecedented physical and mental tension. As a result, large groups of retreating troops, having exhausted all possibilities for resistance and deprived of any support, surrendered - some being wounded, others being psychologically broken, and still others worn to the limit by hunger, cold and other deprivations.

All of this led to the capture by the enemy in the first months of the war of a large number of prisoners and increased the number of the missing in action. And the loss of communications on the army-front-General Staff level eliminated the opportunity to make regular reports about the results of the combat operations or the losses that were suffered.

In every war there have been prisoners and those missing in action. These losses are inevitable companions of armed conflicts. For example, in the 40 months of the war from 1914-1917 the Russian army lost 3,638,271 men captured and missing in action. And there were 1,961,333 captured enemy soldiers and officers on Russian territory during the same time[9].

The intense nature of the Great Patriotic War and the participation of a large amount of people and combat equipment in it give us the right to an explanation but not a justification for the significant losses suffered in these years.

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See: Russia in the World War of 1914-1918 (in figures). (Rossiya v mirovoy voyne 1914-1918 goda (v tsifrakh)). Moscow, 1925. P. 30-41.

Really, the conditions which led a soldier to being captured varied. As a rule, this was preceded by being wounded, physical exhaustion, and the absence of ammunition. Each person knew that a voluntary surrender due to cowardice always was recognized as a military crime. However, for the basic mass of Soviet soldiers the word "voluntary" is not applicable. Almost everyone who was in fascist captivity experienced a severe psychological blow at a tragic hour which threw them from the ranks of Soviet soldiers into a defenseless mass of prisoners of war. Many of them preferred death to agonizing disgrace.

Unfortunately, for many long years during and after the war this topic, at Stalin's and his circle's instructions, was forbidden. We are talking about millions of Soviet soldiers and officers who ended up in the fascists' hands. Therefore, before calculating these losses, we will look at the tragic fate of the soldiers who became Nazi prisoners.

Fascist Germany waged war with the Soviet Union for the complete destruction of it. This criminal goal was graphically displayed in the especially severe treatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Nazis. The mass destruction of them was envisioned in the "Barbarossa" plan and in other documents.

Some historians in the West try to ease the crimes of the fascists and draw a false picture of the situation of Soviet people in captivity. The mass extermination of them is replaced by an "extremely correct" treatment. This is an obvious lie. Soviet people died by the thousands from this "correct" treatment (hunger, disease, torture and execution). Numerous camps became cemeteries for them. Documents from the Nurenburg judicial process for the main war criminals testify about this. In particular, it was noted that the Nazi government and the supreme command of the German army even before the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union had developed special instructions about the extermination of the Soviet prisoners of war - soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

A study of the preparatory measures for the "Barbarossa" plan shows that the command of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi leadership, in essence, worked superficially on questions connected with the holding of prisoners. All of these plans were designed for a rapid victory, of which they had no doubt. What concerns the high command of the German ground forces is that it without argument supported the aim of the political leadership according to which the material expenditures for holding the prisoners of war was to be reduced to a minimum.

This was connected with the existence of a completely different goal - the improvement of the supplying of the German population from the merciless exploitation of the resources of the occupied regions of our country.

The attitude towards the Soviet prisoners of war was barbaric and differed sharply from the conditions in which prisoners from other countries were held. This is manifested, first of all, in the fundamental agreement by the German military leadership to the uncontrolled killing of Soviet prisoners of war by special SS teams (detachments) in the camps that were located in regions of military operations. The so-called "order about the commissars" and a number of other orders, in which it talked about the killing of all party and soviet workers, and also Jews and "Soviet intellectuals", and all of those who could represent a potential threat to "great Germany"

were sent to the troops. Justifying their actions with regards to the prisoners of war, the fascist leadership referred to the fact that the Soviet Union had not ratified the Geneva Convention about prisoners of war.

Only after the collapse of the blitzkrieg strategy and the appearance of the need for an additional work force for Germany's military industry did the attitude towards the prisoners of war change somewhat. It is this situation that led to the attempt to keep part of the prisoners of war alive. However, the measures that were taken did not mean a fundamental change in the attitude towards them. As before the death rate in the camps remained high.

German documents which contain information about the number of Soviet prisoners of war up to the start of 1942 are almost completely missing. This is explained by the fact that in 1941 the report documentation arrived from the eastern front in an inadequate amount and with attentive examination it turned out to be not very reliable. The order about presenting reliable information concerning Soviet prisoners of war was sent to the high command of the ground forces only on 1 January 1942 when the scale of the capture of Soviet soldiers had significantly decreased.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the responsibility for all of the questions concerning prisoners of war (conditions of camps, maintaining and using prisoners of war) in fascist Germany was divided between the supreme high command (OKW) and the high command of the ground forces (OKH). On territory of the Reich together with adjacent countries and areas these questions were the responsibility of the office for prisoner of war affairs of the Wehrmacht general staff, and on the territory of occupied parts of the Soviet Union they were the responsibility of the military administration department of the chief of rear services for the ground forces (the department of the quartermaster-general).

In the so-called competency zone of the Wehrmacht general staff (OKV) from the very start of the war there was no interest in reconstructing statistical data about the number of prisoners. The organizational order of the office for prisoner of war affairs from 16 June 1941 did not put such information in the mandatory categories. This procedure was changed on 2 July 1941, but it concerned the counting of prisoners only on the territory of the Reich.

At the end of July 1941 in collection points and in transit camps located in the zone of responsibility of the ground forces a large number of prisoners had built up for whom there were no men or equipment to keep them. In connection with this, order No 11/4590 from 25 July 1941 was issued from the quartermaster-general for setting free Soviet prisoners of war of a number of nationalities (Volga Germans, Balts, Ukrainians, and then Belorussians). However, by order No 3900 of the OKW from 13 November 1941 further action of this order was halted. All together in this period 318,770 men were set free, and of them, 292,702 were in the OKH zone and 26,068 were in the OKW zone. There were 277,761 Ukrainians in the total number of those who were set free. In 1942-1944 mainly people who joined volunteer security and other formations or the police were set free from captivity. Up to 1 May 1944 all together 823,230

prisoners of war were set free, and of them, 535,523 were in the OKH zone and 287,707 were in the OKW zone[10].

For the purpose of bringing order to the accounting on 30 September 1941 an order was given to the commandants of camps in the East to make cards for registering prisoners. But it was emphasized here that this order should be carried out only after the completion of the campaign on the eastern front. And that the central information office should receive information only for those prisoners who "after selection" done by the Einzatskömmandos (Sonderkommandos), "ultimately remain in the camps or at appropriate jobs".

It followed from this that the documents of the central information office should not get information about prisoners of war who were killed during redeployment and filtration. Probably for this reason statistical information about Soviet prisoners of war is completely missing for the Reichkomissariats "Ostland" (Baltic area) and "Ukraina", where in the fall of 1941 there was a significant number of prisoners.

Federal Archive of Germany, RH-23/5-155; RH-53-23/65; R-41/168; H-3/729.

Table 85

INFORMATION

about the number of Soviet prisoners of war located in camps of the supreme command of the German armed forces (OKW) and used as labor in the German economy in 1942-1945[11]

| Date | Number of prisoners of war | | Total prisoners of war |
|---|---|---|---|
| | in OKW camps | at jobs in the German economy (concentration camps) | |
| On 1 Feb 1942 | 1,020,531 | 147,736 | 1,168,267 |
| On 1 Mar 1942 | 976,458 | 153,674 | 1,130,132 |
| On 1 Apr 1942 | 643,237 | 166,881 | 810,118 |
| On 1 Jun 1942 | 734,544 | 242,146 | 976,690 |
| On 1 Sep 1942 | 1,675,626 | 375,451 | 2,051,077 |
| On 1 Oct 1942 | 1,118,011 | 455,054 | 1,573,065 |
| On 1 Nov 1942 | 766,314 | 487,535 | 1,253,849 |
| On 1 Jan 1943 | 1,045,609 | No data | - |
| On 1 Feb 1943 | 1,038,512 | 493,761 | 1,532,373 |
| On 1 Jul 1943 | 647,545 | 505,975 | 1,153,520 |
| On 1 Aug 1943 [12] | 807,603 | 496,106 | 1,303,709 |
| On 1 Dec 1943 | 766,314 | 564,692 | 1,331,006 |
| On 1 Mar 1944 | 861,052 | 594,279 | 1,455,331 |
| On 1 May 1944 | 877,980 | 618,528 | 1,496,508 |
| On 1 Jun 1944 | 875,733 | 618,528 | 1,494,261 |
| On 1 Aug 1944 | 889,309 | 631,559 | 1,520,868 |
| On 1 Sep 1944 | 905,864 | 765,444 | 1,671,308 |
| On 1 Oct 1944 | 911,990 | No data | - |
| On 1 Nov 1944 | 929,100 | No data | - |
| On 1 Jan 1945 | 930,287 | 750,000 | 1,680,287 |
| On 25 Apr 1945 | - | - | 800,000 |

Reports from the office for prisoner of war affairs of the OKW to the International Red Cross Committee encompassed only the system of camps subordinate to the OKW. Information about the Soviet prisoners of war started to appear only in February 1942, that is, after the decision was made about the use of them as a work force in the German war industry (see table 85).

On 7 July 1943 a meeting was held in Hitler's high command headquarters on the question of using the work force in the mining industry. In directive No 02358/43 from 8 July 1943 signed by Himmler it was indicated that, "The Fuhrer on 7 July ordered that the mining of coal be increased immediately in order to conduct an extensive program for producing iron and steel and that for this the demand for the work force be covered from the prisoners of war...

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According to German accounting data stored in the federal and military archives of Germany and the Central Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (file 500, cat. 12450, d.86), and also according to materials of military historical works published in FRG.

In the period from February 1942 through August 1943 the prisoners of war held in receiving-transit camps and stations located in the responsibility zone of the German ground forces command (OKH) are not counted in these materials. From the fall of 1943 they were moved to subordination to the German supreme high command (OKW).

Prisoners - men ages from 16 to 55, taken in the fight against bands in the zone of military operations, the rear of the army, eastern commissariats, the governor-generalship, and in the Balkans are considered to be prisoners of war. This refers to men in the newly captured areas of the East as well. They should be sent to a prisoner of war camp, and from there to work in Germany..."[13].

It should be kept in mind that there was a large number of peaceful Soviet citizens in the prisoner of war camps who were not servicemen and were seized by the Germans in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. This, for example, is confirmed in testimony given on 28 December 1945 by the former head of the office of prisoner of war affairs of the Danzig military district, Ostereich Kurt. In particular, he writes, that in the camps subordinate to him in Ukraine simultaneous with the prisoners of war in separate barracks up to 20,000 Soviet citizens taken as hostages from a number of regions that were engulfed in the partisan movement were held under arrest[14].Still more hostages were held in prisoner of war camps on Belorussian territory and in the Baltics.

Consequently, in order to recreate the actual number of Soviet servicemen who were held prisoner a careful analysis of the German documentary sources is needed. This would make it possible to get close to the truth. Meanwhile, in many publications here and abroad contradictory and sometimes clearly exaggerated data are presented.

In the foreign press (mainly in Germany) the number of Sovet prisoners of war is given in the rage of 5,200,000 to 5,750,000 men, where the main mass of them belongs to the first period of the war (June 1941 - November 1942). It can be assumed that with the absence of reliable documentary materials they are taking information about prisoners that was received from the staffs of army groups "North", "Center" and "South" in the period of the offensive operations in 1941. Thus, in the reports of the German high command it was reported that in the pockets around Belostok, Grodno and Minsk 300,000 prisoners were taken, 103,000 were taken at Uman', 450,000 were taken at Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Gomel', 180,000 around Smolensk, 655,000 in the Kiev area, 100,000 around Chernigov, 100,000 in the Mariupol' region, and 663,000 around Bryansk and Vyaz'ma. All together, in 1941 2,561,000 men were taken prisoner.

The figures are imposing, but not quite accurate since the fascist leadership included in the number of prisoners all of the workers of party and soviet organs, and also men regardless of age who were withdrawing together with the retreating and then encircled troops.

In total the number of Soviet soldiers taken prisoner sometimes exceeds the size of the armies and fronts that took part in some operation (battle). For example, the German command reported that east of Kiev 665,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. Meanwhile the entire size of the South-Western Front at the start of the Kiev defensive operation was 627,000 men, of which 150,000 were not surrounded. The situation with the report by the

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CSAOR, file 7021, cat. 148, d. 258, p. 420-421.

See: "Military History Journal" (Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal) No 3, p. 40.

German command about capturing 100,000 prisoners of war in Sevastapol is analogous. Clearly the Nazis counted the entire population of the hero city which could not be evacuated.

In connection with this, it is appropriate to refer to the statement by the English historian D. Fuller who said that it is impossible to believe the German communique about the victories since they often had astronomical figures in them[15].

What is our data about the number of Soviet prisoners of war in German captivity during the years of the war? The basic official source is the reports about losses received from the front and army strategic formations, formations, and independent units. They were analyzed in the General Staff, clarified and supplemented by materials about uncounted losses.

As a result of the summarization and analysis of all sources it was determined that for the years of the war 4,559,000 Soviet servicemen were taken prisoner and missing in action. As was revealed during subsequent research, prisoners of war were a significant part of this number. The absence of a concise demarcation among between these losses is explained by the fact that in conditions of a rapidly changing situation on the front it was exceedingly difficult to establish the fact that one was taken prisoner, and, consequently, the number of people captured by the enemy. Therefore many of those who were not in the formation after a battle were recorded among those missing in action. It is also necessary to consider the disdainful attitude towards being captured that existed then. This sometimes forced commanders and chiefs to reduce the number of people who were clearly taken prisoner and to show them in reports as missing in action.

On the basis of the existing documents the total number of Soviet servicemen who were missing in action and taken prisoner (4,559,000 men) can be distributed in the following manner.

It is reliably known that 1,836,000 men returned from captivity after the end of the war, 939,700 servicemen among the number of the previously missing in action and former prisoners were drafted again in the territory liberated from occupation[16], and 673,000 according to German data died in fascist captivity. Thus, there were all together 4,059,000 Soviet servicemen in captivity and about 500,000 died in battles, although according to reports from the fronts they were listed as missing in action.

This information does not coincide, and can not coincide, with the data published in the foreign press. The differences are explained mainly by the fact that in the German data, in addition to servicemen, they also count captured personnel of special formations from various civilian departments (communications lines, ocean and river fleets, defense construction, civilian aviation, communications, health care and so on) from whom reports were not made to the army and navy staffs. For example, the directorates for defense construction under the Council of Peoples Commissars of the USSR, the NKVD, and Peoples Commissariat for Defense had a

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See: Fuller D. The Second World War 1939-1945 (Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gg). Moscow. 1956. P. 164.

CAMD, file 19-1, cat. 1914, d. 7, p. 87-96; file 8-1, cat. 1261, d. 2, p. 50.77.

small percentage of servicemen (command personnel), but the main mass, then rather significant, consisted of workers. They put up defensive lines and fortified areas, and they built air bases and roads. Many of them ended up being surrounded and taken prisoner. General D.M. Karbyshev, who was inspecting the progress of the building of fortified areas, ended up among them. The partisans and underground as well as the personnel from incomplete formations from the home guard, the local air defense, fighter battalions and the militia were not servicemen.

However all of the listed categories of Soviet citizens who ended up in territory captured by the Nazis were counted by the German command as prisoners of war and were sent to camps.

Also, in the first weeks of the war, when the general mobilization was occurring in the country, a large part of the civilians who were drafted by the draft offices of Belorussia, Ukraine and the Baltic republics were captured by the enemy while en route, that is, before they became soldiers. They did not make it on to the accounting documents of the fronts (armies), but they ended up captured. According to information from the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff that was worked out in June 1942 the number of people with a military obligation who were captured by the enemy was over 500,000[17]. If one counts another 5% of the civilians released for various reasons from the draft in the western republics and oblasts who also ended up in territory occupied by the enemy and often taken prisoner, then the total number of those with a military obligation and the conscripts who were taken prisoner numbers about 1 million men.

The enemy included in the number of prisoners the wounded and sick who were being treated in hospitals captured by them and the previously counted in the reports from our forces as sick, injured and wounded losses.

Consequently, the information being published in the foreign press about the prisoners of war can not be fully accepted as the basis for calculating the number of Soviet servicemen who ended up as German prisoners.

At the end of the war in connection with the arrival of Soviet troops onto the territory of fascist Germany the Directorate of the Commission of the Council of the Peoples Commissariat of the USSR for Repatriation Affairs was created. It was headed by General-Colonel F.I. Golikov. The files of this directorate have statistical data for 3 October 1945 broken down demographically for 1,368,849 Soviet prisoners of war who had returned from captivity. Here are some of them.

In terms of the time of the stay in captivity

| From which year taken prisoner | Officers | Sergeants | Soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|

CAMD, file 15-1, cat. 113, d. 1, p. 116-126, 228-238.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| From 1941 | 52,025 | 76,359 | 544,321 | 672,705 |
| From 1942 | 48,796 | 52,046 | 348,110 | 448,952 |
| From 1943 | 13,083 | 18,350 | 128,082 | 159,515 |
| From 1944 | 5,876 | 9,449 | 54,705 | 70,030 |
| From 1945 | 1,344 | 1,665 | 14,638 | 17,647 |

By nationality:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Russian | - 657,339, | or 48.02%; |
| Ukrainian | - 368,568, | or 28.24%; |
| Belorussian | - 103,053 | or 7.53%; |
| Uzbek | - 28,228, | or 2.06%; |
| Cossak | - 23,143, | or 1.69%; |
| Georgian | - 23,816, | or 1.74%; |
| Azerbaydzhani | - 20,850, | or 1.52%; |
| Lithuanian | - 2,749, | or 0.20%; |
| Moldavian | - 4,739, | or 0.35%; |
| Latvian | - 3,286, | or 0.24%; |
| Khirgiz | - 4,014, | or 0.29%; |
| Tadzhik | - 3,948, | or 0.29%; |
| Armenian | - 20,067, | or 1.47%; |
| Turkmen | - 3,511, | or 0.26%; |
| Estonian | - 2,484, | or 0.18%; |
| Bashkir | - 4,248, | or 0.31%; |
| Kalmyk | - 3,772, | or 0.28%; |
| Karelian | - 1,989, | or 0.14%; |
| Tatar | - 30,698, | or 2.24%; |
| Jewish | - 4,457, | or 0.32%; |
| Other nationalities | - 35,890, | or 2.63%. |

The total count is 1,368,849.

This data can be used with a small error factor when describing the total number (4,059,000) of Soviet prisoners.

Unfortunately, we can not with all certainty talk about the fate of those who did not return to the Homeland. Further difficult studies continue and their results, possibly, will bring us to the truth.

## Weapons and combat equipment: production and losses

The fighting capability, the attack and maneuver capabilities of the troops, the diversity and effectiveness of the combat operations conducted by them together with the quality of the training and the number of personnel are conditioned by the level of the degree to which they are equipped technically. Wars at the start of the 20th century which were waged by massive armies showed that it is possible to achieve strategic goals only when the army and navy are equipped to a high degree with various forms of weapons and combat equipment.

Already in the course of the first world war new, for that time, types of weapons - tanks, airplanes, improved artillery systems and rifles - had come on the scene. This gave the grounds for one of the English military theoreticians to state that war seems to depend 99% on the weapon and the other factors - strategy, leadership, bravery, discipline, supply - can give only one percent of the capabilities of warring armies.

The idealization of the role of technical equipment in war was pursued in a number of works of other military theoreticians. The Italian general Due believed, for example, that the daily strikes by 500 bombers on 50 industrial centers would shatter the front and lead to surrender by the enemy. The German general Guderian gave a preference to massed tank strikes which, in his opinion, were able to destroy any defense. The American admiral Mahan back at the start of the 20th century put forth the idea of the dominance of "sea power" which should play the decisive roll in war.

In the Soviet Union in the 20's-30's the military leaders V. Triandafillov, M. Tukachevskiy and others developed and put into practice a theory of the engagement and operation in depth with the use of major groupings of tank forces, air forces and airborne assaults.

Military doctrines were formed, armed forces were built and plans for the mass production of weapons and combat equipment were made under the influence of these theories. These theories and doctrines did contain a strategic paradox" the higher the degree to which armies are equipped in a technical regard, the less capable they find themselves, in conditions of the corresponding strong and organized opposition by the enemy, to conduct "lightning wars" and to spill "little blood" on the fields of battle.

The process of the technical equipping of armies with new types of weapons and combat equipment that appeared in the first world war occurred rapidly in the 1930's. Fascist Germany, having decided to take revenge for its defeat in the first world war and to win "world domination" began an aggressive preparation for a new war. It bet on an army which would have tank and motorized divisions, a strong air force and infantry equipped with modern rifles and powerful artillery.

And our country was preparing for an armed defense. In this period the defense industry was producing tanks: T-26, BT-7M, T-50, and KV; artillery systems: 45 mm anti-tank guns, 75 mm guns, 122 mm howitzers, 152 mm howitzer-guns, 152 mm howitzers, 152 mm guns, 203 mm guns, 210 mm guns, 280 mm mortars, and 305 mm howitzers; 25 mm anti-aircraft guns, 37 mm AA guns, 76 mm AA guns, 85 mm AA guns; 50 mm mortars, 82 mm mortars, 120 mm mortars; aircraft: TB-3, Pe-8 (TB-7), Yer-2, DB-3F (Il-4), R-Zet, MBR-2, Yak-2 (BB-22), Yak-4, Su-2, SB, AR-2, R-10, Kor-2, Il-2, I-15bis, I-153, I-153, I-16, Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3, Po-2 and others.

The tactical-technical data about the weapons and combat equipment produced in the Soviet Union on the eve of the war of 1941-1945 are presented in tables 86, 87 and 88.

Table 86 [18]

Tactical-technical characteristics of the main models of tanks produced in the Soviet Union on the eve of the war

| Name | T-26 | BT-7 | T-50 | T-34 | KV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

[18] The tactical-technical characteristics presented in tables 86, 87 and 88 are from data of the main and central directorates of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year of production | 1937 | 1939 | 1941 | 1940 | 1939 |
| Combat weight, tons | 10.5 | 14.6 | 14 | 30.9 | 47.5 |
| Maximum speed, kmh | 30 | 62 | 52 | 55 | 35 |
| Range, km | 200 | 600 | 340 | 300 | 250 |
| Engine power, hp | 97 | 400 | 85 | 500 | 600 |
| Height, m | 2.33 | 2.70 | 1.90 | 2.40 | 2.71 |
| Width, m | 2.46 | 2.23 | 2.35 | 3 | 3.32 |
| Armor thickness: | | | | | |
| front, mm | 15 | 20 | 37 | 45 | 75 |
| side, mm | 15 | 13 | 37 | 45 | 75 |
| Gun caliber, mm | 45 | 45 | 45 | 76.2 | 76.2 |
| Gun firing range, km | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 12 | 12 |
| Round initial vel., m/s | 760 | 760 | 760 | 662 | 662 |
| Complement of rounds | 165 | 188 | 150 | 100 | 114 |
| Number of machine guns | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 |

Table 87

Tactical-technical characteristics for artillery guns and mortars produced in the Soviet Union on the eve of the war

| Name | Weight in combat position, kg | Firing range, km[19] | Weight of round, kg | Initial velocity of round, m/s | Maximum rate of fire, shots/min |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 mm anti-tank gun, 1937 model | 560 | 4.6 | 1.4 | 760 | 20 |
| 76 mm reg. gun, 1927 model | 780 | 8.5 | 6.2 | 387 | 10-12 |
| 76 mm div gun, 1939 model | 1480 | 13.3 | 6.2 | 680 | 15-20 |
| 122 mm howitzer, 1938 model | 2500 | 11.6 | 21.7 | 515 | 5-6 |
| 122 mm gun, model 1931/37 | 7120 | 19.7 | 25 | 800 | 5-6 |
| 152 mm howitzer, model 1938 | 4150 | 12.3 | 40 | 508 | 3-4 |
| 152 mm howitzer-gun, 1937 model | 7128 | 17.2 | 43.5 | 655 | 3-4 |
| 152 mm gun, 1935 model | 17200 | 27 | 49 | 880 | 0.5-1 |
| 203 mm howitzer, 1931 model | 17500 | 18 | 100 | 607 | 0.5-1 |
| 210 mm gun, 1939 model | 44000 | 28.6 | 133 | 800 | 0.5 |
| 280 mm gun, 1939 model [20] | 17600 | 14.1 | 286 | 356 | 0.5 |
| 305 mm howitzer, 1939 model[20] | 45700 | 10.4 | 465 | 410 | 0.5 |
| 25 mm AA gun, 1940 model | 1060 | 2.4/2 | 0.28 | 910 | 250 |
| 37 mm AA gun, 1939 model | 2100 | 4/ | 0.77 | 880 | 180 |
| 76 mm AA gun, 1938 model | 4300 | 14/9.5 | 6.6 | 813 | 20 |
| 85 mm AA gun, 1939 model | 4300 | 15.5/10.5 | 9.2 | 800 | 15-20 |
| 50 mm mortar, 1938 model | 10 | 3 | 0.9 | | 30 |
| 82 mm mortar, 1937 model | 61 | 3.1 | 3.4 | | 25 |
| 120 mm mortar, 1938 model | 280 | 5.7 | 16 | 272 | 12-16 |

[19] For anti-aircraft guns the numerator is the horizontal firing range and the denominator is the range in terms of height.

[20] Production was halted on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

Table 88

Tactical-technical characteristics for airplanes produced in the Soviet Union on the eve of the war

| Name | Year arrived in arsenal | Engine power, hp | Flight range, km | Maximum flight speed, kph | Ceiling, m | Weaponry [21] | Bomb load, kg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Fighters** | | | | | | | |
| I-15bis | 1935 | 1X730 | 770 | 367 | 9000 | 4X7.62 | 150 |
| I-16 | 1934 | 1X900 | 625 | 462 | 9700 | 4X7.62 | 100 |
| I-153 | 1938 | 1X900 | 690 | 427 | 10000 | 4X7.62 | 200 |
| Yak-1 | 1941 | 1X1050 | 700 | 572 | 9600 | 1X20<br>2X7.62 | — |
| LaGG-3 | 1941 | 1X1050 | 556 | 549 | 9600 | 1X20<br>1X12.7<br>2X7.62 | 200 |
| Mig-3 | 1940 | 1X1200 | 1000 | 620 | 12000 | 1X12.7<br>2X7.62 | 200 |
| **Attack aircraft** | | | | | | | |
| Il-2 | 1941 | 1X1600 | 510 | 412 | 5500 | 2X20<br>2X7.62<br>8 rocket projectiles | 600 |
| **Bombers** | | | | | | | |
| TB-3 | 1934 | 4X850 | 4000 | 288 | 7740 | 8X7.62 | 4000 |
| DB-3f | 1937 | 2X1000 | 2700 | 440 | 10000 | 3X7.62 | 2500 |
| SB | 1935 | 2X1050 | 1000 | 445 | 9000 | 4X7.62 | 1500 |
| Pe-2 | 1941 | 2X1260 | 1100 | 540 | 8800 | 4X7.62 | 1000 |
| **Special** | | | | | | | |
| R-5 (recon) | 1931 | 1X650 | 600 | 230 | 6150 | 3X7.62 | 400 |

[21] Number of machine guns and cannons and their calibers (in mm).

Table 89

Combat equipment found in the Soviet Armed Forces and possessed by Germany, and also its allies, on 22 June 1941 (000's)

| Name | Soviet Union | | Ratio for active armies | Germany | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Active army | MD [22] and Supreme Command Headquarters Reserve | | On Soviet-German front [23] | In reserve and other theaters of military operations [24] |
| Tanks of all types | 14.2 [26]<br>(3.8) [27] | 8.4 | 3.3 : 1<br>(1 : 1.1) [1] | 4.3 | 2.4 |
| Guns and mortars of all calibers [25] | 48.9 / 32.9 | 63.9 / 43.6 | 1 : 1 / 1 : 1.4 | 47.2 | 43.1 |
| Combat aircraft of all types | 9.2 | 10.8 | 1.5:1 | 5.9 | 7.8 |

The war which had started made new, higher demands on the quality of the weapons and combat equipment of the warring sides. A real need was seen to increase the firepower and armor protection for tanks and to develop means of combating enemy tanks. It was necessary to raise the mobility and firing capabilities of the artillery. It was required to improve the quality of the combat aircraft, especially the fighters that were intended to carry out the main mission - winning supremacy in the air - without which the successful operations by the ground forces would not be possible.

The war, as if on a touchstone, checked the correctness of the military technology policy that was being followed on the eve of the war. Thus, in the Red Army at the start of the war there clearly were not enough anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. As a result, our troops found themselves defenseless during enemy attacks from the air and before his concentrated tank forces. In these conditions the main burden of battles and operations lay on the Soviet soldier with a rifle

[22] MD - Internal military districts.

[23] Of these, there were 262 tanks, 5200 guns and mortars, and 978 combat aircraft in the armies of Germany's allies (Finland, Hungary, and Rumania).

[24] Including in Italy, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania there were 800 tanks, 24,100 guns and mortars, and 3700 combat aircraft. Also, there was a large amount of captured equipment (France, Belgium, Poland and other states) in fascist Germany and in the armies of its allies.

[25] The numerator shows the number of Soviet guns and mortars except for 50 mm mortars and the ratio for them. The information for the German army is shown without the 50 mm mortars.

[26] Of this number, 29% of the tanks needed a major overhaul, 44% needed medium repairs, and 3800 tanks were completely combat ready.

[27] The number of functioning Soviet tanks and the ratio of them is shown in parentheses.

and machine gun. And he fought valiantly, displaying courage, resolve and daring, and often self-sacrifice in the name of victory. In critical situations Soviet fliers rammed planes, infantrymen threw themselves under tanks with a satchel of grenades or a bottle with a fuel mixture, covered pillbox embrasures with their chests, and fired at enemy planes with rifles. But even the heroism and bravery of the Soviet soldiers could not overcome the deficit in the quality and quantity of weapons and combat equipment. Tanks, planes, and guns which would make it possible to fight successfully against a strong enemy were needed.

Of the armored equipment produced in the USSR, the T-34 tank had a high quality. It proved itself in the course of the entire war, but it needed an increase in firepower. The Soviet design thinking and industry had to work extra hard to create and produce new models of fighters and bombers and to improve the ground attack aviation.

The artillery systems of practically all calibers and uses underwent modernization and improvement. Special attention was given to the production and development of rocket artillery ("katyushas") which won world-wide fame.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union the following tanks entered the arsenal: T-60, T-70, T-34-85, KV-85, IS-2 and IS-3; self-propelled guns: Su-76, Su-85, Su-100, Su-122 (ISU-122), and Su-152 (ISU-152); guns: 45 mm anti-tank gun, 57 mm anti-tank gun, 76 mm gun (ZIS-3), 76 mm gun (ob-25), 100 mm gun (BS-3), 152 mm howitzer (D-1), and 160 mm mortar; combat aircraft: Tu-2, Il-10, Yak-3, Yak-7, Yak-9, La-5, La-7, and Li-2.

The production of pre-war modification weapons and combat equipment with improved basic performance indicators continued.

The tactical-technical characteristics of the tanks, guns and mortars, and combat aircraft produced in the war years are given in tables 90, 91 and 92. A comparison of the tactical-technical data for the weapons and combat equipment produced before and during the war shows the directions and the degree of improvement and modernization of them.

Table 90

Tactical-technical characteristics for main models of tank and self-propelled guns (SAU) produced in the Soviet Union in the war years

| Name of characteristic | T-60 | T-70 | T-34-85 | KV-85 | IS-2 | IS-3 | Su-76 | Su-85 | Su-100 | ISU-122 | ISU-152 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year of production | 1941 | 1942 | 1944 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | 1943 | 1943 | 1944 | 1944 | 1943 |
| Combat weight, tons | 6.4 | 10 | 32 | 45 | 46 | 46.5 | 10.5 | 29.6 | 31.6 | 45.5 | 46 |
| Maximum speed, kph | 42 | 45 | 55 | 42 | 37 | 40 | 45 | 55 | 50 | 35 | 35 |
| Range, km | 450 | 250 | 300 | 225 | 140 | 190 | 250 | 300 | 310 | 220 | 220 |
| Engine power, hp | 70 | 2X70 | 500 | 600 | 520 | 520 | 2X70 | 2X70 | 500 | 520 | 600 |
| Height, m | 1.73 | 2.04 | 2.70 | 3.24 | 2.73 | 2.45 | 2.10 | 2.10 | 2.24 | 2.48 | 2.48 |
| Width, m | 2.30 | 2.42 | 3 | 3.32 | 3.07 | 3.15 | 2.71 | 2.71 | 3 | 3.07 | 3.07 |
| Armor thickness, | | | | | | | | | | | |
| front, mm | 35 | 45 | 45 | 75 | 120 | 120 | 35 | 45 | 110 | 90 | 90 |
| side, mm | 15 | 15 | 45 | 75 | 90 | 90 | 15 | 45 | 45 | 90 | 90 |
| Gun caliber, mm | 20 | 45 | 85 | 85 | 122 | 122 | 76 | 85 | 100 | 122 | 152 |
| Gun range, km | 2 | 6 | 13.6 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 12.1 | 13.6 | 25.4 | 14.3 | 6.2 |
| Initial velocity of round, m/s | 815 | 760 | 782 | 792 | 781 | 781 | 680 | 792 | 895 | 781 | 655 |
| Complement of rounds | 780 | 90 | 56 | | 28 | 28 | 60 | 48 | 34 | 30 | 20 |
| Number of machine guns | | | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | | | | | |

Table 91

Tactical-technical characteristics for artillery guns produced in the Soviet Union in the war years

| Name | Weight in combat position | Firing range, km | Weight of shell, kg | Initial velocity of round, m/sec | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 mm anti-tank gun (M-42) 1942 model | 570 | 4.4 | 1.4 | 870 | 30 |
| 57 mm anti-tank gun (ZIS-2) 1943 model | 1150 | 8.4 | 3.14 | 990 | 15 |
| 76 mm gun (ZIS-3) 1942 model | 1180 | 13.2 | 6.2 | 680 | 20-25 |
| 76 mm gun (ob-25) 1943 model | 600 | 4.2 | 6.2 | 262 | 10-12 |
| 100 mm gun (BS-3) 1944 model | 3650 | 20 | 15.6 | 900 | 7 |
| 152 mm howitzer (D-1) 1943 model | 3600 | 12.4 | 40 | 508 | 4 |
| 160 mm mortar 1943 model | 1080 | 5 | 40 | | 3 |

Table 92

Tactical-technical characteristics for main types of aircraft produced in the Soviet Union in the war years

| Name | Year arrived in arsenal | Engine power, hp | Flight range, km | Maximum speed, kph | Ceiling, m | Weapons, bomb load, kg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yak-2 | 1944 | 1310 | 480 | 645 | 10,800 | 1x20<br>2x12.7 |
| Yak-7 | 1942 | 1260 | 820 | 580 | 10,000 | 1x20<br>2x12.7 |
| Yak-9 | 1943 | 1260 | 1330 | 584 | 10,000 | 1x20<br>1x12.7 |
| La-5 | 1942 | 1500 | 490 | 650 | 11,200 | 2x20<br>200 |
| La-7 | 1944 | 1850 | 500 | 680 | 11,200 | 2x20<br>200 |
| Il-10 | 1944 | 2000 | 600 | 600 | 6,000 | 2x23<br>2x7.62<br>4 rocket projectiles<br>400-600 |
| Tu-2 | 1942 | 2X1550<br>2000 | 2000 | 550 | 9,500 | 3x12.7<br>1000-3000 |

A description of the volumes of production for the main types of weapons and combat equipment in the Soviet Union in the war years is given in table 93.

Table 93

Volumes of production for main types of weapons and combat equipment in the Soviet Union

| Name | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945, Jan-Apr | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rifles of all types, million units[28] | 1.76 | 5.91 | 5.92 | 4.86 | 1.38 | 19.83 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns of all types, thous. units | 4.7 | 24.5 | 24.1 | 29 | 16 | 98.3 |
| Guns and mortars of all types and calibers, thous. units[29] | 53.6 | 287 | 126 | 47.3 | 11.3 | 525.2 |
| Planes of all types, thous. units | 11.5 | 25.4 | 34.9 | 40.2 | 10.1 | 122.1 |
| Among the, combat aircraft, thous. units | 8.2 | 21.7 | 29.9 | 33.2 | 8.2 | 101.2 |
| Combat ships, main classes | 35 | 15 | 14 | 4 | 2 | 70 |

The production volumes for combat equipment and weapons in table 93 shows that Soviet industry with the start of the war increased production of medium and heavy tanks, self-propelled guns, anti-tank artillery, fighter aircraft and attack aircraft at a high rate. This ultimately predetermined the conditions for achieving the turning point in the war and the victorious completion of it.

The growing production volumes for combat equipment and weapons in the war years made it possible to supply on a sufficiently high level the demand by the active army, to restore the combat capability of the troops quickly, and to replace their losses in the course of operations.

[28] Minus revolvers and pistols.

[29] Does not include production of artillery guns for tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, aircraft and ships

Table 94

The amount of the basic combat equipment and weapons in the Red Army by years of the war[30]

| | Name | Tanks and self-propelled guns, (000) | Guns and mortars, (000)[31] | Combat aircraft, (000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On 22 Jun 41 | Total | 22.6 | 76.5 | 20 |
| | In active army | 14.2 | 32.9 | 9.2 |
| On 1 Jan 42 | Total | 7.7 | 48.6 | 12 |
| | In active army | 2.2 | 30 | 5.4 |
| On 1 Jan 43 | Total | 20.6 | 161.6 | 21.9 |
| | In active army | 8.1 | 91.4 | 12.3 |
| On 1 Jan 44 | Total | 24.4 | 244.4 | 32.5 |
| | In active army | 5.8 | 101.4 | 13.4 |
| On 1 Jan 45 | Total | 35.4 | 244.4 | 43.3 |
| | In active army | 8.3 | 114.6 | 21.5 |
| On 9 May 45 | Total | 35.2 | 239.6 | 47.3 |
| | In active army | 8.1 | 94.4 | 22.3 |

From table 94 it is clear that by the end of 1941 in our active army in comparison with the start of the war there had been a sharp drop in the number of tanks (by almost 6.5 times) and combat aircraft (by 1.7 times). This is explained first of all by the great losses in combat equipment by Soviet troops and also by the cutback of supplies of it from industry. In the fall of 1941 defense enterprises of Ukraine, Belorussia and partially Russia were evacuated to the eastern regions of the country and Central Asia. Only by the fall of 1942 did a significant growth of the delivery of combat equipment and weapons to the front start. Also, the amount of it in the active army was significantly smaller than in the Armed Forces on the whole: at the start of the war a large part of the weapons was located in strategic formations and formations of the internal military districts, in the High Command Headquarters reserve, and also in the Far East, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

[30] Also counts malfunctioning weapons.

[31] Minus 50 mm mortars

Table 95

# Summary table of availability, delivery and losses of weapons and equipment in the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (by years)

## I. Infantry Arms

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Revolvers and pistols, mln units | 1.24 | 0.13 | 1.37 | 0.44 | 32.1 | 0.93 | 0.17 | 1.10 | 0.39 | 35.5 | 0.71 | 0.37 | 1.08 | 0.08 | 7.4 |
| Rifles and carbines, mln units | 7.74 | 1.57 | 9.31 | 5.55 | 59.6 | 3.76 | 4.04 | 7.80 | 2.18 | 27.9 | 5.62 | 3.85 | 9.47 | 1.26 | 13.3 |
| Submachine guns, mln units | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 50 | 0.10 | 1.56 | 1.66 | 0.55 | 33.1 | 1.11 | 2.06 | 3.17 | 0.53 | 16.7 |
| Light machine guns, thous units | 170.4 | 45.3 | 215.7 | 134.7 | 62.4 | 81 | 172.8 | 253.8 | 76.7 | 30.2 | 177.1 | 250.2 | 427.3 | 82.8 | 19.4 |
| Heavy machine guns, thous units | 76.3 | 8.4 | 84.7 | 54.7 | 64.6 | 30 | 58 | 88 | 24.5 | 27.8 | 63.5 | 90.5 | 154 | 21 | 13.6 |
| Heavy caliber machine guns, thous units | 2.2 | 1.4 | 3.6 | 1.4 | 38.9 | 2.2 | 7.4 | 9.6 | 4.9 | 51 | 4.7 | 14.4 | 19.1 | 0.9 | 4.7 |
| Anti-tank rifles, thous units | — | 17.7 | 17.7 | 8.8 | 49.7 | 8.9 | 249 | 257.9 | 86.9 | 33.7 | 171 | 164.5 | 335.5 | 46.6 | 13.9 |
| Total, mln units | 9.33 | 1.87 | 11.20 | 6.29 | 56.2 | 4.91 | 6.26 | 11.17 | 3.31 | 29.6 | 7.86 | 6.20 | 14.06 | 2.02 | 14.4 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 9/5/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Revolvers and pistols, mln units | 1 | 0.57 | 1.57 | 0.15 | 9.6 | 1.42 | 0.21 | 1.63 | 0.06 | 3.7 | 1.57 | 1.45 | 2.69 | 1.12 | 41.6 |
| Rifles and carbines, mln units | 7.61 | 2.06 | 9.67 | 1.61 | 16.6 | 8.06 | 0.24 | 8.30 | 0.67 | 8.1 | 7.63 | 11.16 | 18.90 | 11.27 | 59.6 |
| Submachine guns, mln units | 2.64 | 1.78 | 4.42 | 0.84 | 19 | 3.58 | 0.03 | 3.61 | 0.26 | 7.2 | 3.35 | 5.53 | 5.63 | 2.28 | 40.5 |
| Light machine guns, thous units | 344.5 | 179.7 | 524.2 | 106.1 | 20.2 | 418.1 | 14.5 | 432.6 | 27.2 | 6.3 | 405.4 | 662.5 | 832.9 | 427.5 | 51.3 |
| Heavy machine guns, thous units | 133 | 89.9 | 222.9 | 38.2 | 17.1 | 184.7 | 10.8 | 195.5 | 12.9 | 6.6 | 182.6 | 257.6 | 333.9 | 151.3 | 45.3 |
| Heavy caliber machine guns, thous units | 18.2 | 14.8 | 33 | 1.9 | 5.8 | 31.1 | 7.3 | 38.4 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 37.5 | 45.3 | 45.5 | 10 | 21 |
| Anti-tank rifles, thous units | 288.9 | 37.7 | 326.6 | 56.5 | 17.3 | 271.9 | 0.8 | 272.7 | 15.2 | 5.6 | 257.5 | 471.5 | 417.5 | 214 | 45.4 |
| Total, mln units | 12.04 | 4.73 | 16.77 | 2.81 | 16.8 | 14.06 | 0.69 | 14.75 | 1.04 | 7 | 13.71 | 19.85 | 29.18 | 15.47 | 53 |

## II. Artillery

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Anti-aircraft, thous units | 8.6 | 3.4 | 12 | 4.1 | 34.2 | 7.9 | 6.8 | 14.7 | 1.6 | 10.9 | 13.1 | 12.2 | 25.3 | 0.8 | 3.2 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25 mm AA gun | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 37, 40 mm AA gun | — | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 33.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | — | — | 0.4 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 0.1 | 5.3 |
| 76,85,90 mm AA gun | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.8 | 1.2 | 42.8 | 1.6 | 3.8 | 5.4 | 0.6 | 11.1 | 4.8 | 6.9 | 11.7 | 0.4 | 3.4 |
| Anti-tank , thous units | 7.2 | 1.7 | 8.9 | 2.8 | 31.5 | 6.1 | 2.8 | 8.9 | 0.9 | 10.1 | 8 | 3.8 | 11.8 | 0.3 | 2.5 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45 mm gun | 14.9 | 2.5 | 17.4 | 12.1 | 69.5 | 5.3 | 20.5 | 25.8 | 11.5 | 44.6 | 14.3 | 23.4 | 37.7 | 5.5 | 14.6 |
| 57 mm gun | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 14.9 | 2.1 | 17 | 12 | 70.6 | 5 | 20.5 | 25.5 | 11.3 | 44.3 | 14.2 | 21.5 | 35.7 | 5.2 | 14.6 |
| | — | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 25 | 0.3 | — | 0.3 | 0.3 | 66.7 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 2 | 0.3 | 15 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/44 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 9/5/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Anti-aircraft, thous units | 24.6 | 13.4 | 38 | 1 | 2.6 | 37 | 2.6 | 39.6 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 39 | 38.4 | 47 | 8 | 17 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25 mm AA gun | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 37, 40 mm AA gun | 1.8 | 2.4 | 4.2 | 0.3 | 7.1 | 3.9 | 0.5 | 4.4 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 0.6 | 12.2 |
| 76,85,90 mm AA gun | 11.3 | 9 | 20.3 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 19.8 | 1.5 | 21.3 | 0.4 | 1.9 | 20.9 | 22.6 | 24 | 3.1 | 12.9 |
| Anti-tank , thous units | 11.5 | 2 | 13.5 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 13.3 | 0.6 | 13.9 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 13.8 | 10.9 | 18.1 | 4.3 | 23.8 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45 mm gun | 32.2 | 6.4 | 38.6 | 9.3 | 24.1 | 29.3 | 1.4 | 30.7 | 4 | 13 | 26.7 | 54.2 | 69.1 | 42.4 | 61.4 |
| 57 mm gun | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 30.5 | 4.1 | 34.6 | 8.2 | 23.7 | 26.4 | 0.6 | 27 | 3.5 | 13 | 23.5 | 48.8 | 63.7 | 40.2 | 63.1 |
| | 1.7 | 2.3 | 4 | 1.1 | 27.5 | 2.9 | 0.8 | 3.7 | 0.5 | 13.5 | 3.2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 2.2 | 40.7 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Delivered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Delivered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Delivered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Field, thous units | 33.2 | 10.1 | 43.3 | 24.4 | 56.3 | 18.9 | 30.1 | 49 | 12.3 | 25.1 | 36.7 | 22.1 | 58.8 | 5.7 | 9.7 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 76 mm gun | 15.3 | 6.5 | 21.8 | 12.3 | 56.4 | 9.5 | 23.6 | 33.1 | 10.1 | 30.5 | 23 | 16.6 | 39.6 | 5 | 12.6 |
| 100,107 mm gun | 0.9 | 0.1 | 1 | 0.4 | 40 | 0.6 | — | 0.6 | 0.1 | 16.7 | 0.5 | — | 0.5 | — | — |
| 122 mm howitzer | 8.1 | 1.9 | 10 | 6 | 60 | 4 | 4.5 | 8.5 | 1.5 | 17.6 | 7 | 3.8 | 10.8 | 0.6 | 5.6 |
| 122 mm gun | 1.3 | 0.3 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 56.2 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1 | — | — | 1 | 0.5 | 1.5 | — | — |
| 152 mm gun | 3.8 | 0.3 | 4.1 | 2.6 | 63.4 | 1.5 | — | 1.5 | 0.2 | 13.3 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 1.4 | — | — |
| 152 mm htzr-gun,gun | 2.8 | 0.9 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 56.8 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 0.4 | 12.1 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 4 | 0.1 | 2.5 |
| 203 mm and higher | 1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 9.1 | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | — |
| Mortars, thous units | 56.1 | 42.4 | 98.5 | 60.5 | 61.4 | 38 | 230.3 | 268.3 | 82.2 | 30.6 | 186.1 | 67.9 | 254 | 26.7 | 10.5 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 50 mm | 36.3 | 23.2 | 59.5 | 38 | 63.9 | 21.5 | 104.4 | 125.9 | 37.3 | 29.6 | 88.6 | 17.5 | 106.1 | 13.3 | 12.5 |
| 82 mm | 14.5 | 16.6 | 31.1 | 18.5 | 59.5 | 12.6 | 100.5 | 113.1 | 34.8 | 30.8 | 78.3 | 33.6 | 111.9 | 10.3 | 9.2 |
| 107,120 mm | 5.3 | 2.6 | 7.9 | 4 | 50.6 | 3.9 | 25.4 | 29.3 | 10.1 | 34.5 | 19.2 | 16.8 | 36 | 3.1 | 8.6 |
| 160 mm | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Guns and mortars, thous units | 112.8 | 58.4 | 171.2 | 101.1 | 59 | 70.1 | 287.7 | 357.8 | 107.6 | 30.1 | 250.2 | 125.6 | 375.8 | 38.6 | 10.3 |
| Rocket artillery, thous units | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | 1 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 0.7 | 16.3 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 6.9 | 2.1 | 30.4 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| BM-8 | — | 0.4 | 0.4 | — | — | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 23.1 | 1 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 35.7 |
| BM-13 | — | 0.6 | 0.6 | — | — | 0.6 | 2.4 | 3 | 0.4 | 13.3 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 5.5 | 1.6 | 29.1 |
| BM-31-12 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/44 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 9/5/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Field, thous units | 53.1 | 21.5 | 74.6 | 12.3 | 16.5 | 62.3 | 5.8 | 68.1 | 6.8 | 10 | 61.3 | 89.6 | 122.8 | 61.5 | 50.1 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 76 mm gun | 34.6 | 17.3 | 51.9 | 10.8 | 20.8 | 41.1 | 4.8 | 45.9 | 5.8 | 12.6 | 40.1 | 68.8 | 84.1 | 44 | 52.3 |
| 100,107 mm gun | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.8 | — | — | 0.8 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 9.1 | 1 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 37.5 |
| 122 mm howitzer | 10.2 | 3.1 | 13.3 | 1.2 | 9.0 | 12.1 | 0.3 | 12.4 | 0.7 | 5.6 | 11.7 | 13.6 | 21.7 | 10 | 46.1 |
| 122 mm gun | 1.5 | 0.2 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 5.9 | 1.6 | 0.1 | 1.7 | — | — | 1.7 | 1.4 | 2.7 | 1 | 37 |
| 152 mm gun | 1.4 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 5.9 | 1.6 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 5.9 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 4.6 | 3 | 65.2 |
| 152 mm htzr-gun,gun | 3.9 | 0.3 | 4.2 | 0.1 | 2.4 | 4.1 | 0.2 | 4.3 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 7 | 2.8 | 40 |
| 203 mm and higher | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 9.7 |
| Mortars, thous units | 227.3 | 2 | 229.3 | 29.2 | 12.7 | 200.1 | 1.4 | 201.5 | 7 | 3.5 | 194.5 | 344 | 400.1 | 205.6 | 51.4 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 50 mm | 92.8 | — | 92.8 | 8.5 | 9.2 | 84.3 | — | 84.3 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 81.9 | 145.1 | 181.4 | 99.5 | 54.9 |
| 82 mm | 101.6 | 0.6 | 102.2 | 14.6 | 14.3 | 87.3 | 1 | 88.3 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 84.6 | 152.3 | 166.8 | 82.2 | 49.3 |
| 107,120 mm | 32.9 | 1.4 | 34.3 | 5.8 | 16.9 | 28.5 | 0.4 | 28.9 | 0.9 | 3.1 | 28 | 46.6 | 51.9 | 23.9 | 46 |
| 160 mm | — | 0.6 | — | — | — | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.4 | — | — | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | — | — |
| Guns and mortars, thous units | 337.2 | 43.3 | 380.5 | 51.8 | 13.6 | 328.7 | 11.2 | 339.9 | 18.4 | 5.4 | 321.5 | 526.2 | 639 | 317.5 | 49.7 |
| Rocket artillery, thous units | 4.8 | 2.6 | 7.4 | 1.5 | 20.3 | 5.9 | 0.8 | 6.7 | 0.6 | 8.9 | 6.1 | 11 | 11 | 4.9 | 44.5 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| BM-8 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 35.7 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 9.1 | 1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 58.3 |
| BM-13 | 3.9 | 0.9 | 4.8 | 1 | 20.8 | 3.8 | — | 3.8 | 0.4 | 10.5 | 3.4 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 3.4 | 50 |
| BM-31-12 | — | 1.2 | 1.2 | — | — | 1.2 | 0.6 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 5.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 5.6 |

## III. Armored equipment

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Tanks, thous units | 22.6 | 5.6 | 28.2 | 20.5 | 72.7 | 7.7 | 27.9 | 35.6 | 15 | 42.1 | 20.6 | 22.9 | 43.5 | 22.4 | 51.5 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| heavy | 0.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 60 | 0.6 | 2.6 | 3.2 | 1.2 | 37.5 | 2 | 0.9 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 44.8 |
| medium | 0.9 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 74.2 | 0.8 | 13.4 | 14.2 | 6.6 | 46.5 | 7.6 | 16.3 | 23.9 | 14.7 | 61.5 |
| light | 21.2 | 2.4 | 23.6 | 17.3 | 73.3 | 6.3 | 11.9 | 18.2 | 7.2 | 39.6 | 11 | 5.7 | 16.7 | 6.4 | 38.3 |
| Self-propelled guns, thous units | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 100 | — | 4.4 | 4.4 | 1.1 | 25 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| heavy | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 100 | — | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 38.5 |
| medium | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 12.5 |
| light | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 100 | — | 2.3 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 21.7 |
| Tanks and self-prop. guns, thous units | 22.6 | 5.6 | 28.2 | 20.5 | 72.7 | 7.7 | 28 | 35.7 | 15.1 | 42.3 | 20.6 | 27.3 | 47.9 | 23.5 | 49.1 |
| Armored vehicles, tractors, other armored equipment | 13.1 | 10.8 | 23.9 | 3 | 20.9 | 20.9 | 10.2 | 31.1 | 9 | 28.9 | 22.1 | 10.6 | 32.7 | 12.5 | 38.2 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/44 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 5/9/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Tanks, thous units | 21.1 | 21.2 | 42.3 | 16.9 | 40 | 25.4 | 8.5 | 33.9 | 8.7 | 25.7 | 25.2 | 86.1 | 108.7 | 83.5 | 76.8 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| heavy | 1.6 | 4 | 5.6 | 0.9 | 16.1 | 4.7 | 1.5 | 6.2 | 0.9 | 14.5 | 5.3 | 10 | 10.5 | 5.2 | 49.5 |
| medium | 9.2 | 17 | 26.2 | 13.8 | 52.7 | 12.4 | 6.1 | 18.5 | 7.5 | 40.5 | 11 | 55 | 55.9 | 44.9 | 80.3 |
| light | 10.3 | 0.2 | 10.5 | 2.3 | 21.9 | 8.2 | 0.9 | 9.1 | 0.3 | 3.3 | 8.8 | 21 | 12.2 | 33.4 | 79.1 |
| Self-propelled guns, thous units | 3.3 | 13.6 | 16.9 | 6.8 | 40.2 | 10.1 | 5 | 15.1 | 5.0 | 33.1 | 10.1 | 23.1 | 23.1 | 13 | 56.3 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| heavy | 0.8 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 0.9 | 27.3 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 3.6 | 0.9 | 25 | 2.7 | 5 | 5 | 2.3 | 46 |
| medium | 0.7 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 1 | 32.3 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 2.9 | 1 | 34.5 | 1.9 | 4 | 4 | 2.1 | 52.5 |
| light | 1.8 | 8.6 | 10.4 | 4.9 | 47.1 | 5.5 | 3 | 8.5 | 3.1 | 36.5 | 5.4 | 14 | 14 | 8.6 | 61.4 |
| Tanks and self-prop. guns, thous units | 24.4 | 34.7 | 59.1 | 23.7 | 40.1 | 35.4 | 13.5 | 48.9 | 13.7 | 28 | 35.2 | 109.1 | 131.7 | 96.5 | 73.3 |
| Armored vehicles, tractors, other armored equipment | 20.2 | 17 | 37.2 | 12.5 | 33.6 | 24.7 | 10.6 | 35.3 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 34.6 | 59.1 | 72.2 | 37.6 | 52.1 |

## IV. Aircraft

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Bombers, thous units | 8.4 | 2.5 | 10.9 | $\frac{7.2}{4.6}$ | 42.2 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 7.8 | $\frac{2.5}{1.6}$ | 20.5 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 10.4 | $\frac{3.6}{1.7}$ | 16.3 |
| Attack aircraft, thous units | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.5 | $\frac{1.1}{0.6}$ | 40 | 0.4 | 7.2 | 7.6 | $\frac{2.6}{1.8}$ | 23.7 | 5 | 11 | 16 | $\frac{7.2}{3.9}$ | 24.4 |
| Fighters, thous units | 11.5 | 6 | 17.5 | $\frac{9.6}{5.1}$ | 29.1 | 7.9 | 10.7 | 18.6 | $\frac{7}{4.4}$ | 23.7 | 11.6 | 17 | 28.6 | $\frac{11.7}{5.6}$ | 19.6 |
| Total combat aircraft, thous units | 20 | 9.9 | 29.9 | $\frac{17.9}{10.3}$ | 34.4 | 12 | 22 | 34 | $\frac{12.1}{7.8}$ | 22.9 | 21.9 | 33.1 | 55 | $\frac{22.5}{11.2}$ | 20.4 |
| Training, transport, and other aircraft | 12.1 | 1.1 | 13.2 | $\frac{3.3}{0.3}$ | 2.3 | 9.9 | 5.7 | 15.6 | $\frac{2.6}{1.3}$ | 8.3 | 13 | 5.1 | 18.1 | $\frac{4.2}{0.5}$ | 2.8 |
| Total aircraft, thous units | 32.1 | 11 | 43.1 | $\frac{21.1}{10.6}$ | 24.6 | 21.9 | 27.7 | 49.6 | $\frac{14.7}{9.1}$ | 18.3 | 34.9 | 38.2 | 73.1 | $\frac{26.7}{11.7}$ | 16 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/44 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 5/9/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Bombers, thous units | 6.8 | 5.3 | 12.1 | 3.2/1.5 | 12.4 | 8.9 | 2.2 | 11.1 | 1.4/0.6 | 5.4 | 9.7 | 19.2 | 27.6 | 17.9/10 | 36.2 |
| Attack aircraft, thous units | 8.8 | 10.3 | 19.1 | 8.9/4.1 | 21.5 | 10.2 | 3.7 | 13.9 | 3.8/2 | 14.4 | 10.1 | 33.6 | 33.7 | 23.6/12.4 | 36.8 |
| Fighters, thous units | 16.9 | 20 | 36.9 | 12.7/4.1 | 11.1 | 24.2 | 9.1 | 33.3 | 5.8/1.5 | 4.5 | 27.5 | 62.8 | 74.3 | 46.8/20.7 | 27.9 |
| Total combat aircraft, thous units | 32.5 | 35.6 | 68.1 | 24.8/9.7 | 14.2 | 43.3 | 15 | 58.3 | 11/4.1 | 7 | 47.3 | 115.6 | 135.6 | 88.3/43.1 | 31.8 |
| Training, transport, and other aircraft | 13.9 | 7.5 | 21.4 | 5.7/0.7 | 3.3 | 15.7 | 3.5 | 19.2 | 2.3/0.2 | 1 | 16.9 | 22.9 | 35 | 18.1/3 | 8.6 |
| Total aircraft, thous units | 46.4 | 43.1 | 89.5 | 30.5/10.4 | 11.6 | 59.9 | 18.5 | 77.5 | 13.3/4.3 | 5.5 | 64.2 | 138.5 | 170.6 | 106.4/46.1 | 27 |

## V. Ships

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Surface ships (except for small ships) | 235 | 264 | 499 | 121 | 24.2 | 378 | 66 | 444 | 46 | 10.4 | 394 | — | 394 | 22 | 5.6 |
| Combatant craft | 466 | 682 | 1148 | 168 | 14.6 | 980 | 548 | 1528 | 159 | 10.4 | 1369 | 311 | 1680 | 210 | 12.5 |
| Submarines | 212 | 20 | 232 | 36 | 15.5 | 196 | 13 | 209 | 37 | 17.7 | 172 | 14 | 186 | 19 | 10.2 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 913 | 966 | 1879 | 325 | 17.3 | 1554 | 627 | 2181 | 242 | 11.1 | 1939 | 321 | 2260 | 251 | 11.1 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/44 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 9/5/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Surface ships (except for small ships) | 372 | 8 | 380 | 21 | 5.5 | 359 | 54 | 413 | 2 | 0.5 | 411 | 388 | 623 | 212 | 34 |
| Combatant craft | 1470 | 568 | 2038 | 141 | 6.9 | 1897 | 40 | 1937 | 22 | 1.1 | 1915 | 2149 | 2615 | 700 | 26.8 |
| Submarines | 167 | 3 | 170 | 9 | 5.3 | 161 | 1 | 162 | 1 | 0.6 | 161 | 51 | 263 | 102 | 38.8 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2009 | 579 | 2588 | 171 | 6.6 | 2417 | 95 | 2512 | 25 | 1 | 2487 | 2588 | 3501 | 1014 | 29 |

## VI. Automobiles, thous units

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Automobiles of all types | 272.6 | 204.9 | 477.5 | 159 | 33.3 | 318.5 | 152.9 | 470.7 | 66.2 | 14.1 | 404.5 | 158.5 | 563 | 67 | 11.9 |

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/44 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 5/9/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Automobiles of all types | 496 | 157.9 | 653.9 | 32.6 | 5 | 621.3 | 70.9 | 692.2 | 27 | 3.9 | 665.2 | 744.4 | 1017 | 351.8 | 34.6 |

## VII. Radio equipment, thous units

| Name of weapon and equipment, unit of measurement | 1941 (22 June - 31 December) | | | | | 1942 | | | | | 1943 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 6/21/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/42 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/43 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Radio equipment of all types | 37.4 | 5.6 | 43 | 23.7 | 55.1 | 19.3 | 27.5 | 46.8 | 7 | 15 | 39.8 | 49.8 | 89.3 | 17.7 | 19.8 |

| | 1944 | | | | | 1945 (1 Jan - 10 May) | | | | | For war | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number on 1/1/41 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 1/1/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply | Number on 9/5/45 | Deli-vered | Supply | Losses | % of losses to supply |
| 1 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| Radio equipment of all types | 71.6 | 48.7 | 120.3 | 13.3 | 11.1 | 107 | 20.1 | 127.1 | 13.4 | 10.5 | 113.7 | 151.4 | 188.8 | 75.1 | 39.8 |

Comments: 1 The data presented in the table was compiled on the basis of an analysis of archive materials from the period of the Great Patriotic War and calculations based on them.

2. In the columns (Number on...) the weapons and combat equipment, including that being repaired, used up or having a short service life (running time, guaranteed work time for engines in combat vehicles, level of wear of gun barrels and so on) are counted.

3. In the columns "Delivered" the weapons and combat equipment that arrived from industry, from lend lease, and after recovery (major overhaul) are counted. The delivery does not include about 43,000 infantry weapons, 17,100 guns and mortars, 1300 tanks, 1600 aircraft that were sent by the Soviet Union in the years of the Great Patriotic War to equip formations and units from Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

4. In the columns "Losses" the combat and noncombat losses are counted together since the size of the noncombat losses is small except for aircraft. Its losses are given as the total losses in the numerator and the combat losses in the denominator.

5. In the columns "Percent of losses to supply" the percentage of the losses to the total supply (the availability on the starting date plus the deliveries) is given by years and for the war.

6. From lend-lease and other supply systems the following were received from the United States, Great Britain and Canada: 151,700 infantry weapons, 9400 guns and mortars, 11,900 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 5000 armored personnel carriers, 18,300 planes, and 520 ships and boats.

The information presented here about the deliveries includes only that amount of weapons and combat equipment which actually reached the army and navy. The count does not include losses during shipment, faulty items, or equipment and weapons sent to other departments.

Table 96

Irrecoverable losses in main combat equipment and weapons of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War

| Name | Amount | | | % of losses | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | on 22 Jun 1941 | of total supply[32] | of losses | to number on 22 Jun 1941 | to total supply |
| Infantry weapons of all types, million units | 9.33 | 29.18 | 15.47 | 166 | 53 |
| Tanks and self-propelled artillery, thousand units | 22.6 | 131.7 | 96.5 | 427 | 73.3 |
| Guns and mortars[33], thousand units | 112.8 | 639 | 317.5 | 281 | 49.7 |
| Combat aircraft of all types, thousand units | 20 | 135.6 | 88.3[34] / 43.1 | 442 / 216 | 65.1 / 31.8 |

In the course of the war much of the equipment was sent to newly deployed formations and units that were removed from the fronts to restore their combat capability, and also to academies and reserve formations and units.

By the end of the war the amount of equipment and weapons that was undergoing repair and also being sent to equip the troops of the Far East had increased. Each day during the war from 8 to 10% of all of the combat equipment and weaponry of the army was on the road (to and from fronts - for recovery and during regroupings).

The overall dynamic of the change in the amount of weaponry and combat equipment in the Red Army is presented in table 95.

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[32] The total supply is the sum of the amount of weapons and combat equipment on 22 June 1941 and the amount that was supplied to equip the armed forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

[33] In this and the following tables the total amount of losses for guns and mortars includes the losses of 50 mm mortars, the number of which was from 29-30% in the active army in 1941-1942 and down to 3% in 1945.

[34] Losses of combat aircraft are given as: the numerator has the total planes, the denominator has the combat planes. The losses of the other types of weapons and combat equipment were not divided into combat and noncombat losses since the latter comprised a negligible part of the total losses.

From table 96 it is seen that the irrecoverable losses of tanks and self-propelled artillery comprise the highest percentage: 427% in comparison to that available on 22 June 1941 and over 73% of the total supply.

The percentage of irrecoverable losses in combat aircraft is high: 442% and 216% of that available on 22 June 1941, and so too are the total losses, 65.1%, and the combat losses, 31.8% of the total supply. In the air forces a large percentage of the losses, over half, are noncombat losses. They are connected with the training of pilots, with the reduction in the time for training them, especially with the mastering of new equipment, and also with the lack of discipline of the air crews and the flight leaders when carrying out flight training missions. The amount of noncombat losses also depended on the design and production shortcomings of the planes.

Table 97

Irrecoverable losses for the main types of weapons and combat equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces by years of the war

| Name | Losses for war | 1941 | | 1942 | | 1943 | | 1944 | | 1945 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % | Amount | % |
| Infantry weapons of all types, mln units | 15.47 | 6.29 | 40.7 | 3.31 | 21.4 | 2.02 | 13 | 2.81 | 18.2 | 1.04 | 6.7 |
| Tanks and self-propelled artillery, thousand units | 96.5 | 20.5 | 21.2 | 15.1 | 15.6 | 23.5 | 24.4 | 23.7 | 24.6 | 13.7 | 14.2 |
| Guns and mortar, thousand units | 317.5 | 101.1 | 31.8 | 107.6 | 33.9 | 38.6 | 12.2 | 51.8 | 16.3 | 18.4 | 5.8 |
| Combat aircraft, thousand units | 88.3 / 43.1 | 17.9 / 10.3 | 20.3 / 23.9 | 12.1 / 7.8 | 13.7 / 18.1 | 22.5 / 11.2 | 25.5 / 26 | 24.8 / 9.7 | 28.1 / 22.5 | 1.1 / 4.1 | 12.4 / 9.5 |

As we can see, the Soviet forces had the greatest losses in infantry weapons during the retreat in 1941 and 1942 (over 60%). There were major losses in tanks and self-propelled artillery in 1941, 1943 and 1944. In the first year of the war the main share of the losses consisted of out of date types of tanks. In 1943-1944 the loss grew from enemy anti-tank weapons, especially when breaking through his defensive lines. The greatest losses in guns and mortars occurred in 1941-1942 (65.7%). During the withdrawal guns and mortars, even those with small damage, were left behind, and sometimes this occurred because of the absence of or the malfunctioning of truck tractors. These losses for us ended up being irrecoverable. The maximum losses of combat aircraft occurred in 1943-1944 (48.5%). At this time the fight for air supremacy was especially sharp. Intense air battles on the Kuban' and over Kursk, and also strategic operations conducted with the participation of major air force groupings were accompanied by large losses.

The losses for the main types of combat equipment and weapons for Soviet troops are given in table 98 by periods and strategic operations during the war years.

Table 98

Losses of combat equipment by periods and strategic operations

| Name of operations, periods in which they were conducted, length in days | Losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | infantry weapons, thousand units | | tanks and self-propelled artillery | | guns and mortars | | combat aircraft | |
| | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily |
| **Period I (22 June 1941 - 18 November 1942)** | | | | | | | | |
| Baltic defensive operation 6/22-7/9 1941 (18) | 341 | 18.9 | 2523 | 140 | 3561 | 198 | 990 | 55 |
| Belorussian defensive operation 6/22-7/9 1941 (18) | 521.2 | 28.9 | 4799 | 267 | 9427 | 524 | 1777 | 99 |
| Defensive operation in Western Ukraine 6/22-7/6 1941 (15) | 169.8 | 11.3 | 4381 | 292 | 5806 | 387 | 1218 | 81 |
| Defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia 6/29-10/10 1941 (104) | 40.2 | 0.4 | 546 | 5 | 540 | 5 | 64 | 1 |
| Kiev defensive operation 7/7-9/26 1941 (82) | | | | | | | | |
| Leningrad defensive operation 7/10-9/30 1941 (83) | 1764.9 | 21.5 | 411 | 5 | 28419 | 347 | 343 | 4 |
| Battle of Smolensk 7/10-9/10 1941 (63) | 733.3 | 8.8 | 1492 | 18 | 9885 | 119 | 1702 | 20-21 |
| Donbass-Rostov defensive operation 9/29-11/16 1941 (49) | 233.4 | 3.7 | 1348 | 21 | 9290 | 147 | 903 | 14 |
| Moscow defensive operation 9/30-12/5 1941 (67) | 369 | 7.5 | 101 | 2 | 3646 | 74 | 240 | 5 |
| Tikhvin offensive operation 11/10-12/30 1941 (51) | 250.8 | 3.7 | 2785 | 42 | 3832 | 57 | 293 | 4 |
| Rostov offensive operation 11/17-12/2 1941 (16) | 31.1 | 0.6 | 70 | 1-2 | 2293 | 45 | 82 | 1-2 |
| | 66.8 | 4.2 | 42 | 2-3 | 1017 | 64 | 42 | 2-3 |

| Name of operations, periods in which they were conducted, length in days | Losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | infantry weapons, thousand units | | tanks and self-propelled artillery | | guns and mortars | | combat aircraft | |
| | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily |
| Moscow offensive operation 12/5 1941 - 1/7 1942 (34) | 1093.8 | 32.2 | 429 | 13 | 13350 | 393 | 140 | 4 |
| Kerch'-Feodosiya assault landing operation 12/25 1941-1/2 1942 (9) | 11.2 | 1.2 | 35 | 4 | 133 | 15 | 39 | 4-5 |
| Rzhev-Vyaz'ma offensive operation 1/8-4/20 1942 (103) | 305.5 | 3 | 957 | 9 | 7296 | 71 | 550 | 5 |
| Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive operation 6/28-7/24 1942 (27) | 488.6 | 18.1 | 2436 | 90 | 13716 | 508 | 783 | 29 |
| Stalingrad defensive operation 7/17-11/18 1942 (125) | 412.6 | 3.3 | 1426 | 11-12 | 12137 | 97 | 2063 | 16-17 |
| North Caucasus defensive operation 7/25-12/31 1942 (160) | 139.2 | 0.9 | 990 | 6 | 5049 | 31-32 | 644 | 4 |
| Total for strategic operations of period I of the war (1024)[35] | 6972.4 | 6.81 | 24771 | 24 | 129397 | 126 | 11873 | 11-12 |
| **Period II (19 November 1942 - 31 December 1943)** | | | | | | | | |
| Stalingrad offensive operation 11/19 1942 - 2/2 1943 (76) | 112.2 | 1.5 | 2915 | 38 | 3591 | 47 | 706 | 9 |
| North Caucasus offensive operation 1/1-2/4 1943 (35) | 36.7 | 1 | 220 | 6 | 895 | 26 | 236 | 6-7 |
| Breakthrough of Leningrad blockade 1/12-1/30 1943 (19) | 17.4 | 0.9 | 41 | 2 | 417 | 22 | 41 | 2 |

[35] Here and henceforth in the table the total number of days of length of the strategic operations that were conducted in a given period is given.

| Name of operations, periods in which they were conducted, length in days | Losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | infantry weapons, thousand units | | tanks and self-propelled artillery | | guns and mortars | | combat aircraft | |
| | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily |
| Voronezh-Khar'kov offensive operation 1/13-3/3 1943 (50) | 81.5 | 1.6 | 1023 | 20 | 2106 | 42 | 307 | 6 |
| Khar'kov defensive operation 3/4-3/25 1943 (22) | 116.5 | 5.3 | 322 | 15 | 3185 | 145 | 110 | 5 |
| Kursk defensive operation 7/5-7/23 1943 (19) | 70.8 | 3.7 | 1614 | 85 | 3929 | 207 | 459 | 24 |
| Orel offensive operation 7/12-8/18 1943 (38) | 60.5 | 1.6 | 2586 | 68 | 892 | 23 | 1014 | 27 |
| Belgorod-Khar'kov offensive operation 8/3-8/23 1943 (21) | 21.7 | 1 | 1864 | 89 | 423 | 20 | 153 | 7 |
| Smolensk offensive operation 8/7-10/2 1943 (57) | 33.7 | 0.6 | 863 | 15 | 234 | 4 | 303 | 5 |
| Donbass offensive operation 8/13-9/22 1943 (41) | 37.9 | 0.9 | 886 | 22 | 814 | 20 | 327 | 8 |
| Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation 8/26-9/30 1943 (36) | 48 | 1.3 | 1140 | 32 | 916 | 25 | 269 | 7 |
| Novorossiysk-Taman' offensive operation 9/10-10/9 1943 (30) | 4.5 | 0.2 | 111 | 4 | 70 | 2 | 240 | 8 |
| Lower Dnepr offensive operation 9/26-12/20 1943 (86) | 179.9 | 2.1 | 2639 | 31 | 3125 | 36 | 430 | 5 |
| Kiev offensive operation 11/3-13 1943 (11) | 8.6 | 0.8 | 271 | 25 | 104 | 9 | 125 | 11 |
| Total for strategic operations in period II of the war (541) | 829.9 | 1.5 | 16495 | 30 | 20701 | 38 | 4720 | 8-9 |

| Name of operations, periods in which they were conducted, length in days | Losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | infantry weapons, thousand units | | tanks and self-propelled artillery | | guns and mortars | | combat aircraft | |
| | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily |
| **Period III (January 1944 - May 1945)** | | | | | | | | |
| Liberation of Right Bank of Ukraine 12/24 1943 - 4/17 1944 (116) | 362.6 | 3.1 | 4666 | 40 | 7532 | 65 | 676 | 6 |
| Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation 1/14-3/1 1944 (48) | 77.1 | 1.6 | 462 | 10 | 1832 | 38 | 260 | 5 |
| Crimea offensive operation 4/8-5/12 1944 (35) | 29.7 | 0.8 | 171 | 5 | 521 | 15 | 179 | 5 |
| Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive operation 6/10-8/9 1944 (61) | 24.1 | 0.4 | 294 | 5 | 489 | 8 | 311 | 5 |
| Belorussian offensive operation 6/23-8/29 1944 (68) | 183.5 | 2.7 | 2957 | 43 | 2447 | 36 | 822 | 12 |
| L'vov-Sandomir offensive operation 7/13-8/29 1944 (49) | 79 | 1.6 | 1269 | 26 | 1832 | 38 | 289 | 6 |
| Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation 8/20-8/29 1944 (10) | 6.2 | 0.6 | 75 | 7-8 | 108 | 10-11 | 111 | 11 |
| Eastern Carpathian offensive operation 9/8-10/29 1944 (51) | 47.9 | 0.9 | 478 | 9 | 962 | 19 | 192 | 4 |
| Baltic offensive operation 9/14-11/24 1944 (71) | 172.7 | 2.4 | 522 | 7 | 2593 | 37 | 779 | 11 |
| Belgrade offensive operation 9/28-10/20 1944 (23) | 16.6 | 0.7 | 53 | 2 | 184 | 8 | 66 | 3 |
| Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive operation 10/7-10/29 1944 (23) | 2.9 | 0.1 | 21 | 1 | 40 | 2 | 62 | 3 |
| Budapest offensive operation 10/29 1944 - 2/13 1945 (108) | 135.1 | 1.3 | 1766 | 16 | 4127 | 38 | 293 | 2-3 |

| Name of operations, periods in which they were conducted, length in days | Losses | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | infantry weapons, thousand units | | tanks and self-propelled artillery | | guns and mortars | | combat aircraft | |
| | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily | In operation | Average daily |
| Vistula-Oder offensive operation 1/12-2/3 1945 (23) | 25.3 | 1.1 | 1267 | 55 | 374 | 16 | 343 | 15 |
| Western Carpathian offensive operation 1/12-2/18 1945 (38) | 21.5 | 0.6 | 359 | 9 | 753 | 20 | 94 | 2 |
| Eastern Prussia offensive operation 1/13-4/25 1945 (103) | 119.4 | 1.2 | 3525 | 34 | 1644 | 16 | 1450 | 14 |
| Eastern Pomerania offensive operation 2/10-4/4 1945 (54) | 89.4 | 1.7 | 1027 | 19 | 1005 | 19 | 1073 | 20 |
| Vienna offensive operation 3/16-4/15 1945 (31) | 29.6 | 0.9 | 603 | 19 | 764 | 25 | 614 | 20 |
| Berlin offensive operation 4/16-5/9 1945 (23) | 215.9 | 9.4 | 1997 | 87 | 2108 | 92 | 917 | 40 |
| Prague offensive operation 5/6-5/11 1945 (6) | 59.8 | 10 | 373 | 62 | 1006 | 168 | 80 | 13 |
| Total for strategic operations in period III of war (940) | 1698.3 | 1.8 | 21885 | 23 | 30321 | 32 | 8611 | 9 |
| **Campaign in the Far East (August 1945)** | | | | | | | | |
| Manchurian offensive operation 8/9-9/2 1945 (25) | 11 | 0.4 | 78 | 3 | 232 | 9 | 62 | 2 |
| Total for strategic operations of Great Patriotic War | 9511.6 | 3.75 | 63,229 | 25 | 180,651 | 71 | 25,266 | 10 |

In strategic operations the troops lost 62.2% of the infantry weapons, 65.6% of the tanks and self-propelled artillery, 56.8% of the guns and mortars, and 60% of the combat aircraft losses suffered in the entire war. Each day on average in the Soviet forces 11,000 pieces of infantry weaponry, 68 tanks, 224 guns and mortars, and 30 aircraft were lost. And in defensive operations such as the Baltic, Belorussian, Kiev, and Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad operations the daily losses reached 20-30,000 pieces of infantry weaponry, 90-290 tanks, 200-520 guns and mortars, and 30-100 combat aircraft. The losses by our troops in the period of the waging of the battle of Kursk and the Berlin offensive operation were high: each day 70-90 tanks, 90-210 guns and mortars, and 25-40 aircraft were lost.

The losses of infantry weapons after 1941 steadily decreased for all types. The percentage of losses of light tanks also decreased, but this occurred because the production of them was halted: the medium and heavy tanks played the main role in battles and operations. Their losses especially grew in 1943. In that year the fascist command undertook an attempt to take revenge for Stalingrad, having gambled again, as at the start of the war, on improved models of tanks and assault guns. The largest battles with the massive use of tank forces on both sides took place in the Donbass, and around Khar'kov and Kursk.

In 1944 a number of major strategic offensive operations were conducted from the Barents to the Black Seas for the purpose of expelling the enemy from Soviet territory and liberating the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe from their German-fascist invaders. A large role in the operations was given to the artillery. It participated in the preparation for attacks and in close fire support for rifle troops and tanks in the depth of the enemy defense. In these conditions the losses of artillery of all types, except for mortars, grew. The losses of them decreased since the share of their participation in offensive operations, especially the 50 mm mortars, which at the end of 1944 was removed from the strength tables of rifle divisions and brigades, dropped.

In 1942 the aviation losses stabilized and remained on approximately the same level.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet forces lost 351,800 automobiles (34.6% of the supply), 75,100 pieces of radio equipment of all types (40% of the supply), about 10,000 pieces of engineer equipment (ferries, tow boats, graders, scrapers, compressor units, mobile charging and power stations, water lifting engines, mobile repair shops and other equipment), over 24,000,000 pieces of chemical protective gear, over 31,000 special chemical vehicles, instruments and sets, and several thousand pieces of rear services property and equipment.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War 1014 ships of various classes were lost. Of them, there were 314 surface ships and submarines of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd rank (a list of these ships with an indication of the date and place of the loss is given in table 99), 139 torpedo boats, 128 submarine hunters, 77 armored launches, 168 minesweepers, and 188 patrol and other craft.

The losses of combat equipment and weapons by Soviet troops are enormous. The need to compare them with the damage inflicted upon the enemy is quite natural. But the authors of this book did not set for themselves the goal of calculating the losses of fascist Germany and its allies in the war with the Soviet Union. It can only be said that everything produced by them before their attack on the Soviet Union and in the course of the war was, for them, an irrecoverable loss. All together, these are also large figures: 42,700 tanks and assault guns, 379,400 guns and mortars, and 75,700 combat aircraft. The fascist army ceased to exist.

The Red Army on 9 May 1945 had in its equipment 35,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 1.6 times more than it had on 22 June 1941, 321,500 guns and mortars, an increase of 2.9 times, and 47,300 combat aircraft, 2.4 times more than at the start of the war. The Soviet Armed Forces had a rich experience in waging various operations and engagements and were at a high combat readiness. Part of them, the troops in the Far East, in a short time routed and captured the Kwantung Army of Japan.

After the war the striking power of the army and navy grew significantly. Nuclear weapons and missiles with various purposes appeared in the arsenal of the Soviet Armed Forces, and several generations of tanks, artillery systems, combat aircraft and ships were replaced. The weaponry of the Red Army which had brought victory over the Nazi invaders and Japanese militarists now are only displays in museums and monuments on pedestals: the feted 34's "Il's", "Katyushas", 45's, 76 mm cannons, 122 mm howitzers, submarines and torpedo boats, the three ton and one and a half ton workers of the front line roads... They remain in the memories of millions of peoples as the fruit of their intensive labor, a symbol of the military glory of our

soldiers during the defeating and expelling of the aggressor from our native land and during the liberation of other nations from the fascist enslavers.

Table 99

## Roster of ships of the Soviet Navy lost in the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Cruisers** | | |
| 1 | 9/18/41 | Petropavlovsk | Red Banner Baltic | Leningrad | Raised |
| 2 | 11/12/41 | Chervona Ukraina | Black Sea | Sevastapol | |
| | | | **Frigates** | | |
| 1 | 6/26/41 | Moskva | Black Sea | East of Constanta | |
| 2 | 9/23/41 | Minsk | Red Banner Baltic | Kronshtadt | Raised |
| 3 | 7/2/42 | Tashkent | Black Sea | Novorossiysk | |
| 4 | 10/6/43— | Khar'kov | Black Sea | Central part of Black Sea | |
| | | | **Destroyers** | | |
| 1 | 6/23/41 | Gnevyy | Red Banner Baltic | Mouth of Gulf of Finland | |
| 2 | 6/23/41 | Lenin | Red Banner Baltic | Liyepaya | |
| 3 | 7/1741 | Bystryy | Black Sea | Sevastapol' | |
| 4 | 7/19/41 | Serdityy | Red Banner Baltic | Muhu Bay | |
| 5 | 7/20/41 | Stremitel'nyy | Northern | Yekaterininskaya harbor | |
| 6 | 7/27/41 | Smelyy | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Riga | |
| 7 | 8/8/41 | Karl Marks | Red Banner Baltic | Loks Bay | |
| 8 | 8/18/41 | Statnyy | Red Banner Baltic | Muhu Bay | |
| 9 | 8/24/41 | Engel's | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yuminda | |
| 10 | 8/24/41 | Yakov Sverdlov | Red Banner Baltic | Near Mokhni Island | |
| 11 | 8/28/41 | Skoryy | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yuminda | |
| 12 | 8/28/41 | Kalinin | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yuminda | |
| 13 | 8/28/41 | Volodarskiy | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yuminda | |
| 14 | 8/28/41 | Artem | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yuminda | |
| 15 | 9/21/41 | Steregushchiy | Red Banner Baltic | Kronshtadt | Raised |
| 16 | 9/21/41 | Frunze | Black Sea | Near Tendrovskaya Kosa | |
| 17 | 11/5/41 | Smetlivyy | Red Banner Baltic | Near Naysaar Island | |
| 18 | 11/14/41 | Surovyy | Red Banner Baltic | Near Keri Island | |
| 19 | 11/14/41 | Gordyy | Red Banner Baltic | Near Naysaar Island | |
| 20 | 3/6/42 | Smyshlenyy | Black Sea | Near Zheleznyj Rog | |
| 21 | 4/3/42 | Shaumyan | Black Sea | In area of Gelendzhik | |
| 22 | 5/14/42 | Dzerzhinskiy | Black Sea | In area of Sevastapol' | |
| 23 | 6/8/42 | Sovershennyy | Black Sea | Sevastapol' | |
| 24 | 6/10/42 | Svobodnyy | Black Sea | Sevastapol' | |
| 25 | 6/26/42 | Bezuprechnyy | Black Sea | In area of Yalta | |
| 26 | 7/2/42 | Bditel'nyy | Black Sea | Novorossiysk | |
| 27 | 11/20/42 | Sokrushitel'nyy | Northern | Barents Sea - central part | |
| | | | | Black Sea - central part | |
| 28 | 10/6/43 | Besposhchadnyy | Black Sea | Black Sea - central part | |
| 29 | 10/6/43 | Sposobnyy | Black Sea | Near Bolshoy Oleniy Island | |
| 30 | 1/16/45 | Deyatel'nyy | Northern | | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Submarines** | | |
| 1 | 6/23/41 | M-78 | Red Banner Baltic | In area of Ventspils | |
| 2 | 6/23/41 | S-1 | Red Banner Baltic | Liepaya | |
| 3 | 6/23/41 | Ronis | Red Banner Baltic | Liyepaya | |
| 4 | 6/23/41 | Spidola | Red Banner Baltic | Liyepaya | |
| 5 | 6/23/41 | M-71 | Red Banner Baltic | Liyepaya | |
| 6 | 6/23/41 | M-80 | Red Banner Baltic | Liyepaya | |
| 7 | 6/24/41 | S-3 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Uzhava lighthouse | |
| 8 | 6/26/41 | M-83 | Red Banner Baltic | Liyepaya | |
| 9 | 6/28/41 | S-10 | Red Banner Baltic | Danzig Bay | |
| 10 | 6/28/41 | M-99 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Khiyumaa Island | |
| 11 | 7/1/71 | M-81 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Vormsi Island | |
| 12 | 7/6/41 | Shch-206 | Black Sea | Near Shabler | |
| 13 | 7/21/41 | M-94 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Ristna lighthouse | |
| 14 | 8/2/41 | S-11 | Red Banner Baltic | Soela Vain | |
| 15 | 8/41 | M-49 | Pacific Ocean | In area of Vladivostok | |
| 16 | 8/41 | M-63 | Pacific Ocean | In area of Vladivostok | |
| 17 | 8/28/41 | S-5 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 18 | 8/28/41 | Shch-301 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yuminda | |
| 19 | 8/41 | S-6 | Red Banner Baltic | In area of Karlskrona | |
| 20 | 8/41 | M-103 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 21 | 9/41 | P-1 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 22 | 9/41 | Shch-319 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 23 | 9/23/41 | M-74 | Red Banner Baltic | Kronshtadt | Raised |
| 24 | 10/41 | S-8 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 25 | 10/41 | Shch-322 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 26 | 10/41 | M-58 | Black Sea | Near Constanta | |
| 27 | 10-11/41 | M-59 | Black Sea | In area of Sulina | |
| 28 | 10-11/41 | M-34 | Black Sea | In area of Constanta | |
| 29 | 11/41 | S-34 | Black Sea | Near Cape Emin | |
| 30 | 11/41 | Shch-211 | Black Sea | In area of Varna | |
| 31 | 11/14/41 | L-2 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Keri Island | |
| 32 | 11/14/41 | M-98 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Naysaar Island | |
| 33 | 11/41 | Kalev | Red Banner Baltic | Near Naysaar Island | |
| 34 | 11/41 | L-1 | Red Banner Baltic | Leningrad | |
| 35 | 11/41 | Shch-324 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 36 | 11-12/41 | Shch-204 | Black Sea | In area of Varna | |
| 37 | 1/10/42 | M-175 | Northern | Varanger Fjord | |
| 38 | 3/42 | Shch-210 | Black Sea | Near Cape Shabler | |
| 39 | 4/8/42 | Shch-421 | Northern | Near Cape Nordkap | |
| 40 | 4/42 | Shch-401 | Northern | Near Fuley Island | |
| 41 | 5/12/42 | K-23 | Northern | Near Cape Nordkin | |
| 42 | 6/13/42 | Shch-405 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Seskar Island | |
| 43 | 6/15/42 | M-95 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Gogland Island | |
| 44 | 6/20/42 | Shch-214 | Black Sea | Near Cape Aytodor | |
| 45 | 6/42 | D-3 | Northern | Tana Fjord | |
| 46 | 6/26/42 | S-32 | Black Sea | Near Cape Aytodor | |
| 47 | 6/26/42 | D-6 | Black Sea | Sevastopol' | |
| 48 | 6/26/42 | A-1 | Black Sea | Sevastopol' | |
| 49 | 7/4/42 | M-176 | Black Sea | Varanger Fjord | |
| 50 | 7/18/42 | Shch-138 | Pacific Ocean | Nikolayevsk-na-Amur | |
| 51 | 7/42 | Shch-317 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 52 | 8/42 | M-173 | Northern | In region of Varda | |
| 53 | 8/42 | M-33 | Black Sea | In region of Odessa | |
| 54 | 8-9/42 | Shch-208 | Black Sea | In region of Constanta | |
| 55 | 8-9/42 | K-2 | Northern | Tana Fjord | |
| 56 | 9/42 | M-97 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Gogland Island | |
| 57 | 9/42 | M-60 | Black Sea | In area of Odessa | |
| 58 | 10/1/42 | M-118 | Black Sea | Near Cape Burnas | |
| 59 | 10/42 | Shch-320 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 60 | 10/42 | Shch-302 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 61 | 10/11/42 | L-16 | Pacific Ocean | Pacific Ocean off coast of United States | |
| 62 | 10/14/42 | Shch-213 | Black Sea | In area of Constanta | |
| 63 | 10/42 | Shch-311 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 64 | 10/42 | Shch-308 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 65 | 10/21/42 | S-7 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Bothnia | |
| 66 | 10/29/42 | Shch-304 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 67 | 11/5/42 | Shch-305 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Bothnia | |
| 68 | 11/42 | Shch-306 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 69 | 11/42 | m-121 | Northern | Varanger Fjord | |
| 70 | 12/42 | L-24 | Black Sea | Near Cape Shabler | |
| 71 | 12/42 | M-31 | Black Sea | In Zhebriany Bay | |
| 72 | 12/42 | Shch-212 | Black Sea | Near Cape Sinop | |
| 73 | 12/42 | M-72 | Red Banner Baltic | Leningrad | Raised |
| 74 | 2/43 | K-22 | Northern | Near coast of Norway | |
| 75 | 4/10/43 | K-3 | Northern | Near coast of Norway | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 76 | 5/1/43 | Shch-323 | Red Banner Baltic | In area of Kronshtadt | Raised |
| 77 | 5/14/43 | M-122 | Northern | Off Cape Tsyp-Navolok | |
| 78 | 5/22/43 | Shch-408 | Red Banner Baltic | Off Vayndlo Island | |
| 79 | 6/1/43 | Shch-406 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 80 | 7/5/43 | Shch-106 | Northern | Varanger Fjord | |
| 81 | 7/43 | Shch-422 | Northern | Off coast of Norway | |
| 82 | 8/1/43 | S-12 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 83 | 8/13/43 | S-9 | Red Banner Baltic | Off Bol'shoy Tyuters Island | |
| | | | | In area of Sevastapol | |
| 84 | 8-9/43 | Shch-203 | Black Sea | Off Novaya Zemlya Islands | |
| 85 | 9/43 | K-1 | Northern | In area of Ochamchira | |
| | | | | Varanger Fjord | |
| 86 | 9/22/43 | M-51 | Black Sea | Tana Fjord | |
| 87 | 10/43 | M-172 | Northern | Varanger Fjord | |
| 88 | 10/43 | Shch-403 | Northern | Kalamitskiy Bay | |
| 89 | 10/43 | M-174 | Northern | Kalamitskiy Bay | |
| 90 | 10/28/43 | A-3 | Black Sea | Off coast of Norway | |
| 91 | 12/43 | D-4 | Black Sea | In area of Kobuleti | |
| 92 | 12/43 | S-55 | Northern | Karkinitska Bay | |
| 93 | 1/4/44 | M-36 | Black Sea | Kongs Fjord | |
| 94 | 1/17/44 | L-23 | Black Sea | Near Cape Tarkhankut | |
| 95 | 2/44 | M-108 | Northern | Off coast of Norway | |
| 96 | 2-3/44 | Shch-216 | Black Sea | In area of Sevastapol' | |
| 97 | 3/44 | S-54 | Northern | Off coast of England | |
| 98 | 4/44 | L-6 | Black Sea | Gulf of Narva | |
| 99 | 7/27/44 | V-1 | Northern | In area of Garnvik | |
| 100 | 9/44 | M-96 | Red Banner Baltic | Danzig Bay | |
| 101 | 9/21/44 | Shch-402 | Northern | | |
| 102 | 1/6/45 | S-4 | Red Banner Baltic | | |
| | | | **Monitors** | | |
| 1 | 7/16/41 | Vinnitsa | Pina Flotilla | On Berezina River | |
| 2 | 8/12/41 | Zhemchuzhin | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 3 | 8/31/41 | Bobruysk | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 4 | 9/1/41 | Zhitomir | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 5 | 9/15/41 | Smolensk | Pina Flotilla | On Desna River | |
| 6 | 9/18/41 | Martynov | Danube Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 7 | 9/18/41 | Levachev | Pina Flotilla | In area of Kiev | |
| 8 | 9/18/41 | Flyagin | Pina Flotilla | In area of Kiev | |
| 9 | 9/18/41 | Rostovtsev | Pina Flotilla | In area of Kiev | |
| 10 | 9/18/41 | Vitebsk | Pina Flotilla | In area of Kiev | |
| 11 | 9/19/41 | Udarnyy | Danube Flotilla | Ner Kinburnskaya Kosa | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Patrol combatants | | |
| 1 | 7/13/41 | Passat | Northern | Near Kharlov Island | |
| 2 | 7/19/41 | Shtil' | Northern | Guba Ura | |
| 3 | 8/10/41 | Tuman | Northern | Kil'dinskiy Ples | |
| 4 | 8/11/41 | Zhemchut | Northern | Mouth of White Sea | |
| 5 | 8/26/41 | Reka | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 6 | 8/26/41 | Parizhskaya Kommuna | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 7 | 8/28/41 | Sneg | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yumida | |
| 8 | 8/28/41 | Tsiklon | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yumida | |
| 9 | 8/28/41 | Rulevoy | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 10 | 8/28/41 | Bodop'uanov | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 11 | 8/31/41 | Tekhnik | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 12 | 8/37/41 | Bol'shevik | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 13 | 9/9/41 | Pushkin | Pina Flotilla | On Desna River | |
| 14 | 9/41 | Karl Marks | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 15 | 9/41 | Engel's | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 16 | 9/18/41 | Voroshilov | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 17 | 9/22/41 | Vikhr' | Red Banner Baltic | Kronshtadt | Raised |
| 18 | 9/26/41 | Shchors | Red Banner Baltic | Near Lavensaari Island | Raised |
| 19 | 10/41 | SKR-11 (RT-66) | Northern | Near Tersko-Orlovskiy lighthouse | |
| 20 | 12/3/41 | Virsaytis | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 21 | 1/42 | SKR-24 (Aysberg) | Northern | Near Lumbovskiy Island | |
| 22 | 3/8/42 | Mgla (RT-39) | Northern | Near Cape Tsyp-Navolok | |
| 23 | 5/12/42 | Brilliant | Northern | Iokan'ga | Raised |
| 24 | 5/17/42 | SKR-21 (RT-73) | Northern | Iokan'ga | |
| 25 | 7/15/42 | LK-2 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 26 | 8/20/42 | Voykov | Azov Flotilla | Kerch' Bay | |
| 27 | 8/24/42 | Shturman | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk | |
| 28 | 8/24/42 | Burya | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 29 | 9/1/42 | Purga | Ladoga Flotilla | Lake Ladoga | Raised |
| 30 | 10/11/42 | Musson (RT-54) | Northern | Matochkin Shar Straits | |
| 31 | 11/5/42 | SKR-23 (RT-57) | Northern | In area of Iokan'ga | |
| 32 | 12/8/42 | Smerch | Northern | Rosta settlement | Raised |
| 33 | 5/12/43 | SKR-31 (RT-5) | Northern | Near Cape Tsyp Navolok | |
| 34 | 8/3/43 | Priliv | Northern | Kil'dinskiy Ples | |
| 35 | 10/17/43 | SKR-14 (RT-86) | Northern | Yenisey Bay | |
| 36 | 9/23/44 | Brilliant | Northern | Kara Sea- central part | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Gunboats** | | |
| 1 | 7/23/41 | Narova | Chudskoye Flotilla | Chudskoye Lake | |
| 2 | 8/11/41 | Peredovoy | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 3 | 8/11/41 | Issa | Chudskoye Flotilla | Chudskoye Lake | |
| 4 | 8/13/41 | Embakh | Chudskoye Flotilla | Chudskoye Lake | |
| 5 | 8/25/41 | Vernyy | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 6 | 8/26/41 | Dimitrov | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 7 | 8/27/41 | Kreml' | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 8 | 8/28/41 | I-8 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yumida | |
| 9 | 8/31/41 | Trudovoy | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 10 | 9/15/41 | Kaganovich | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 11 | 9/18/41 | Smol'nyy | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 12 | 9/21/41 | Krasnaya Armeniya | Black Sea | Near Tendrovskaya Kosa | |
| 13 | 9/27/41 | Pioner | Red Banner Baltic | Leningrad | Raised |
| 14 | 10/6/41 | Olekma | Ladoga Flotilla | Lake Ladoga | Raised |
| 15 | 10/19/41 | Krenkel' | Azov Flotilla | Taganrog | |
| 16 | 5/11/42 | Rion | Azov Flotilla | Kerch Bay | |
| 17 | 7/2/42 | No 4 | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk | |
| 18 | 7/28/42 | Sarafimovich | Azov Flotilla | Don River | |
| 19 | 7/31/42 | KL-13 (Izhorets-18) | Onega Flotilla | Lake Onega | |
| 20 | 8/10/42 | Dnestr | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk | |
| 21 | 8/21/42 | Ural | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk Bay | |
| 22 | 8/21/42 | Burlak | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk Bay | |
| 23 | 8/22/42 | No 1 (IP-22) | Azov Flotilla | Kuban' River | |
| 24 | 8/24/42 | Don | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk | |
| 25 | 8/24/42 | Bug | Azov Flotilla | Temryuk | |
| 26 | 9/2/42 | Rostov-Don | Azov Flotilla | Taman' Bay | |
| 27 | 9/2/42 | Oktyabr' | Azov Flotilla | Taman' Bay | |
| 28 | 11/16/42 | Krasnoye Znamya | Red Banner Baltic | Near Lavensaari Island | Raised |
| 29 | 2/27/43 | Krasnaya Gruziya | Black Sea | In area of Myskhako | |
| 30 | 5/17/43 | Krasnyy Dagestan | Volga Flotilla | On Volga River | |
| 31 | 5/26/43 | Krasnogvardeyets | Volga Flotilla | On Volga River | |
| 32 | 6/1/43 | KL-12 (Kalyayev) | Onega Flotilla | Onega Lake | |
| 33 | 6/22/43 | Kama | Red Banner Baltic | Near Lavensaari Island | Raised |
| 34 | 11/10/44 | Amgun' | Red Banner Baltic | Near Aegna Island | Raised |
| | | | **Mine layers** | | |
| 1 | 8/11/41 | Surop | Red Banner Baltic | In area of Kuyvastu | |
| 2 | 8/28/41 | Mina | Pina Flotilla | On Dnepr River | |
| 3 | 9/21/41 | Kolkhoznik | Danube Flotilla | Ner Kinburnskaya Kosa | |
| 4 | 2/11/42 | Doob | Black Sea | In area of Sevastapol' | |
| 5 | 3/23/42 | Ostrovskiy | Black Sea | Tuapse | |
| 6 | 10/10/42 | Komintern | Black Sea | At mouth of Khopi River | |
| 7 | 3/5/43 | Zarya | Black Sea | In area of Myskhako | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Mine sweepers** | | |
| 1 | 6/24/41 | T-208 (Shkiv) | Red Banner Baltic | Glotov Banks | |
| 2 | 7/1/41 | T-299 (Imanta) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Saaremaa Island | |
| 3 | 7/6/41 | T-216 | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Takhkun | |
| 4 | 7/7/41 | No 39 (Petrozavodsk) | Red Banner Baltic | In area of Kronshtadt | Raised |
| 5 | 7/9/41 | T-890 (Nalim) | Northern | Zapadnaya Litsa Bay | |
| 6 | 7/29/41 | No 51 (Zmey) | Red Banner Baltic | Soela Vain | |
| 7 | 7/30/41 | T-201 (Zaryad) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Ristna | |
| 8 | 7/31/41 | No 46 (Izhorets-25) | Red Banner Baltic | Tallinin | |
| 9 | 8/3/41 | T-212 (Shtag) | Red Banner Baltic | Soela Vain | |
| 10 | 8/11/41 | T-213 (Krambol) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yumida | |
| 11 | 8/13/41 | No 41 (Lenvodput'-12) | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 12 | 8/15/41 | T-202 (Buy) | Red Banner Baltic | Ner Cape Yumida | |
| 13 | 8/18/41 | No 80 (Izhorets-21) | Red Banner Baltic | Muhu Bay | |
| 14 | 8/18/41 | T-503 (Baykal) | Black Sea | In area of Ochakov | |
| 15 | 8/19/41 | T-487 (Ochakovskiy Kanal) | Black Sea | In area of Kherson | |
| | | T-214 (Bugel') | | | |
| 16 | 8/24/41 | T-209 (Kiyekht) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Keri Island | |
| 17 | 8/24/41 | T-898 (RT-411) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Keri Island | |
| 18 | 8/25/41 | No 71 (Crab) | Black Sea | Mouth of White Sea | |
| 19 | 8/28/41 | No 42 (Lenvodput'-13) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yumida | |
| 20 | 8/28/41 | T-493 (Khadzhibey) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Cape Yumida | |
| 21 | 9/6/41 | T-402 (Minrep) | Black Sea | Odessa | |
| 22 | 9/12/41 | No 81 (Izhorets-22) | Black Sea | Near Feodosiya | |
| 23 | 9/16/41 | | Red Banner Baltic | Baltic Sea - central part | |
| | | No 122 (Som) | | Lake Ladoga | |
| 24 | 9/17/41 | No 53 (Izhorets-39) | Ladoga Flotilla | Leningrad | |
| 25 | 9/19/41 | No 33 (Molotov) | Red Banner Baltic | Leningrad | Raised |
| 26 | 9/20/41 | No 41 (S. Kirov) | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | Raised |
| 27 | 9/22/41 | No 31 (Ozernyy) | Red Banner Baltic | Kronshtadt | |
| 28 | 9/23/41 | No 64 (Iznorets-71) | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 29 | 9/30/41 | No 82 (Izhorets-23) | Red Banner Baltic | Interned in Sweden | |
| 30 | 9/41 | No 87 (Izhorets-34) | Red Banner Baltic | Interned in Sweden | |
| 31 | 9/41 | No 89 (Izhorets-83) | Red Banner Baltic | Interned in Sweden | |
| 32 | 9/41 | No 85 (Izhorets-29) | Red Banner Baltic | Baltic Sea - central part | |
| 33 | 9/41 | | Red Banner Baltic | Near Keri Island | |
| | | T-203 (Patron) | | Kerch' | |
| 34 | 10/25/41 | T-507 (Delegat) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Lavensaari Island | |
| 35 | 10/27/41 | No 36 (Moskva) | Black Sea | Near Lavensaari Island | |
| 36 | 10/29/41 | No 43 (Izhorets-65) | Red Banner Baltic | | Raised |
| 37 | 11/1/41 | | Red Banner Baltic | | |

| | Date | Name | Fleet | Region of loss | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38 | 11/2/41 | T-504 (Rabotnik) | Black Sea | Near Cape Aytodor | |
| 39 | 11/2/41 | T-498 (Yegurcha) | Black Sea | Novorossiysk | |
| 40 | 11/3/41 | No 177 (Beluga) | Red Banner Baltic | Leningrad | Raised |
| 41 | 11/7/41 | No 178 (Ul'yanov) | Red Banner Baltic | Neva Bay | Raised |
| 42 | 11/7/41 | T-484 (Khenkin) | Black Sea | Near Cape Sarych | |
| 43 | 11/14/41 | T-206 (Verp) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Keri Island | |
| 44 | 11/15/41 | T-889 (RT-3) | Northern | Near Ostrye Ludki Islands | |
| | | | | Gulf of Finland | |
| 45 | 11/22/41 | No 35 (Menzhinskiy) | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 46 | 11/25/41 | No 56 (Klyuz) | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 47 | 11/30/41 | No 67 (Izhorets-53) | Red Banner Baltic | Lake Ladoga | Raised |
| 48 | 11/30/41 | No 171 (Norek) | Ladoga Flotilla | Near Kerch' peninsula | |
| 49 | 12/28/41 | T-485 (Kakhovka) | Black Sea | In area of Evpatoriya | |
| 50 | 1/5/42 | T-405 Vzryvatel') | Black Sea | Kerch' | |
| 51 | 3/2/42 | T-491 (Kiziltash) | Black Sea | In area of Yasenskiy Bay | |
| 52 | 4/29/42 | T-494 (Sary-Kamysh) | Azov Flotilla | In area of Sevastapol' | |
| 53 | 6/13/42 | T-413 | Black Sea | Demansteynskaya Banks | |
| 54 | 8/3/42 | No 39 (Petrozavodsk) | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Finland | |
| 55 | 8/24/42 | T-204 (Fugas) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Seskar Island | |
| 56 | 10/2/42 | No 57 (Udarnik) | Red Banner Baltic | Kronshtadt | |
| 57 | 11/20/42 | No 48 (Izhorets-33) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Danilov Island | Raised |
| 58 | 11/24/42 | T-105 | Northern | In area of Myskhako | |
| 59 | 2/27/43 | T-403 (Gruz) | Black Sea | In area of Myskhako | |
| 60 | 3/4/43 | T-514 (Ost) | Black Sea | Tsemesskaya Bay | |
| 61 | 3/26/43 | T-511 (Chervonyi Kazak) | Black Sea | Mouth of Volkhov River | |
| 62 | 4/10/43 | No 126 (Izhorets-66) | Ladoga Flotilla | In area of Sukhumi | Raised |
| 63 | 6/15/43 | T-411 (Zashchitnik) | Black Sea | Nera Yugorskiy Shar Bay | |
| 64 | 7/25/43 | T-904 (RT-94) | Northern | Near Novaya Zemlya Islands | |
| 65 | 7/30/43 | T-911 (RT-76) | Northern | In area of Sukhumi | |
| | | | | Near Mikhaylov peninsula | |
| 66 | 8/29/43 | Dzhalita | Black Sea | Near Seskar Island | |
| 67 | 10/1/43 | T-896 (RT-308) | Northern | | |
| 68 | 12/23/43 | Raduga | Red Banner Baltic | | |
| 69 | 5/9/44 | T-886 (RT-15) | Northern | Kola Bay | |
| 70 | 6/21/44 | No 47 (Izhorets-26) | Red Banner Baltic | B'yerkezund | |
| 71 | 6/21/44 | No 53 (Izhorets-39) | Red Banner Baltic | B'yerkezund | |
| 72 | 7/2/44 | T-210 (Gak) | Red Banner Baltic | Vyborg Bay | |
| 73 | 8/2/44 | T-37 (Tyulen') | Red Banner Baltic | Narva Bay | |
| 74 | 8/3/44 | No 127 (Izhorets-32) | Ladoga Flotilla | Lake Ladoga | |
| 75 | 8/12/44 | T-118 | Northern | Kara Sea - central part | |
| 76 | 8/13/44 | T-114 | Northern | Kara Sea - central part | |
| 77 | 8/26/44 | T-45 (Antikaynen) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Nerva Island | |
| 78 | 9/2/44 | T-410 (Vzryv) | Black Sea | In area of Constanta | |
| 79 | 9/8/44 | T-353 | Red Banner Baltic | Narva Bay | |
| 80 | 9/19/44 | No 49 (Izhorets-31) | Red Banner Baltic | Virgund Banks | |
| 81 | 9/24/44 | T-120 | Northern | Kara Sea - central part | |
| 82 | 10/23/44 | T-379 | Red Banner Baltic | Tallinin | |
| 83 | 11/22/44 | T-109 | Northern | Near Kolguyev Island | |
| 84 | 11/28/44 | T-387 | Red Banner Baltic | In area of Tallinin | |
| 85 | 12/5/44 | T-82 (Izhorets-82) | Red Banner Baltic | Ust'-Dvinsk | |
| 86 | 12/5/44 | T-377 | Red Banner Baltic | Gulf of Riga | |
| 87 | 12/29/44 | T-883 (RT-45) | Northern | Near Cape Svyatoy Nos | |
| 88 | 1/11/45 | T-76 (Korall) | Red Banner Baltic | Near Aegna Island | |

## Enemy losses

The study of Soviet and German documents from the period of the second world war, and also many military history works and publications from foreign authors has shown that determining the scale of personnel losses for the armed forces of fascist Germany and its allies during the years of the second world war with reliable accuracy is an extremely difficult problem.

Information from the German staffs about losses were close to objective approximately up to January 1945. However in the last stage of the war, when the forces of fascist Germany suffered major defeats, the staff mechanism of the Wehrmacht lost accuracy in work and the information about losses was approximated, mainly by the calculation method on the basis of information for preceding months. During this period the systematic documentary accounting of losses also broke down. There are contradictions and inaccuracies in the information about them. This especially concerns the statistics for the rear and service units, subunits and facilities, and also the police and other paramilitary formations that were staffed with citizens of other countries (Serbs, Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, French, Belgians, Dutch and so on).

The personnel losses by fascist Germany in the second world war do not take into account the losses of Germany's allies (Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria), and also Spanish and Slovak divisions, French and Croatian infantry regiments, a Belgian infantry battalion, and a number of other foreign units which took part in battles on the Soviet-German front. The losses of "Volksturm" subunits and military formations of the so-called "volunteer helpers" of Germany from representatives of peoples of the Soviet Union (Balts, Moslems, Ukrainians, the "Russian Liberation Army", and so on) are not included in reports. Meanwhile, the number of personnel of formations of this sort, including police and auxiliary formations, by the middle of July 1944 exceeded 800,000 men. Over 150,000 former citizens of the Soviet Union served in the "SS" troops alone in the period of the war.

It should be explained what went into the idea of "total personnel losses for the German armed forces". According to German documents, they included irrecoverable as well as sick, injured and wounded losses only of servicemen. Losses of various paramilitary institutions which serviced the armed forces were included in losses in the civilian population.

**Irrecoverable losses** include **those killed, those who died from wounds and diseases** in treatment facilities and at home due to causes connected with the use of weapons, **the missing in action**, and also **noncombat losses** (those who died during accidents, those executed, and so on). There is no category such as prisoners of war in the Wehrmacht report documents. They are counted as a subsection of "missing in action".

**Sick, injured and wounded (temporary) losses** were the wounded, injured, sick, frostbitten and burned, and then only those who were treated in hospitals or evacuated to the rear.

In the years of the second world war the reports about personnel losses in the armed forces of fascist Germany were made by three independent channels.

The **first channel** supported the gathering of reports along staff lines and had the goal of giving an idea about the consumption of men and the need for replacements to the high command.

The **second channel** went along the lines of the medical service and was to deterne the degree to which hospitals were burdened and the expansion of their capacities, and also to determine the need to relocate them.

The **third channel** was for supporting the personnel accounting of the losses of servicemen.

Reports went along the lines of all three channels, depending on the end goal, to the appropriate organs of the staffs of the service branches (ground forces, air force and navy) in order for making necessary decisions.

The summarizing and analyzing of the information about losses in the general staff of the supreme high command of the armed forces (OKW) was done in the central bureau (department) for accounting of personnel losses of the armed forces which received all information on this matter. The monthly reports about personnel losses for the German-fascist forces put together by this bureau are the most complete and reliably accurate. However, in the concluding stage of the war, because of the breakdown of the command of the forces on the Soviet-German front the reliability of the reports dropped sharply. Confirmation of this is the last summarized report from the central bureau dated 14 March 1945 which characterizes the scale of the losses of German forces based on the situation of 31 January 1945.

For comparison and evaluation of the reliability of this information we will present the figures for the condition reports for 31 December 1944 and 31 January 1945 (see table 100).

From the table it is clear that the number of servicemen in the navy who were killed and died on 31 December 1944 is greater than the number of them for the end of January 1945, and in the ground forces and "SS" forces there are differences in terms of the number of wounded in the direction of a drop (by 838,400 men). On the whole, the total personnel losses for the German armed forces for 31 January 1945 dropped by 729,750 men.

The main shortcoming of this information is that it does not show the losses during the last months of the war in Europe, that is, during that period when the situation on the front went against fascist Germany and its armed forces in a short interval of time (4 months) suffered the most perceptible losses.

Table 100

| Types of losses | Ground forces and SS troops | | Air forces | | Naval forces | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 9/1/39-12/31/44 | 9/1/39-1/31/45 | 9/1/39-12/31/44 | 9/1/39-1/31/45 | 9/1/39-12/31/44 | 9/1/39-1/31/45 | 9/1/39-12/31/44 | 9/1/39-1/31/45 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | 3359979 | 3425877 | 303464 | 319138 | 160285 | 159088 | 3823728 | 3904103 |
| Breakdown: | | | | | | | | |
| killed, died from wounds and for other reasons | 1750281 | 1779561 | 155014 | 163006 | 60029 | 58832 | 1965324 | 2001399 |
| missing in action and taken prisoner | 1609698 | 1646316 | 148450 | 156132 | 100256 | 100256 | 1858404 | 1902704 |
| Wounded losses | 5026404 | 4188037 | 192594 | 216579 | 21002 | 25259 | 5240000 | 4429875 |
| Total ................ | 8386383 | 7613914 | 496058 | 535717 | 181287 | 184347 | 9063728 | 8333978 |

In connection with the fact that there is no statistical data about personnel losses for 1945 in the archives, a rough estimation of the scale of them was done after the war by the department for accounting for Wehrmacht losses.

According to the calculation data of the German command, these losses for the period from 1 January through 30 April 1945 numbered:

Table 101

| Types of losses | Ground forces and SS troops | Air forces | Naval forces | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Irrecoverable** | 1250000 | 17000 | 10000 | 1277000 |
| Breakdown: | | | | |
| killed | 250000 | 10000 | 5000 | 265000 |
| missing in action or taken prisoner | 1000000 | 7000 | 5000 | 1012000 |
| **Wounded losses** | 750000 | 30000 | 15000 | 795000 |
| Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2000000 | 47000 | 25000 | 2072000 |

However, the reliability of the calculations that are given causes some doubt. First of all, they do not include losses suffered in combat operations that took place in the period from 1 through 11 May 1945; second, the average monthly losses for three months of 1944, which might not correspond to the losses of 1945, are taken as the basis for the calculations; third, the indicated calculations contradict the materials of the staff of the supreme high command of the German armed forces published in the work of B. Muller-Hillebrand (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976), in which on page 328 it says that the number of the killed and missing in action was approximately 1,900,000, and not 1,277,000 men as is shown in table 101.

We will look at yet another document from the Wehrmacht department for accounting for losses prepared after the end of combat operations. In a radio telegram addressed to the Quartermaster General of the OKW dated 22 May 1945 the following information is given: "For OKW radiogram, quartermaster general No 822/266 from 5/18/45 I report:

1. a) The dead, including 500,000 who died from wounds, number 2.03 million. Also 200,000 died as a result of accidents and diseases.

b) The wounded number 5.24 million.

c) The missing in action number 2.4 million.

Total losses are 9.73 million.[36]

2) Since 5/2/45 the Russians have about 70,000 wounded and the Americans and English have 135,000.

3) The total wounded in the Reich at the present time is about 700,000...

Department of losses of the Wehrmacht 5/22/45"[37].

From this report it follows that the irrecoverable losses of German armed forces numbered 4,630,000 men. However, this number does not correspond to the data of other sources.

[36] A mistake is made in the total (it is reduced by 140,000).

[37] Military archives WF, No 01/1913, p. 655.

According to a report of the organization department of the OKH dated 10 May 1945, just the ground forces, including the "SS" forces (minus the air force and navy), for the period from 1 September 1939 through 1 May 1945 lost 4,617,000 men (2,007,000 killed and 2,610,000 missing in action and taken prisoner)[38].

For comparison and analysis of the summary data we will present the comparison table

Table 102

| Periods of war and sources | Personnel losses, (000) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Irrecoverable losses | | | Wounded | Total number of losses |
| | Killed, died of wounds | Missing in action, taken prisoner | Total | | |
| 1 Sep 1939 - 31 Dec 1944 (according to accounting data) | 1965.3 | 1858.5 | 3823.8 | 5240 | 9063.8 |
| 1 Jan - 30 Apr 1945 (according to calculations) | 265 | 1012 | 1277 | 795 | 2072 |
| Total for war | 2230.3 | 2870.9 | 5100.8 | 6035 | 11135.8 |
| According to report from OKW loss department dated 22 May 1945 | 2230 | 2400 | 4630 | 5240 | 9870 |

From the table it is clear that the total number of losses in the indicated sources differs by 1,265,800 men, especially in terms of the number of the missing in action and the wounded.

According to materials from the "Information Service of Germany" (appendix to the FRG law "About preservation of burial sites"), the total number of German soldiers buried just on the territory of the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries numbers 3,226,000, of which, 2,395,000 have had names established. Information about the number of the buried Wehrmacht servicemen in western countries, on whose territory combat operations were conducted (Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Norway and so on), and in North Africa is not given in these materials.

What concerns the missing in action and the prisoners of war is that it is known that after the war just from the Soviet Union 1,939,000 men returned to their homeland, and 450,600 German soldiers and officers died in captivity (356,700 men in NKVD camps, and the other 93,900 at transit stations and en route).

Consequently, information about the number of military losses for fascist Germany that is presented in Wehrmacht documents is contradictory and unreliable.

[38] Military archives, WF No 01.1761, p. 123,124.

Starting out from this, it can be assumed that the number of the missing in action and the prisoners of war was significantly greater (by approximately 1,200,000 men) due to the dead on the battlefield, not to mention those taken prisoner during the surrender of Germany. Evidence of this is the analysis of the consumption rate of the personnel mobilization resources for Germany in the second world war.

Information about the number of German prisoners of war also exists in Soviet archives. According to the statistical report data for fronts, fleets and independent armies, summarized in the General Staff, the number of prisoners captured by our troops on the Soviet-German front is 3,777,300 men[39] (see table 103). Of these, over 600,000 prisoners of various nationalities were freed directly on the fronts without being sent to rear camps, and no documents were filled out for 183,619 men[40].

[39] CAMD, file 13-A, cat. 3028, d. 10, p. 1-15.

[40] Central State Archives, file 1 (illegible) 32b, d 2, p. 8-9.

Table 103

| Periods of the war | Personnel | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Generals | Officers | Non-coms | Soldiers | Total |
| 22 Jun - 31 Dec 1941 | - | 303 | 947 | 9352 | 10602 |
| 1 Jan - 30 Jun 1942 | 1 | 161 | 762 | 5759 | 6683 |
| 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1942 | 2 | 1173 | 3848 | 167120 | 172143 |
| 1 Jan - 30 Jun 1943 | 27 | 2336 | 11865 | 350653 | 364881 |
| 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1943 | - | 866 | 4469 | 72407 | 77742 |
| 1 Jan - 30 Jun 1944 | 12 | 2974 | 15313 | 238116 | 256415 |
| 1 Jul - 31 Dec 1944 | 51 | 8160 | 44373 | 895946 | 948530 |
| 1 Jan - 30 Apr 1945 | 20 | 10014 | 59870 | 1234440 | 1305344 |
| 1 May - 8 May 1945 | 66 | 10424 | 40930 | 583530 | 634950 |
| Total .......... | 179 | 36411 | 182377 | 3558323 | 3777290 |

Comment. Of the total number of prisoners of war (3,777,290 men), the following were counted: Germans - 2,389,560, Austrians - 156,682, Hungarians - 513,767, Rumanians - 201,800, Italians - 48,957, Finns - 2377. The remaining 464,147 men were French, Slovaks, Czechs, Belgians, Spaniards, and others who had served earlier in the Wehrmacht or worked in service and rear installations.

Table 104

| Name of countries, formations and types of losses | Personnel losses, (000) |
|---|---|
| **Armed forces of Germany** | |
| Wehrmacht and SS troops | 6231.7 |
| Breakdown: | |
| killed, died from wounds and disease | 2869.3 |
| missing in action | 972.8 |
| taken prisoner | 2389.6 [41] |
| Austrians, Sudeten Germans, Alsace and Lorraine natives, Luxemburgers who served in the Wehrmacht | 462 |
| Breakdown: | |
| killed, died from wounds and disease, missing in action | |
| taken prisoner | 280 |
| Foreign formations of the Wehrmacht (Spanish and Slovak divisions, French, Belgian, Flemish and other formations) | 182 |
| Volunteer formations of the Wehrmacht and SS troops (Vlasov's men, Balts, Moslems and so on) | 15 |
| | 215 |
| Total | 6923.7 |
| **Armed forces of Germany's allies** | |
| Hungary | 863.7 |
| Breakdown: | |
| killed, died from wounds, missing in action | 350 |
| taken prisoner | 513.7 [42] |
| Italy | 93.9 |
| Breakdown: | |
| killed, died from wounds, missing in action | 45 |
| taken prisoner | 48.9 |
| Romania | 681.8 |
| Breakdown: | |
| killed, died from wounds, missing in action | 480 |
| taken prisoner | 201.8 [43] |
| Finland | 86.4 |
| Breakdown: | |
| killed, died from wounds, missing in action | 84 |
| taken prisoner | 2.4 |
| Total | 1725.8 |
| All losses in armies from fascist block countries | 8649.5 |

Analysis of some archive materials and publications in the Soviet and foreign press which characterize the military loss in the second world war show that the total personnel losses for the armed forces of fascist Germany equal 13,448,000 men, or 75.1% of the number of those mobilized in the war years, and 46% of the entire male population of Germany (in 1939), including Austria. Here the irrecoverable losses on the Soviet-German front number 6,923,700.

Germany's allies (Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland) lost (irrecoverably) 1,725,800 men on the Soviet-German front (see table 104).

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[41] Including 450,600 who died in captivity.

[42] Including 54,700 who died in captivity.

[43] Including 40,000 who died in captivity.

After 9 May 1945 1,284,000 enemy soldiers and officers turned over their weapons to Soviet troops.

Thus, the personnel losses for German, and also its allies who fought in Europe against the Soviet Union were very significant, not to mention the complete destruction and surrender of their armed forces. The irrecoverable losses alone numbered 8,649,500 men.

Also, Japan's Kwantung army in the period of the combat operations against the Soviet Union (August-September 1945) lost 83,700 men killed and 640,100 men captured (including 609,400 Japanese, 16,100 Chinese, 10,300 Koreans, 3600 Mongols, 700 Manchurians and other nationalities).

Although part of the losses was returned to the warring countries in the form of an exchange of prisoners of war, still, the aggression of fascism cost Germany and its allies dearly. Their irrecoverable personnel losses on the Soviet-German Front ended up being only 30% smaller than the analogous losses of Soviet troops (8.6 million men for them and 11.4 million for us). Thus, the ratio in terms of irrecoverable losses was 1 : 1.3.

The larger number of these losses for Soviet troops is connected basically with the first period of the Great Patriotic War during which the factor of the surprise attack by Germany on the Soviet Union and the mistakes of the Soviet military and political leadership that were made on the eve of and at the start of the war had an effect.

# Chapter IV

# LOSSES AMONG SOVIET SERVICEMEN WHO PARTICIPATED IN PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL, MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, AND ALSO IN ELIMINATING MILITARY BORDER CONFLICTS

## The war in Korea 1950-1953

After the formation of two Korean states in 1948 and the departure of first Soviet and then American troops from the peninsula, a military conflict broke out between South Korea and the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic (KPDR).

In addition to South Korean and American troops, a number of formations, units and subunits from the armed forces of 15 states, mainly those that were a part of NATO and several other blocks (Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, France and others) took part in the war which began on 25 June 1950 under the UN flag.

The government of the Soviet Union viewed the war in Korea as a domestic liberation war by the Korean people and as a difficult time for the KPDR, and guided by the interests of the defense of the country, sent it a large amount of weapons, combat equipment and various kinds of materiel.

Chinese volunteers took part in the war on the KPDR's side.

In critical days the Soviet government transferred to the northeastern region of China several Soviet air divisions[44] which participated in repelling the raids by US air forces on the territory of China and North Korea. Also, Soviet military advisers were sent to the formations and staffs of the Korean peoples army.

The aggressive combat operations of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese peoples volunteers, and also the growing demands by the world community to put an end to the war led to the signing of a cease fire agreement in 1953.

[44] See: History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1975. (Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR, 1945-1975 gg.): Moscow, 1976, Vol. 2. P. 165.

All together during the war in Korea Soviet air force formations that took part in repelling the raids of US air forces lost 335 planes and 120 pilots[45]. The total losses for out units and formations numbered 299 men, of which 138 were officers and 161 were soldiers and sergeants.

## Local wars and military conflicts in countries of Asia, the Middle East and Africa

As a result of the second world war and the national liberation fight by peoples, young developing countries appeared in the world which had freed themselves of colonial dependence. Over half of the newly appearing states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America won their sovereignty and independence through the use of arms. In a number of former colonies mass armies were created which waged an armed struggle against the restoration of colonial systems.

The Soviet Union gave comprehensive aid to the nations who had liberated themselves from colonial dependence, and from the '60's such help was given to many friendly developing countries for creating and strengthening national armed forces.

In accordance with agreements between states, Soviet military subunits and units, military advisers and specialists were sent to these countries to give assistance to the national military command on various matters regarding the building of the military. Soviet weapons and military equipment were supplied, and technical assistance was given for creating objects with a military purpose.

In a number of countries in which local wars were being waged and military conflicts broke out, Soviet servicemen often took part in combat operations. The size of their losses is shown in table 105.

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[45] CAMD, file.16-A, cat. 3139, d. 188, p. 2; cat. 175512, d. 1, p. 1-45.

Table 105

| Countries | Periods when combat operations were conducted | Contingents of Soviet Servicemen | Losses | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | total of dead | combat | | noncombat | |
| | | | | Total | Among them, officers | Total | Among them, officers |
| Algeria | 1962-1964 and subsequent years | Military advisers and specialists | 25 | 21 | 20 | 4 | 4 |
| United Arab Republic (Egypt) | 18 Oct 1962-1 Apr 1963; 1 Oct 1969-16 Jul 1972; 5 Oct 1973-1 Apr 1974 | Specialists | 15 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 10 |
| | | Military units | 6 | 6 | 6 | - | - |
| | | Total ............ | 21 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 10 |
| Yemen Arab Republic | 18 Oct 1962-1 Apr 1963 | Military advisers and specialists | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| Vietnam | July 1965-December 1974 | Same | 16 | 13 | 12 | 3 | 3 |
| Syria | 5-13 June 1967, March-July 1970, September-November 1972, 6-24 October 1973 | Same | 35 | 30 | 28 | 5 | 5 |
| Angola | November 1975 - November 1979 | Same | 7 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Mozambique | 1867, 1869, November 1975 - November 1979 | Same | 6 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Ethiopia | 9 Dec 1977-May 1990 | Same | 34 | 14[46] | 11 | 20 | 16 |

Comment. The servicemen who died from diseases and who were killed as a result of accidents not connected with the conducting of combat operations are not shown in the table.

## Events in Hungary in 1956

There was an armed uprising by anti-socialist forces in Hungary in 1956. The organizers of the uprising used the gross mistakes and distortions committed by the leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party: distortions in the area of economic policy and serious violations of the law. A certain part of the young people and other strata of the population were involved in the armed conflict.

A group of leaders of the Hungarian Workers Party on 4 November 1956, in this difficult situation, formed a revolutionary workers and peasants government, and created the temporary Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. The new government turned to the Soviet Union for help.

Military units of the Soviet Army, temporarily deployed on the territory of the Hungarian Peoples Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Pact took part in suppressing the armed uprising.

[46] In this number the missing in action number 7 men, 5 officers and 2 soldiers.

During the suppression of the armed uprising in Hungary Soviet troops suffered the following losses[47]:

Table 106

| Types of losses | Officers | Sergeants and soldiers | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Irrecoverable losses | | | |
| Killed and died from wounds | 85 | 684 | 669 |
| Missing in action | 2 | 49 | 51 |
| Total .......... | 87 | 633 | 720 |
| Sick, injured and wounded losses<br>Wounded, injured | 138 | 1402 | 1540 |
| Total .......... | 225 | 2035 | 2260 |

## Sending of troops into Czechoslovakia

On 21 August 1968 troops from five member states of the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian Peoples Republic, German Democratic Republic and Polish Peoples Republic) were sent into Czechoslovakia for the purpose, as it was then stated, to give international assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the matter of defending socialism from right-wing revisionist and anti-socialist forces supported by the imperialists of the West.

There were no combat operations when the troops moved in. During the course of the redeployment and placement of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia (from 21 August through 20 October 1968) as a result of hostile actions by individual citizens of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic **11 Soviet servicemen were killed,** including 1 officer, and 87 were wounded, including 19 officers. Also, 85 men died as a result of accidents and the careless handling of weapons and combat equipment, as well as other accidents and diseases.

In 1989 the action of sending troops into Czechoslovakia received a different evaluation. It became clear that the "international assistance", in essence, halted the process of the development of democracy in Czechoslovakia. Regarding this, on 5 December 1989 a Decree of the Soviet government and a Decree of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the USSR, in which the sending of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 was evaluated as an illegal act of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state which halted the process of

[47] CAMD, file 16-A, cat. 3139, d. 193, p. 10,12,48,65,69-73.

the democrat renewal of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and which had long term negative consequences, were published in the press.

## Military border conflicts in the Far East and in Kazakhstan (1969)

In the '60's in connection with the so-called cultural revolution that had begun in China the anti-Soviet orientation both in internal and in foreign policy sharply prevailed. A desire to change unilaterally the location of the state border between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China in a number of places appeared at that time among the Chinese leadership.

Violating the border situation, groups of civilians and servicemen started systematically to move into Soviet territory, from which each time they were evicted without the use of arms.

The most dangerous and aggressive were the military provocations in the area of Damanskiy Island, in the Ussuri River and around Lake Zhalanashkol', in Kazakhstan.

On 2 March 1969, having secretly concentrated up to 300 armed soldiers, the Chinese violated the state border and seized the Soviet Damanskiy Island (300 km south of Khabarovsk). When Soviet border guards went to the site of the state border violation, they were opened fire upon. The violators were driven from Soviet territory by the resolute actions of border guard subunits.

After having concentrated up to a regiment of infantry, reinforced with artillery and tanks by 15 March, the Chinese command undertook a new attempt to capture the island.

As a result of the joint actions of Soviet border guards and also subunits of the Far Eastern Military District the second provocation was intercepted.

The personnel losses in battles around Damanskiy Island during the period from 2 through 21 March 1969 numbered:

Table 107

| Types of losses | Personnel of border troops | | Personnel of Far Eastern Military District troops | | Total | Among them, officers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total | Among them, officers | Total | Among them, officers | | |
| Killed and died from wounds | 49 | 4 | 9 | - | 58 | 4 |
| Wounded, injured | 61 | 7 | 33 | 2 | 94 | 9 |
| Totaled ....... | 110 | 11 | 42 | 2 | 152 | 13 |

On 13 August 1969 Soviet border guards eliminated a new military provocation by the Chinese, this time in Kazakhstan.

Two Soviet border guards were killed and five were wounded in a battle near Lake Zhalanashkol'.

## The rendering of military assistance to the government of Afghanistan (25 December 1979 - 15 February 1989)

In December 1978 a Treaty about Friendship, Good Neighbor Relations and Cooperation was concluded between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Article 4 of this treaty stated, "The High Agreeing Sides, acting in the traditions of friendship and good neighbor relations, and also the UN Charter, will consult with one another and with the agreement of both Sides will take the appropriate measures for the purposes of ensuring the security, independence and territorial integrity of both Sides".

When turning with requests for the sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 in order to give military assistance in the armed struggle with the anti-government opposition and in defense from outside interference, the Afghan leadership relied on this article of the treaty.

In December 1979 a decision was made about sending troops into Afghanistan. It was kept in mind here that formations and units would be stationed in garrisons and would take important objects under their protection.

The sending in and stationing of the contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were conducted from 25 December 1979 until the middle of January 1980. The contingent included the command of the 40th Army with service and support units, 4 divisions, 5 independent brigades, 4 independent regiments, 4 combat aviation regiments, 3 helicopter regiments, 1 pipeline brigade, 1 logistical support brigade, and several other units and facilities.

Besides the formations and units of the Soviet Army, there were independent subunits of border troops as well as KGB and Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs troops in Afghanistan.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded highways, many objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation (gas works, electric power stations, a nitrogen fertilizer factory in Mazari-Sharif, and others). They guarded and supported the functioning of airports in major cities. They assisted the strengthening of the organs of power in 21 provincial centers. They conducted columns with military and national economic cargoes for their own needs and in the interests of the Democrat Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Together with Afghan units and subunits they conducted combat operations of various scales to defeat armed detachments and groups from the opposition, and also they fought against caravans that were delivering weapons and ammunition into the DRA from Pakistan and Iran.

At the request of the republic's leadership Soviet servicemen performed various other tasks as well.

The sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan did not lead to the collapse of the armed resistance by the opposition. To the contrary, from the spring of 1980 it started to grow.

In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the Soviet Union, Soviet troops in response to the numerous times their garrisons and transport columns were fired upon by opposition detachments started to conduct joint combat operations with Afghan subunits to search out and destroy the most aggressive enemy groups. This even further aggravated the situation. The number of refugees in Pakistan and Iran started to grow and, consequently, the number of trained and well armed opposition detachments that came into Afghanistan from there started to grow as well.

Thus, the Soviet troops that were sent into Afghanistan ended up being involved in the internal military conflict on the government's side.

The stay by the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activity are divided into the following stages:

**1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980**. The sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the stationing of them in garrisons, and the organizing of security for deployment points and various objects.

**2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985**. The conducting of active combat operation, including large scale operations jointly with Afghan formations and units. The work to reorganize and strengthen the DRA armed forces.

**3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986**. The transition from active combat operations primarily to support operations of Afghan troops by Soviet air forces, artillery and combat engineer subunits. The use of motorized rifle, airborne and tank subunits mainly as a reserve and to raise the morale and combat strength of the Afghan troops. Spetsnaz (specialized troops) subunits continued to conduct the fight to intercept the delivery of weapons and ammunition from across the border. The rendering of assistance in the development of the DRA armed forces. The departure of six Soviet regiment to the Homeland.

**4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989**. Participation of Soviet troops in the conducting of the national pacification policy by the Afghan leadership. Continuation of the support of the combat activity of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops to return to the Homeland and carrying out the complete departure of them.

## The number of personnel and their losses

The time of the stay in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by servicemen was set at no more than 2 years for officers and 1.5 years for sergeants and soldiers. All together, for the period from 25 December 1979 through 15 February 1989, 620,000 servicemen served in the troops located on the territory of the Afghan Republic, and of these, 525,000 men were in Soviet Army formations and subunits, 90,000 were in border and other formations of the Soviet KGB, and 5000 men were in independent formations from the troops and militia of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Also, during this period there were 21,000 men in positions of civilian workers in the Soviet troops.

The annual strength level for the Soviet Army troops was 80,000 - 104,000 servicemen and 5000 - 7000 workers.

**Total irrecoverable losses** (killed, died from wounds and diseases, killed in accidents) for the Soviet Armed Forces together with the border and internal troops numbered 14,453 men. Here the command organs of the Soviet Army formations and units lost 13,833 men, KGB subunits lost 572 men, Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs troops lost 28 men, and other ministries and departments (State Film, State Television and Radio, the Construction Ministry, and others) lost 20 men.

During this period 417 servicemen were missing in action and taken prisoner, of which 119 men were released from captivity (97 men returned to the homeland and 22 men are in other countries).

The structure of the irrecoverable losses in terms of their types is presented in table 108.

Table 108

| Types of losses | | Total | Breakdown | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Soviet Army | KGB | Ministry of Internal Affairs | other ministries and departments |
| Died in battle | Number<br>% of losses | 9511<br>65.81 | 8984<br>64.95 | 499<br>87.24 | 28<br>100 | |
| Died from wounds | Number<br>% of losses | 2386<br>16.51 | 2337<br>16.89 | 49<br>8.57 | | |
| Total combat losses | Number<br>% of losses | 11,897<br>82.32 | 11,321<br>81.84 | 548<br>95.80 | 28<br>100 | |
| Died in accidents, committed suicide, and so on | Number<br>% of losses | 1739<br>12.03 | 1708<br>12.35 | 11<br>1.92 | | 20<br>100 |
| Died from diseases | Number<br>% of losses | 817<br>5.65 | 804<br>5.81 | 13<br>2.27 | | |
| Total noncombat losses | Number<br>% of losses | 2556<br>17.68 | 2512<br>18.16 | 24<br>4.2 | | 20<br>100 |
| Total irrecoverable losses | Number<br>% of losses | 14,453<br>100 | 13,833<br>100 | 572<br>100 | 28<br>100 | 20<br>100 |
| Average monthly irrecoverable losses | Number<br>% of losses | 131<br>0.91 | 126<br>0.91 | 5<br>0.87 | -<br>- | -<br>- |
| Among the killed and dead:<br>generals | Number<br>% of losses | 4<br>0.03 | 4<br>0.03 | | | |
| officers | Number<br>% of losses | 2129<br>14.73 | 1975<br>14.28 | 129<br>22.55 | 25<br>89.29 | |
| warrant officers | Number<br>% of losses | 632<br>4.37 | 616<br>4.45 | 16<br>2.80 | | |
| sergeants and soldiers | Number<br>% of losses | 11,549<br>79.91 | 11,120<br>80.39 | 427<br>74.65 | 2<br>7.14 | |
| workers | Number<br>% of losses | 139<br>0.96 | 118<br>0.85 | -<br>- | 1<br>3.57 | 20<br>100 |

Comment. There were 145 officers among the 190 military advisers who were killed.

**Sick, injured and wounded losses** numbered 469,685 men, including 53,753 men (11.44%) wounded and injured and 415,932 (88.56%) sick.

The relationship of the sick, injured and wounded loses according to their types and the outcomes of the treatment of the wounded, injured and sick are described by the following indicators:

Table 109

| Types of losses and outcome of treatment | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Wounded and injured | 53,753 | 100 |
| Breakdown: | | |
| returned to duty | 44,056 | 81.86 |
| discharged for health reasons | 7,311 | 13.60 |
| died* | 2,386 | 4.44 |
| Sick | 415,932 | 100 |
| Breakdown: | | |
| returned to duty | 411,015 | 98.82 |
| discharged for health reasons | 4,343 | 1.04 |
| died* | 574 | 0.14 |
| Total of sick, injured and wounded losses | 469,685 | 100 |
| Breakdown: | | |
| returned to duty | 455,071 | 96.89 |
| discharged for health reasons | 11,654 | 2.48 |
| died* | 2,960 | 0.63 |
| Average monthly sick, injured and wounded losses | 4,269 | 0.91 |
| Breakdown of wounded, injured and sick | | |
| officers and warrant officers | | |
| sergeants and soldiers | 10,287 | 2.19 |
| workers | 447,493 | 95.28 |
| | 11,905 | 2.53 |

* Included among irrecoverable losses

A significant place among the total number of sick, injured and wounded losses is occupied by the sick (89%). This is explained by the difficult local climate, medical and sanitary conditions which helped the spread of acute infectious diseases among the troops. During the 110 months stay by Soviet troops in Afghanistan, in spite of the measures taken by the medical service, 415,932 men became sick, including 115,308 with infectious hepatitis, 31,080 with typhoid, and 140,665 with other infectious diseases.

Of the 11,654 men discharged from the army in connection with wounds, maimings and serious diseases, 10,751 men (92%) became invalids, including 672 men in the 1st group, 4216 in the 2nd group, and 5863 in the third group.

If one takes the losses of just the Soviet Army (13,833 irrecoverable and 466,425 sick, injured and wounded losses), then they were the greatest in the second stage of the combat activity (March 1980 - April 1985). Over 62 months they comprised 49% of the total number of all losses. All together, the losses are distributed among the stages in the following way:

Table 110

| Stages of the combat activity and their length | | Irrecoverable losses | | Sick, injured and wounded losses | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| First (Dec 1979 - Feb 1980)<br>2 months | All losses<br>Average monthly | 243<br>121 | 1.76<br>0.88 | 5306<br>2653 | 1.14<br>0.57 | 5549<br>2774 | 1.15<br>0.58 |
| Second (Mar 1980 - Apr 1985)<br>62 months | All losses<br>Average monthly | 8945<br>144 | 64.66<br>1.04 | 226649<br>3626 | 48.59<br>0.78 | 235594<br>3800 | 49.06<br>0.79 |
| Third (May 1985 - Dec 1986)<br>20 months | All losses<br>Average monthly | 2700<br>135 | 19.52<br>0.98 | 114861<br>5743 | 24.63<br>1.23 | 117561<br>5878 | 24.48<br>1.22 |
| Fourth (Jan 1987 - Feb 1989)<br>25 months | All losses<br>Average monthly | 1945<br>75 | 14.06<br>0.54 | 119609<br>4600 | 25.64<br>0.99 | 121554<br>4676 | 25.31<br>0.97 |
| Total for 110 months | All losses<br>Average monthly | 13833<br>126 | 100<br>0.91 | 466425<br>4240 | 100<br>0.91 | 480258<br>4366 | 100<br>0.91 |

The losses of equipment and weapons were:

aircraft - 118;
helicopters - 333;
tanks - 147;
infantry fighting vehicles, airborne fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers - 1314;
guns and mortars - 433;
radio stations, command and staff vehicles - 1138;
engineering vehicles - 510;
gas tanker trunks and trucks with sides - 11,369.

On 15 February 1989 Soviet troops returned home. But the pain of the heavy losses will not leave the national memory. Everyone who performed his military and international duty with dignity and honor has earned all of the people's respect.

After people in our country finally learned the truth about this war, the sending of the Soviet military contingent into Afghanistan, although it was not contradictory to the norms of international law, officially was recognized as a mistake.

## Summary data about the personnel losses for the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, combat operations and military conflicts

The sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the rendering of military assistance to this republic is the last page in the combat history of the Soviet Armed Forces which is encompassed by this statistical research. The analysis and exact determining of all of the types of losses of the army and navy in various wars, combat operations and military conflicts end here.

What does the counting up of our personnel losses in large and small wars, and also during the stay by Soviet troops abroad show? The answer to this question is given in the following table.

Table 111

## Summary data
## about personnel losses for the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, combat operations and military conflicts (1918-1989)

| Wars, combat operations, military conflicts | Irrecoverable losses (killed, died, died as a result of accidents, missing in action, not returned from captivity | Sick, injured and wounded losses (wounded, injured, sick, frostbitten) |
|---|---|---|
| Civil war (1918-1922) | 939,755 | 6,791,783 |
| Fight with Basmatch counterrevolutionary movement (1923-1931) | 626 | 867 |
| Sino-Soviet military conflict (1929) | 187 | 665 |
| Rendering of military aid to the Spanish Republic (1936-39) and to China (1937-39) | 353 | No data |
| Repelling of Japanese aggression in region of Lake Khasan (1938) | 989 | 3,279 |
| Combat operations in region of Khalkhin-Gol River (1939) | 8,931 | 15,952 |
| Campaign into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (1939) | 1,139 | 2,383 |
| Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940) | 126,875 | 264,908[51] |
| Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) | 8,668,400 | 22,326,905[52] |
| War in Korea (1950-1953) | 299 | No data |
| Rendering of military and technical aid to the countries of Asia, the Middle East and Africa (1962-1979) | 145[48] | No data |
| Events in Hungary (1956) | 720 | 1,540 |
| Sending of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968) | 96[49] | 87 |
| Military border conflicts in the Far East and Kazakhstan (1969) | 60 | 99 |
| Rendering of military aid to the government of the Republic of Afghanistan (1979-1989) | 14,751[50] | 469,685 |
| Total | 9,763,326 | 29,878,153 |

[48] The irrecoverable losses of Soviet servicemen only for the periods of the conducting of combat operations in the countries in which they stayed are shown.

[49] Of them 85 were noncombat losses.

[50] The irrecoverable losses of Soviet Army personnel, Ministry of Internal Affairs formations, KGB formations, and formations of other departments (see p. 367), including the missing in action are 298 men.

[51] According to the data of treatment facilities.

[52] According to the data of treatment facilities.

# CONCLUSION

In this statistical study systematized information about the personnel losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, combat operations and military conflicts during the period from 1918 through 1989 is shown for the first time. The summarized totals for all types of losses are presented in table 111, from which it is seen that during the indicated period as a result of military operations the irrecoverable losses of servicemen numbered 9,763,326 men, and the sick, injured and wounded losses numbered 29,878,153 men.

The greatest number of irrecoverable personnel losses belongs to the two most serious wars - the civil war (1918-1922) and the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). In the former they numbered 939,755 men, and in the latter they numbered 8,668,400 men.

The Great Patriotic War, forced on the Soviet Union by German fascism, was unprecedented in terms of scale and ferocity. The Soviet people were able to endure an enemy attack that was unprecedented in terms of its force, to thwart his plans, to inflict enormous damage to him, and then together with their allies to defeat him completely and in the end to win a world-wide historic victory.

In the period between the civil war and the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed Forces many times took part in battles with the Basmatch counterrevolutionary movement, in defending the Homeland's lines around Lake Khasan and also on the Khalkhin-Gol River, in the war with Finland and other military conflicts. In the post-war years Soviet servicemen in accordance with international agreements gave aid to many friendly and developing countries.

All of this, as a rule, required great human sacrifices. In the period between the wars (1923-1940) the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army numbered 139,100 men, and in the post war period (1950-1989) the Armed Forces lost 16,100 men.

The totals for the personnel losses of the Soviet Armed Forces that are given in this book can be used not only for scholarly and research goals, but also when performing various endeavors to immortalize the memory of the fallen soldiers.

The authors' collective continues research work on the topic of this work. Here the main efforts are directed at the search for new documents and materials which would make it possible, first of all, to fill out some inadequate data about the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces and, second, to learn more fully and adequately the losses of their enemies in past wars and military conflicts.This concerns the losses by the Nazi Wehrmacht and its allies on the Soviet-German front, the Japanese armed forces in the Far East, the Finnish army in 1939-1940 and 1941-1944, and the foreign military interventionists in the period of the civil war. The study of losses by the white armies requires serious efforts.

It seems to the authors of this book that the creation of a unique work about the losses of all of the warring sides in all wars and military conflicts of recent times, and also in the most significant battles and operations is possible only with the joint efforts of the international

authors' collective to whom access will be given to the necessary documents in the archives of any country.